	Page 1
1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	Case No. 19-23649-rdd
4	x
5	In the Matter of:
6	
7	PURDUE PHARMA L.P.
8	
9	Debtor.
10	x
11	United States Bankruptcy Court
12	Tele/Video Proceedings
13	300 Quarropas Street, Room 248
14	White Plains, NY 10601
15	
16	October 14, 2021
17	10:16 AM
18	
19	
20	
21	BEFORE:
22	HON ROBERT D. DRAIN
23	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
24	
25	ECRO: A. VARGAS

	Page 2
1	HEARING re Notice of Agenda / Agenda for October 14, 2021
2	Hearing and Pre-Hearing Conference
3	
4	HEARING re Motion to File Proof of Claim after Claims Bar
5	Date filed by Emanuel Thirkill (ECF #3764)
6	
7	HEARING re Motion to File Proof of Claim after Claims Bar
8	Date filed by Howard Adelglass (ECF #3840)
9	
10	HEARING re Letter / Support for Debtor's Motion to File
11	Proof of Claim after Claims Bar Date (related document(s)
12	3840) filed by Howard Adelglass (ECF #3885)
13	
14	HEARING re Objection /Debtors' Objection to Motion to File
15	Proof of Claim after Claims Bar Date (related document(s)
16	3885, 3840) filed by James I. McClammy on behalf of Purdue
17	Pharma L.P. (ECF #3911)
18	
19	HEARING re Motion to Allow/Letter - Derivative and
20	Fraudulent Conveyance filed by Ronald Bass, Sr. (ECF #3619)
21	
22	HEARING re Objection to Motion for the Joint Administration
23	of Claims of Ronald Bass, Sr. (related document(s) 3619
24	(filed by Valerie A. Hamilton on behalf of State of New
25	Jersey (ECF #3905)

Page 3 HEARING re Objection / Debtors' Omnibus Objection to Ronald 1 2 Bass's Derivative and Fraudulent Conveyance Motion and Supporting Letter (related document(s) 3619, 3721) filed by 3 4 James I. McClammy on behalf of Purdue Pharma L.P. (ECF 5 #3910) 6 7 HEARING re Related Document: Letter to Judge Drain in support of the hearing for the month of October 2021 re: 8 claim 89590 (related document(s) 3619) filed by Ronald Bass, 9 10 Sr. (ECF #3721) 11 12 HEARING re Certification of Direct Appeal to Court of 13 Appeals/ United States Trustees Memorandum of Law in Support 14 of Motion to Certify Direct Appeal to the Court of Appeals 15 under 28 USC § 158(d) (related document(s) 3799, 3777) filed 16 by Linda Riffkin on behalf of United States Trustee (ECF 17 #3868) 18 19 HEARING re Responses Received: Opposition to Motions to 20 Certify Direct Appeals to the Second Circuit (related 21 document(s) 3686, 3874, 3871) filed by James P. Wehner, Jr. 22 on behalf of Multi-State Governmental Entities Group (ECF 23 #3932) 24 25

Page 4 1 HEARING re Objection/Debtors Omnibus Objection to Motions 2 for Certification of a Direct Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Pursuant to 28 USC 3 158(D) (related document(s) 3686, 3874, 3871, 3913) (ECF 4 5 #3933) 6 7 HEARING re Objection/Joinder of the Ad Hoc Group of Individual Victims' to Debtors' Omnibus Objection to Motions 8 9 for Certification of a Direct Appeal to the United States 10 Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Pursuant to 28 USC § 11 158(D) and Statement of Non-Consent to Certification 12 (related document(s) 3868, 3874, 3933, 3871, 3913) filed by 13 J. Christopher Shore on behalf of Ad Hoc Group of Individual 14 Victims of Purdue Pharma L.P. (ECF #3934) 15 16 HEARING re Opposition of the Official Committee of Unsecured 17 Creditors to Motions to Certify Direct Appeal (related document(s) 3868, 3874, 3871, 3913) filed by Ira S. 18 19 Dizengoff on behalf of The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Purdue Pharma L.P., et al. (ECF #3935) 20 21 22 HEARING re Opposition to of The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Purdue Pharma L.P., et al. (ECF 23 24 #3935) 25

Page 5 1 HEARING re Objection / Ad Hoc Committee's Omnibus Objection 2 to Motions for Certification Under 27 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) (related document(s) 3868, 3874, 3871) filed by Kenneth H. 3 Eckstein on behalf of Ad Hoc Committee of Governmental and 4 5 Other Contingent Litigation Claimants. (ECF #3936) 6 7 HEARING re Related Documents: Motion to Shorten Time / United States Trustee's Ex Parte Motion for an Order 8 9 Shortening Notice and Scheduling Hearing with Respect to the 10 United States Trustee's Motion to Certify Direct Appeal to 11 the Court of Appeals under 28 USC § 158(d) (related 12 document(s) 3868) filed by Linda Riffkin on behalf of United 13 States Trustee (ECF #3869) 14 15 HEARING re Notice of Hearing / Notice of Hearing on United 16 States Trustee's (1) Expedited Motion for an Order 17 Certifying Direct Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Under 28 USC § 158(D) and 18 19 (II) Motion for an Order Shortening Notice and Scheduling 20 Hearing with Respect to the United States Trustee's Motion 21 to Certify Direct Appeal to the Court of Appeals Under 28 22 USC § 158(d) (related document(s) 3868, 3869) filed by Linda 23 Riffkin on behalf of United States Trustee. (ECF #3870) 24 25

Page 6 1 HEARING re Notice of Hearing / Amended Notice of Hearing on 2 United States Trustees (I) Expedited Motion for an Order 3 Certifying Direct Appeal to the United States Court of 4 Appeals for the Second Circuit Under 28 USC 158(D) and (II) 5 Motion for an Order Shortening Notice and Scheduling Hearing 6 with Respect to the United States Trustees Motion to Certify 7 Direct Appeal to the Court of Appeals Under 28 USC 158(d) 8 (related document(s)3870) (ECF #3875) 9 10 HEARING re Appealing States' Motion for Certification. 11 Certification of Direct Appeal to Court of Appeals the 12 Appealing States' Motion for Certification Pursuant to 28 13 USC § 158(d)(2) (A) filed by Matthew J. Gold on behalf of 14 State of Washington. (ECF #3871) 15 16 HEARING re Responses Received: Opposition to Motions to 17 Certify Direct Appeals to the Second Circuit (related document(s) 3868, 3874, 3871) filed by James P. Wehner Jr. on 18 19 behalf of Multi-State Governmental Entities Group. 20 #3932) 21 22 23 24 25

Page 7 1 HEARING re Objection / Debtors Omnibus Objection to Motions 2 for Certification of a Direct Appeal to the United States 3 Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Pursuant to 28 4 U.S.C. 158(D) (related document(s) 3686, 3874, 3871, 5 3913) (ECF #3933) 6 7 HEARING re Objection / Joinder of the Ad Hoc Group of individual Victims' to Debtors' Omnibus Objection to Motions 8 9 for Certification of a Direct Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Pursuant to 28 10 11 U.S.C. § 158(0) and Statement of Non-Consent to 12 Certification (related document(s) 3868, 3874, 3933, 3871, 13 3913) filed by J. Christopher Shore on behalf of Ad Hoc 14 Group of Individual Victims of Purdue Pharma L.P. (ECF 15 #3934) 16 17 HEARING re Opposition of the Official Committee of Unsecured 18 Creditors to Motions to Certify Direct Appeal (related document(s) 3868, 3874, 3871, 3913) filed by Ira S. Dizengoff 19 on behalf of The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors 20 21 of Purdue Pharma L.P., et al. (ECF #3935) 22 23 24 25

Page 8 1 HEARING re Objection / Ad Hoc Committee's Omnibus Objection 2 to Motions for Certification Under 27 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) 3 (related document(s) 3868, 3874, 3871) filed by Kenneth H. 4 Eckstein on behalf of Ad Hoc Committee of Governmental and 5 Other Contingent Litigation Claimants. (ECF #3936) 6 7 HEARING re Motion to Shorten Time - The State of 8 Washington's Ex Parte Motion for an Order Shortening Notice 9 and Scheduling Hearing with Respect to the Appealing States' 10 Motion for Certification Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 11 158(d)(2)(A) filed by Matthew J. Gold on behalf of State of 12 Washington. (ECF #3872) 13 14 HEARING re Amended Notice of Hearing on {I) Appealing 15 States' Motion for Certification Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 16 158(d)(2)(A) and (II) The State of Washington's Ex Parte 17 Motion for an Order Shortening Notice and Scheduling Hearing with Respect to The Appealing States' Motion for 18 19 Certification Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) filed by 20 Matthew J. Gold on behalf of State of Washington. 21 #3881) 22 23 24 25

Page 9 1 HEARING re State of California Direct Appeal and Joinder. 2 Certification of Direct Appeal to Court of Appeals and 3 Joinder to the Appealing States' Motion for Certification 4 Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) filed by Bernard Ardavan 5 Eskandari on behalf of The People of the State of 6 California. (ECF #3874) 7 8 HEARING re Responses Received: Opposition to Motions to 9 Certify Direct Appeals to the Second Circuit (related document(s) 3868, 3874, 3871) filed by James P. Wehner Jr. on 10 11 behalf of Multi-State Governmental Entities Group. 12 #3932) 13 14 HEARING re Objection / Debtors Omnibus Objection to Motions 15 for Certification of a Direct Appeal to the United States 16 Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Pursuant to 28 17 U.S.C. 158(0) (related document(s) 3686, 3874, 3871, 18 3913) (ECF #3933) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Page 10 1 HEARING re Objection/ Joinder of the Ad Hoc Group of 2 Individual Victims' to Debtors' Omnibus Objection to Motions 3 for Certification of a Direct Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Pursuant to 28 4 5 U.S.C. § 158(D) and Statement of Non-Consent to 6 Certification (related document(s) 3868, 3874, 3933, 3871, 7 3913) filed by J. Christopher Shore on behalf of Ad Hoc 8 Group of Individual Victims of Purdue Pharma L.P. (ECF 9 #3934) 10 11 HEARING re Opposition of the Official Committee of Unsecured 12 Creditors to Motions to Certify Direct Appeal (related 13 document(s) 3868, 3874, 3871, 3913) filed by Ira S. 14 Dizengoff on behalf of The Official Committee of Unsecured 15 Creditors of Purdue Pharma L.P., et al. (ECF #3935) 16 17 HEARING re Objection / Ad Hoc Committee's Omnibus Objection to Motions for Certification Under 27 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) 18 (related document(s) 3868, 3874, 3871) filed by Kenneth H. 19 Eckstein on behalf of Ad Hoc Committee of Governmental and 20 21 Other Contingent Litigation Claimants. (ECF #3936) 22 23 24 25

Page 11 1 HEARING re Statement and Joinder of Certain Canadian 2 Municipality and First Nations Creditors and Appellants, In 3 Support of the Motions by the Office of the United States 4 Trustee and the Appealing States for Certification of a 5 Consolidated and Expedited Direct Appeal to the Court of 6 Appeals for the Second Circuit (related document(s)3868, 7 3874, 3871) filed by Allen J. Underwood on behalf of Certain Canadian Municipality Creditors and Canadian First Nation 8 9 Creditors. (ECF #3913) 10 11 HEARING re Responses Received: Opposition to Motions to 12 Certify Direct Appeals to the Second Circuit (related 13 document(s) 3868, 3874, 3871) filed by James P. Wehner Jr. 14 on behalf of Multi-State Governmental Entities Group. (ECF 15 #3932) 16 17 HEARING re Objection / Debtors Omnibus Objection to Motions for Certification of a Direct Appeal to the United States 18 19 Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 158(0) (related document(s) 3686, 3874, 3871, 20 21 3913) (ECF #3933) 22 23 24 25

Page 12 1 HEARING re Objection / Joinder of the Ad Hoc Group of 2 Individual Victims' to Debtors' Omnibus Objection to Motions 3 for Certification of a Direct Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Pursuant to 28 4 5 U.S.C. § 158(D) and Statement of Non-Consent to 6 Certification (related document(s) 3868, 3874, 3933, 3871, 7 3913) filed by J. Christopher Shore on behalf of Ad Hoc 8 Group of Individual Victims of Purdue Pharma L.P. (ECF 9 #3934) 10 11 HEARING re Opposition of the Official Committee of Unsecured 12 Creditors to Motions to Certify Direct Appeal (related 13 document(s) 3868, 3874, 3871, 3913) filed by Ira S. 14 Dizengoff on behalf of The Official Committee of Unsecured 15 Creditors of Purdue Pharma L.P., et al. (ECF #3935) 16 17 HEARING re Objection / Ad Hoc Committee's Omnibus Objection to Motions for Certification Under 27 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) 18 (related document(s) 3868, 3874, 3871) filed by Kenneth H. 19 Eckstein on behalf of Ad Hoc Committee of Governmental and 20 21 Other Contingent Litigation Claimants. (ECF #3936) 22 23 24 25

Page 13 1 HEARING re United States Trustee's Motion for Stay Pending 2 Appeal / Memorandum of Law in Support of United States 3 Trustees Expedited Motion for A Stay Of Confirmation Order And Related Orders Pending Appeal Pursuant To Federal Rule 4 5 Of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007 (related document(s) 3777, 3776) 6 filed by Linda Riffkin on behalf of United States Trustee. 7 (ECF #3778) 8 9 HEARING re Related Documents: Order signed on 9/15/2021 10 Granting Motion (I) Authorizing the Debtors to Fund 11 Establishment of the Creditor Trusts, the Master 12 Disbursement Trust and Topco, (II) Directing Prime Clerk LLC 13 to Release Certain Protected Information, and (ill) Granting 14 Other Related Relief (Related Doc # 3484) (ECF #3773) 15 16 HEARING re Motion for Stay Pending Appeal / Memorandum of 17 Law in Support of United States Trustees Expedited Motion for A Stay of Confirmation Order and Related Orders Pending 18 Appeal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007 19 (related document(s) 3777, 3776) filed by Linda Riffkin on 20 21 behalf of United States Trustee. (ECF #3778) 22 23 24 25

Page 14 1 HEARING re Motion to Shorten Time United States Trustees Ex 2 Parte Motion for An Order Shortening Notice and Scheduling Hearing with Respect to The United States Trustees Expedited 3 Motion for A Stay Of Confirmation Order And Related Orders 4 5 Pending Appeal Pursuant To Federal Rule Of Bankruptcy 6 Procedure 8007 (related document(s) 3778) filed by Linda 7 Riffkin on behalf of United States Trustee. (ECF #3779) 8 9 HEARING re Modified Bench Ruling on For Confirmation of 10 Eleventh Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan Signed on 9/17/2021. (ECF #3786) 11 12 13 HEARING re Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, And Order 14 Confirming the Twelfth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of 15 Reorganization Of Purdue Pharma L.P. and its Affiliated 16 Debtors Signed On 9/17/2021 (related document(s)3726). (ECF 17 #3787) 18 19 HEARING re Amended Motion for Stay Pending Appeal / Amended 20 Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's 21 Expedited Motion for A Stay Of Confirmation Order And 22 Related Orders Pending Appeal Pursuant To Federal Rule Of 23 Bankruptcy Procedure 8007 (related document(s) 3799, 3777, 24 3776, 3778, 3779) filed by Linda Riffkin on behalf of United 25 States Trustee. (ECF #3801)

Page 15 1 HEARING re Motion to Stay / Memorandum of Law in Support of 2 United States Trustee's Expedited Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay of the Confirmation Order and for a Limited 3 Stay of the Related Orders Pending Resolution of His 4 Expedited Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal (related 5 6 document(s)3786, 3787, 3773) filed by Linda Riffkin on 7 behalf of United States Trustee. (ECF #3803) 8 HEARING re Motion to Shorten Time / United States Trustees 9 10 Ex Parte Motion for an Order Shortening Notice and 11 Scheduling Hearing with Respect to the United States 12 Trustee's Expedited Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay of 13 the Confirmation Order and for a Limited Stay of the Related 14 Orders Pending Resolution of His Expedited Motion for a Stay 15 Pending Appeal (related document(s) 3803) filed by Linda 16 Riffkin on behalf of United States Trustee. (ECF #3804) 17 HEARING re Statement / Notice of Listen-Only Dial-in for 18 19 Status and Scheduling Conference (related document(s)3779) 20 filed by Eli J. Vonnegut on behalf of Purdue Pharma L.P. 21 (ECF #3838) 22 23 HEARING re Washington and Connecticut States Stay Motion. Motion for Stay Pending Appeal (related document(s) 3786, 24 25 3787, 3773) filed by Matthew J. Gold on behalf of State of

	Page 16
1	Washington. (ECF #3789)
2	
3	HEARING re Related Documents: Modified Bench Ruling On For
4	Confirmation Of Eleventh Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan
5	Signed on 9/17/2021. (ECF #3786)
6	HEARING re Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, And Order
7	Confirming The Twelfth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan Of
8	Reorganization Of Purdue Pharma L.P. And Its Affiliated
9	Debtors Signed On 9/17/2021 (related document(s)3726). (ECF
10	#3787)
11	
12	HEARING re Motion for Stay Pending Appeal of Confirmation
13	and Trust Advances Orders filed by Brian Edmunds on behalf
14	of State of Maryland. (ECF #3845)
15	
16	HEARING re Related Documents: Order signed on 9/15/2021
17	Granting Motion (I) Authorizing the Debtors to Fund
18	Establishment of the Creditor Trusts, the Master
19	Disbursement Trust and Topco, (II) Directing Prime Clerk LLC
20	to Release Certain Protected Information, and (III) Granting
21	Other Related Relief (Related Doc# 3484). (ECF #3773)
22	
23	HEARING re Modified Bench Ruling on For Confirmation Of
24	Eleventh Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan Signed on
25	9/17/2021.(ECF #3786)

	Page 17
1	HEARING re Findings of Fact, Conclusions Of Law, And Order
2	Confirming The Twelfth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan Of
3	Reorganization Of Purdue Pharma L.P. And Its Affiliated
4	Debtors Signed On 9/17/2021 (related document(s)3726). (ECF
5	#3787)
6	
7	HEARING re Motion for Stay Pending Appeal (related
8	document(s)3810, 3847) filed by Ronald Bass Sr. (ECF #3860)
9	
10	HEARING re Related Documents: Order signed on 9/15/2021
11	Granting Motion (I) Authorizing the Debtors to Fund
12	Establishment of the Creditor Trusts, the Master
13	Disbursement Trust and Topco, (II) Directing Prime Clerk LLC
14	to Release Certain Protected Information, and (III) Granting
15	Other Related Relief (Related Doc# 3484). (ECF #3773)
16	
17	HEARING re Modified Bench Ruling on For Confirmation Of
18	Eleventh Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan Signed on
19	9/17/2021.(ECF #3786)
20	
21	HEARING re Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
22	Confirming the Twelfth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of
23	Reorganization of Purdue Pharma L.P. and Its Affiliated
24	Debtors Signed On 9/17/2021 (related document(s)3726). (ECF
25	#3787)

Page 18 1 HEARING re Motion for Stay Pending Appeal filed by Allen J. 2 Underwood on behalf of Certain Canadian Municipality 3 Creditors and Canadian First Nation Creditors (ECF #3873) 4 HEARING re Related Documents: Order signed on 9/15/2021 5 Granting Motion (I) Authorizing the Debtors to Fund 6 Establishment of the Creditor Trusts, the Master 7 Disbursement Trust and Topco, (II) Directing Prime Clerk LLC to Release Certain Protected Information, and (III) Granting 8 9 Other Related Relief (Related Doc# 3484). (ECF #3773) 10 HEARING re Modified Bench Ruling on For Confirmation of 11 12 Eleventh Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan Signed on 13 9/17/2021.(ECF #3786) 14 HEARING re Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 15 Confirming the Twelfth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of 16 Reorganization of Purdue Pharma L.P. and Its Affiliated 17 Debtors Signed On 9/17/2021 (related document(s) 3726). (ECF 18 #3787) 19 20 HEARING re Motion for Stay Pending Appeal filed by Ellen 21 Isaacs (ECF #3890) 22 23 24 25

Page 19 1 HEARING re Related Documents: Order signed on 9/15/2021 2 Granting Motion (I) Authorizing the Debtors to Fund 3 Establishment of the Creditor Trusts, the Master 4 Disbursement Trust and Topco, (II) Directing Prime Clerk LLC 5 to Release Certain Protected Information, and (III) Granting 6 Other Related Relief (Related Doc# 3484). (ECF #3773) 7 HEARING re Modified Bench Ruling on For Confirmation of 8 9 Eleventh Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan Signed on 10 9/17/2021. (ECF #3786) 11 12 HEARING re Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law, And Order 13 Confirming The Twelfth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan Of Reorganization Of Purdue Pharma L.P. And Its Affiliated 14 15 Debtors Signed On 9/17/2021 (related document(s)3726). (ECF 16 #3787) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Transcribed by: Sonya Ledanski Hyde

	Page 20
1	APPEARANCES:
2	
3	DAVIS POLK WARDWELL LLP
4	Attorneys for Debtors
5	450 Lexington Avenue
6	New York, NY 10017
7	
8	BY: MARSHALL SCOTT HUEBNER (TELEPHONICALLY)
9	ESTHER TOWNES (TELEPHONICALLY)
10	JAMES I. MCCLAMMY (TELEPHONICALLY)
11	MARC JOSEPH TOBAK (TELEPHONICALLY)
12	BENJAMIN S. KAMINETZKY (TELEPHONICALLY)
13	
14	UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
15	Attorneys for the U.S. Trustee
16	201 Varick Street, Suite 1006
17	New York, NY 10014
18	
19	BY: BENJAMIN J. HIGGINS (TELEPHONICALLY)
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

	Page 21
1	UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
2	Attorneys for the U.S. Trustee
3	441 G Street, NW, Suite 6150
4	Washington, DC 20530
5	
6	BY: NAN ROBERTS EITEL (TELEPHONICALLY)
7	
8	OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NJ
9	Attorneys for the State of New Jersey
10	25 Market Street
11	Trenton, NJ 08625-0106
12	
13	BY: VALERIE A. HAMILTON ((TELEPHONICALLY)
14	
15	PULLMAN COMLEY, LLC
16	Attorneys for the State of Connecticut
17	850 Main Street
18	Bridgeport, CT 06604
19	
20	BY: IRVE J. GOLDMAN (TELEPHONICALLY)
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

	Page 22
1	OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL - STATE OF MARYLAND
2	Attorneys for the State of Maryland
3	200 Saint Paul Place
4	Baltimore, MD 20852
5	
6	BY: BRIAN EDMUNDS (TELEPHONICALLY)
7	
8	KLEINBERG, KAPLAN, WOLFF & COHEN, P.C.
9	Attorneys for the State of Washington
10	500 Fifth Avenue
11	New York, NY 10110
12	
13	BY: MATTHEW J. GOLD (TELEPHONICALLY)
14	
15	LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG & AFANADOR
16	Attorneys for Certain Canadian Municipality Creditors
17	and Canadian First Nation Creditors
18	570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
19	Newark, NJ 07102
20	
21	BY: ALLEN J. UNDERWOOD (TELEPHONICALLY)
22	
23	
24	
25	

	Page 23
1	AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD
2	Attorneys for the Official Committee of Unsecured
3	Creditors
4	One Bryant Park
5	Bank of America Tower
6	New York, NY 10036-6745
7	
8	BY: ARIK PREIS (TELEPHONICALLY)
9	MITCHELL HURLEY (TELEPHONICALLY)
10	
11	KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS FRANKEL LLP
12	Attorneys for the Ad Hoc Committee of Government and
13	Other Contingent Litigation Claimants
14	1177 Avenue of the Americas
15	New York, NY 10036
16	
17	BY: DAVID E. BLABEY (TELEPHONICALLY)
18	
19	CAPLIN & DRYSDALE
20	Attorneys for Multi-State Governmental Entities Group
21	600 Lexington Avenue, 21st Floor
22	New York, NY 10022
23	
24	BY: JEFFREY LIESEMER (TELEPHONICALLY)
25	

	Page 24
1	WHITE & CASE LLP
2	Attorneys for Ad Hoc Group of Individual Victims
	-
3	1221 Avenue of the Americas
4	New York, NY 10020-1095
5	
6	BY: J. CHRISTOPHER SHORE (TELEPHONICALLY)
7	
8	ALSO PRESENT TELEPHONICALLY:
9	DR. HOWARD ADELGLASS, Pro Se
10	RONALD BASS, SR., Pro Se
11	ELLEN ISAACS, Pro Se
12	AMANDA MORALES, Pro Se
13	JILL S ABRAMS
14	ROXANA ALEALI
15	ANNE ANDREWS
16	MICHAEL ATKINSON
17	JASMINE BALL
18	BROOKS BARKER
19	KATHRYN BENEDICT
20	SARA BRAUNER
21	JULIUS CHEN
22	DYLAN CONSLA
23	MARIO D'ANGELO
24	HEATHER M. CROCKETT
25	CLINT DOCKEN

1	1 g 23 01 292
	Page 25
1	STEPHANIE EBERHARDT
2	MARIA ECKE
3	KENNETH H. ECKSTEIN
4	BERNARD ARDAVAN ESKANDARI
5	MATHEW FARRELL
6	LAURA FEMINO
7	LAWRENCE FOGELMAN
8	MAGALI GIDDENS
9	JEFFREY R. GLEIT
10	SEAN T HIGGINS
11	ELISA HYDER
12	HAROLD D. ISRAEL
13	EVAN M. JONES
14	GREGORY JOSEPH
15	MARC KESSELMAN
16	DARREN S. KLEIN
17	ANN LANGLEY
18	ALEXANDER LEES
19	BETH ANN LEVENE
20	MARA LEVENTHAL
21	KEVIN MACLAY
22	BRIAN S. MASUMOTO
23	PATRICK C. MAXCY
24	SHANNON M MCNULTY
25	MICHELE MEISES

_	Pg 26 of 292	
		Page 26
1	NATHANIEL MILLER	
2	MAURA KATHLEEN MONAGHAN	
3	MICHAEL PATRICK O'NEIL	
4	THOMAS ROBINSON O'NEILL	
5	RACHEL R OBALDO	
6	SUSAN OUSTERMAN	
7	KATHERINE PORTER	
8	MICHELE PUIGGARI	
9	LINDA RIFFKIN	
10	RACHAEL RINGER	
11	CHRISTOPHER ROBERTSON	
12	JEFFREY J. ROSEN	
13	ELIZABETH SCHLECKER	
14	PAUL KENAN SCHWARTZBERG	
15	LUCAS H SELF	
16	J. CHRISTOPHER SHORE	
17	MARC F. SKAPOF	
18	D. RYAN R SLAUGH	
19	KATE SOMERS	
20	CLAUDIA Z. SPRINGER	
21	ERIC STODOLA	
22	ANDREW M. TROOP	
23	ALICE TSIER	
24	GERARD UZZI	
25	MELISSA L. VAN ECK	

1	1 9 27 01 292	
		Page 27
1	ANDREW D. VELEZ-RIVERA	
2	ELI J. VONNEGUT	
3	ALLISON H. WEISS	
4	THEODORE WELLS	
5	LAUREN S. ZABEL	
6	JAMIE ZEEVI	
7	VINCE SULLIVAN	
8	NADINE A ALBENZE-SMITH	
9	JOSEPH BRANDT	
10	ROBERT G. BURNS	
11	TZERINA DIZON	
12	MATTHEW FITZSIMMONS	
13	CAROLINE GANGE	
14	UDAY GORREPATI	
15	TAYLOR HARRISON	
16	JEREMY C. HILL	
17	DIETRICH KNAUTH	
18	ANN KRAMER	
19	M. NATASHA LABOVITZ	
20	NICOLE A LEONARD	
21	KAREN LEUNG	
22	SIDNEY P. LEVINSON	
23	THOMAS MAHLUM	
24	NICHOLAS PREY	
25	EVAN ROMANOFF	

	Page 28
1	JOSEPH A. SHIFER
2	RICHARD SHORE
3	SARAH SRADERS
4	JACOB W. STAHL
5	MAHALAXMI SUBRAMANIAN
6	VINCE SULLIVAN
7	WENDY WEINBERG
8	ANNIE WELLS
9	KATIE M WHITE
10	MARY JO WHITE
11	HAROLD WILLIFORD
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: All right, good morning. This is

Judge Drain. We are here in In re Purdue Pharma L.P., et al

for the October Omnibus hearing. I have the agenda for this

hearing, and I am happy to go down it in order.

I will note that I'm a little late getting on the bench because I have received and reviewed District Judge McMahon's memorandum and order denying without prejudice the United States Trustee's emergency motion for a stay pending appeal. The agenda includes at the end of the calendar a pre-hearing conference on this Court's determination of the U.S. Trustee's motion for a stay pending appeal and other similar motions.

So, again, I'm going to go down the agenda in the order of the agenda. And the first matter on the calendar is a motion -- I'm deeming it a motion as the Debtor's did by filing a notice, and a notice of opposed order resolving it, of Emanuel Thirkill. Is Mr. Thirkill on the phone? No. All right.

I don't know who is handling this from the Debtor's side.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, good morning. For the record, Marshall Huebner of Davis Polk. I believe that the first matter is being held by Ms. Esther Townes.

THE COURT: Okay.

Page 30 1 MR. HUEBNER: I'll turn the podium over to her. 2 THE COURT: I see Ms. Townes on the screen. MS. TOWNES: Good morning, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Good morning. MS. TOWNES: For the record, this is Esther Townes 5 6 with Davis Polk & Wardwell on behalf of the Debtor. Can you 7 hear me clearly? 8 THE COURT: Yes, I can. Thanks. MS. TOWNES: So Mr. Thirkill's late claim motion 9 10 is at Docket Number 3764. And based on (indiscernible) Mr. 11 Thirkill's motion, the Debtor (indiscernible) granting his 12 request (indiscernible) Pioneer factors. In addition, the 13 Debtor has consulted with the UCC and the Ad Hoc Group 14 (indiscernible) individual victims regarding 15 (indiscernible). 16 So on that basis, the Debtors (indiscernible) at 17 Docket Number 3901. And that (indiscernible). 18 THE COURT: Okay. You were cutting in and out a 19 little bit, Ms. Townes. But I think the record is clear that the Debtors consent to the motion for relief to file a 20 21 late claim under Bankruptcy Rule 9006 and the case law 22 interpreting it. And, in fact, the Debtors then provided 23 notice of their proposed order on October 6th, which would grant the motion without prejudice of course to any party's 24 25 rights with regard to the underlying merits of the claim.

That notice is unopposed, and the Debtors have also represented that the Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee does not oppose the granting of the motion. Does anyone else have anything to say on this motion? Okay.

I will grant the motion. The standard to permit a late claim to be filed under Bankruptcy Rule 9006 and the case law interpreting it, including Pioneer Investment

Services Company v. Brunswick Associates Limited

Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993) and In re Enron Corp.,

419 F.3d 115, 122 (2d Cir. 2005) is a fairly exacting one,

particularly with regard to Circuit has described as the most important factor to consider, which is whether the filing of the late claim in a timely manner was within the reasonable control of the movant, i.e. the excuse for the late filing.

The scrutiny paid to request to file late claims is heightened when there has been a lengthy delay between the bar date and the request to file a late claim and also where a plan in reliance on in part the claims that were timely filed has been negotiated and confirmed. Both of those facts apply here, as does the fact that there was substantially extended notice of the bar date, particularly for personal injury claims.

Nevertheless, Mr. Thirkill asserts that he was subject to COVID-19 restrictions as well as confinement.

And I think the Debtors could reasonably infer because of that, his filing a late claim was outside of his reasonable control.

In any event, the focus will be on the merits of the claim, which is fully preserved and not on this issue, which would have cost a fair amount of money to resolve as far as whether it was within or not within his control.

So you can email the order granting the motion and reserving all other rights to chambers and it will be entered.

MS. TOWNES: Will do, Your Honor. Thank you.

is a motion that actually does not seek specifically leave to file a late claim under Bankruptcy Rule 9006 and Pioneer and Enron but has been taken by the Court to seek that relief given that the movant, Howard Adelglass, has not filed a timely claim. And in a letter to the Court dated September 23, 2021 seeks to have a claim considered against the Debtors.

So I see Mr. Adelglass on the screen. This motion was objected to by the Debtors. I have reviewed it. But, Mr. Adelglass, I don't know if you have anything more to say on the request to file the claim late.

MR. ADELGLASS: Well, I am a doctor, and I was targeted by Purdue. And I didn't find out about McKinsey's

Page 33 1 involvement with Purdue until a few weeks ago. And 2 basically because of my targeting by Purdue, it caused me --I write opioids. I am a doctor. I bought all their 3 propaganda. And then I was arrested for doing my job and 4 5 writing prescriptions for patients that lost their doctors. 6 A number of patients lost their doctors because they were 7 arrested. And when I took them on, I got arrested. And so 8 I basically -- my life is over because of this whole thing. 9 THE COURT: When did that happen, Dr. Adelglass? 10 When were you arrested? 11 MR. ADELGLASS: November 18th. 12 THE COURT: Of this year? 13 MR. ADELGLASS: Yes. 14 THE COURT: Well, because your letter is dated 15 September 23, 2021. 16 MR. ADELGLASS: Right. Basically I didn't 17 understand how McKinsey was involved with this. And when I read the article in Times that they admitted that they 18 19 helped Purdue target doctors by basically propaganda and 20 making the doctors give more -- write more prescriptions to 21 Purdue and make Purdue more profitable. I only found that 22 out about a month ago. 23 THE COURT: When did you first understand that you were under investigation? 24 25 MR. ADELGLASS: I basically -- in 2018 they took

Page 34 my files from my office. But when I spoke to my attorneys at that time, they said I'm just a person of interest and I'm not under -- there is no investigation started. That's what I was told. And then one day I woke up and the police were in my -- the FBI, DA, everyone was in my apartment. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Do you have anything more to say on the motion? MR. ADELGLASS: Just that, you know, the oxycontin, the labeling that says it's not addictive, all the propaganda used to make me want to prescribe this. And the other doctors are in the same situation as me. I basically took on a number of patients that were on high dose opioids when their doctors were arrested, and they were going into withdrawal and suffering. I took them on, and then I got arrested. THE COURT: And when did you take them on? MR. ADELGLASS: 2018, right before I was -- right before they came to my office and took my files. THE COURT: Okay, all right. Very well. All right. I have reviewed the Debtor's objection as well, but I'm happy to hear from the Debtor's counsel on this. MR. MCCLAMMY: All right. Good morning, Your Jim McClammy of Davis Polk & Wardwell on behalf of

the Debtors. Am I being able to be heard okay?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MCCLAMMY: Thank you. Your Honor, we do stand on our papers. I will not respond to the statement of the history of how things transpired that Dr. Adelglass has set up here. I think the record of these cases is clear as to the Debtor's position with respect to how we are going about addressing the merits of claims such as those.

I will say, however, that this presentation and this motion, to the extent it can be construed as a motion, is very different from the others that we've seen. It appears to us, having heard argument today, that the allegations do relate back to a pre-petition hearing, that Dr. Adelglass was well aware of his connections with Purdue and, you know, potential claims against Purdue.

As Your Honor has noted, the notice of the pendency of these cases and the bar date has been extensive and perhaps even unprecedented. And we do not see any basis set out in either the motion papers or the presentation today to argue for excusable neglect or delay here. And the prejudice we think would be immense in these cases if we were to start to open the floodgates to prescribers just coming out now and, you know, without any explanation of the reasons for the delay.

So for the reasons set forth in the papers and just now, we would respectfully request that this motion be

denied.

THE COURT: Okay. Does anyone else have anything to say on the motion? All right.

I have before me what I deem to be a motion. It's dated September 23, 2021. I will note that it was preceded by a September 2, 2021 letter to the Court that really did not seek any specific relief. We got this letter on or around the 23rd. It also does not seek any specific relief other than recognition of the claim that is asserted in it, which is for millions of dollars, \$2.5 million in compensation. The bar date in this case was several months ago for filing proofs of claim.

Nevertheless, the bankruptcy rules and Rule 9006 permit a claim to be filed late on the basis of excusable neglect. That requires a two-step analysis, i.e. first, whether there was neglect caused by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, or by intervening circumstances beyond the parties' control as opposed to an intentional act. And then second, that the neglect was excusable. See In re DPH Holdings Corp., 434 B.R. 77, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

The Supreme Court interpreted such a request in Pioneer Investment Services Company v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993) and there noted that the determination of excusable neglect is an equitable one considering all the circumstances, including "One, the

danger of prejudice to the Debtor; two, the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings; three, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant; and four, whether the movant acted in good faith," id at 395.

The Second Circuit in applying that test has noted that it takes a hard line with respect to the test because the equities will rarely if ever favor a party who fails to follow the clear dictates of a court rule, or in this case, a court order setting a time limit. And that's where the rule is entirely clear. Courts expect that a party claiming excusable neglect will in the ordinary course lose under the Pioneer test, In re Enron Corp., 419 F.3d 115, 122-23 (2d. Cir. 2005). That occurs based on the most important factor where no excuse for the claim being filed late or an unreasonable excuse for the claim being filed late is asserted. The other factors in the Second Circuit listed in the Pioneer case generally then apply where there are closed questions.

The movant has the burden of proving excusable neglect, id at 121 quoting Jones v. Chemetron Corp., 212 F.3d 199, (3d Cir. 2000). Here, the letter itself stated no basis for why the claim was filed several months late, and it appears to me based on the movant's statements at oral argument that he was aware or reasonably aware of the

alleged basis for his claim as far back as 2018. Even his acknowledgment that he was under investigation at least at that time for the improper prescription of oxycontin and that he had taken over, according to him, patients who had previously been treated by doctors who were either under investigation or themselves had been arrested for the improper prescription of oxycontin, which to my mind would have put him on notice as to his current theory that he was misled by the Debtors to prescribe the drug.

So the primary factor not being established under the Pioneer test, namely whether the delay had some form or excuse or not, that would be sufficient to deny the motion here.

In addition, however, there have been several months since the bar date was established. It was a lengthy bar date. And since the bar date was established, the Court has confirmed the Debtor's Chapter 11 plan, which is premised upon complex interlocking settlements among different types of claimants, including personal injury claimants, hospitals, and governmental entities, among others, that allocate the Debtor's value among those different groups of claimants. To open the door at this point to this type of claim would be prejudicial not only to the Debtors, but also to those parties who negotiated that plan.

So that factor as well applies, as does the length of delay. The factor being prejudice, as well as the length of delay, in addition to whether the filing of the claim late was within the reasonable control of the movant. So I will deny the motion for those reasons.

The Debtor should email an order consistent with that ruling to chambers.

MR. MCCLAMMY: Thank you, Your Honor. We will do that.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

MR. ADELGLASS: Judge, Judge, can I talk?

THE COURT: No. I have ruled, sir.

MR. ADELGLASS: Okay.

another pro se matter by Ronald Bass, a motion by Mr. Bass in which he seeks to join as a necessary party various parties involved in litigation in New Jersey state court that he has brought against the State of New Jersey,

Department of Treasury, Gerold Christopher, the chief of New Jersey Bureau of Securities, the State of New Jersey's Attorney General's Office, retirement pension plans, all public entities, employees, and private entities of the State of New Jersey, and others, including other parties besides certain of the debtors who are either manufacturers or distributors of opioid drugs.

Page 40 1 The motion also seeks -- I'll just read it. "An 2 order for the United States Trustee, Division of the U.S. 3 Department of Justice, to file derivative claims to protect my claims against fraudulent conveyance," and apparently 4 5 also a -- either underneath that heading or under a separate 6 heading, a request to avoid and stop payouts under the plan 7 to the State of New Jersey, et al. The motion has been objected to by the State of 8 9 New Jersey as well as the Debtors. I have reviewed the 10 pleadings on this, but I am happy to hear a brief oral 11 argument. 12 MR. BASS: Your Honor, this is Ronald 13 (indiscernible). 14 THE COURT: I cannot hear you clearly. Can you 15 get closer to your receiver or your microphone. 16 MR. BASS: Yes. I am here. Can you hear me now? 17 THE COURT: Yes. 18 MR. BASS: Yes. This is Ronald Bass. Also, this 19 is consistent with my tagalong claim I filed with the United 20 States Judicial Panel who (indiscernible) that I should try 21 to reach alternatives in the bankruptcy court --22 THE COURT: You mean in the multidistrict 23 litigation in Ohio? 24 MR. BASS: I did a tag along with this claim also

and I stated that.

Page 41 1 THE COURT: Right. 2 MR. BASS: And they stated that (indiscernible) says that the (indiscernible) alternative transfer to a 3 4 minimum whatever if any (indiscernible). 5 I'm sorry, sir. You're fading in and THE COURT: 6 out, and I'm just having a hard time hearing you. Are you 7 on the phone? 8 MR. BASS: Yes. I sent the -- yes, I am on the 9 phone. Can you hear me? 10 THE COURT: Yes. But you're going to have to --11 MR. BASS: I'm on the phone. 12 THE COURT: I hate to say this, but you're going 13 to have to stay close to the receiver so that you don't fade 14 in and out. 15 MR. BASS: Okay. But I sent a copy of the order 16 from the judicial panel, the multidistrict litigation panel. 17 I sent you a copy of that, a courtesy copy, as well as one for the clerk. And they made reference that after you 18 (indiscernible) should be referred to. Although the state 19 20 denied it, but I am appealing it to the district court. 21 What was your finding? 22 THE COURT: I'm sorry? 23 MR. BASS: I said did you -- what was your findings in --24 25 THE COURT: Well, I haven't ruled yet.

Page 42 1 waiting to hear from the parties. I've read the pleadings. 2 And you are correct, you have also sought to have your 3 action included in the multidistrict litigation pertaining 4 to opioids that's pending in the district court in Ohio, 5 although I understand that that was turned down. But --6 MR. BASS: They denied it. 7 THE COURT: And I also understand that you and a 8 family member have filed a proof of claim in these bankruptcy cases against these debtors. 9 10 MR. BASS: Right. And also (indiscernible). 11 THE COURT: Right. Okay. 12 MR. BASS: Right. So --13 THE COURT: But that is not before me, sir. This 14 is not -- my case is not a multidistrict case and it's not 15 governed by the rules that pertain to multidistrict 16 litigation. 17 MR. BASS: Okay. But back to the (indiscernible) the state (indiscernible) the government (indiscernible). 18 THE COURT: You know, sir, it's just -- I 19 20 apologize. I have your pleading. I just can hear every 21 other word. It's not going to come through with the court 22 reporter. 23 I don't know if either the State of New Jersey or 24 the Debtors have anything to add to their pleadings. 25 Otherwise, I am prepared to give my ruling based on the

Page 43 1 pleadings before me. 2 MS. HAMILTON: Your Honor, we'll stand on our 3 pleadings. THE COURT: Could you just state your name for the 4 5 record, ma'am? 6 MS. HAMILTON: Valerie Hamilton on behalf of the 7 State of New Jersey. 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. MCCLAMMY: And Jim McClammy, Davis Polk, on 10 behalf of the Debtors. We will also stand on our pleadings, 11 Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Okay. All right. I will give my 13 ruling, then. 14 Mr. Bass, as I noted, seeks two forms of relief, 15 one of which may be in two parts. The first is that these 16 Chapter 11 cases involving the Purdue debtors and the other 17 defendants in his pending litigation in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County, be jointly administered. 18 19 essence I gather taken away from the administration by the 20 New Jersey court. And as far as the claims asserted to the 21 New Jersey court against the non-debtor entities, most of 22 which are officials of the state of New Jersey, but in 23 addition include other defendants engaged in the production or distribution of opioid products. 24 25 That litigation has proceeded for some time

independently of these bankruptcy cases and has resulted in the grant of two motions to dismiss the original complaint and the amended complaint, although they were without prejudice. And as I understand it, a further amended complaint has been filed in that litigation.

The rubric under which Mr. Bass seeks this relief is Bankruptcy Rule 7019, which provides that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 applies in adversary proceedings except that if an entity joined as a party raises the defense that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the defense is sustained, the Court shall dismiss such entity from the adversary proceedings. Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth when a party is required to be joined to a civil action.

The objections to the applicability of Bankruptcy Rule 7019 here are twofold. First, they assert that Rule 7019 does not apply because these cases and Mr. Bass' claims in these cases, and he filed proofs of claim timely, are not adversary proceedings as specified in the rule.

Bankruptcy Rule 9014(c), which incorporates specific Part 7 rules of the Bankruptcy Rules, does not incorporate Rule 7019, leaving it up to the court whether it wishes to do so in the particular facts and circumstances.

Secondly, the objections contend, as recognized by Rule 7019 they can, that the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over the causes of action asserted in the New Jersey court complaint against the non-debtor parties. And of course the causes of action against the debtor parties are stayed and will be governed by the Chapter 11 plan.

Both of those objections are meritorious and would require the denial of the motion. There is really no procedural basis to consolidate and jointly administer either of the Debtor's cases or the Bass claims in these cases with the litigation pending in New Jersey, which raises totally if issues unrelated to the claims against these debtors except only in terms of the potential for providing some context for the assertions in the third proposed amended complaint.

In addition, the Court would not have jurisdiction over those causes of action, i.e. the causes of action in the New Jersey court against the non-debtor parties which are not covered under 28 U.S.C. 1334. Those causes of action neither relies under the Bankruptcy Code or in a bankruptcy case, nor are they related to this bankruptcy case in that they do not have a conceivable effect on the case or the debtor's estates. They assert causes of action against the non-debtor parties, based on my review of the complaint, on a theory that the New Jersey actors discriminated against Mr. Bass by excluding him from various essential services for the participation and programs,

activities, or services offered by the State of New Jersey
public and private entities that received federal funding to
provide healthcare benefits based upon his alleged
disability arising from drug addiction.

The complaint also asserts claims against the State of New Jersey or entities within the rubric of the State of New Jersey based on their asserted investments in the Debtors --

MR. BASS: Excuse me, Judge --

THE COURT: -- which are not in fact -- just is not in fact the case. They have not invested in the Debtors. The Debtor's shareholder structure is clear, or ownership structure is clear, and it does not include any such investments.

So there really is not subject matter jurisdiction to have this Court take on the determination of the litigation in New Jersey. The Court will of course retain jurisdiction over the claims filed in these Chapter 11 cases by Mr. Bass, but only those claims.

Secondly, as I noted, the motion seeks -- I am interpreting injunctive relief in two respects that may be related. One is to have the United States Trustee file a derivative claim to protect his claim against fraudulent conveyance under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code and to have this Court and the U.S. Trustee avoid and stop payments

I gather under the plan to the State of New Jersey. There really is no basis for such an injunction either in terms of the operation of the statute, which puts the fraudulent transfer cause of action within the estate and therefore the control of the Debtor's estate barring the grant of derivative standing, the basis for which has not been shown here, or what I take to be the request for a pre-judgement attachment of distributions to the State of New Jersey based on the alleged right to do so premised upon the underlying complaint filed in the New Jersey court. There really is no basis for any such pre-judgement attachment. Moreover, it really should not be sought in this Court, even if there were such a basis. It should be sought from the Court where the claim that is pending that is the basis for the alleged attachment.

That's not an encouragement to do so. It is only an observation that this Court really would not have jurisdiction over such an asserted remedy. Moreover, based upon the Court's consideration of the complaint that has been filed, it would appear that there would be no likelihood of success on the merits with respect to such an injunction in any event given what I've already identified as a fatal flaw in the complaint, which is an assertion that somehow the State of New Jersey or New Jersey entities have an ownership interest in these debtors, which is flatly

Page 48 1 contradicted by the record before me. 2 So I will deny the motion. I don't know whether either of the objectors has already prepared a draft order. 3 4 If not, I will ask the Debtors to prepare an order denying 5 the motion for the reasons stated on the record. You should 6 email a copy to Ms. Hamilton, Mr. McClammy, and to Mr. Bass 7 when you email it in to chambers. 8 MR. MCCLAMMY: We can do that. Thank you, Your 9 Honor. 10 MS. HAMILTON: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 12 MR. BASS: Judge, before (indiscernible). THE COURT: Okay. 13 14 MR. BASS: Can you hear me? THE COURT: I really can't, Mr. Bass. You're 15 16 coming in and out. And I'm sorry for that. I can generally 17 hear people on these calls, but it's just not working right 18 now. 19 But in any event, I've ruled on this based on the 20 papers. 21 MR. BASS: Okay, I've got that. I'd just like to 22 have a copy of the state's motion, their opposition. 23 THE COURT: Well, it's on the docket. So you can get it off the docket. I'm sure Ms. Hamilton -- I trust she 24 25 served you with it. But she can send you a copy in any

Pg 49 of 292 Page 49 1 event. 2 MS. HAMILTON: I did, Your Honor. I'm happy to 3 send another. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. BASS: I appreciate it. 6 THE COURT: Okay, very well. 7 MR. BASS: Thank you. 8 THE COURT: All right. The next matter on the 9 calendar is a motion by the United States Trustee for direct 10 certification of its appeal of the Court's order confirming 11 the Chapter 11 plan as well as, although this is barely 12 addressed in the motion, the Court's subsequent order 13 authorizing certain preliminary steps to prepare for the 14 plan going effective. That motion has been joined in by 15 what I'll refer to as the appealing states, that is those 16 states who have also appealed the confirmation order. And 17 in addition, by what we have been referring to as the Canadian creditors, that is certain Canadian municipality 18 19 and first nations claimants. 20 I reviewed those pleadings as well as the 21 responses that were filed yesterday by the Debtors, the 22 multi-state governmental entities group, the joinder in the 23 debtor's pleading by the Ad Hoc Group of Individual Victims, 24 the ad hoc committees, that is the Ad Hoc Committee of

Governmental Entities and the Official Committee of

Page 50 1 Unsecured Creditors. 2 I appreciate that in addition to the motions, the U.S. Trustee sought an expedited hearing on the motions 3 which has not been opposed. And, frankly, I'm not even sure 4 5 that such a motion is necessary or was necessary given that 6 we were here on October 14th and the motion was filed on 7 October 1. But I gather no one opposes the request for 8 expedited treatment. Is that correct? Okay. 9 So I will grant that motion. 10 MS. ISAACS: Your Honor, this is Ellen Isaacs 11 (indiscernible). I would like to say something, please, to 12 Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Well --14 MS. ISAACS: You keep addressing (indiscernible) 15 attorneys only --16 THE COURT: Ms. Isaacs, I don't believe -- Ms. 17 Isaacs, I don't believe you have taken a position on this motion. So I --18 19 MS. ISAACS: Okay. What I have a position on, 20 Your Honor, and I'd like for you to please hear me -- it's 21 that you --22 THE COURT: No. I'm not going to hear -- I'm only going to hear the matters that are before me on this motion. 23 24 MS. ISAACS: This has to do with this motion. 25 THE COURT: Well, then I will hear you when there

Page 51 1 is appropriate time for it. All right? Not right now. 2 MS. ISAACS: Okay. I will patiently wait. THE COURT: Yes. 3 MS. ISAACS: Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. All right. So I have read the 5 6 pleadings on this and I'm happy to hear brief oral argument. 7 MS. EITEL: Good morning, Your Honor. This is Nan 8 Eitel for the United States Trustee, appearing for the U.S. 9 Trustee. 10 THE COURT: Good morning. 11 MS. EITEL: First, Your Honor, Section 158(d) provides four independent criteria warranting certification 12 13 of a directed review and appeal to the circuit court. And 14 although the U.S. Trustee satisfies all four of those gates, 15 it need only satisfy one. And if one is satisfied, 16 certification for direct review is mandatory and there is no 17 discretion. 18 I think it's important to note that the merits of 19 the United States Trustee's appeal are not before the Court 20 today and the Court need not find that the appeal itself 21 would be meritorious, though of course we believe that it 22 should be. 23 Second, Your Honor, before turning to the argument on the four criteria and why each is satisfied here, it's 24 25 important to note how puzzling the Debtor's opposition is to

direct certification. It seems at odds with everything that the Debtors have said for two years about the need for expedition in completing this case and to get money out for the abatement programs and the creditors.

Over and over again, Mr. Huebner and his colleagues sit at the podium talking about the need to go more quickly. And we agree, and as a result proposed the most aggressive of the briefing schedules at the district court on the merits and also seek direct review as a result.

The opposition is also perplexing, Your Honor, because in the shareholder agreement that was approved as part of the plan of reorganization at 2.09 obligates the Debtors and the Sackler family not only to agree to direct certification, but also to seek it. Specifically the language refers to the NDT -- and the agreement defines the NDT to be the Debtors until the plan goes effective -- shall promptly request that all appellants and appellees (indiscernible) consent, that the appeal be certified for direct appeal. If the consent cannot be promptly obtained, the NDT, the Debtors, shall promptly make a motion to the bankruptcy court under 28 U.S. Code § 158(d)(2)(B)(i) requesting that the appeal be certified.

And I think it is this Court's expectation based on comments at earlier hearings, both at the confirmation proceeding and thereafter, that every appellant should be

seeking expedited review. And I think he said (indiscernible) that we would get it.

And there's also a fallacy in the oppositions about the delay, Your Honor. Seeking direct certification has no effect and no delay on the district court appeal.

The matters will go forward on a parallel path and not a sequential path. So there is a distinct possibility that, given how quickly Judge McMahon tends to act, that the District Court will outrun the Second Circuit. But the Second Circuit. But the Second Circuit could also just take the appeal and adopt for expedited briefing schedule as its own, which would make (indiscernible) sense.

THE COURT: Well, can I interrupt you on that?

The Debtors have asserted, as has the Committee as something I should take into account, although frankly the circuit itself has been clear that simply expedition is not a factor in its determination to take an appeal, that a request for a direct appeal can add significant time to the appeal process. Do you have a view on that or any information on that point?

MS. EITEL: Your Honor, the only reason I'm bringing up the issue of delay is because it's been argued by the Debtors and not by the United States Trustee and by the Committee. I mean, they are correct that there are four factors about whether there's controlling precedent, whether

Page 54 1 it's a matter of public importance, or whether it resolved 2 the case. But speed is not one of the criteria either way -3 THE COURT: All right. So why are we arguing this 4 point? Unless for PR. Which I don't appreciate. I 5 6 understand the point that you just made; speed alone is not 7 a factor. 8 MS. EITEL: It's just simply that the Debtors have 9 represented to the Court that somehow the U.S. Trustee is 10 delaying the matter, and that's simply wrong as a factual 11 matter. 12 THE COURT: Well, I don't view that. I don't 13 think you're trying to delay the matter. 14 MS. EITEL: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll just move 15 on. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MS. EITEL: And one additional point before 18 getting to the criteria. 19 In the Committee's opposition in Footnote 3, it 20 was puzzling for different reasons, for the failure to not 21 understand DOJ authorities. They were shocked that the UST 22 announced that the solicitor general had authorized the U.S. 23 Trustee to file a motion for direct certification to the 24 Second Circuit and deemed this somehow nefarious. But, Your 25 Honor, rudimentary research and consultation with an

appellate lawyer would have led them to 28 CFR --

THE COURT: Again, it's not really an issue before me. I don't -- again, you are correct. The merits of the appeals are not part of what's before me on this issue, on your motion and the joinders by the appealing states. And similarly, whether any of those states or the U.S. Trustee are somehow acting in a way that the appellees don't like is not really before me, either.

MS. EITEL: That's fine, Your Honor. If I just may conclude by saying it's mandated by the Code of Federal Regulations (indiscernible) nothing nefarious to be gained, only the solicitor general can approve.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. EITEL: Let's turn now to why we're here, which is the four criteria.

The first criteria, is there a legal question with no controlling precedent from either the circuit or the Supreme Court. And Judge McMahon agrees with the U.S.

Trustee. As she said in court on Tuesday, "As far as I can tell, this is a pure question of law. About as pure a question of law as you can get. The core issue is whether this is constitutional or whether this is statutorily authorized. Simply because this case is complicated, unwieldy, involving lots of issues and parties doesn't make the issue of third-party releases anything other than a

legal question.

Moreover, the standard is, is there no controlling precedent either from the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court has never decided the issue of the due process nature and implications of a non-consensual non-debtor release. And that alone is sufficient to establish that certification is warranted and required.

But if we want to look at precedent within the Second Circuit, we need only compare or contrast the Debtor's statements on this issue to conclude the Second Circuit has not squarely addressed the issues presented by this appeal.

In the opposition, the Debtor said, "Third party release in bankruptcy and the circumstances under which those releases may be approved are issues that have been settled in the circuit for decades."

In contrast, on June 16th, Debtors and other opponents wrote to Judge McMahon seeking a joint tribunal for confirmation. And I quote, "While Your Honor and the Third Circuit have recently held that bankruptcy courts may issue a final order confirming a plan providing for third-party releases," and citing the cases, "The Second Circuit has yet not squarely addressed these issues." We need not go further than the Debtor's admission in the June letter. The Second Circuit has not squarely addressed the issues

presented by the Purdue releases.

Next, Your Honor, in discussion about what the case law was within the Second Circuit, I think people were shocked that the U.S. Trustee argued that Metromedia did not hold anything about third party releases because it was dismissed for equitable movements. So the entire discussion there is dicta. Admittedly, it's dicta that has been followed and adhered to and discussed at length by multiple opinions with the Second Circuit. But at the end of the day, it's not a holding, it's dicta. Metromedia didn't answer or address the due process question presented here, either.

With respect to due process, the Debtors
repeatedly refer to all of the notice and the publicity that
was given to provide due process with respect to this case.
But when they do that, they are wrongly conflating the issue
of due process with respect to Purdue's creditors or their
claims against Purdue and their participation in Purdue's
bankruptcy. The objection goes to great lengths to
(indiscernible) process. But that's a red herring because
we don't challenge the adequacy of the notice
(indiscernible) creditors, only about the due process
related to the Sacklers.

The Debtor has also suggested that the United States Trustee wasn't getting facts about not receiving

value for claims under the plans for the third-party releases. But, Your Honor, that's straight from the plan itself and it's cited and quoted in our motion papers where it says, "Payment is only made for claims held against the Debtors and not against non-debtor parties."

Debtors do get one thing right about the UST position on releases, that bankruptcy courts do not have the power or the constitutional authority to impose non-consensual releases of such claims of non-debtors versus non-debtors.

The Debtor also says that we're saying the courts of appeals have been violating due process for decades. I would simply note that in a related context until the Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, bankruptcy courts were routinely exceeding constitutional authority until one litigant challenged that notion all the way to the Supreme Court. So it's not unheard of for issues to be assumed that they are okay until they are not and decided by the Supreme Court.

Speaking of Stern, Your Honor, every opponent here today previously wrote to Judge McMahon in that same June 16th letter asking for the reference to be withdrawn in two discrete matters because there are stern issues related to the third-party releases, which is also part of United States Trustee's appeal. I quote, "In order to eliminate

any doubt concerning the finality of any order confirming the plan, the Debtors respectfully request that Your Honor consider presiding as a joint tribunal only on two discrete issues; the plan's treatment of personal injury claimants and the imposition of non-consensual third-party releases." This to me seems an admission of there is a possible constitutional infirmity in this Court's authority. And again, that alone should warrant taking up appeal. The Second Circuit, simply put, has not considered the issue of due process. One cannot read the past decade or two of Supreme Court decisions on bankruptcy matters as anything of an endorsement of expansive equitable powers or creative solutions outside the lines. Jevic, Law v. Siegel, ASARCO, RadLAX, Stern, (indiscernible), there are others, in every one of those cases, bankruptcy practitioners were surprised to find the narrow view and the narrow holding of the bankruptcy court's authority and power. So the United States Trustee satisfies Matter 1. It's a legal question on which there is no Supreme Court precedent and there is a division of opinions. One need only --THE COURT: Well, wait, wait. Where is division of opinion in the Second Circuit? MS. EITEL: That's not the standard, Your Honor.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Page 60 1 It's within the Second Circuit. It's not that the Second 2 Circuit has contradicted itself. That wouldn't make any 3 sense. THE COURT: But no, within the Second Circuit. 4 5 I'm not saying at the Second Circuit. I'm saying within the 6 Second Circuit. 7 MS. EITEL: For example, Aegean Marine as --THE COURT: Let's read Aegean Marine. I've been 8 9 hearing about Aegean Marine for quite a while now. I 10 addressed it in my opinion. Let's read it together. All 11 right? And let's read SunEdison together. Do you have it 12 there, ma'am? 13 MS. EITEL: I do not have it in front of me. It's 14 on my computer. But I am familiar where the Court talked 15 about the participation trophies. 16 Your Honor, the point is that there are -- there 17 are different --18 THE COURT: No, this is important. Because you 19 and at least one legal professor who doesn't know how to 20 read a case -- I'm not saying you don't, I'm saying he 21 doesn't -- have miscited this case. Something that a first-22 year law student can understand. So let's read it. All 23 right? 24 It cites Metromedia. It relies on Metromedia. 25 Does it not?

Page 61 1 MS. EITEL: It does. It does, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: And Judge Wiles says, "The governing 3 case law," that's a quote, "The governing case law requires me to consider not only the contributions made by the 4 5 proposed releases, but also the particular claims that are 6 to be released." He recognizes that there is governing case 7 law, having cited it. Metromedia. He also cites 8 Residential Capital and Johns Manville and then says I don't 9 have any of those facts before me here. 10 Let's go to SunEdison. All right? 11 Oh, by the way, Judge Wiles also, I think you'll 12 have to recognize, does impose a non-consensual release as 13 far as an exculpation is concerned, does he not? 14 MS. EITEL: He does, (indiscernible) --15 THE COURT: All right. All right. So I guess 16 he's following something. I guess he follows some 17 jurisdiction. And then as far as SunEdison is concerned, Judge 18 19 Bernstein says that he does not believe that the facts here 20 support under Metromedia the grant of the injunction, 21 although he finds that the court does have jurisdiction to 22 enjoin. 23 So, you know, it's one thing to say that people 24 discuss the extent of this case law, it's really another to

say that these are holdings that say that there is no such

Page 62 1 case law. And I think --2 MS. EITEL: Your Honor --3 THE COURT: -- one needs to be very clear on that 4 point. 5 MS. EITEL: Your Honor, I think reasonable minds 6 can differ with respect to the vast range of case law even 7 within the Second Circuit at the bankruptcy court level. 8 And I understand that --9 THE COURT: Well, you cited two cases. And I've 10 just gone through them again. And while they raise concerns 11 about the extent of releases, they do so in the context of 12 or the rubric of the Metromedia factors and Johns Manville 13 and the many cases that have actually imposed third party releases and injunctions in the Second Circuit. 14 15 MS. EITEL: And there are many cases that have 16 not. And --17 THE COURT: Where? In the Second -- where in the 18 Second Circuit that have not recognized the power to do so? 19 Name me one. 20 MS. EITEL: Your Honor, if -- there are multiple 21 cases where it may be in the context of particular facts, 22 but Metromedia has not -- does not decide the issue. As you 23 said yourself --24 THE COURT: So the reference to governing case law 25 in both of those opinions was just sort of thrown out there?

You actually think that Judge Wiles, if the facts would have in his view have fit within Metromedia would have said oh, well, I'm not going to follow that?

MS. EITEL: Your Honor --

THE COURT: That really would be extraordinary.

That really would be a basis for a direct appeal, would it

not?

MS. EITEL: Your Honor, I return to what you yourself said about reading the case as a first-year law student. You go to law school, and you get the primer and you're told what's the holding and what's the dicta. And I think for anyone to go in and say that Metromedia held anything about a third-party release is not reading the case carefully.

That said, I understand very well that Metromedia has taken on a life of its own and that is deemed controlling case law within the Second Circuit. But a clear and careful reading of Metromedia would show otherwise. But we can ignore all that, Your Honor. And I understand that you have a different view with respect to there is conflict within the circuit. It really doesn't matter because the bottom line is there is no Supreme Court decision on the constitutional authority or the due process rights on third-party releases. The Supreme Court has never decided the issue.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, are you saying that (d)(2)(A)(1) applies if there is controlling authority in the circuit but not at the Supreme Court? Is that how you interpret that section? MS. EITEL: Yes. It's an or, Your Honor. there is no controlling authority at the Second or the Supreme Court. And there is none at the Supreme Court. It's not and, it's or. It's disjunctive. It's one or the other. THE COURT: Do you have any cases that support that or commentators? MS. EITEL: Other than that the word or is disjunctive, I haven't gone to look for them. I'd be happy to provide a supplemental briefing on the topic. THE COURT: So you're basically saying that whenever the Supreme Court hasn't ruled on t bankruptcy issue, even if the circuits have and even though the legislative history, which the Weeber case relies on heavily, focuses on getting these opinions up at the circuit level, that we have to force the circuit to do work on any case when the Supreme Court hasn't ruled? MS. EITEL: If there's no controlling precedent, Your Honor, and it's a pure legal issue. That's not a particularly common occurrence, as the Debtors themselves point out.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

So we can move on to -- there's four gates. And the United States Trustee submits that we've satisfied gate one.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. EITEL: The second gate is a matter of public importance. I think Your Honor and the Debtors have said there has never been a case like this. And the issues transcend the case. And I understand that the issue is not in the context of Purdue Pharma, it's the issue of third party release. They're important in the bankruptcy context, and they are made increasingly frequent use of. And it is very important with respect to how the public interacts.

I think the Court is aware of in particular this case, one of the matters that has most, it had the public pro se litigants engaging with the Court, is about the third-party release. It's very important to the public about what authority a Court has to issue a third-party release.

Moreover, Congress itself has not one, not two, not three, but four pieces of legislation pending on the authority to issue a third-party release in bankruptcy.

Whether one agrees with that is right or wrong, it simply suggests that it's a high-profile matter that is very important to the public.

It would be disingenuous in the context of this

case to pretend that there is not an extreme degree of public (indiscernible) on this legal issue given the impact of Purdue Pharma and the Sackler family's conduct here.

It's a public health crisis. It's been very traceable to the conduct of the Sackler family who is being released.

And, Your Honor, here if the Sackler family members had filed for individual bankruptcy relief, under Section 523, they couldn't get the kind of release that they're getting now. They're getting a more generous treatment than (indiscernible) unfortunate debtor would ever be afforded in an individual case. Claims for things like fraud are being discharged when a debtor could not get that under 523.

Your Honor, this simply hasn't been decided before. Third-party releases are very important to the public interest whose rights are being affected and basically given up as participation trophies, as Judge Wiles said in Aegean Marine, and it needs to be decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals both whether there is a due process issue with non-consensual, non-debtor releases, and whether there is a Stern issue with non-consensual, non-debtor releases.

The third gate is is there a question of law requiring resolution in conflicting decisions within the Circuit. Your Honor, I think we just went through all of

	Page 67
1	those with respect to Aegean Marine, SunEdison, and this
2	case. And the result may well be different depending on
3	what district you go to, what state you go, and which
4	particular courtroom you go to.
5	THE COURT: Let's just cover that now. All right?
6	Is Connecticut in the Second Circuit?
7	MS. EITEL: Yes, Your Honor
8	THE COURT: Yes. All right?
9	MS. EITEL: I mean, yes. Yes.
10	THE COURT: So what in earth are you talking
11	about? I want you to come clean on this. What are you
12	talking about when you make that assertion innuendo?
13	MS. EITEL: Judge, I am making no innuendo, nor
14	assertion
15	THE COURT: You're not? Good.
16	MS. EITEL: I'm not. And
17	THE COURT: Then I think you should retract your
18	statement.
19	MS. EITEL: Your Honor, it's simply that there are
20	differing understandings of the extent of the authority that
21	courts have to do this.
22	THE COURT: In the Second Circuit? You have not
23	cited me one case for that. Not one.
24	MS. EITEL: Your Honor okay, Your Honor.
25	Chassix Holdings, for example. That's a fairly unique case

Page 68 1 where the issue of impairment and the right to vote. So a 2 class that was deemed not to be impaired and deemed to consent to the plan was being forced to get a third-party 3 4 And the Court came and said -release. 5 THE COURT: Right. 6 MS. EITEL: -- you know what? That --7 THE COURT: Yes. Every court in this circuit 8 would rule the same way. I have ruled that way multiple 9 times before and after Chassix. 10 MS. EITEL: But other courts, Your Honor, have 11 not. 12 THE COURT: Which ones in this circuit? 13 MS. EITEL: Your Honor, I don't have a laundry 14 list of --15 THE COURT: You don't. You're just throwing this 16 stuff out there. And it's -- you're right; it is important. 17 And if you are casting aspersions on the integrity of any 18 judge, any bankruptcy judge in this circuit, you'd better be prepared to say why. 19 20 MS. EITEL: Your Honor, I have cast no aspersions, 21 and nor do I --22 THE COURT: You don't? Are you going on record to 23 say that? 24 MS. EITEL: Yes, Your Honor. No aspersions in the 25

Page 69 1 THE COURT: Because it was suggested to me about 2 two minutes ago that you were when you referred to --3 MS. EITEL: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- particular judges and particular 4 5 states. 6 MS. EITEL: Your Honor, Your Honor, you are 7 misinterpreting my argument, and I apologize for that, for 8 not being more clear. 9 THE COURT: All right. Well, you don't have any facts apparently to back it up. So let's just move on from 10 11 that point. 12 MS. EITEL: Your Honor, I would just simply 13 conclude with that there is not uniformity within the 14 courts. And --15 THE COURT: Where? Which courts? 16 MS. EITEL: Your Honor, we just talked about 17 Aegean Marine, we've talked about SunEdison --18 THE COURT: All right. 19 MS. EITEL: -- and we've talked about --20 THE COURT: Those are your two cases. And I've already read those cases. And I know exactly what they say. 21 22 MS. EITEL: We've talked about Chassix Holdings. 23 THE COURT: And I think, frankly, if Judge Wiles had had this case, you would have been shocked if he had 24 25 ruled differently. Because this case is not Aegean Marine.

MS. EITEL: Your Honor, just to conclude this third point, I want to be very clear. I am not casting aspersions on the integrity of this Court, any other court, or any other judge. Reasonable minds can differ over these issues, which is why we take appeals and why we make legal argument and why judges may reach different conclusions in different matters. And because there have been dissimilar conclusions on similar facts, a fact that I know you disagree with, suggests that it is more important than ever that this get back to the Second Circuit for the due process and Stern issue squarely presented to the Second Circuit for decision. It's not a matter of integrity; it's a matter of a question of law and that we need to get the law settled on these important matters.

Finally, Your Honor, the fourth criteria is an immediate appeal may materially advance the progress of the case.

The response of the Debtor, and that I think lead the Committee awry, is that we need to go to the district court because it will benefit (indiscernible) at the district court. This case is a little different than the garden variety bankruptcy case where ordinary district court review likely offer some additional benefit. But these issues have been thoroughly briefed, fairly contested over a lengthy confirmation hearing, and the subject of much

discussion and reflection by Your Honor in issuing your opinion. There is no need to stop at the district court.

But that said, it's not going to delay the case by going to the Second Circuit because I don't think anyone thinks for a second that this case is going anywhere but the Second Circuit. It's just simply a matter of time.

THE COURT: But the case law is clear that that fact isn't a basis for a direct appeal. Right? The fact that parties are going to go eventually to the circuit is not a basis to grant a direct appeal.

MS. EITEL: Well, no. But the -- we discussed at the beginning about the expedition. But if it may materially advance the progress of the case. Clearly this can materially advance the progress of the case because it's different than saying a need for speed versus it's going to advance the case. The case is going to the Second Circuit -

THE COURT: No, but the case law on that point is consistent, as is the commentary. The fact that it's going to the circuit eventually is not a basis for certification of direct appeal.

MS. EITEL: Well, that may be particularly true. But what I'm explaining, Your Honor, is that this has been very well briefed and very well argued at the bankruptcy court level. It's being given a level of treatment and

discussion that is unlike, I think the Court would perhaps agree, your garden variety Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. This isn't Mom and Joe's pizza shop where there --

THE COURT: There was a lot of sophisticated briefing in Sabine. There was a lot of sophisticated briefing in GM.

MS. EITEL: And GM (indiscernible) once, if I recall correctly, on expedited briefing. And the Second Circuit decided very, very quickly in that case. I think it was only the second time where the matter was not certified if I recall correctly. I think GM did go up quickly in the second circuit (indiscernible) particular to that case. And also that that this was a matter of public importance, much like this one.

Your Honor, just to conclude, there are four gates for certification. The United States Trustee only has to satisfy one. Here, Judge McMahon said it best this week.

She would -- that appellants for their part raise important questions under the Constitution, the Bankruptcy Code, and Second Circuit law. The importance of having those issues considered and decided on appeal cannot be understated. And we would add, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Well, I agree with that completely.

MS. EITEL: -- oh appeal -- on appeal by --

THE COURT: But that's in the -- but no, that's in

the context of a motion for a stay.

MS. EITEL: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Not in certifying an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Is that your concern? I sort of want to cut to the chase on this last point. I think the last point, although I don't believe this is how the case law treats it, I think you're arguing that we'll get a faster result if there is a direct appeal. And in any event, Judge McMahon can continue on with the appellate process as the statute permits pending the determination by the Circuit whether it wants to accept a direct appeal. That's what you're -- I mean, that's really what you're saying, right?

MS. EITEL: Your Honor, yes. We are pursuing two parallel paths. And as I've said earlier, Judge McMahon may outrun the Second Circuit for the certification.

THE COURT: Right. Although I do have some real
I do have some real concern. Judge McMahon is a terrific
judge, and no one can say I think that there's any judge in
the Southern District who is more independent. But
presiding over an appeal like this, knowing that at any
moment the circuit could take it from you, isn't that kind
of like playing an exhibition baseball game or football game
or basketball game? You know, a preseason game. You know,
there's nothing more important than the matter before you.
But if you believe it's going to be taken away potentially

at any moment, I wonder whether that's what the circuit really wants.

MS. EITEL: Your Honor, Judge McMahon expressed no concern with that. She is well aware of the request for direct certification, and she mentioned it multiple times on Tuesday. And she said two things in particular. She said if the Second Circuit takes the case, they can keep my expedited briefing schedule and maybe they'll ask me to sit She had no concerns whatsoever with the by designation. idea of putting in this work and having the case taken away. And I agree, she has done a tremendous job of, just this week alone, turning around very quickly some decisions on the important issues with respect to who appellees are, who needs to intervene in the appeal, and what needs to happen with respect to the motion for stay. But Judge McMahon herself said they can take it; they can take my schedule. And if they want me, I'll go sit with them there, too.

And we would simply say that this is a case that satisfies four criteria for --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, I still want to explore
that last point a little bit. This is a question for all of
the parties. Have any of you -- I'm not saying you should,
I just wonder if you have. Have any of you gotten any sense
from the Court of Appeals as to when they would consider
accepting a direct appeal and their ability to hear it on an

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

expedited basis.

MS. EITEL: Your Honor, we would have no ability to do that because we haven't filed anything with the Second Circuit. I think that you can look at -- there is a range of options. In General Motors, they acted incredibly quickly given the public importance there. In other cases, they can sometimes take months to decide. There is no indication one way or another what it is that causes them to act with expedition on accepting the direct review. And it may be at the end of the day, Your Honor, that we'll get a decision on the merits out of Judge McMahon before the Second Circuit decides to take the appeal and it just goes up in the ordinary course. But we're trying to pursue two parallel paths to --

THE COURT: Do you have any sense as to whether the request for acceptance of a direct appeal will accelerate in any way the determination, or are those two separate panels that would handle it?

MS. EITEL: Your Honor, I don't know the answer to that question in terms of you say, like, accelerate the consideration once they take the direct certification?

THE COURT: Right.

MS. EITEL: It's up to the panel whether they would take the expedited briefing schedule. And we would -- just as we proposed at the district court, United States

Trustee would propose a very aggressive expedited briefing schedule. And we actually think Judge McMahon's solution was a good one, that if they take it before she has heard oral argument on November 30th, that they could just accept her briefing schedule.

THE COURT: I quess the last point I raise is -and this comes through strongly in the Weeber case. Circuit has been clear -- and this is consistent with jurisprudence generally and the structure of the federal courts -- that the circuits benefit from the analysis of the lower courts by the lower courts, particularly where there is an extensive record. And obviously Judge McMahon has tried scores of cases. She can evaluate a record really, really well. Obviously the Court of Appeal can, too. But, again, they have said Congress emphasized the importance of our expeditious resolution of bankruptcy cases, but it did not wish us to privilege speed over other goals. Indeed, speed is not necessarily compatible with our ultimate objective. Answering questions wisely and well in many cases involving unsettled areas of bankruptcy law reviewed by the district court would be most helpful. Courts of appeal benefit immensely from reviewing the efforts of the district court to resolve such questions. Citing Supreme Court as well as Justice Cardozo, explained that the common law process goes inch by inch.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

So the court of appeals doesn't get a lot of bankruptcy cases. Congress was judicious in Section 158(d) in changing that. It chose not to have direct appeals in most cases. And the district courts do get more of these cases. Judge McMahon has a lot of experience with them.

You know?

MS. EITEL: Your Honor, there is no --

THE COURT: She has granted injunctions, she has denied injunctions, she has narrowed injunctions. She has thought about these issues for years. And there are times - - I picked on a law professor earlier, now I'll give law professors some kudos. In a recent case where there was a direct appeal, the Gravel case, a bunch of law professors said no, you missed the boat. You should reconsider this. There wasn't an intervening district judge to have addressed nuances that might have been missed by the bankruptcy court or at least put those nuances in a context where the court of appeals could weigh differing views, or maybe the same view.

So ultimately here, although it's two different things -- there is the certification and then there is the acceptance -- the lower courts when asked to certify direct appeal are really trying to understand what Congress wanted and what the Circuit views Congress wanted in Section 158.

MS. EITEL: Your Honor, may I respond?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. EITEL: And I would agree, it's probably a universe of 99 percent of the cases that are not appropriate for direct review. The cases that don't get a fully developed record and cases that don't have full necessarily engagement. I understand the Sabine decision was a case like that. But there is a tremendous discussion and development of the record and consideration of this issue from this Court such that the intermediate appeal is of much limited -- much less utility than it would be in a typical bankruptcy case.

And I would finally make this point, Your Honor.

The Second Circuit may or may not take it, but we need to be able to flip the switch. We need this Court's authorization for us to go ask for that relief, to go to the Second Circuit. And that's all we're asking, Your Honor.

The Second Circuit may agree with you. The Second Circuit may say, United States Trustee, no, we want to hear from Judge McMahon. And the Second Circuit could tell us that. But I think it would be better for the Second Circuit to tell us they don't want to hear from Judge McMahon than for us to guess that they don't to hear from Judge McMahon.

THE COURT: Okay. I guess the last point I wanted to say is that if the parties seeking a direct appeal have the concern that somehow if that isn't granted, their rights

to a stay pending appeal would be adversely affected, they shouldn't have that concern. That's really a -- that's not -- I think they're two very different issues.

MS. EITEL: I appreciate --

THE COURT: So if their concern is that they want to make sure that the Second Circuit gets to hear this issue if they seek it to be heard on an expedited basis, I think that concern is not going to be borne out, whether there is a direct appeal or not a direct appeal.

MS. EITEL: Thank you, Your Honor. That's reassuring in the sense that I turn back to where we started today, which is the Debtors have been worried about getting out of bankruptcy. And we are happy to do everything possible to get this case to a conclusion and whatever the best path is. I think it would be helpful to hear from the Second Circuit to know do they want to hear it first or do they want to wait. And that's simply the opportunity the United States Trustee is asking for. We believe that any more of the criteria would warrant the entering of the relief and lets let the Second Circuit decide if they want to accept the appeal.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. EITEL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. I don't know if any of the joinder parties want to add to that.

MR. EDMUNDS: Your Honor, Brian Edmunds for the State of Maryland. May I just quickly make a few points? I don't think you need to hear the whole argument again, and I rely on the papers for most of it.

But in response to Your Honor's questions that you asked during the U.S. Trustee's argument, there is no doubt that there is a concern with speed here. Our state has some respectful disagreement with some of the terms of the plan. But I think that everyone here is benefitted by the decision being reviewed and review being completed as quickly as possible. We just have some concerns with the issues that we raise on appeal.

The fourth factor under Section 158 talks about whether an immediate appeal will materially advance the progress of the case. That's the factor. And if that's satisfied, that's one reason to certify.

I have read the case law and I agree with the Court's conclusion that speed or the fact that it's going to the Second Circuit are not grounds in their own right. But the importance of this case and the importance of I think the case generally, meaning in the constitutional sense of the case, the facts and the public health warrant parties doing everything possible to move this as quickly as they can. And direct review could potentially help that.

THE COURT: Well, I'm asking the same question,

Mr. Edmunds, that I asked the U.S. Trustee's counsel. The Debtors and the Committee suggest that there's actually a meaningful potential for delay by giving the circuit not one, but two questions, i.e. do they want to accept the direct appeal which has its own life, and then secondly, do they want to -- you know, when they will rule on the merits of the appeal.

Do you have any sense of how that first question, how long it will take to be decided?

MR. EDMUNDS: Your Honor, I think what is true is that it can vary. It could be that the Second Circuit decides to issue a decision, as it's done in a few other cases, on the standard for granting a direct appeal. And that might make it take longer because it will issue a published opinion. But I think in the run-of-the-mill ordinary circumstance, the certification would be presented to a motions panel which would decide the matter very quickly. Again, it's up to the Second Circuit and it's entirely -- it's difficult to foresee. But based on my experience at least not in this context exactly, but in similar interlocutory appeal type issues from district courts, it can rule quickly.

In any case though, whether it does or it doesn't, there is a schedule before Judge McMahon, and it's going to conclude with argument on November 30th, after which I think

we can expect she'll issue a prompt decision based on what she has indicated. And if it takes the Second Circuit longer, that will moot the issue I think. If there is a final determination by Judge McMahon in, say, December, then there will be no more need for direct appeal and there will be no need for the Second Circuit to consider it. But if we can advance it a little bit more quickly, I think that it's something that we should do for a lot of the reasons that have been raised in opposition to the motions for the stay. I mean, everyone benefits from getting this resolved correctly and quickly. And those two things are important. But I think that a lot of what the Court has questioned are reasonable things to think about. But those are questions that Second Circuit motions panel can answer and has discretion under Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and under the Second Circuit Internal Operating Procedures to decide quickly if it feels -- if the judges of that panel decide that it needs to be done.

And I think given the importance of the case, which I know the Court has recognized, and given the seriousness and all of the things that ride on the case and the outcome, I think that that's something that Second Circuit can determine for itself one way or the other. The factors are present, and they warrant, if the Second Circuit decides to do so, a direct appeal.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Page 83 1 So I think -- I hope that that answers all of the 2 Court's questions. That's really all I want to do, is sort 3 of be helpful on that. I think if the Court will allow, I'll just rest on the papers and others' arguments for the 4 5 rest. 6 THE COURT: Okay. That's fine, Mr. Edmunds. 7 Thank you. 8 MR. EDMUNDS: Thank you. 9 MR. GOLD: Good morning, Your Honor. Matthew 10 Gold, Kleinberg Kaplan Wilk & Cohen. 11 THE COURT: Good morning. 12 MR. GOLD: Can you hear me, and may I be heard? 13 THE COURT: Yes. 14 MR. GOLD: Thank you, Your Honor. First, I just 15 want to note so that the record is clear that while Your 16 Honor has referred to us as joinder parties, we did file our 17 own independent motion. And that motion was made jointly by Washington, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Oregon, Rhode 18 Island, Vermont, and the District of Columbia. 19 20 Today we are appearing on behalf of Washington, 21 Delaware, Rhode Island, Vermont, District of Columbia, and 22 Oregon with respect to this motion. 23 I will not repeat what has been said before in argument, Your Honor. The one point that I would like to 24 25 particularly elaborate is one of the mandatory prongs, which

is is this a matter of public importance. The statute states that as a disjunctive, and we believe that that is the simplest standard to satisfy here.

The appealing parties are states. The plan would strip these states of important rights. This is a matter of huge importance to the millions of residents of these states and to their elected officials.

To be clear, the issues in this case are important to all of the citizens and inhabitants of the states, not nearly those who might have been considered or claimants in the case. And those are parties that even the Debtor, the UCC, other parties who claim to be fiduciaries for creditors in the case, do not represent the citizens and inhabitants of these states that are interested in having their laws properly enforced and not about letting those who fought those law buy their way out of justice.

Now, I understand that reasonable minds can differ about whether that is the effect of Your Honor's ruling.

But to say that these are not fair issues of dispute that have not been raised by the parties and that will not have to be decided through an appeal and that these are therefore not matters of huge public importance, I don't see how that case can be made.

I will just briefly comment on what Mr. Edmunds said before. I think he's right. I have enormous respect

for the panels of the Second Circuit that would hear issues on a stay or whether it would take a case that has been certified. I believe that in a case of this magnitude, of this public importance, with all the great lawyering that all the parties are bringing to bear that there is relatively low chance that this case will slip between the cracks and somehow not be addressed by those parties either to take the case or not take the case. And the chance that it will languish seems to me to be remote. I would submit it is remote.

And so, Your Honor, we do echo the call that Your Honor has to service the gatekeeper to certify that, yes, this is a matter of public importance. And then the Circuit Court can decide the Weeber factors that Your Honor mentioned about whether in a matter of public importance it still would rather hear from a lower court or not, or it can take those matters into consideration.

And other than that, Your Honor -- well, the only other thing I will add just because it has not been mentioned before, the Debtors and objecting parties are now claiming oh my goodness, there are so many facts in this case. We had a nine-day trial. This is not inherently a (indiscernible) dispute even though in the runup to the confirmation hearing they argued many times that they had gone for papers and that our arguments were essentially

legal ones. We think that, yes, there are some facts at play here, but those are not disputed facts. I suppose it's a fact that the appealing states are states. It is a fact in some sense that the actions that are being taken from them are police powers. But Your Honor has already determined that these are police powers. We know that these are states. And so the essential facts that bring this case to a matter of public importance and that undergird the legal nature are not in dispute. Accordingly, Your Honor, we submit that certification should be granted here.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. GOLDMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Irve

Goldman, Pullman & Comley, for the State of Connecticut and
the other states that mentioned by Mr. Gold. May I have a
brief period for commentary here?

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLDMAN: I just want to put some finer points why we believe there is no controlling decision in the Second Circuit on the questions of law that have been presented. And that takes me first to the Metromedia decision where the parties' and the Court's focus has been during this hearing.

I think we all understand that as defined by Black's Law Dictionary, a holding is a court's determination of a matter of law pivotal to its decision. It's

interesting to note, on the other hand, what the Second
Circuit considers to be the highest order of dictum, and
that is judicial dictum, which is defined in U.S. v. Bell,
524 F.2d 206, as where a higher court is providing a
construction of law to guide the future conduct inferior
courts. And even in that situation, it held that judicial
dictum is not binding on the court and therefore not binding
precedent. So at most I think we can say that Metromedia's
discussion of non-consensual third-party releases is
judicial dictum and therefore it is not a controlling
decision on non-consensual third-party release in general,
let alone when they're used to release the police power
claims of state governments.

Even the dicta in Metromedia leaves wide open questions on whether third-party releases are permissible. For example, whoever decides or even provides guidance on when a non-debtor release steps over the line into what it calls (indiscernible) of the bankruptcy process.

And it's significant that in the last paragraph of its discussion about third-party releases, the Circuit rejected the appellee's argument because the appealing creditors received distribution under the plan from the third party. They had no right to complain about the non-debtor release. And it reasoned that the appealing creditor's plan distribution was on account of their claims

against the debtor, not on account of their claims against the non-debtor. That was at Page 143 of the decision. And so it is here the distributions the states are receiving on account of their claims against Purdue, not the Sacklers.

And that question was left open in Metromedia expressly in the last paragraph that I just mentioned.

I think it's an even clearer case for certification when you consider there is on Second Circuit decision on the question of whether state governments can be forced to release their police power claims against non-debtor third parties via a third-party release.

At Page 141 of Your Honor's modified bench ruling, you recognized that for many of the governmental objectors' causes of action against shareholder-released parties, the police power exception would apply.

But in deciding that those claims could be taken away involuntarily by the third-party release here, Your Honor did not cite any controlling Second Circuit decisions, but decisions from other jurisdictions that police power claims can be enjoined and that Congress's power under the bankruptcy (indiscernible) of the Constitution overrides police and regulatory power or state sovereignty. There is simply no controlling Second Circuit decision on those points of law, or certainly Your Honor would have cited them.

There is also an open question in the Second

Circuit as to whether the bankruptcy court has core

jurisdiction and the Constitutional authority

(indiscernible) the third-party release. I recognize that

Judge McMahon considered those issues (indiscernible). But

there still is no controlling decision in the Circuit -
from the Circuit, rather, on those points. And, indeed, the

only circuit to have resolved them was the Third Circuit in

(indiscernible).

THE COURT: Well, but Mr. Goldman, I think when you read the cases applying 158(d)(2)(A)(i), they recognize, as one would have to, that it is incredibly rare, and you would never be asking for a direct appeal in any event, if you had a case exactly on point. And that's not how they define a controlling decision. They define a controlling decision as really controlling law, which may be supplied by combining holdings from multiple cases. And there have been no more number of opinions written since Stern v. Marshall I think in the appellate area on Stern v. Marshall. And I just -- I think to define controlling law that narrowly would again open the door in a way that neither the statute nor the circuit has said it should be opened.

Similarly, courts have said that it doesn't warrant certification for direct appeal where someone says there is not a decision that has adopted your position

that's open. I mean, I just think there are plenty of course that say that. Novel arguments do not make controlling precedent any less so.

So the statute has narrow exceptions for police power. And it just seems to me that to put it into (d)(2)(A)(i) as opposed to maybe one of the other provisions, maybe the last one, is going to open the door where courts almost uniformly have closed it.

I mean, there has been litigation in the Second Circuit over third-party releases and injunctions since the 1980s. And it's not like the wave of certifications when (indiscernible) came out to interpret the new provisions of (indiscernible), as Colliers predicts would happen every time the Bankruptcy Code is amended in a meaningful way.

So I guess I would push back a little on what you're saying. I understand these issues are important.

And I also understand I believe they will get to the Second Circuit. It's just, again, whether it warrants a direct appeal that's really what's before me.

MR. GOLDMAN: I hear what you're saying, Your

Honor, but I think that could leave us falling into the

public importance category given the proliferation of third
party releases and the constitutionality after Sterns v.

Marshall.

I think there is also a compelling issue based on

the Jevic decision which holds that Section 105 can't be used when there is a (indiscernible) statutes such as 249, which allows the court to dismiss a case and (indiscernible) certain provisions for cause, which it held was not sufficiently implemented in that case.

And here there is a similar issue with Sections 1123(a) and (b)(6). They are very vague statutes, but they are being relied upon here as a means to say that third-party releases are permissible under the Code. And I think there is an equivalence there to what the Court held in Jevic. And so I think for that additional reason, a direct appeal is supported.

I think, finally, I would just conclude with observing that as the U.S. Trustee pointed out, the factor settlement agreement mandates that the debtors would move themselves to direct certification. So obviously the Debtors and the Sacklers considered any challenge to the third-party release to be suitable for a direct appeal. Why they've changed course now I would submit is perplexing and they should be held to their position as stated in that settlement agreement which Your Honor approved stating that there would be no amendment notwithstanding anything to the contrary.

THE COURT: Well, that's a fair point. And, frankly, I don't think either your objection or the U.S.

Page 92 1 Trustees raised it, but you are raising it now, and I will 2 take that into account. 3 MR. GOLDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. That concludes my remarks. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. GOLD: Your Honor, Matthew Gold. I just want 7 to briefly mention that our objection did mention the 8 Sackler settlement that this was contrary to and that the 9 Debtors (indiscernible). 10 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Underwood, are you going to 11 speak? 12 MR. UNDERWOOD: Yes, Your Honor, if I may. Good 13 Allen Underwood on behalf of certain Canadian morning. 14 municipality, first nation creditors and appellants. 15 (indiscernible) this matter, I think it's apparent appeals 16 (indiscernible) process and jurisdictional issues related 17 (indiscernible) authority of non-Article III judges over both U.S. sovereigns and foreign sovereign and release --18 19 held release claims as to them by debtors. (indiscernible) 20 take that. 21 I want to pull back to 28 U.S.C. 158. I'm going 22 to lower my volume here, Your Honor, because I hear that 23 there's feedback. I don't know why. 24 The provision that I am interested in with regard 25 to 28 U.S.C. 158 is that the immediate appeal to the circuit

they materially advance the progress of the case.

First of all, this is a direct appeal that is desired by a number of -- a substantial number of different governmental entities. We now know that there is -- virtually no time is going to be lot by pursuing this appeal to the Circuit. And the language that I want to focus on within this provision is "advance the progress of the case". And believe it or not, I actually believe that the direct appeal has a basis to advance, materially advance the progress of this case. Because as we sit here today, although we have a confirmed plan, it is subject to appeal, and it remains pending effective date and consummation.

There are some open issues I believe with regard to this case and whether or not it may be consummated ultimately at or near the effective date.

The first issue that I raise is one which was raised in our papers, which is that the plan itself right now is pending a motion for recognition in Canada. Now I will cut to the chase. And certainly I -- at the risk of quoting Your Honor, I believe you said on the record that at the time of the decision, you did not believe whether or not this case was recognized in Canada would effect Newco.

And when I went back and read that, I tend to actually agree with that statement. What I don't know is whether or not recognition in Canada materially impacts

whether the claim can be funded through the trusts in Jersey. And that is an issue that was certainly the subject of significant examination and documentation at trial.

As it stands right now, the motion for recognition by the foreign representative of the Debtors is opposed by the Canadian municipalities and first nations. The hearing is scheduled for November 9th, 2021 in Ontario, Toronto before Judge Conway.

At this point, we can at least presume that the district court will provide us a decision by November 30th.

I can't predict whether or not the --

THE COURT: Well, I don't know if Judge McMahon is going to rule from the bench. I don't think we should assume that necessarily.

MR. UNDERWOOD: -- (indiscernible) to carry that pending matter to a date after the appeal before the district court is decided on November 30th, or perhaps to a later date when the circuit makes a decision, if that is that path which Your Honor recommends and which the circuit accepts.

I personally think that given the multi-party dispute here and the likelihood that whatever the case may be with regard to a district court decision, some party is likely to take a higher appeal beyond the district court, which is going to further delay that -- potentially further

delay that recognition proceeding.

I think it's material to this that over the last two weeks, I have openly -- twice openly requested of the Debtors information as to whether or not they have sought, the Debtors or the Sacklers in fact, have actually sought the determinization of the court in Jersey as to whether or not they can fund the plan as it exists today. I have also asked how long they would anticipate it taking for a decision to be rendered by the Jersey courts. And I have also asked if they have not sought that determination, when they intend to (indiscernible). I have received no response to those questions which I brought to the Debtors twice, copied on all parties in this case.

And I bring those questions to the Debtor because I think it's a fundamental issue about this with reference to progress, material progress in this case. And if they cannot tell me that that application has been made and that the (indiscernible) would approve the plan as confirmed, I don't believe the plan can be funded. And that's a fundamental program. And I think that is almost a sick joke in the sense that we are arguing here about delay when that delay could ultimately be immaterial if plan funding cannot occur because of any number of different circumstances here. And one of those potential circumstances could be a failure in modification and recognition in Canada. So that is my

first point, Your Honor, effectively that appealing to the Circuit may actually advance and (indiscernible) progress of the case vis-à-vis a determination that may be critical to plan funding. I have asked, I don't have a response of whether or not it is critical to plan funding.

With regard to the other issue that I would like to address, Your Honor, in terms of the -- in terms of the Debtor's arguments with regard to the Canadian first nations and municipalities appeals, they have yet still -- they have made multiple pleadings to cite a case that states that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is not the exclusive path for obtaining affirmative jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign.

The Debtor has never effectively tried to suggest that there is an exception to the Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act that applies. And there are fairly clear exceptions set forth in the statute. And there is significant case law about this. In terms of that fact that what the Second Circuit's position on all of this is, I would say that the exclusive mechanism for obtaining jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns is through the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. And the citation of that is

Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Avenue and Related Properties, 830 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir. 2016). And the quotation is, "The FSI provides the exclusive basis for obtaining subject

matter jurisdiction over a foreign state."

Now, at the outset of this, I said that there are jurisdictional constitutional issues related to these appeals. And I think that that suggests that that provision from Kirschenbaum when read with reference to 1334 suggests that there if in fact a subject matter jurisdictional issue that should be handled by an appellate court.

And so on that, Your Honor, I think additionally with respect to Section 106 of the Code, there is no question that 106 of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to U.S. tribal sovereigns. And I think it is more than arguable that it does not apply to foreign tribal sovereigns. But there is obviously a basis here, Your Honor, for a good faith appeal to the district court. And it is our belief that when we look at the good faith basis of appeal, the weight of the appeal, the weight of the case and the fact that determining these issues may actually materially (indiscernible) the progress of this case, that the request for certification, respectfully, should be granted.

And I appreciate Your Honor's exceptional dedication to this case. Thank you.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, Marshall Huebner of

Davis Polk. I see that Ms. Isaacs has her screen on. I

don't know if she -- I believe she had said before she wants

to be heard on this motion. I assume that she is on the side of the appellants. And so before the Debtors begin to respond to the incredible array of brand-new things we heard today that were not in anybody's papers, as well as what was in the papers, I want to extend Ms. Isaacs the courtesy of speaking first if she would like to. THE COURT: Okay, Ms. Isaacs? Did -- I don't think you filed a motion seeking direct appeal, so I'm not sure I agree with Mr. Huebner. I am not sure what position you want to take on this motion or whether there is a basis to take any position. MS. ISAACS: Your Honor, you are incorrect. file an appeal. And I've --THE COURT: No, I know you filed an appeal. I know you filed an appeal. But this is a separate issue. MS. ISAACS: Okay. And I have -- let me talk, Your Honor. Because you keep interrupting everybody that has spoken today. And I would appreciate your time and effort in this, please. THE COURT: Well, again, I have a question. And you may think it's unfair, but I need to structure this argument. I don't think you filed a motion seeking a direct appeal. Right? MS. ISAACS: This is because I was not advised of anything that's been going on. I have not been given due

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Page 99 1 process or service in anything that's been going on since I 2 fired my attorney and came pro se into these proceedings. 3 Nobody, not Huebner, nobody has sent me anything. Give minutes before these proceedings, I had to work with Ms. Li 4 5 to get the link to these hearings. They're unfair and 6 unjust and they're not impartial to the American people. 7 And this needs to stop. 8 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to cut you off, If you haven't filed a motion before me, I'm not 9 ma'am. going to hear this. I'm sorry. You have your right to 10 11 appeal, you have appealed. I will hear you on the stay 12 issues, but not on this motion. All right? 13 MS. ISAACS: Your Honor --14 THE COURT: No, that's it. 15 MS. ISAACS: Your behavior --16 THE COURT: I'm -- no. I'm sorry, ma'am. 17 not going to hear this. This is not a pulpit for anyone who 18 wants to speak. This is a particular motion where people 19 take positions on the motion on the time allotted and not 20 just randomly saying I haven't received due process. 21 So I will hear the objectors. 22 MS. ISAACS: Your Honor, it's incorrect that 23 (indiscernible) in the middle of us having a --24 THE COURT: We're going to cut if off. I'm sorry. 25 You can come back on. We will put you back on when we get

to the pretrial conference on the motions for stay. If you were in the courtroom, the marshal --

MS. ISAACS: Please have them stop --

THE COURT: If you were in the courtroom, the CSO would take you out, Ms. Isaacs. This is a courtroom, and I am not going to delay this on this basis. You don't have standing on this motion, which is a discrete and narrow legal issue.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, for the record, Marshall Huebner of Davis Polk for the Debtors.

First, with respect to Ms. Isaacs, Your Honor, just to help her and all the pro se claimants who I do believe have gone to extraordinary lengths to try to facilitate access, there are three -- there's totally free instant access to the docket 24 hours a day, seven days a week for all parties on the Prime Clerk website. I believe that the hearing information is posted on those as well. It's not actually our obligation to serve all of the hundreds of thousands of parties individually for every single motion. These aren't even our motions. This is actually someone else's motion to which we are objecting. And I just want to be clear, as an objector to someone else's motion, the motion that we have to tell every claimant in the case about the motion is just not a burden that could fairly be put on us.

Your Honor, as I said a few minutes ago, a dizzying array of brand-new things that were in nobody's papers, both cases and alleged facts, which are wrong, and the like were told to you. And so I am going to be I think, with apologies, a little bit less organized than I try to be just because I was essentially hit with a brand-new set of arguments that nobody ever made.

And there are great answers to all of them, Your

Honor, and I will get to all of them, including your factual

question as to which parties were guessing at the answers,

and they were wrong. And I have facts that I think will

probably be helpful to the Court.

Your Honor, let me begin off-script before I do anything else about the U.S. Trustee's repeated citations to Judge McMahon.

So, Your Honor, let me sort of express where we are procedurally. We obviously have enormous respect for Judge McMahon and are delighted to be before her. And we are gratified that she actually adopted our proposed schedule for the briefing of the appeal because we want it briefed and heard before we emerge. And that is an extremely important point.

But, you know, for U.S. Trustee to cite Judge
McMahon's views expressed at a scheduling conference needs
context. The irony is the U.S. Trustee talks again and

again and again about due process, ironically, for people who we don't believe exist, which are people with claims against the Sacklers who don't have claims against Purdue.

And even if they did exist, those claims are not being released under the plan.

But, Your Honor, here's what was before Judge
McMahon, and then I'm going to move on from this very
quickly. Despite knowing weeks ago that this Court was not
going to enter a bridge order, the United States Trustee
waited until last Friday evening, the business day before
the district court's scheduling conference, to hit us with
that total surprise 25-page emergency stay motion at the end
of the page limit, after Judge McMahon issued an order that
said no more letters because they had previously filed
letters seeking relief, which we took to mean no more
pleadings.

The only document before Judge McMahon at a scheduling conference held on Tuesday was a U.S. Trustee pleading that on every single page misstates the facts and misstates the law.

THE COURT: But, Mr. Huebner, we seem to be going a little far afield of what's before me. I don't know where this is headed.

MR. HUEBNER: So, Your Honor, it's headed to whether it's a pure question of law or not. They were

suggesting to, and in fact quoting from her that she has already decided that these are pure legal issues. And that's just completely false.

So let me just move on, Your Honor. That was actually all I was going to say, which is there was a scheduling conference where they had papers that they ambushed us with that nobody else had time to respond to.

And Judge McMahon, based only on that, expressed some views.

That's not really relevant to today.

So let me just move right to the heart of the matters.

Your Honor, Ms. Gold quite correctly began by noting who was on the one side of this very important contested matter. So let's take a minute and talk about who was on the other side.

It has been confirmed to us that the Ad Hoc Group of Hospitals, the Rate Payer Mediation Group, the third-party (indiscernible) participants, and the Ad Hoc Group of Public Schools have formally advised the UCC that they support all the arguments (indiscernible) UCC.

So on our side of the V as it were, Your Honor, you have the Debtors, the UCC, the AHC, which as you know, represents multiples of the number of states of the objectors and appellants as well as many others in the NDL (indiscernible), the Multi-State Entities Group, the

personal injury claimants, the actual victims in this case that others are somehow claiming to speak for, the NAS Ad Hoc Group, the pediatric victims that others are claiming to speak for, the hospitals, the public schools, the third party payers, and the rate payers.

And so on one side, Your Honor, we have every organized group in the entire case who have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the plan. And on the other side, we have approximately one on-thousandth, a little bit more than that, of one percent of the creditors in this case, about ten out of 614,000.

So, Your Honor, let's just go right to the statute. Because you just heard a lot of oral argument.

And the most remarkable thing is that not one person cited one case to you that actually addressed 158. And that's because every single case that has addressed 158 on each of the prongs is fatal on its face to the (indiscernible).

And why is that so? It's so important, Your
Honor, because you insisted that it be so. You did not
break new ground in confirming the plan. In fact, you
refused to. And you told the parties at multiple junctures
during the confirmation hearing, I am not going to prove the
current form of the releases because they will be reversed
because they don't satisfy Metromedia. If you don't fix
them, I'm not confirming the plan.

And not only did you do it all through the confirmation hearing. Even after we thought that we fixed them about four times, you still were not satisfied. And you said not there yet. And in your actual ruling, you pushed the releases even farther, well and unquestionably within the scope of Metromedia. A lot more on that in a few minutes. No new ground, no new law.

The second major assertion -- and just to say it in plain English before I start citing case after case after case -- is that the essential claim of the states is that they are asserting claims for money damages and they want an exemption from well-established law, Citing no cases and no statute. They say merely because we are a government, won't you please exempt us from existing law.

Now, that may or may not happen someday, and I think it's totally unsupported by anything. I also think it happens to be terrible social policy. But that's a different issue. But asking to be exempted from decades of well-established law, there is not world in which any court has ever found that that is anything other than a failed argument under 158.

In fact, the case law on 158 is quite clear that novel and unsupported arguments attacking circuit law, which is what the constitutional arguments do, or seeking to evade it, which is what the supposed please give me an exemption

police power does, does not satisfy 158. Many people have tried this before, which is why our brief is full cases.

And they've all failed.

But, Your Honor, it's so telling. I would ask you when you have a moment to just look at the very line of the U.S. Trustee's brief, the first sentence of their preliminary statement. Because it says it all, and it's the ultimate tell. The U.S. Trustee says that the appeal in this case will resolve, and I quote, "The circumstances, if any, under which Chapter 11 bankruptcy may extinguish non-debtors' direct claims against other non-debtors." That's how the U.S. Trustee described in their opening sentence the question on appeal; are third-party releases inherently legal?

But, Your Honor, that's the exact question that was answered both very long ago and then again and again by controlling Second Circuit authority. I mean, you know, these quotations to Metromedia, I don't know if they think they're only going to read their sort of cherry-picked quotes from it. So let's talk about what it actually says.

"We have previously held that in bankruptcy cases, a court may enjoin a creditor from suing a third party provided the injunction plays an important part in the debtor's reorganization plan." Citing Drexel, which goes back to 1992. So they are reaffirming their previous

holding.

And I'm so glad that Mr. Goldman pointed you to the last page before they (indiscernible). Because I have all the cases, and I have all the right things circled. And what the Second Circuit actually did after going through the factors that we all use, even though it's not the question of factors, is it said but in this case, there was no evidence about the necessity of the releases. And in this case, it was not proven that these were unusual circumstances. And therefore, merely paying some money into the estate doesn't justify you getting a release. We could not possibly agree more and had about a hundred pages of briefing on how the Metromedia holding and factors were satisfied.

So as Your Honor has said to them again and again, and they're just not listening, this has been the law in the circuit for decades. Going back to Drexel, cited by Metromedia as a holding, and to Johns Manville, which addresses these circumstances.

Your Honor, when you strip away all the adjectives and all the adverbs, they don't have nouns or verbs, because this case is a straightforward application of Metromedia and multipole, multiple predecessor and successor, which we'll talk about in a few minutes, cases.

We respect the fact that the appellants think

Metromedia should be overruled. They are welcome to appeal. We respect the fact that they think that you misapplied it based on the facts of this case. They are welcome to appeal. We understand that they are seeking a brand-new exemption from existing law. They are welcome to seek that from the circuit court. But that's not what 158 does.

In fact, as the cases say, let's talk about Zewdie v. PNC Bank, 2015 WL 6007410. 158 is reserved for, "exceptional circumstances in which the guidance of the circuit court of appeals is necessary."

And, Your Honor, you've cited -- I don't know if it's Weber or Weeber. The Second Circuit has told us, "Direct appeal is most appropriate where it, the court, is called upon to resolve a question of law not heavily dependent on the particular facts of a case." Weber, 484 F.3d 158. Every ruling made by this Court after days of testimony and thousands of pages of sworn evidence was supported. And you tied it to the facts of this case. Which is why, despite looking for weeks, we have not found any confirmation order ever in the history of the Second Circuit certified for direct appeal. Because as I will explain in a few minutes -- citing cases to you, not making stuff up -- there are very obvious reasons why that is so.

So let's begin with prong one; is there controlling circuit authority? So let me begin with the

U.S. Trustee's brand-new argument. Not in anybody's papers.

I'm not sure when it came to them, but obviously we will

deal with things as they arise, that somehow it's

disjunctive and you have to have both a supreme court ruling

and a circuit court ruling.

THE COURT: You don't need to cover that. That just doesn't make sense. I mean, to give someone -- I mean, remember, 1158(d)(2) is mandatory. It says shall. So the idea of bankruptcy courts all around the country certifying direct appeals to the courts of appeals whenever there is no supreme court case on record is just -- it's nonsensical. So let's just move on from that.

MR. HUEBNER: And, Your Honor, I'll leave it except to say there is a reason no court has ever even suggested that, because it would write the circuit court right out of the statute. Because if you need a supreme court, which obviously governs all of us, what's the point of having it be or the circuit court. So it just -- again, I have four arguments. I'll leave them aside if Your Honor views it.

So now let's talk about whether Metromedia is actually law or dicta. Your Honor, 16 years ago when Metromedia was handed down, it was not a new ruling. It was just another ruling in a line. Manville was in 1988, reaffirmed in the nineties. Drexel was in 1992. But don't

take my word for it. As I quoted before, Your Honor, the Second Circuit itself said we have previously held that.

And then it quotes Drexel, "for the legality in appropriate circumstances of third-party releases," 416 F.3d 141, quoting Drexel, 960 F.2d 293.

But of course Metromedia is not the last Second Circuit decision, it's the middle one. Because it was reaffirmed twice at the circuit level since 2005. In re Bernie Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 740 F.3d 81, 93, Note 12. And Pfizer, Inc. v. Angelos (In re Quigley Co.), 676 F.3d 45, 57. It there cannot be possibly be gainsaid that these cases don't trigger 158(d)(1), which involves a "question of law as to which there is no controlling decision of the circuit court or the supreme court."

But, Your Honor, let me take a detour. Because I do want to say it one last time, and then I'm not going to say it again. Had the sixth or seventh or eighth amended plan where the release were arguably much edgier -- and we were prepared to defend them, but they were unquestionably broader and edgier -- still been in the plan, the question of whether this Court went beyond the contours of Metromedia might actually make today a hearing where there was fair things to say on both sides. But Your Honor refused to do that. And you said it again and again, I'm just not doing it.

So, Your Honor, if you look on Page 20 of the U.S. Trustee's brief, as they're just fighting yesterday's war, they allege that no controlling law exists because the existing cases do not authorize "release of non-debtors' direct claims of other non-debtors that are independent of the debtor's own claims and property." That profound misperception or misrepresentation has no relevance because there are no such totally independent claims released here.

Rather, Your Honor found expressly that that was not the case. What Madoff tells us is that "The touchstone for bankruptcy jurisdiction over a non-debtor claim remains whether its outcome might have a conceivable effect on the bankruptcy estate." Madoff at Page 88, quoting Quigley. Those are the claims being released here.

Your Honor specifically limited the releases of the Sacklers to claims for which the "conduct, omission, or liability of a debtor is a legal cause of legally relevant factor." And Your Honor as a trier of fact found as a matter of fact that the release claims against the Sacklers have a direct impact on the estates and their property.

As you said in the bench ruling at Page 111, "I conclude that the third-party claims that are covered by the shareholder release under the plan, as I will further narrow that release in this ruling, directly affect the (indiscernible) of the debtor's estates, including insurance

rights, the shareholder release parties' rights to indemnification and contribution, and the debtor's ability to pursue the estate's own closely-related, indeed fundamentally overlapping claims. And thus, the bankruptcy subject matter jurisdiction to impose a third-party release and injunction under the plan exists."

And, Your Honor, in the confirmation order at Page 30, you further found that the debtor's continued unavoidable involvement in potentially thousands of lawsuits against the Sacklers that are clearly all about the debtor's prior alleged or actual misconduct -- they admitted to multiple crimes -- unquestionably would implicate (indiscernible) debtors.

So with their first argument that it's not dicta,

I mean, they're basically trying to overrule the Second

Circuit, which has made it clear multiple times that it is a holding. Which is of course why if you were to ask them what case ever anywhere in the world has ever said that

Metromedia is dicta, the answer is none. Because not only did they say in Metromedia that it was a holding, they did it later in Madoff where they said, and I quote, "In In re Metromedia Fiber Network Inc., we held that a bankruptcy court could permit the non-consensual release of creditors' claims against third parties upon a finding of truly unusual circumstances that render the release terms important to the

success of --" they use different words, but the underlying bankruptcy plan.

So now let's talk about other cases. And then I'm going to move on to point two. Judge Wiles in Aegean

Marine, which is a fabulous case for us in every way, says that Metromedia commands -- his words, "Metromedia commands" that third-party release may be granted in appropriate circumstances.

In SunEdison, Judge Bernstein said Metromedia sets the "requirements" for the third-party release, as does Judge Peck in Charter Communications. Yet other cases so holding, including Kirwan, Oneida, ResCap and (indiscernible), are laid out in Paragraph 9 of the UCC's brief.

So if the movants are right that Metromedia is somehow dicta, it's going to be a pretty shocking piece of news to the Second Circuit, which has said three times it's not, and to every single court in this district ever to have addressed Metromedia and said the contrary.

Point number two, Your Honor. And this is where the "police power" comes in. So first of all, no one has ever said that all of the states' claims for money damages for past conduct are police power claims. Quite the contrary. When we filed our injunction, one of our rationales was even with an individual complaint by a state,

there could be some that are clearly police power, some that might be police power, and some that we don't believe are police power. And the parsing what was literally thousands and thousands of individual accounts was unneeded and impossible. But I don't think there was ever a ruling that the state's claims for money damages for past conduct are all police power. But it doesn't matter at all. Because their next argument is that the fact that there is no settled Second Circuit decision on whether every governmental entity presumably in the world gets an exemption from established law has already been ruled on under 158 by cases on analogous types of arguments.

So let's call a spade a spade. What the movants seek is a brand-new, plucked from thin air, bespoke exception to Metromedia. They want to add a new factor that says unless you are a government, in which case this doesn't apply.

Leaving aside that this would leave any governmental entity, no matter how large or small, no matter how legitimate or illegitimate, no matter how unreasonable their demands were. If there were 80,000 governmental entities to one, that one set, I'm not doing a deal unless you do X, Y, or Z because I have the power to stop this plan. That's the rule of law they are looking for. And it's not a surprise that they have exactly zero -- zero

cases, zero statutes, zero anything supporting their request to be exempt from existing law.

But what we do have, Your Honor, is multiple cases. So when you say, hey, I wish this were different for me, you lose. In Paragraph 16 of our brief, the cases are there. An attempt to seek a novel exception or loss on well-settled law does not justify direct appeal.

In In re Goody's Family Clothing, 209 WL 2355705 at Page 2, the Court held, "The court need not conclude that this case presents a question of first impression merely because appellants have innovated a novel argument."

In In re Ladder 3, 2018 WL 22998349, the district court rejected the movant's attempt to artificially transform a simple application of 9019 into a legal question and said, "There is no controlling decision addressing the precise question... That's not because the legal question is open, but because no one has made such an obviously flawed argument."

With respect to Mr. Underwood's arguments, Your
Honor, first of all, he filed a joinder six days after the
deadline for the motions. If my memory is right, he's not
even allowed to make separate arguments that were not in the
main motions. All of this stuff about Jersey law honestly,
it just has no relevance today. We are all moving rapidly
and assiduously towards being able to close when allowed to

1 do so.

Again, I shouldn't have to address any of this because this is all an ambush and improper under a joinder, but on a motion that already was moving on shortened time. But for the avoidance of doubt, Your Honor, his foreign sovereign immunities claims were exactly what agreed to confirmation, and Your Honor dealt with them completely and definitively. No case has ever held that 106 does not mean exactly what it says on its face, which is that sovereign immunity is abrogated when you participate in a case. So I'm going to leave Mr. Underwood sort of, you know, riffing on his joinder on that motion to shorten time at that.

Point three, Your Honor. I only have to say the sentence, but then I'm going to use a lot of case law.

Arguments that Metromedia was wrongly decided, and the appellants believe it's going to be overturned either by the Second Circuit itself or by the Supreme Court has been held by many courts to not remotely trigger 158. Because 158 is about the lack of controlling circuit decision. It's not about displeasure with circuit decisions. And what they're doing is they're expressing their displeasure that the law in the Second Circuit and six other circuits is what it is. And if some day they are granted cert, they are absolutely welcome under our legal system to advance that argument to the supreme court. But what they are not allowed to do is

pretend that it justifies 158.

So let's talk about that. So first of all, let's just leave aside the audacity and hail Mary cubed aspect of the appellants actually saying the Second Circuit got this wrong five times, six other circuits got it wrong multiple times, and that dozens of courts have been violating the constitution literally for decades and only these appellants have figured that out. Because even if they're right, that goes in their cert petition. It's a dead loser under 158.

So first let's talk about -- and now I'm going to tie back to the sort of attempted weaponization of Judge McMahon, which I think was extremely inappropriate after the ambush the U.S. Trustee pulled on many more governments who are on our side than, frankly, are on theirs. It's just not a pure legal issue at all. The question of whether due process was provided hinges in no small part on the notice and opportunity to be heard. That is an inherently and intensely factual issue that turns on the notice provided, a subject on which there was extraordinarily extensive testimony, unrebutted, uncontroverted, and mostly unchallenged at multiple hearings before confirmation.

And, Your Honor, you made detailed, factual findings, including about the notice of the third-party release claims. I think we all remember -- I think it was Mr. McClammy holding up the print ads and the internet ads

and the plain English posters and the links to more sophisticated notice and the ways that we spent literally tens of millions of dollars. We spent more on trying to give every American notice, with billions of hits, than most bankruptcy cases involve. And this Court ruled on the facts.

Page 115 to 116, "As far as the record before me is concerned, notice of the confirmation hearing and the plan's proposed third-party claims release satisfied due process." Bench ruling at Page 113.

"Under the amended plan, it is now clear...that only holders of claims against the debtors are being deemed to grant the shareholder release, and it is equally clear that...that holders of such claims receive due process notice."

Second, Your Honor. If the movants were correct in their claim that the third-party releases inherently and forever violate due process because they're always illegal, that means that 50 courts, including seven courts of appeal have all been violating the constitution.

Your Honor, for the avoidance of doubt, the due process laws of the Fifth Amendment is 230 years old. I think it is a reasonable assumption that the seven circuits, including the Second Circuit, knew about the existence of the Constitution of the United States of America and the due

process clause as they ruled again and again that under appropriate circumstances third-party releases are appropriate.

Finally, Your Honor, Section 158's requirement of no controlling circuit precedence becomes both a farce and a nullity if you can satisfy it by saying, well, there is controlling precedent, but it's wrong. Then there's no test at all because all you have to do is say I think the circuit got it wrong --

THE COURT: I actually don't think they're really
-- I don't think they've really been pursuing that argument.
I mean, I don't get that in the motions. But...

MR. HUEBNER: Okay. I'll leave it at that. If you don't even view it as the argument, I don't need to spend more time doing battle with it.

So, Your Honor, let me keep rolling then. We're sort of about to start factor number two. So the question on factor number two is what they are calling the public importance factor. And again, it's just beyond telling that you heard a lot of oral argument, and you asked a lot of questions, and no one actually cited to you the many cases that we all agree are the governing or relevant cases because they are fatal to their claim.

So let me be very clear so there is no misunderstanding. I have said probably more than any lawyer

in this case, because I am at the podium the most, for worse or for better, that these cases and the plan are without any possible doubt extraordinarily important. That's why we're all so passionate, because the plan has the ability to ameliorate, improve, and hopefully even save many lives, holding thousands or tens of thousands to abatement programs it is almost ready to begin funding with billions of dollars.

But that's not the test under 158. It's not of the case is of things that are important, and it's not even whether the appeal's outcome is important. What courts have held -- first let's talk about the standard. So all the relevant courts have held that the -- and I'll just quote it, courts "interpret the public importance prong narrowly." See In re Nortel Networks Corp., 2010 WL 1172642 at 2, Jaffe v. Samsung, 470 B.R. 374. Because it's easy for lots of cases to say big case, important case, famous case. Right? That's not the standard.

Jude Scheindlin in Mark IV Industries v. New

Mexico, 452 B.R. 385, 388-389 explained, and I quote,

"Public importance exists when the matter on appeal

transcends the litigant and involves a legal question, the

resolution of which will advance the cause of jurisprudence

to a degree that is not usually the case." That holding has

been applied in every case that has articulated the

standard. Sabine, 551 B.R. 140; American Home Mortgage 408 B.R. 42; Springfield Hospital, 618 B.R. 109. And we'll get to Springfield Hospital in a few minutes. We are delighted they cited that case, because it actually proves, like all the other cases that actually ruled on 158, why they lose.

And we all agree that this is the standard. The U.S. Trustee put it at Page 20 of their brief, California put it at Page 2 of their brief. It's not the importance of the case or how it affects people, it's whether there is an open legal question whose resolution by a circuit will advance the cause of jurisprudence.

Your Honor, let's look at General Motors. Because we were told a lot of things about it that were just flatly not true. Because it's incredibly instructive. So, Your Honor, you've asked the question during the case, which is what was the timing of the Second Circuit in General Motors. Davis Polk might have gotten it wrong, but is sure hope not, because we went and got you your answer.

The petition for direct appeal was filed on June 18th, 2015. It was granted 83 days later. That's just the petition on the 9th of August. The ultimate opinion was rendered 391 days after the petition for direct appeal was filed on July 13th, 2016. So, I don't know, maybe we've got something wrong, but I don't think so.

Your Honor, the General Motors 158 opinion is

incredibly relevant and deadly on point. And it shows you why they lose under prong two. We cited, Your Honor, in Paragraph 23 of our brief and the MSGE discusses it at length in Paragraph 14 of the brief. Almost exactly as here, the GM objectors asked Judge Gerber to certify (indiscernible). Many of us were involved in the auto cases around the clock at that time. It is no exaggeration to say that the survival of the U.S. auto industry was at stake and the livelihoods and pensions and medical benefits for hundreds of thousands of people as well as tens of billions of dollars of U.S. and Canadian taxpayer funds.

But Judge Gerber correctly and un-controversially distinguished between the importance of the case and of GM from the "question of law presented". And here's what's just so important about the case. He concluded that the legal question was not a matter of public importance that merited direct appeal because "Many people would agree that GM's wellbeing is a matter of public importance." But then he went on to say the legal question was not an issue of, quote, public importance because it had already -- sorry, that's not a quote. Because exactly as here, the issue had already been decided by the circuit. And quote -- this is a quote, "Deciding it again was not a matter of public importance."

The final attempt by the movants, Your Honor, to

shoehorn themselves into public importance where they just don't fit, is an argument that the third-party releases themselves are an important issue. But again, they're simply attempting to attack existing circuit law. What the 158 prong two cases say, there has to be an open question below the circuit level on which new circuit law guidance is needed to advance jurisprudence. Having the Second Circuit overrule itself cannot possibly meet that standard. That's not new guidance on an unresolved issue.

And in Millennium, by the way, just to get even more focused, Judge Silverstein specifically concluded that the legality of non-consensual third-party release in bankruptcy cases is not a legal issue of public importance under this prong despite being exactly as here, "unqualifiably important to parties". Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC, 543 B.R. 703, 716. So we have case after case saying you lose public importance if the circuit has already ruled. Or even on cases saying that this exact issue doesn't satisfy the process.

So, Your Honor, let's look at Springfield
Hospital, which sort of is their only case on public
importance. Because there too, they just seem to keep
forgetting that you read every case if you read them all
cover to cover, and you actually understand what they
actually say.

What happened in Springfield Hospital is that
COVID happened, and the CARES Act was passed, and PPP was
put in. And there was a novel question that had not been
answered by the Second Circuit about whether or not Chapter
11 debtors were eligible or ineligible for healthcare
programs under the CARES Act. That's a perfect potential
use of 158, new statues, new issue, never been ruled on.
You know, one side argue, well, but it's about to sunset.
The other side said no, we're in a terrible national crisis,
it might get extended, people need to know whether debtors
can get PPP CARES Act funds or not. In that case, which,
again, it's all right there in black and white, agreed that
the public importance prong under 158(d)(2) is a high bar
for certification. And like all the other cases, they cite
Mark IV, Sabine, and Millennium for the demanding standard
they don't come close to meeting. And Jaffe v. Samsung,
which they quote for the proposition, and I quote, "There is
no question that 158(d)(2) should be involved only in narrow
circumstances," id at 117, quoting Jaffe.
So, Your Honor, these cases are very, very
important. But that just is not relevant at the end of the

Prong three, Your Honor. Do these cases require reconciliation of conflicting authority? I'm going to cut this short because I think that Your Honor already basically

day to 158(d)(2) by which many courts have ruled.

did exactly what I was going to do. And to be candid, it's actually very dispiriting to me to see a division of the Department of Justice in a major state represent what cases do and don't say to a federal court in ways that are just unsupportable. Interestingly enough, even the appealing states, who don't hold many punches back, couldn't bring themselves to advance this argument. They dropped a footnote that just says in like five words, you know, maybe prong two, footnotes one. You know, no explanation, no color.

The notion that there is an intra-circuit conflict within the Second Circuit is just completely and totally not credible. They cite a grand total of two cases. Do those cases conflict with one another? No. Do they say they conflict with one another? No. Do they say I think Judge Wiles got it wrong, I respectfully disagree with Judge Bernstein? No. Did they refuse to apply Metromedia? No. What did they actually do? Judge Wiles said, "As commanded by the Second Circuit in Metromedia," and then went on to say you can impose third-party releases in appropriate circumstances. He definitely took issue, and I agree with him passionately and completely, that people -- some people, not us -- have started to treat third-party releases as "no big deal" and they don't present evidence. And in that case, there was no evidence that if the release claims were

not released, that would undermine the restructuring.

Here, we had about a thousand pages of declarations and days of trial that there could be no restructuring without these releases in large part because of the other dozens of intercreditor deals in which these very movants insisted in Phase 1 mediation that there be a Sackler settlement or else there was not public-private deal.

So in our case, which probably had the most intensive trial on third-party releases ever, not only was it proved beyond (indiscernible) that the claims would, quote, undermine the plan if they weren't settled, but there would be no plan. It would be obliterated.

Then of course there is SunEdison. Somehow -- and again, you asked them for the quote. Of course there is none because it's just totally a misrepresentation of the case. SunEdison, like Aegean Marine, simply applied Metromedia to the facts before it. That's what trial courts do. They take the law, and they say you give me the facts, let's look at the law, and then I rule.

And not only that, but in SunEdison, after finding that they failed to justify any conceivable effect on the estate, the judge even said if you want to submit a modified form of release that does come within Metromedia, go ahead. You simply did it before the ruling and said if you don't

fix these, I'm not ruling at all. And then they were fixed. So the notion that there is an intra-circuit dispute based on the only two cases any party cites, both of which agree with each other and actually reach very similar conclusions in applying Metromedia to their facts is really shockingly unsupported as a claim.

Finally, Your Honor, there is the question of whether a direct appeal will "materially advance the progress of these cases". Here also, Your Honor, it's amazing to me that someone can get up and make a legal argument to a court and not cite a single case where case after case has interpreted and addressed this prong. So let's actually go to the law.

Their first claim that we want to end up at the Second Circuit so you should let us -- or beyond. And I'm going to talk about that in a few minutes. But they certainly don't intend to stop based on everything they have said so far, including on Tuesday.

Their first argument is we'd like to go to the Second Circuit eventually, so let us go there first and won't that save some time. We'll talk in a few minutes about whether it will save time, because it most assuredly will not. The argument loses the minute the question is articulated. As Judge (indiscernible) ruled in Manville, and I quote, "If valid, the argument would eliminate appeals

to the district court, contrary to the statement by the court of appeals that the normal appellate process should proceed so that the court of appeals is provided with the views of the district court to aid in the fair decision of the appeal."

Citing Weeber, Your Honor, exactly as you did, 484 F.3d 160. "Congress was aware of the dangers of retrying the district court in the appeals process and probably recognized the salutary effects of allowing some cases to percolate through normal channels." Manville, 449 B.R. 31, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

Then there is the Lehman case, which addresses their argument and dispenses with it. In Lehman as well, the movants have apparent aspirations to take the case to the Second Circuit and beyond. And the Lehman court said that this would, and I quote, "If the mere expectation of advancement to a circuit court was sufficient to establish material advancement, Section 158(d)(2)(A) would effectively eliminate the district court from the bankruptcy review process altogether." In re Lehman Brothers Inc., 2013 WL 5272937 *5.

But then, Your Honor, let's pretend for a minute - let's just pretend that the law says I think I can go
faster if I just skip the district court so would you let me
just go faster, it definitely does not say that. Not even

close. But even if it did, they still would lose. Because given where we already are, there is no question that direct certification would still be appealed down probably by months and impose terrible, utterly avoidable costs and harm on all parties.

As Your Honor knows, Judge McMahon has been assigned the appeals. In her words, she put the appeal on a "Rocket docket". Appellate briefing is commencing on October 22nd, concluding on November 19th. Oral argument is scheduled for November 30th, and she intends to rule expeditiously thereafter.

The U.S. Trustee basically admitted -- I think she said it three times -- that there is a distinct possibly, it's very likely that Judge McMahon will already have ruled before the Second Circuit even decides whether or not to take the case, let alone then having a second round where we ask for expedited briefing and then having briefing, and then schedule an oral argument, and then having oral argument, and then waiting for a three-judge panel to coordinate and rule. Any argument that the Second Circuit is going to get us to a decision on the merits on the appeal faster than what looks to be early to mid-December is completely, completely not credible.

And that's why Judge Toto found that thinking you're going to move faster by just skipping a step -- and

the Second Circuit in Weeber said not happening. Which is why, Your Honor, it's very likely that this helps explain why no confirmation order to our knowledge has ever been directly certified.

THE COURT: So the statute says in 158(d)(2)(D) that the appeal at the district court level proceeds until the circuit court takes the -- if it decides to take the certification. So the U.S. Trustee says well, then we can have the best of both worlds. Judge McMahon, who is I think probably not likely to lay down her pen, would keep working. And then the circuit would be that much faster along because there would be a request for a direct appeal.

I understand your argument about, well, we can't set up precedent that just says if speed is important, then it always goes to the circuit. But what is your response to the U.S. Trustee's point that you can have the best of both worlds?

MR. HUEBNER: Sure. Your Honor, it's not actually the best of both worlds at all. The best of both worlds is for the existing appeal to be argued as if it were an existing appeal. And then there is a decision of a district court that requires no special extraordinary extra round of decision-making under a statute that is supposed to be invoked very rarely under extraordinary circumstances.

I think there is a very good argument -- I try not

to make stuff up on the podium, but I think there's a very good argument that we actually get to the Second Circuit faster if we actually have a normal appeal and it is ruled on with extraordinary speed which Judge McMahon is being remarkable about. And then we all go together if that's where we are.

Look at the facts I gave you in GM, Your Honor.

It took them 83 days just to rule on direct certification.

They will already have well before them I would think based on what Judge McMahon has said so far in appellate decision—and by the way, Your Honor, I'll give you another great answer which is totally different. One of the appellant's ground for appeal, which we actually think is frivolous, is the Stern v. Marshall issue, which is that you need an Article III judge and not an Article I judge.

Here's another great reason. Because skipping the district court harmed the case grievously if that argument is found to be meritorious. Because if the Second Circuit finds that, they have to remand it for further proceedings. If the District Court finds it under amending standing order of reference, M10-468, S.D.N.Y 2012, they are actually allowed, I think it's a directive maybe, to treat any rulings of this court as proposed findings about conclusions of law. And so actually if one of the arguments they love, and we don't put stock in, that they're actually right, then

it's a fact that we get resolved (indiscernible) the district court because there is no remand. The district court can (indiscernible) and the circuit court cannot (indiscernible). So that's just one of many reasons.

But again, Your Honor, the burden is not on the respondent. The burden is on the movant to be granted extraordinary relief available in only rare circumstances. And they have the burden of proving that these cases would proceed much faster, and the just have nothing except we'd like to skip the district court because we'd like to go to the circuit eventually, so why not go there first. And there is a reason that no case has ever allowed that, because all the other three prongs of 158 become a joke if you can merely say I'd like to move fast. This is not inefficient. And they're asking the Second Circuit to now potentially start ruling on an innumerable number -- I guess kind of a numerable number -- on some unknown but very high number of direct certification motions.

And there is a reason no case has ever held this, because it's wrong and because it would make a complete hash of the actual requirements of 158, which are simply not satisfied. I mean, I think at the end of the day it's kind of that simple.

Your Honor, I guess there are a couple of other things that were said that -- so let me just pause for a

minute, Your Honor. Does that answer your question?

THE COURT: Yeah, I guess so. I think the phrase leaves a lot, I think, a fair amount to interpret. But you needed to read it in the light of the other provisions, 158(d).

In the hospital case, I actually think that the district court ruled again quite on the PPP issue before it ever got to the circuit. And I think it died there. So clearly a direct appeal certification doesn't stop an appellate process. Some judges might conceivably put less into it than they would if they knew they were going to have to make a decision, but I don't think Judge McMahon would be one of those judges.

But I guess the issue is that these points will be raised in the future. And I guess any deviation from the general logic of the statute has to be pretty well thought out.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, I would say one other thing. Your point that there is a canon of construction statues for -- you know, designed to be read harmoniously to give effect to each provision, right? I mean, the first three prongs would really almost be erased if any time you just thought you could move faster and --

THE COURT: No, I understand. So I guess the answer to your question is I think you should move on to the

Page 134 point which, I stand correct, was raised in the last paragraph of the state's motion. I don't think in the U.S. Trustee's motion, about the Sackler settlement agreement --MR. HUEBNER: Sure. THE COURT: -- and whether this litigation is somehow a breach of that agreement. MR. HUEBNER: So, Your Honor, the answer is, as you might imagine, we are aware of what our settlement agreement says. So let me explain it as follows. The agreement was obviously negotiated and was I believe filed on the docket well before the confirmation hearing was underway, and certainly well before Your Honor issued a great amount of guidance during the hearing and great amount of further guidance in connection with the ruling, including at the ruling itself, including directing us not to change it. The ethos of that provision without any question is in fact getting to an appeal because, frankly, we have never had a problem with them. And that's the other great sort of unstated untruth, that somehow we are desperately

trying to avoid a layer of appellate review. That's wrong. And that's why the U.S. Trustee's puzzlement is puzzling, because we made our views quite clear.

We agree and in fact support -- who cares what we think? We're just lawyers for the Debtors. But so that

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

there is no confusion, we fully agree with and support the views of both this Court and Judge McMahon that this plan is not getting mooted until Judge McMahon rules. Period, end of story.

But that's because she already told us, which is why it's so terrific, that she understands the tremendous harm involved here in delay. The fact that like a half of one percent of the creditors are trying to stop one of the most complicated and overwhelmingly consensual plans in history. Let's not forget, Your Honor, that 4,924 governments voted on the plan.

THE COURT: Okay. But let me -- do you have the agreement of the people that need to agree on the settlement agreement?

MR. HUEBNER: We do, Your Honor. I was about to get there, Your Honor. So while kind of a waiver under the document is unquestionably something in favor of the debtors — and clearly the court — I can't imagine them to rule the Sacklers are not allowed to waive any provisions that are not in the state's best interest. You know, we are not amending it because you told us you don't want to see it amended again, this final document. But the answer is absolutely. We of course would not be here today litigating ourselves into a breach of the settlement agreement. It goes without saying that in light of the Court's ruling,

which we did not know until September 1st, and the way you ruled and the extraordinary use of the factual record, we don't think direct certification is legally appropriate. We don't think 158 is satisfied. We think it's an improper abuse of a statute and we think it's not in the estate's best interest because we have a judge who will rule and tell us whether she shares your view or not that this plan was entirely lawful. So the expedition provisions nobody wants to move away from. We want this on a rocket docket, and we were delighted that Judge McMahon adopted our briefing schedule. We do have a waiver of the obligation to pursue a direct appeal because it is wrong to do so and no longer makes sense. So you are representing that you do THE COURT: have a waiver from the Sacklers of that provision? MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, the notion that I would be here today asking you to enter a ruling that would then breach the settlement agreement (indiscernible) piece of the plan, obviously it goes without saying that is not right, could never be right, et cetera. Of course we have a waiver. THE COURT: Okay. MR. HUEBNER: And so, you know, that's why the

U.S. Trustee's puzzlement is -- I'm not sure what they are

puzzled about. We have a schedule before a fantastic judge

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

who understands the seriousness of these issues. What we don't want to do is be GM, where we end up with a direct certification and we wait 391 days for a ruling. I'm not going to elaborate the consequences, the fee burn, the delay in abatement, the delay in paying victims. You know, you've heard views from many parties enough times about the extraordinary pain and cost and harm of delay. So it's not puzzling at all.

We have a court, the proper court, the court that hears 99.9 percent of bankruptcy appeals and 100 percent of confirmation appeals in decades of the Second Circuit. And that's the court we should go to. And as we hope when that court rules and Your Honor's, you know, six-and-a-half-hour ruling is upheld on appeal, we will be ready to start (indiscernible) and improving and saving lives with the billions of dollars that 99 percent of the stakeholders, every voting class, and 80 percent of the states themselves, and almost all the voting creditors in the estates of the objecting states believe is the right outcome. So we have only one goal.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HUEBNER: So, Your Honor, unless the Court has any questions, that's all I have. I know that there are a few other parties on our side who have different things to say, but I think we're actually (indiscernible). But I'm

Page 138 happy to rest on our papers, which I think were, you know, hopefully complete and apprehensible on any issues that I did not hit. THE COURT: Okay, thank you. MR. HUEBNER: Mr. Preis? MR. BLABEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Can you hear me okay? THE COURT: Well, I have someone else on the screen I think. MR. BLABEY: All right, you can go ahead. Arik, you can go ahead. THE COURT: Mr. Blabey, did you want to go ahead? I think Mr. Preis is frozen for a second. MR. BLABEY: Yes, I can go ahead. Can you hear me okay, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes. MR. BLABEY: David Blabey from Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee of Governmental and Other Contingent Litigation Claimants. Your Honor, we also submitted an opposition to the request for certification. I think Mr. Huebner has covered all the arguments against certification in a lot of detail, so I will be very brief. I think it's important to respond, as Mr. Huebner did, just to one or two points raised by the United States

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Trustee.

At the outset of their argument, the United States

Trustee had argued that the Debtor's position on

certification was puzzling since the Debtors and other

parties have previously stated that they are in favor of

moving these cases along. And I want to be clear that no

one is more concerned with an expedited emergence and with

the desire to begin abating the opioid crisis than the Ad

Hoc Committee is.

But the reason why we oppose the motions is because we have concluded, along with the Debtors and the Committee, that going through the district court represents the best chance and the fastest possible emergency while also accommodating the desire for appellate review.

Your Honor mentioned at the September 30th hearing that those two interests have to be balanced and that there is a sweet spot that can be achieved between then. And we think that going through the district court is the best way to hit that sweet spot.

I also wanted to just respond to the argument made by the United States Trustee that the issues on appeal here involve pure questions of law. As Mr. Huebner noted, Judge McMahon's commentary on that was made after she had only received briefing from the United States Trustee. And I think that it's clear from the case law, including

Metromedia itself, that these issues are not purely legal issues. Metromedia says that before granting a third-party release, the bankruptcy court must make "specific factual findings". And of course that's what the Court did here in some detail. So I think unless the U.S. Trustee is suggesting that they don't actually disagree with the Court's findings under Metromedia, then the appeals obviously involve questions of fact. And I think with that, Your Honor, I won't belabor or repeat the points that Mr. Huebner did. But for the reasons he has stated today and set forth in our brief, we would also urge the Court to deny the motions. Thank you. THE COURT: Okay, thank you. MR. PREIS: Good morning, Your Honor. Can you hear me? THE COURT: Yes, I can. I can see you, too. Okay, great. Good morning, Your Honor. Arik Preis, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld on behalf of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. Please tell me if at any point you can't hear me, because this is the first time we're trying this. Okay? THE COURT: Okay. By agreement, Mr. Huebner argued most if not all of the motion on behalf of the parties that are

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

objecting to the motion. I rise now only to address the fourth point, which is whether the appeal will advance the progress of the case, a point that you've been talking about a little bit.

As Mr. Huebner stated and as the case law clearly states -- for instance, see Johns Manville, 449 B.R. 34, if this provision were to simply mean that bypassing the district court and going to an appellate court would be faster than having to go to the district court first, by definition every case would be certified to the appellate courts and there would never be any appeal to the district court. We talked about that.

But that's of course not the case and not the correct way to look at the statute. Rather, as Mr. Huebner pointed out and we point out in our papers, one must look at the facts and circumstances and whether bypassing second circuit would materially advance the progress of the case, not the progress of the appeal. And the facts of this case in particular weigh heavily against direct certification.

Mr. Huebner already addressed the five or six most important points here but let me just restate them before I get to the main point. First, the district court has already given us a very fast schedule and said basically it's going to render its oral -- going to hear oral argument in 46 days.

Second, there are fact-specific issues that the appellants have sought to raise which will be reviewed by the district court. And you've also talked about those earlier.

Third, there is a jurisdictional issue that the Appellants have raised, and which Mr. Huebner mentioned, which if they are successful at the Second Circuit, will result in going back to the District Court to cure it and then back up to the Second Circuit.

Fourth, sitting here today, we don't know if the Second Circuit would even accept certification.

Fifth, even if the Second Circuit accepts certification, there is no assurance that they are going to accept Judge McMahon's schedule or that they're going to move in anywhere close to the alacrity of Judge McMahon.

Sixth, and something people kind of just passed over, is if we go on the dual path that the Office of the United States Trustee is recommending, we will have to -they will brief in front of the Second Circuit a motion to expedite or to certify, we will respond. They may have to respond. We will then have oral argument, and then the Second Circuit will make its decision. And if the Second Circuit makes its decision right before Judge McMahon makes her decision, then we will have wasted the estate's time and money over the last month-and-a-half, where we already have

a district court ready to make a ruling on a very quick schedule.

However, I did not just get up to echo a lot of what Mr. Huebner has said or to lay some additional points. Simply stated, everyone here talks about the need for speed in this case. But the Office of the United States Trustee wants this Court and all parties to take the risk that going to the Second Circuit will not result in more expeditious review in going to the Second Circuit -- in going to the district court.

Putting aside that we believe that the case law is squarely against them, taking that risk will result in more delay and more time between now and the effective date.

And the appellants implicitly are downplaying the slowdown of a few weeks or maybe a month or two. That's the point I want to talk about, as it goes to the harm that will occur if there is a slowdown in these cases. In other words, that the cases are not advanced.

Yesterday, the CDC issued a press release stating that the number of overdose deaths in the United States rose in the 12 months ending March 2021 as compared to the 12 months ending December 2020. In sheer numbers, approximately 96,000 people died of overdose deaths in the United States in the 12 months ending March 2021, of which approximately 72,000 were opioid overdose deaths.

Moreover -- and here is the significant part -while opioid overdose deaths accounted for 71.1 percent of
all overdose deaths in the 12 months ending December 2020,
in contrast, opioid overdose deaths accounted for 75.2
percent of all overdose deaths in the 12 months ending March
2021. In other words, opioid overdose deaths constituted
almost 90 percent of the increase, while only being 75
percent of the overdose -- of all overdose deaths. Said
another way, we are losing the fight against the opioid
epidemic.

But the facts don't end there. There are some other examples. Approximately 1,000 of 15,000 addiction treatment centers have closed in the last 18 months. 54 percent of addiction treatment centers have closed programs, and 65 percent have been forced to turn away patients due to constraints placed upon them by COVID. 39 percent of treatment organizations believe they could survive six months or less as of September 2020, despite 52 percent of such organizations reporting an increase in demand for --

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to cut you off though, Mr. Preis. I know the following. I believe that the disagreement here is not over the need to respond promptly as soon as possible to the opioid crisis, but rather a difference of opinion on the interpretation of the statute and how it would be implemented. And I don't think

the U.S. Trustee or any of the appealing states disagrees with you that getting money out promptly is extremely important.

They assert that they need to balance that with their view as stated on appeal that the plan isn't the proper way to do that. And that's really an issue for appeal and an issue for consideration when one hears motions for a stay pending appeal. But I don't think as far as this motion before me is concerned there is a disagreement as to the goal, which is to get a prompt appellate review. I think it's really just about, A, whether the statute permits what the movants want, and B, as a subset of that, whether the movants are right that if the statute in its last prong focuses on speed of appellate review, that a direct appeal will result in that determination.

So I'm going to cut that part short. I know it's incredibly important. I think it's more important for a hearing on a motion for a stay pending appeal though.

MR. PREIS: Understood, Your Honor. And I will then cut it short. I will just say the following. Everyone again talks about the speed. But the movants effectively want all of us to take the risk that they are right. That's the point here, and that's what I was going to get to. And with that, Your Honor, I have nothing further.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

1 MR. LIESEMER: Your Honor, may I be heard?
2 THE COURT: Sure, go ahead.

3 MR. LIESEMER: Jeffrev Liesemer. C

MR. LIESEMER: Jeffrey Liesemer, Caplin &

Drysdale, on behalf of the multi-state governmental entities

group. We also put in an opposition to direct

certification. A lot of ground has been covered this

afternoon with respect -- on the plan supporter side, so I'm

going to be very brief.

Your Honor asked the parties -- I took it as all parties -- whether we had any signal from the Second Circuit that they would move expeditiously. And my client group is not aware of anything from the Second Circuit, and we all know that Judge McMahon has set a full day oral argument for November 30th. She is keenly aware of the significance of this case and the importance of timing. And we have -- the case has been -- the appeal before Judge McMahon has been set on a fast track.

And the other point I wanted to make, Your Honor, is that I think it's been established here that when Your Honor rendered the bench ruling and confirmed the plan, Your Honor wasn't writing on a blank slate. When Your Honor approached the third party release, Your Honor applied Metromedia. When Your Honor dealt with due process, Your Honor cited and relied on Mullane and Motors Liquidation. When Your Honor dealt with jurisdiction, Your Honor

interpreted Quigley. These are all Second Circuit and Supreme Court cases, they are all controlling decisions, and therefore, we don't believe that the movants have satisfied the controlling decision prong or any of the other prongs for the reasons stated in our opposition and what's been said on the plan supporter side. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. And I did -- because I read the other objections, I read your objection, and I thought it was quite focused and clear, so thank you.

MR. LIESEMER: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. SHORE: Your Honor, this is Chris Shore. May

I be heard briefly?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SHORE: Thank you, Your Honor. Chris Shore from White & Case on behalf of the Ad Hoc Group of Individual Victims. I have one observation and one clarification of the record.

Clearly there is a narrative that's attempting to be created, both in the papers filed in court and in the press coverage of this and everything else that what Your Honor did in this case was some extraordinary change of law. And I think the direct certification motion is another effort on the (indiscernible) to try to turn the confirmation order, which Mr. Huebner has pointed out is straight down the middle of existing law right now and turn

it into something extraordinary. And that's not helpful to the process at this point.

And in order to make that point, you heard a number of people wear the mantle of either a government regulator or a government to say that they're out there protecting the constitutional rights of their citizens which are being deprived. That is not able to be squared with the legal position they're taking and what happens in bankruptcy court.

Their legal position is the third-party releases are unconstitutional and depriving due process of citizens or are not authorized by the statue. If that were truly the case and they truly believe that, you would see the U.S. Trustee objecting to every third party release. You would see states intervening in bankruptcy cases, at confirmation, to object to a third-party release of their citizens' claim. That doesn't happen. This isn't about them protecting constitutional rights or parties, it's their attempt to use those constitutional rights to create a narrative that what you did here is so extraordinary that this will be one of the one in ten thousand (indiscernible) that gets directly certified under the statue. And I think it's fair game for Your Honor to take judicial notice (indiscernible) that you don't have the United States Trustee objecting to every third-party release either because it violates individual's

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

constitutional rights, or it is (indiscernible). And you don't have states appearing every time there is a third-party release to advance the position that their citizens are being deprived of their (indiscernible).

Now, with respect to the clarification, the U.S.

Trustee has repeated in this Court and elsewhere that -- and it sounds good -- it's not just that constitutional rights are being violated, people's property is being taken away without compensation. And you heard that today, that people have Sackler claims and you, Your Honor, entered an order which takes those claims away without compensation.

First -- and this is a point that the first words out of Judge McMahon's mouth in questioning the United States Trustee is what claims are we talking about.

Identify for me a claim that exists against the Sacklers that is being released under the plan that is not either duplicative of a claim against the estates, or is it an estate claim itself? The U.S. Trustee was unable to do it then. They are still unable to do it now. I keep asking them to identify (indiscernible) hearing if it goes forward when we try to balance (indiscernible).

But from our perspective, this is a policy point over hypothetical claims that they say are being released.

But it is not true to say that the claims are being released without compensation.

Counsel for the United States Trustee cited the plan supplement to support her argument that says the plan requires that nobody get paid (indiscernible) Sacklers.

That, again, sounds good, but not correct. I'll just cite to Section 2(b)(1) of the non-NAS, the TDP. It says, and this is an important word, "Claims will not be determined based upon (indiscernible)." But the fact that the -- right? It doesn't say that you're not getting paid for it.

I just says when you're trying to calculate what distributions will be under the TDP, it is without regard to who caused the harm.

The fact that the determination of payouts is made agnostic to where the harm comes from is not the same as saying that the funds that are put there by the Sacklers are not in payment in part for the Sackler claim. The confirmation record is clear that the release of direct claims against the Sacklers related to opioid use and the release of the -- or the channeling of the claims against the Debtors, was a sine qua non of the Sackler's agreement to pay.

So it is incorrect, and from a third-party perspective sensationally incorrect to say that the way the plan works, and the confirmation order works, is that people who have claims against the Sacklers are having those claims taken away without compensation. It's just that all of the

compensation comes through the TDP, at least for the individuals. And that in the determination of the payouts, there is not going to be a specific allocation between whether it was Mortimer Sackler who did it or Purdue who did it, which of course is completely appropriate if we want to get (indiscernible).

So that's all I have, Your Honor, unless you have any --

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, with huge apologies, Mr. Shore, I actually missed a page of my notes. I just want to take ten more seconds on that. Because the TDPs are actually very clear. And in fact, Section 2(b)(2) of both the adult and the NAS expressly state that any distribution is deemed to be in satisfaction of essentially -- I'm not going to read the whole language, it's a little bit techy. But on both your claims against the Sacklers and your claims against Purdue for exactly this reason. In other words, there absolutely is compensation. We all know that the funding to pay the TDPs is coming because of the publicprivate splits, because of the Sackler fund. But again, all of the states, including the appellants and movants, require in Phase I mediation, and they know it. The money is only coming in and only being split and only going to people with claims against the Sacklers because there is a settlement

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

with the Sacklers that provides for the billions of dollars.

And they also know that, as this Court insisted, releases are inextricably tied to claims against Purdue also. You have to hold a claim against Purdue, be the holder of a claim to do that.

Your Honor, two other very quick points. Number one, I've got more data for you, because I know it's very important to you. We think that the average time based on what we saw just to get the first step from the Second Circuit on direct certification is about three months. And then when you add in briefing, oral argument, and ruling, unsurprisingly, you get to the GM outcome where the first step was about three months, but then in the end it was obviously over a year until they ruled. It's just not knowable because at each step there's unknown -- not total uncertainty about delay, but it is months and months I think is probably the best anybody could say.

Number two, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Could I ask, regardless of how Judge

McMahon would rule, would the appellants -- I'm sorry, would

the appellees -- and the appellants have already said they

would do this -- would the appellees promptly seek expedited

review?

MR. HUEBNER: So, Your Honor, I clearly can't speak on the fly alone at home for what all the appellees

would do. I mean, I just can't. Obviously I could never do
that. I don't ever misrepresent things.

From our perspective fundamentally, as Mr. Shore said, we think your decision is actually right down the middle of the fairway. We expect it to be affirmed by Judge McMahon. We certainly hope it will be.

And, Your Honor, in that respect, I do need to take one thing that's of critical importance to me. We were all wearing masks before Judge McMahon. And, frankly, things were a little bit muffled. There is one thing in Judge McMahon's ruling where she said the Debtors have conceded that there is a substantial question going to the merits. To be clear, we don't believe we made any such concession, because we don't believe that to be true.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, I didn't pose my question correctly. I'm not asking you to waive rights with respect to arguments where you are seeking a stay pending appeal.

Take that out of the picture. Assume you have whatever rights you have on that.

MR. HUEBNER: Okay, understood.

THE COURT: What I'm asking is different, which is if there is an appeal and I guess a stay is granted, would the Debtors, along with the appellants, seek expedited relief from the circuit court?

MR. HUEBNER: Yes. So, Your Honor, it's sort of

like a triple advisory opinion. Right? There is a November 9th stay hearing we haven't had yet. But we intend both to put on evidence, as is our right, and put the movants to their evidence.

There is an opinion of Judge McMahon we have not seen yet, and we don't know what it's going to say. And so, you know, if the fundamental question is, you know -- and I'll make it even more stark than you posed it. Do you agree to continue to be stayed and not emerge as long as anybody wants to keep going?

THE COURT: No, no. I'm not asking that. I'm just asking will the Debtors, if there is an appeal, seek expedited treatment of it?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ HUEBNER: Well, we wouldn't be the appellant. So I guess the question --

THE COURT: Well, you might be. You might be.

She might rule against you and in favor -- so, again, I'm not asking you anything about a stay. I'm not asking you to waive any rights in respect to the stay. I'm just saying if it's before the circuit court, I'd like to have an idea as to whether, as the appellants have said, you would seek expedited treatment without any waiver on stay rights.

MR. HUEBNER: Understood, Your Honor. Here's what I would say. I have a client. This is not a simple question. And, frankly, without knowing what Judge

McMahon's ruling says in either direction -- because you're right, I don't even know if I'm the appellee or the appellant. So to represent today on October X that on December X I pledge today to do X or Y, I'm just not sure that it's a question that I can answer, let alone that I would be doing it given I may have been exposed to COVID and I'm completely alone in my apartment right now. And I would be doing it by guessing of what answer my client would like me to give.

But, Your Honor, one last point on prong four, which I actually thought was in some ways the easiest of the four prongs. The case law says -- and I forgot to give you this answer before -- that circuit courts are greatly helped by district courts --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HUEBNER: -- passing on things first.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HUEBNER: And so since we know she's going to pass on it first to a virtual one hundred percent certainty before they would ever get to it, probably before they even decide whether they're willing to get to it, the notion that things should proceed in the ordinary course and that extraordinary relief on which the cases all go against them seems to us to be definitively the better view. So I apologize. But one extra point I didn't make.

And on the Jersey issue, Your Honor, which Mr. Underwood, in violation of (indiscernible) Paragraph 39, raised totally -- not even in the papers. Just to give Your Honor more comfort that we're not a bunch of idiots on our end, the motion we understand from the A side of the family was timely made to the Jersey court. I believe the hearing was held on October 1st, and we have no reason to believe that we would not be timely ready to emerge. So I'm not really sure why that has any relevance. I'm not sure why he was allowed to ask us random deposition questions in the middle of a hearing that he's not even a movant on. But the answer is the right answer. And hopefully that gives the Court comfort that we all sort of know what we're doing, trying to bring this thing to an ability to help the American people. So, Your Honor, with that, I'm going to for sure go back on mute unless the Court has any questions for me. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. We've been at this for a while. I'll hear very brief response from the movants. Maybe we should start with Ms. Eitel from the U.S. Trustee. MS. EITEL: Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate the time, and I will be brief. I want to hit just quickly five or six points that have been addressed in the arguments today.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

The first is maybe not -- the other parties have raised, but it's an issue have concern. Section 2.9 in the shareholder settlement agreement. If you recall, during the confirmation hearing, the United States Trustee expressed concern that the document had not been signed and that under the agreement itself, it was subject to being amended postconfirmation. And the Court said once I sign the confirmation order, that's it. That's the shareholder settlement agreement. So based on what Mr. Huebner said today, it sounds like -- I mean, a waiver is nothing but an amendment by another name. So I think we need to get some clarity on that, when exactly was that shareholder agreement amended. Was it amended after confirmation? And if so, is that a violation of a confirmation order? I don't know because we don't know when it happened. THE COURT: I mean, that provision is there so that the estate is not worse off, that the terms --MS. EITEL: I understand --THE COURT: It's not to protect the Sacklers. So I think there is a difference between our waiver and amendment. MS. EITEL: Your Honor, fair enough. I will move But I just wanted to raise it because this was an issue of confirmation about the malleable shareholder settlement

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Page 158 1 agreement. 2 THE COURT: Okav. Secondly, Mr. Huebner never addressed 3 MS. EITEL: what we raised about his letters to Judge McMahon. He told 4 5 Judge McMahon on June 16th the Second Circuit had never 6 squarely addressed these issues, and yet he arqued to the --7 THE COURT: I understand that point. But 8 ultimately I have to make this decision, not Mr. Huebner. 9 MS. EITEL: Understood, Your Honor. And here's 10 what I would say. I can't frame it --11 THE COURT: And, by the way, Judge McMahon didn't grant that request. And as she says in her letter, that's 12 13 after talking with me. So there's no estoppel here. 14 MS. EITEL: Oh, I understand, Your Honor. But 15 it's just it's interesting that the position in the summer 16 was it's not clearly addressed today, it's decades-old, cite 17 it, and there's not a problem. 18 But here's the legal issue, Your Honor --19 MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, I'm happy to --20 THE COURT: Look, this is a real side point. So 21 let's move on from it. 22 MS. EITEL: So here's the critical point. Can a 23 bankruptcy court extinguish claims of one non-debtor against 24 another non-debtor consistent with due process? That's 25 never been considered or decided by the Second Circuit, and

Page 159 that's the pure legal issue here. It's not dependent upon the facts other than the fact that one may be a non-debtor and the other is a non-debtor. But the rest of it is a red herring. Your Honor, third, Mr. Huebner said these people, these claims don't exist. And I have two responses for that THE COURT: Actually, you know what? I'm not even sure that's right. I think GM, the Motor Liquidation case, actually addresses that point. Because there was a specific free and clear order, and they were focusing on what claims were covered by that and what due process was involved. And that involved a determination of notice. MS. EITEL: But that was respect to 363. It wasn't --THE COURT: But it's --MS. EITEL: But that's a statutory provision that allows that to be done. There is no statutory (indiscernible) entirely different. THE COURT: But the point is the due process point, not the underlying source. That's covered by the Manville-Drexel-Metromedia line of cases. You are mixing apples and oranges there I think. MS. EITEL: Your Honor, I would just beg to

differ. But I know the day is long, and I've said my piece

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

on Manville, Drexel, and Metromedia, et cetera. But I would simply say this. The third point is Mr. Huebner says these people and these claims don't even exist. Well, if that's the case, then it's really just a hypothetical release and it's ineffectual. Strike the provision, appeal over, problem solved. And secondly, I would note that in Aegean Marine, Judge Wiles spent an entire paragraph talking about I'm often asked to give these releases just to protect people from nuisance claims. And he declined to do so and said that would be highly inappropriate to do so.

So, you know, the Debtors can't have it both ways. Either the Sackler family paid money to get released from something that was a real threat and harm that they were worried about or there's nothing that's being released as Mr. Huebner would say so there should be no release. I mean, there's --

THE COURT: But clearly -- look, there are claims asserted by the 48 states and the District of Columbia and governmental entities. Some of them are police power claims, I think. Some of them are not, I think. I have a much harder time -- and I think this is all that -- I don't think was Mr. Huebner. I think it was Mr. Shore -- understanding the basis for individual claimant's claims against the Sacklers. And this is really fundamentally a question of bankruptcy law.

Interestingly, I asked that the parties address it at the disclosure statement hearing because the U.S. Trustee actually raised an issue as to what types of claim and the basis for it would be covered by the proposed release at that time. And I cited then -- because I thought everyone should understand it and address and I'm going to cite it now, although, it hasn't been addressed all this time and I think it's important.

The second circuit has discussed the issue at length as to the basis for claims by individuals against the owners of companies based on the actions that they take as owners or their ownership. It is discussed at length in in Re Tronox Inc., 855 f3d 84 99-107 2nd Circ 2007. Of course it goes back a lot farther that that in time and the Tronox court discusses this case as well as many others. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v PepsiCo, Inc., 884 f2d 688 2nd Circ 1989.

So I think the only point that is being made here, and unfortunately, it's not really being made for my benefit but because I think people are being tired of pillar over it in the press which is a shame because people shouldn't care about those things, is that it really isn't that easy -- in fact, it's exceedingly difficult -- for an individual to assert this type of claim on his or her own behalf because the case law is pretty clear that in most cases, it's a

claim that belongs to the Debtor's estate. So that's the only point that I think Mr. Shore was making and I think you better be prepared with an answer for that question when we get to the hearing on stays pending appeal as to who -whose interests you're representing. I would raise that, and I think we will eventually get to it -- the pre-trial conference -- on this point, but it's an important point. But it's not important for this issue. MS. EITEL: Your Honor, (indiscernible). I just make one point before I move on to the final which is, this is way in which this case is extraordinary. The Sackler family is directly --THE COURT: Ma'am, the law is what it is. circuit has spoken on this issue repeatedly and I think the people who claim that they were poisoned by environmental contamination in Tronox would not put themselves second to anybody by Kerr-McGee --MS. EITEL: And I'm not suggesting that --THE COURT: -- so let's just move off of this point. It's really irrelevant to this issue. MS. EITEL: Certainly, Your Honor. I was --It is apparently not irrelevant to the THE COURT: press but then again, they don't read the cases. You do, so I expect you to address those cases when we get to the

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

issues of stay pending appeal. They do not necessarily apply to the states. It's a different consideration.

MS. EITEL: Understood, Your Honor. Moving on to the next point which, Mr. Huebner said that it was very clear there would be no (indiscernible) in this or wouldn't be mooted until there was a ruling by Judge McMahon, and the subtext of that, Your Honor, is that what about the second circuit? And --

THE COURT: I understand that issue, too, but that's a stay issue, too, Ms. Eitel. It's an important point, but I don't think it's an issue -- it's a peripheral issue for this hearing. It's very important for the stay hearing.

MS. EITEL: Understood, Your Honor, I just wanted to point it out that we did not get the -- an answer. And let me just simply close with, the four standards -- there are -- as I mentioned, only one needs to be satisfied. A lot of the argument today was directed towards somehow that this is going to slow the case down or make it more difficult. And I reiterate and urge that, these are parallel paths, and it may be that the second circuit does not accept the appeal once its board certifies it, but we should give them that opportunity in a case of this consequence, with a case with a discrete, legal, constitutional issue that has never been squarely presented

Page 164 to them before and see if the second circuit is interested in ruling in the first instance. We may or may not get there before Judge McMahon rules. We'll see. Your Honor, I have no further remarks to offer, and I thank you for your time. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MR. EDMUNDS: Your Honor, if I may --MR. GOLDMAN: -- be heard? THE COURT: Yes, but I think Mr. Edmunds was first. MR. GOLDMAN: Oh. I will yield to Mr. Edmunds. THE COURT: Okay. MR. EDMUNDS: Thank you, Mr. Goldman. Just very briefly, Your Honor. Brian Edmunds for the State of Maryland. You've heard, you know, exhaustive arguments on a bunch of grounds that, you know -- over anything the appellees could think of, that they raised. And essentially, it's like this. Do not certify under this provision that allows for expedition because that will actually make the course of this case go slower, and I don't think there's any basis for that. But the second circuit has the power to expedite it. It has the power to turn it down. The essential thing here is that the factors are

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

met and there may be other important cases, but if this case is not one of those cases, what is? And this is a quintessential case for direct appeal. The Court has already recognized the important decisions that the Court had to make -- the novelty of the issues that aren't directly controlled by any precedent. There is applicable precedent to be sure, but there's no decision of the second circuit that has dealt with these precise issues or issues of their importance in this context before.

And to the argument that somehow allowing direct appeal will slow these proceedings down -- there's just no answer. The statute is enacted to allow for the appeal because it will speed it up, and if the second circuit decides not to do that, it will, one -- Mr. Huebner just offered a three-month average. I have no reason to disagree with that. I think it can happen much faster if the second circuit wants to. But there will be a decision from Judge McMahon by then.

So what we're really arguing is not related to the provision that exists that allows the appeal to be sped up.

And it's telling also that Mr. Huebner could not commit, once it gets to the second circuit, to moving expeditiously through the second circuit. We intend to do that under federal rule of appellate procedure 2. We want a decision as quickly as we can, and you've heard all the states at the

last hearing say that that is what they want. That is what we are seeking.

I cannot interpret what Mr. Huebner and others said today as anything other than an attempt, in the end, to take an appeal that warrants certification and ultimately delay or potentially delay its resolution when it could be resolved faster.

THE COURT: Well, I think to be fair, it's not a question of delay. I think it's a question of wanting to preserve arguments against a request for a stay pending appeal. I think all sides here want to have the most expeditious emergence from bankruptcy possible except you all want to have it through the entire appellate process as expeditiously as possible and they are preserving their arguments to have -- to say, one appeal is enough. Please -- Judge Drain, please, Judge McMahon, please, second circuit, deny a future request for a stay.

I really don't think, having heard Mr. Price, for example, that anyone is looking to delay anything. They just have a different view as to balancing a need for speed versus preserving rights for a full appellate process.

MR. EDMUNDS: Well, Your Honor, the -- but the only -- whatever party's intent think, you know, it's critical that we move as quickly as possible. To not take advantage of law that allows us to move faster because it

might not work out that way doesn't seem to be the way to get to that end. THE COURT: There's merit to what you say, Mr. On the other hand, I actually don't think that's Edmunds. what the statute contemplates, and the case law doesn't say that either. I mean, otherwise, you'd always have -- you'd always go direct appeal and there were people in Congress that wanted that, but that's not what ended up in the statute. But you guys on both of this issue have addressed that point, I think, sufficiently. MR. EDMUNDS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. GOLDMAN: Your Honor, is --MS. MORALES: Can I ask a question? THE COURT: I'm sorry. Mr. Goldman's speaking at this point.

MR. GOLDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I just -I'll be very brief. I first want to thank Your Honor for
recognizing remembering the state's claims. There were a
number of complaints that were made part of the record.

Connecticut's on of them. I know there were a number of
other states that had claims -- pending claims -- against
the Sacklers under their unfair trade practices acts and so
certainly, they are detrimentally affected by the thirdparty releases. And the question now is, as Your Honor

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

rightly pointed out, to the individual claimants.

But moving on to one argument made by Mr. Huebner,

I thought I heard him suggest that the state's argument that

it's impermissible for third-party releases to capture

police power claims, you know, was somehow contrived or

designed as a novel argument to argue for direct review.

But that argument appeared throughout the objections I know

of at least of Connecticut, Maryland, and the District of

Columbia as well as Washington and Oregon based on concepts

of federalism and the principle that the bankruptcy code

doesn't displace state's claims that implicate the public

health, safety, and welfare, and that is a point of law on

which there is no controlling laws -- the back and forth on

-- in the principal argument. And that's the only point in

response that I want to make.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. GOLDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. GOLD: Your Honor, Matthew Gold, on behalf of the parties identified previously.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOLD: Can you hear, and may I be heard?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GOLD: Thank you, Your Honor. I, too, will be brief. First, I think Your Honor recognizes this, but I do want to make it clear that the United States Trustee and the

appealing states, while the relief we've sought is essentially identical on this motion, that the U.S. Trustee has raised on appeal issues that are in many ways broader than the ones that the states are asserting. And so many of the arguments that have been heard before regarding and essentially deal with the merits seem to apply to the issues that the U.S. Trustee is raising on appeal but not necessarily to the states' issues which as I said are more narrow and really mainly focused on the non-Debtor -nonconsensual releases being imposed on state police power actions. Second --THE COURT: But Mr. Gold, where does that lead? I mean, I -- one could logically infer from that that you're suggesting that I certify a direct appeal of the states' appeals and not the U.S. Trustee's and then we could be having appeals in two different forums? That doesn't make sense, right? MR. GOLD: No, I am not -- it does not make sense and I'm suggesting (indiscernible). THE COURT: Okay. MR. GOLD: I believe that the U.S. Trustee appeals include the appeals that are being raised by the states --THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOLD: -- and so that therefore, it would one

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

certification of a whole set of appeals which have been consolidated on to the district court docket because they're all appeals from the same order.

THE COURT: So even if there are a bunch of appeals in front of a district judge and a lot of them don't satisfy 28 U.S.C. 158(d)(2), they get to ride along with those that do?

MR. GOLD: Well, Your Honor, that's an interesting question and I understand that -- and I would say this. I mean, I think the important point is that we have raised issues that we believe unambiguously do satisfy the standard. If the Court wants to parse and say that some other issues do not and shouldn't be tagged along and aren't subject to that, that's fine. But it's very common for many issues to be raised and I don't understand the -- that the standard under the statutes has to be that every issue that's been raised has to fall within this rubric.

If there has to be a winnowing, I understand that, but that should not preclude issues that -- where it's valid for this to be done and where certification should be done to not be certified because there may be other issues in the case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLD: The -- I will just briefly note that Mr. Huebner went on at length and it is his -- and I trust

Your Honor understands that this attorney argument to a claim that we are seeking an exemption from the law. We have never said we seek an exemption from the law. We are saying that we are dealing with a circumstance that neither the second circuit nor any of the other cases, frankly, dealing with nonconsensual third-party releases have addressed. I think that the key word that Mr. Huebner used repeatedly was "zero" and I think that that word very aptly applies to the number of cases that have ruled either way on whether nonconsensual third-party releases, as recognized by some decisions, can be applied where the claimants are states exercising their police powers.

Now, we can argue about whether -- the Debtor's position is, well, a case saying that a bond holder can have their claim released is the same as a state exercising their police powers, so we have decisions in the record and that's fair for argument. That's what parties do. But to say that there's a controlling decision on that point, we maintain, is a vast overstatement of how the law lays which -- and that -- we believe that even we know that Your Honor rejected our views in the ruling, I think you recognized as you're going through it that the issues on these were more difficult and less easy to come to than some of the issues that were placed before Your Honor.

I will also add that the statements in front of

Judge McMahon -- and this was just two days ago, and I'm really surprised to hear this argument about this being -- that this appeal involves legal issues -- was not simply a matter of Judge McMahon reading the U.S. Trustee's papers and riffing on them. The -- Judge McMahon very clearly addressed the entire courtroom and said, it appears to me that the issues on this appeal are entirely legal in nature, and she was looking at that point not merely for purposes of the stay motion but also for setting a briefing schedule in terms of how the issues were going to be raised and how extensive of reliance on the record there was going to be.

So she said to the courtroom, does anyone disagree that these issues are legal in nature. Crickets. Complete silence. Zero comments from any of the parties who are now coming up and saying, oh, no, no, no. This appeal involves massive factual issues. This appeal is -- there's no way this appeal can be heard without all --

THE COURT: But, Mr. Gold, I mean, I -- first of all, I don't have the transcript. I wasn't there, obviously. And I guess the comments that you're making, and that Mr. Huebner made go to the Court's interpretation of the first factor that when it says, "the judgment involves a question of law," they say a pure question of law.

But frankly, the due process issue is a factual issue. Judge McMahon doesn't have to a fact-finder on that

issue, but it is -- there is a factual element to the issue. It wasn't really contested by your clients, I don't believe, as far as due process is concerned. So I guess understand both of your points, but ultimately, not having been there and not having the transcript, it's just not clear to me whether this is helpful on this point.

MR. GOLD: Okay. Fair enough, Your Honor. I won't --

THE COURT: And ultimately, it is more relevant as far as some of the other issues which maybe she's not addressing in that remark since the focus of the U.S.

Trustee was on the releases and Stern versus Marshall, et cetera, and jurisdiction and the like. Those are primarily pure legal issues. I understand that point.

There are some other issues that aren't

necessarily. For example, the merits of the settlement -
the Court's assessments of the settlement; the Court's

assessment of 1129(a)(7), those types of issues. So I'm

reluctant on a number of grounds to go off on this argument

you're making, a), because I wasn't there. I don't have the

transcript. B), I don't know what was really being

considered by Judge McMahon; and c), because I think that

for some of the points, I think there are basic legal

issues, but that's not dispositive for the question either

before me. And for other ones, I think they're mixed issues

of law and fact. So I guess enough said on that point.

MR. GOLD: Yes, Your Honor. The -- I will respond briefly to a comment that Mr. Shore made which I believe is simply a mischaracterization of the states' position. The states have been I think very clear that the states act in the court in their capacity as states in upholding the rights and wellbeing of their citizens. That is not the same as saying that those citizens have standing on their own power to raise these claims. In fact, it's the opposite -- is the states who come in and can assert arguments in order to protect their citizens. That is why the states do not come and effect on private citizens. They have a release imposed upon them because that's a separate issue.

This -- what we are talking about here is the instances where the states, seeking to protect their citizenry through their police powers, attempt to act and are now being deprived. And that is a -- really a narrower question that the one that (indiscernible).

Your Honor, I have nothing further to add (indiscernible). Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Very well.

MR UNDERWOOD: Your Honor, (indiscernible)

THE COURT: Is someone -- I'm sorry. Someone has been wanting to ask a question and since we're done with the response by the movants, I think I'll let you do that. Oh,

Page 175 1 I'm sorry. I didn't see you, Mr. Underwood. I didn't know 2 that you were going to respond. Ms. Morales, why don't you 3 ask your question and then we can go to Mr. Underwood. MS. MORALES: Okay. I have a question about -- so 4 5 when I filed my summary judgment, the response wasn't --6 they didn't respond with -- they just objected, and I don't 7 understand. Is that the answer I get? (indiscernible) like 8 they didn't respond to (indiscernible) they just objected 9 and (indiscernible) I quess I don't understand if that's the 10 final answer of their response. I mean --11 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Morales, I don't -- I'm not 12 quite sure which matter you're talking about. 13 MS. MORALES: Oh, okay. So I filed a summary --THE COURT: No, no. I don't need you to explain 14 15 it to me. It's not on the calendar for today. 16 MS. MORALES: Okay, sorry. 17 THE COURT: It's not what I prepared on. 18 MS. MORALES: Oh, okay. 19 THE COURT: It's not what any of the parties on 20 the phone, on Zoom, prepared on. So I can't answer your 21 question. 22 MS. MORALES: Yeah. But is --23 THE COURT: It's not what we should be doing here. 24 MS. MORALES: Okay. If I don't --25 THE COURT: Okay. So you can raise it separately.

Page 176 1 You can file some sort of pleading if you want. You can ask 2 the Debtors, but I -- we can't do it here at this point. 3 Mr. Underwood. MR. UNDERWOOD: Yes, Your Honor, very briefly. 4 5 The Trustee's -- the Trustee filed a motion to certify on 6 October 1st. We filed our joinder on October 7th. I'm not 7 aware of any reason that the joinder shouldn't be heard. 8 Secondly, with regard to this question that has 9 been asked now three times, we still don't have an answer, I 10 don't believe, that was an effective answer to whether or 11 not plan funding can occur here. I don't think that's 12 material on terms of all the issues that we're addressing. 13 THE COURT: I don't understand how possibly it's relevant at this point, Mr. Underwood, so let's move on. It 14 15 just isn't --16 MR. UNDERWOOD: All right. 17 THE COURT: -- to this issue before me. MR. UNDERWOOD: I mean, in terms of certification. 18 19 THE COURT: No. It's not relevant. 20 MR. UNDERWOOD: Okay. Would you suggest or think 21 that it's relevant with regard to the stay hearing that is -22 23 THE COURT: We'll get to that if we ever get to it 24 today. 25 MR. UNDERWOOD: Okay. I appreciate it. Thank

Page 177 1 you, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Okav. MR. UNDERWOOD: I would only just add that I think 3 that the Debtor's reading of Section 106 is remarkably 4 5 facile considering --6 THE COURT: Mr. Underwood, your client filed 7 proofs of claim in this case, right? 8 MR. UNDERWOOD: Correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: You wanted the Court to decide how 9 10 your clients would get paid under a plan, I assume, right? 11 MR. UNDERWOOD: Correct. 12 THE COURT: All right. That's enough from me. 13 MR. UNDERWOOD: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 MR. HUEBNER: So, Your Honor -- two -- literally, ten seconds. Number one, the number is not zero at all. I 15 16 guess Mr. Gold missed paragraph 15 of our brief where we 17 cite a seventh circuit case applying the third-party 18 releases to the FCC and a Delaware case applying it the 19 Those are right there in black and white, Paradigm 20 and Exxon. I won't read the pin sites. 21 With respect to Mr. Underwood, he should check the 22 CMO, paragraph 39, which bars joinder parties from making 23 arguments not in the movant's papers precisely for this Filing a joinder a few days before a hearing that 24 25 we never saw and making new arguments is a form of ambush

- barred by the rules of this court. There is a limit to how many things we can be fairly asked to respond to with no notice on an ambush basis. At some point, rules have to be followed.
- THE COURT: Okay. I guess, so that Mr. Goldman won't feel compelled to respond, I think all of those cases are outside of the circuit, right, Mr. Huebner?
- MR. HUEBNER: They are, Your Honor. His claim was that no case has ever applied to third-party releases to governmental entities.
- THE COURT: Oh, yes.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

- 12 MR. HUEBNER: And that is a false statement.
- THE COURT: Well, no. I understand and he thinks

 he's really -- as he should, at least -- confining it to the

 statute that's in front of me today.
 - MR. HUEBNER: Correct, Your Honor. And that's our point. We don't have to prove a negative. We're not seeing extraordinary relief. They're trying to get an exemption from existing law and there's just no justification for it. And the two cases that have ruled on it have gone the other way and that's all I have to say.
 - THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. All right. I'm going to take a brief break. I mean, literally brief, like five minutes. So I'll be back at twenty after.

25 AUTOMATED VOICE: Recording stopped.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry. Thanks. Okay
Good afternoon, everyone. This is Judge Drain. We're
resuming in In re Purdue Pharma, LP, et al.

I have before me two motions that each seek the Court's certification of a direct appeal, the Court's order confirming the Debtor's Chapter 11 plan to the second circuit. They are by the United States Trustee and by the so-called appealing states. I have a joinder in the U.S. Trustee's motion by a Canadian municipality and certain Canadian First Nations.

The U.S. Trustee's motion also seeks, albeit very briefly and without any real attempt to address the issues raised in it, direct certification of its appeal from my order dated September 15, 2021, that authorized the Debtors to take certain preliminary steps to be administratively ready to go effective on their plan when the conditions to the effective date occur. Although the Canadian parties joined in the U.S. Trustee's motion, obviously, that is not an issue for them, and it was not raised by the several appealing states.

The authority for a certification of a direct appeal to the circuit court, i.e., bypassing the district court in the normal order of appellate practice, is set forth in 28 U.S.C. Section 158(d)(2). Subsection B of that section states that if the -- any of the conditions for

met, the Court shall make the certification described in that subparagraph, i.e., this is not a matter of the Court's exercise of discretion, although, of course, the district court exercises some discretion in interpreting the statute as applies to the appeals or appeal at issue.

The Congress set forth that the Court shall certify a direct appeal if, (i), the judgment order or decrees involves a question of laws to which there is no controlling decision of the court of appeals for the circuit or of the Supreme Court of the United States or involves a matter of public importance. There's a common between "United States" and the word "or." There's no comma between the word "circuit" and the word "or" of the Supreme Court of the United States in that subsection.

The Court shall also certify a direct appeal under ii of this section if the judgment order or decree involves a question of law requiring resolution of conflicting decisions; or, (iii), an immediate appeal from the judgment order or decree may materially advance the progress of the case or proceeding in which the appeal is taken.

It is clear from the statute that while the court where the appeal sits and for purposes of bankruptcy rule 8006 and 8002 and 28 U.S.C. Section 158(c)(2), it sits with me for the purposes of these motions given the timing of the

orders which are subject to the appeal, the Court, as is appropriate, has no power to compel the circuit court to take the certification. That determination is up to the circuit court in the exercise of its discretion. See, generally, Weber, W-E-B-E-R, v United State Trustee, 484 f3d 154 2nd circ 2007.

This provision of the judicial a code was enacted in 2005 as part of the BPACPA amendments and has been the subject of substantial case law since then, not only at the bankruptcy court level, but also at the district court level since many of the requests for direct appeal have been made at the district court level, as well as at the circuit level. The Court takes primary quidance in resolving these motions which are opposed by the Debtors, the creditors committee, the ad hoc committee of governmental entities, the multistate governmental entities group, and the ad hoc committee of personal injury claimants, all of whom have an interest as appellees in respect of the appeals from the circuit's decision in the Weber case. In that case, the circuit took guidance, first and foremost, from the language of the statute; secondly, from the legislative history, setting for the reasons why Congress passed the statute; and in jurisprudential considerations.

I want to emphasize the latter point. The parties on either sides of these motions are passionate in their

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

articulations of their positions generally in these cases. At times, it has seemed to me that on the narrow issues before me in these motions that passion is not particularly apt and should be saved for arguments on the merits of the appeals and/or motions for stay pending appeal. The Court's determination of the motion before me today, as is appropriate since they're under the judicial code, 28 U.S.C., that is, really do go to considerations of jurisprudence and the proper functioning of the trial and appellate courts.

As much as the parties' strong feelings on the underlying merits of their appeals and the opposition to those appeals may be, they generally share similar goals here and more importantly, perhaps, the Court's determination here is guided not by issues regarding the merits of the appeals or even the merits of motions for stays pending appeal, but rather, the jurisprudential concerns set forth in the statute and the case law. And I am quite aware of the precedential effect of an opinion, tempting as that might be, that would go contrary to the precedent and the jurisdictional framework of this particular statutory provision solely because of my desire to expedite the case, not to limit the issues in the case but simple to move it to a rapid conclusion.

Ironically, I think all of the parties here share

with me the desire to move these cases to a rapid conclusion. They disagree over what is the best means to do that as it pertains to these motions, and I will address those concerns. But, ultimately, my ruling here, I believe, must be guided first and foremost by the language of the statute and these cases interpreting it and not by the parties or perhaps ever my own strong feeling that corners could be cut here within the language of the statute in favor of expedition.

The second circuit has given considerable guidance, as I said, in the Weaver case as to how to approach these types of motions. Now, I recognize that in the case they were determining whether to accept a certification of a direct appeal, but they talk about the statute generally which clearly goes to the three subsections that would lead a Court to direct a notice of certification since the reflect Congress's intent. As the circuit states, the focus of the statute is explicit on appeals that raise controlling questions of law, concern matters of public importance, and arise under circumstances where a prompt determinative ruling might avoid needless litigation. That's at 484 f3d 158.

The circuit goes on to say, "the legislative history confirms that Congress intended this provision to facilitate our provision of guidance on, quote -- I'll

highlight this, rather -- pure questions of law." Among the reasons for the direct appeal amendment was widespread unhappiness at the paucity of settled bankruptcy law The House report that accompanied the BPACPA precedent. emphasized that "decisions rendered by a district court as well as bankruptcy appellate panel are generally not binding and lack stare decisis value." The circuit then goes on to cite the House reports setting forth that view. It then says, "indeed, Congress believed direct appeal would be most appropriate when we are called upon to resolve a question of law not heavily dependent on the particular facts of the case because such questions can often be decided based on an incomplete or ambiguous record." Eliding, again, citations to the legislative history, the court continues, "when a discrete controlling decision or question of law is at stake, we may be able to settle the matter relatively promptly."

The court then turns to the last prong of Section 158(d)(2)(a), namely, "an immediate appeal from the judgment order or decree may materially advance the progress of the case or proceeding in which the appeal is taken." And states -- and this is still at page 158 -- "the legislative history also confirms that direct appeal may be appropriate where a judgment of this court would materially advance the progress of the case. For instance, where a bankruptcy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

court has made a ruling which if correct will essentially determine the result of future litigation. The parties adversely affected by the ruling might very well fold up their tents if convinced that the ruling has the approval of the court of appeals but will not give up until that becomes clear. When that ruling is manifestly correct or manifestly erroneous, the parties would profit from its immediate review in this court."

I think it is fair to say that what the court was addressing there and what many courts and the leading treatise on bankruptcy have noted also with regard to the third prong, i.e., materially advancing the progress of the case or proceeding, is a focus on the case not the appeal itself, not the speed of the appeal, but the conduct of the case, and accordingly, have applied that section where it has been applied to interlocutory appeals or appeals that for purposes of the bankruptcy courts jurisprudence on what constitutes a final order will determine the direction of a case, i.e., a gatekeeping issue for how the parties will then proceed to negotiate a plan and the like. I take this in part also from the court's following analysis in Weaver where it focuses on interlocutory appeals and mandamus as well as the discussion in I Collier at Bankruptcy, paragraph 5.06(d), 16th ed. 2021.

The circuit noted in the Weaver case, however,

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

that Congress carefully limited the circumstances for a direct appeal while introducing the possibility of the right in Section 158(d)(2)(a). At paragraph 160 of the opinion, the circuit states, "nevertheless, although the Congress emphasized the importance of our expeditious resolution of bankruptcy cases, it did not wish us to privilege speed over other goals. Indeed, speed in not necessarily compatible with our ultimate objective: Answering questions wisely and well. In many cases involving unsettled areas of bankruptcy law, where viewed by the district court, would be most helpful. Courts of appeals benefit immensely from reviewing the efforts of a district court to resolve such questions. Permitting direct appeal too readily might impeded the development a coherent body of bankruptcy case law."

I'll skip certain citations and then go on the rest of the quote: "Moreover, since district courts tend to resolve bankruptcy appeals faster that courts of appeals" -- citations omitted -- "and because this court has relaxed the meaning of finality in bankruptcy cases, the cost of speed of permitting district court review will likely" -- I'm sorry -- "the cost in speed of permitting district court review will likely be small."

The court went on the state twice that,

"therefore, in exercising its discretion whether to take a

direct certification it would most -- in most cases -- adopt

the latter path of allowing some cases to percolate through normal channels," id., and also id., at 161.

That view is to the caution with which courts should approach a request to certify a direct appeal is born out in the case law where the courts have held that direct certification of an appeal is a procedural remedy reserved for exceptional circumstances in which guidance of the circuit courts of appeals is necessary. See, for example, In re Sabine Oil and Gas Corp., 551 B.R. 132 142 SDNY 2016 and In re BGI, Inc., 504 B.R. 754 770 SDNY 2014. And I'm sorry, the Sabine case is a bankruptcy SDNY 2016 cite.

The movants have contended that each of the three subsections is independently met under Section 158(d)(2)(a) and correctly noted that they can move ahead and must certify a direct appeal where any one of them is met. See, for example, Homaidin, H-0-M-A-I-D-I-N, v Sallie Mae, S-A-L-L-I-E, M-A-E, 2020 U.S. District LEXIS 177 126 EDNY February 25, 2020, where all of the parties agreed that there was no controlling case from the Supreme Court or the second circuit on the issue before it -- an important issue -- involving the interpretation of the non-dischargability of obligations to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend. The objectants argue to the contrary that none of the subsections of 28 U.S.C.

The case law is clear and consistent with the Weaver case that only pure questions of law, not mixed questions of law and fact with some exceptions where the record is crystal clear and it's primarily not exclusively a legal question, are the types of issues covered by both subsections, I and II, of the statute. Again, see Weaver 484 f3d at 158 and In re American Home Mortgage Investment Corp., 408 B.R. 4244 D Delaware 2009.

In addition, the courts have addressed at length whether a question of law for purposes of this provision is one "as to which there is no controlling decision of the court of appeals for the circuit or of the Supreme Court of the United States."

I will note that the U.S. Trustee made for the first time at oral argument the argument that there need not be a controlling decision -- I'm sorry -- that there may need to be -- excuse me -- there may be a controlling decision at the circuit level, but if there is not one at the Supreme Court level, then subsection I is satisfied. I thoroughly disagree with that argument. The United States Supreme Court rules in a good year on one or two bankruptcy matters, deny certiorari on scores of them, and the notion that circuit law would not be controlling and instead, the path of direct certification should be one aimed at the United States Supreme Court appears to me to be completely

inconsistent with the statute's purpose and in addition, is inconsistent with the statute's plain meaning. It wouldn't reference the court of appeals for the circuit, i.e., in this case, the second circuit, if controlling law at the court of appeals level would be irrelevant to the determination as was argued at appeal -- I'm sorry -- at oral argument by the U.S. Trustee.

As far as what is controlling law for purposes of subsection 2(a)(i), the courts have recognized that this may be supplied by combining holdings from multiple cases, but it is nevertheless law at the circuit level or if there's no law at the circuit level, at the Supreme Court level which admits no ambiguity in resolving the issue of pure law because that's the first element of the requirement in (i). See, In re Gravel 2019 Bankruptcy LEXIS 2576 at page 13; Bankruptcy D Vermont August 12, 2019; and In re Millennium Lab Holding, II, LLC, 543 B.R. 703 708 Bankruptcy D Delaware 2016.

Again, one is governed by the clear direction from the Weaver case that the statute works where there is discrete controlling question of law at stake that can be decided without focusing on an extensive factual record.

The courts have dealt with arguments that try to find a niche outside of controlling precedent and generally have been wary of such arguments. As noted by such courts, novel

arguments do not make controlling precedent any less so.

See In re Ladder Number 3 Corp., 2018 WL 2298349 EDNY March
28, 2018; and In re Goody's Family Clothing 2009 U.S.

District LEXIS 67011 at page 5 D Delaware July 30, 2009.

As also noted by the district court for the District of Delaware, direct certification is not warranted where a movant was not arguing the absence of controlling law but was arguing the absence of a decision that adopted its position, In re Comex Holdings, LLC, 534 B.R. 606 611 D Delaware 2015. See also In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., 2014 U.S. District LEXIS 17689 at page 12, note 3, D Delaware, February 12, 2014.

The reason for this approach I think was made clear by Judger Gerber in In re General Motors, Corp., 409 B.R. 24 Bankruptcy SDNY 2009 where the court emphasized that the statute, no matter how important the matter be to a particular case, does not in this provision require direct certification where the circuit would be only deciding again what it had previously decided in prior cases. The focus instead is on where the circuit would be asked to make new law and the context of that, again, is purely a legal question.

As the editors of Colliers note, most of the requests for certification involving important matters of statutory -- involve important matter of statutory

interpretation where there is a new statute, either the amendment to a bankruptcy code provision or a separate statute that requires interpretation for purposes of the bankruptcy court's exercise of its jurisdiction over the case as was the case in Springfield Hospital v Carranza, In re Springfield Hospital, Inc., 618 B.R. 109 bankruptcy D Vermont 2020; see I Collier on bankruptcy, paragraph 5.06(a).

Finally, as far as Section 158(2)(a)(i) is concerned, Congress, as a separate basis under that provision, if the matter involves -- or the appeal involves -- a matter of public importance. Again, the courts have spent substantial time construing that provision and also can be said to have construed it narrowly. Under the case law, a matter of public importance for purposes of this section is a legal question that will advance the cause of jurisprudence to a degree that is usually not the case if decided by the circuit. Mark IV Industries, Inc., v The Mexico Environmental Department, 452 B.R. 385 388-89 SDNY 2011; In re American Home Mortgage Investments Corp., 408 B.R. 44; In re Nortel Networks Corp., 2010 Bankruptcy LEXIS 812 bankruptcy D Delaware March 9, 2010; and In re General Motors, Corp., 409 B.R. at 28.

The court in that decision, which I've already cited, was obviously presiding over a substantial business,

and the effect of its decision would affect literally tens of thousands of people. In addition, parties raised constitutional issues. Nevertheless, the court determined that a direct appeal was not warranted since guidance on those issues in a controlling way for purposes of the statute existed. See also, In re Sabine Oil and Gas, Corp., 551 B.R. at 40.

Having heard the parties' arguments and obviously being quite familiar with the issues on appeal, I believe that the movants have not satisfied their burden under Section 158(2)(a)(i), either on the first aspect of that provision, i.e., the no controlling decision point, or the alternative aspect of that provision, i.e., involves a matter of public importance. The court's decision that is the subject of the appeal of the confirmation order addressed at length the substantial case law at the circuit level governing each of the issues on appeal that are highlighted for purposes of these motions. It addressed the controlling decisions on the court's jurisdiction, namely Celotex and Quigley -- that is, the Supreme Court's Celotex opinion and the second circuit's opinion in In re Quigley, 676 f3d 45 2d circ 2015.

It addressed the Stern v Marshall issues which, though directly addressed on point in this circuit by the circuit court, have been the subject of extensive general

rulings by the circuit and the Supreme Court in multiple opinions which, at best, the circuit would be asked to refine the application of that case law to the particular facts of this case not a pure question of law for purposes of how that term is viewed in this provision.

The court also addressed the due process issues which obviously are governed by Moline v Hanover at the Supreme Court level and the second circuit's Motors
Liquidation case which I believe are controlling decision, either at the Supreme Court level or, where there is a decision at the second circuit level, at that level. In addition, and as I noted in my ruling that's on appeal, the applicability of due process concerns is substantially factbased and does not present a pure issue of law, I believe, although, it is one that, I believe, is subject to rather rapid review, given the record before the Court and the ultimate ruling by the Court.

The appealing states have argued that no second circuit opinion of Supreme Court opinion exists applying or construing the issue of a course of third-party claims release to states who are asserting, at least in part, their police power rights or their police power. I agree with that assertion, albeit, that there are certainly decisions in other circuits that address that point, although primarily implicitly.

I do not believe, however, that that lack of a decision directly on point is a factor that should require me to certify a direct appeal. The bankruptcy code itself addresses the limitations of the bankruptcy power in response to the police power of governmental entities and otherwise, does not cabin it. And I believe that, therefore, this argument, while certainly a perfectly appropriate argument for appeal as it was perfectly appropriate to make before me, falls into the category of arguments that were addressed in, for example, Goody's Family Clothing and Comex Holdings that I previously cited.

In addition, the question is not a pure question of law, I believe, given that the nature of the police power that is being asserted at this point was addressed as a factual matter by the Court in the decision and order that is the subject of the appeal. It may well be that some types of police power, for example, would not be subject to a mandatory release and injunction, as opposed to the types of police power that are asserted or were asserted before me and now are being asserted on appeal. Again, therefore, one does not see where the guidance from the circuit bypassing the district court's analysis of the record below would be required under the statute.

The movants equate the issue of public importance for jurisprudential purposes and controlling decision. At

times that is helpful but at times that is not. Clearly, something is of public importance if the law is not clear, and that law will come up again and again. That's obviously where guidance is warranted, as discussed in the Weber case, from the circuit. On the other hand, the topic of coerced third-party claims releases in bankruptcy cases, while it does come up often in bankruptcy cases, is the subject of controlling decisions -- the plural -- in the second circuit and that controlling case law, further, requires the Court to make a detailed factual analysis which is, of course, what I tried to do in my ruling that's now the subject of appeal as required by the second circuit in the Metromedia case and the cases that follow it.

So it appears to me that as the courts have cabined the phrase "matter of public importance" to apply to jurisprudential guidance, beyond that, in the normal appellate process, this is not a matter of public importance, because, again, it as Judge Gerber held in the GM case, it's not a matter of public importance for purposes of this statute, that the court decide again the type of issue that it has decided in the past.

The motions, therefore, do not satisfy the first prong of Section 158(2)(a) nor do they satisfy the second prong, i.e., that judgment order or decree involves a question of law requiring resolution of conflicting

decisions. The case law is almost uniform, and this is certainly consistent with the reading of the statute as a whole, that the case law referred to in this section is case law within the circuit below the circuit level. Obviously, given subsection (i) which focuses on controlling decisions in the circuit, the fact that there is conflicting case law outside of the circuit cannot be what Congress intended to acquire a direct appeal of an issue that is not the subject of conflicting decisions within the circuit. Again, see I Collier on bankruptcy, paragraph 5.06(c) as well as In re General Motors Corp, 409 B.R. 24.

Here there is no conflicting case law within this circuit on the issues that are up for appeal. The two cases cited by the U.S. Trustee clearly recognize the requirement that any trial court must follow when dealing with these issues. To follow the Second Circuit's case law, including the Metromedia case, they found in that -- in each of those cases that the Second Circuit's requirements were not satisfied and therefore denied the relief. But that is not a conflict.

Indeed, one would be shocked if a court in the Second Circuit, which includes all the states in the Second Circuit, including the state of Connecticut where the Debtors are headquartered, would not follow the circuit law as set forth in the Johns Manville, Drexel, and Metromedia

opinions as well as In re Quigley, following Metromedia, that discusses the requirements in the Second Circuit for the imposition of a third-party claims release in a bankruptcy case.

That case law, as noted by Judge Wiles in In re
Aegean Marine Petroleum Network Inc., 599 717, 728 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2019) is governing -- the governing case law
requires me to consider, et cetera, et cetera the factors in
Metromedia. Indeed, in that case, Judge Wiles found a basis
for a third-party release and exculpation that anyone who is
a lawyer would cite this opinion as being controlling case
law, and that includes law professors, must either be
wearing blinders or simply intending to misrepresent the law
in the Second Circuit.

Similarly, In re SunEdison, Inc., 576 B.R. 453

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) does not stand, as has been asserted by the U.S. Trustee, for the proposition that Metromedia is not controlling in this circuit and that the bankruptcy courts in this circuit can chart their own paths without following it.

Indeed, Judge Bernstein in that cases at pages 461 through 62 analyzed how Metromedia would apply and found that it did not apply to the releases at issue, although he did find that he had jurisdiction if the plan was amended to comply with Metromedia id est 462. So I conclude that the

second prong, or the second alternative basis for certifying a direct appeal, namely that set forth in Section 158(a)(ii) does not apply here either.

Finally, the parties rely on the third prong, namely (iii) "an immediate appeal from the judgment order or decree may materially advance the progress of the case or proceeding in which the appeal is taken." This provision too is a subject of considerable interpretation and again should be read in the context of the entire section of the judicial code.

The courts have been clear about the following.

First, consistent again with the Weber case, which I previously quoted, the mere fact that leapfrogging the district court in the appellate chain might expedite a final determination is not what Congress had in mind in this provision. If that were the case, one would intuitively think that it would always apply. See In re Johns-Manville Corp.) 449 B.R. 31, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). See also 1 Collier on Bankruptcy Paragraph 6[d]and In re Fisker Automotive Holdings Inc. 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17689 at Page 12.

The section by its plain terms refers to advancing the case, not advancing the appeal. One, I suppose, could construe the cases being advanced by having a final determination, but I think Congress chose that word carefully as opposed to simply setting up a prong that would

obviate the careful consideration of the other two, except where one would need to engage in speculation as to how fast an appellate court might rule, something I don't believe Congress really wanted the lower courts to engage in.

The courts have also made it clear that the fact that parties on a near-certain basis will want to eventually take their appeal to the circuit is not a basis for direct certification. See, for example, In re Lehman Brothers 013 WL 5272937 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2013) and In re Millennium Lab Holdings II LLC 543 B.R. 703 716-17 (Bkrtcy.D.Del. 2016).

I guess I can conceive of a situation, for example, where the district judge that drew an appeal of a matter that warranted expedited determination and could not decide it because, for example, she was about to conduct a three-month jury trial. A court might take into account this provision and say under these circumstances, rather than stay the matter or, alternatively, not stay it and risk that there be no appellate review because of the doctrine of equitable mootness would certify a direct appeal.

I believe that concern clearly does not apply here. District Judge McMahon, who has the appeals, has already set an expedited briefing schedule where she will hear oral argument on November 3 -- 30, excuse me, bearing out the Weber court's observation that normally appeals

through the district court through the circuit move faster.

The U.S. Trustee has pointed out that under 28 U.S.C. Section 158(2)(d), my certifying a direct appeal would not stop or preclude Judge McMahon from deciding the appeal before, and that is true. I believe it is also true, knowing Judge McMahon's character and work ethic, that I do not believe her knowing that I had certified a direct appeal would cause her to put her pen down.

And I understand that if she ruled, and I expect she will soon after the appellate argument on November 30th, i.e. sometime in December, the parties could go to the circuit and say, "We're withdrawing our request that you accept a direct appeal," and instead request that you too seek expedited treatment -- or grant expedited treatment. However, the two-track process would create an extra around of decision making, including at the circuit level, extra briefing and oral argument, and create its own docket, which the record before me, I think, establishes at least that that docket would have its own life and take its own time.

In addition, and this is a more important consideration, one of the issues raised on appeal, which I decided in favor of the Debtor's on, is that consistent with the Third Circuit holding and district court level holding in the Third Circuit and in the Second Circuit, and bankruptcy court holding in the Section Circuit, the Court

has the power to issue a final order confirming a plan as a fundamental aspect of the adjustment of debtor-creditor relations under the Supreme Court Stern v. Marshall case law.

Long ago, before that case law become much more clarified, including at the supreme court level, the district court entered an amended standing order that among other things gave the district court the power to treat a bankruptcy judge's determination, which the bankruptcy judge believed could be a final order as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which of course Stern v. Marshall would permit. With the appeal in front of Judge McMahon, that can happen if it were certified directly to the circuit, and the circuit took it and determined that I was wrong on the Stern v. Marshall point and disagreed with the Third Circuit in the Millennium II case, an extra step involving proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law would have to be taken, in all likelihood by the district court, although perhaps by this Court on remand, ultimately. That would waste time.

There are arguments to be made on both sides on that issue, but that issue, I believe, ultimately under these facts is not what Congress in Section 158(2)(a)(iii) I believe meant the Court to focus on, i.e. the speed of the appeal process, unless in extreme situations that I've

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

already mentioned. It meant to focus on the case and activity within the case so that the case could proceed to its conclusion with legal issues defined along the way that are gatekeeping issues. So I conclude that the movants have not shown that a third prong of Section 158(d)(ii) has been satisfied either.

Again, I do not view this determination as one that requires a lot of heat or passion. It's a jurisprudential issue where the precedents are important and where the courts have consistently held, and the Second Circuit has consistently focused the courts on holding that the Court should be careful in reading the statute broadly and rather should issue a direct certification in only rare instances, as I've previously outlined.

So I will ask the Debtors to submit an order consistent with that ruling denying the motion. Needless to say, the request for directive appeal of my September 15, 2021 order also does not meet the requirements of the statute in any respect for the reasons that I've outlined. There really was no attempt to do so by the U.S. Trustee. And frankly, I think the only reason for it is the U.S. Trustee's hope that the appeals would go forward together because of its concern, or his concern, about mootness issues, which really are more appropriately dealt with when courts consider motions for stay pending appeal.

So let's turn to the last matter on the agenda, which is the pretrial conference that the Court previously scheduled in our first conference on September 30 regarding the motions for stay pending appeal filed by various parties in interest, some of whom were not parties to the motion that I've just decided because I noted at the beginning of this morning's calendar, I've had a chance to review Judge McMahon's order from the 13th of this month denying without prejudice the United States Trustee's emergency motion for a stay pending appeal.

I'm not sure that motion when she granted the TRO actually advised Judge McMahon that the parties were already going to be appearing on that issue before me on November 9th. But in any event, Judge McMahon denied the motion without prejudice on the conditions stated in her order, which I fully agree with and hope I had already signaled to the parties they should agree with so that the November 9 hearing can move forward, as I think Congress contemplated in the 8,000 rules of the bankruptcy rules.

So I left this matter with the parties hoping that we wouldn't need to have a long conferences when we were last here at the end of September, and I think the only issues that really were going to come up, if at all, applied to whether parties would be offering witnesses, or which parties would be offering witnesses, and which discovery

would take place in advance of the November 9 hearing. I have received a motion to quash deposition notices that was made by the U.S. Trustee. I've deferred to conference on that as well as briefing on the stay motion because it seemed like the parties might be able to resolve it, particularly in light of the imminent -- then-imminent ruling by Judge McMahon. So let me open the floor up to those who have sought a stay pending appeal and the parties on the other side, and ask, have you at this point agreed who is putting together witnesses -- who is going to be putting on witnesses, and if so, to a discovery schedule? MAN 1: Your Honor, if I may, I was going to turn the podium over for Davis Polk to Mr. Kaminetzky. There actually is some good news to report on some schedule issues, which is great, and then some uncertainty on others. Your Honor, just for the record, you are completely correct. The U.S. Trustee's motion did not advise the district court at all about November 9th or other things, but we'll leave that aside. So I will put myself on mute and turn over to Mr. Kaminetzky, if that's okay with the Court. THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. So why don't you -- why don't the parties tell me what they've agreed on first?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Page 205 1 MR. KAMINETZKY: This is Ben Kaminetzky at Davis 2 I'm actually going to send it to Mr. Tobak 3 (indiscernible) from the creditors' committee who has been 4 dealing with (indiscernible). 5 THE COURT: All right. 6 MR. TOBAK: This is Marc Tobak. I believe Mr. 7 Hurley will be presenting on the schedule. 8 THE COURT: Okay. I think you're going to have to get a little closer to the microphone, Mr. Tobak, and maybe 9 10 speak a little slower just so we can pick you up. 11 MR. TOBAK: Sorry about that. This is Marc Tobak, 12 Davis Polk. I believe Mr. Hurley from Akin Gump who 13 represents the committee will actually be presenting on the 14 agreed schedule. 15 THE COURT: Okay. So why don't I hear from the 16 Committee's counsel then? Unless I put him to sleep with my 17 ruling, or her. 18 MR. HURLEY: Yes, good afternoon, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Oh, there he is. Okay. 20 MR. HURLEY: Your Honor, apologies --21 THE COURT: That's fine. 22 MR. HURLEY: -- for the delay. Our camera was 23 turned off, we think, by the Court. And we've been 24 (indiscernible) --25 THE COURT: All right.

Page 206 1 MR. HURLEY: -- back online. 2 THE COURT: Okav. MR. HURLEY: So here we are. 3 4 MAN 1: Hey, Mitch. There are two Akin Gump lines 5 that are not muted, and I think they're interfering with 6 each other, so you should probably mute one of them. 7 There's a Mitch line and then --8 MR. HURLEY: My apologies again, Your Honor. So 9 yeah, Mitch Hurley with Akin Gump Strauss Hauer Feld on 10 behalf of the official committee. Your Honor, can you hear 11 me? 12 THE COURT: Yes. 13 MR. HURLEY: My apologies, Your Honor. Can you 14 hear me? 15 THE COURT: Yes, and see you. 16 MR. HURLEY: So regarding the motion to be heard 17 by the Court on November 9th, certain parties have reached an agreement on the schedule (indiscernible). Before I read 18 19 onto the record what that is, I want to make clear for the 20 record --21 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Now I'm not hearing you. 22 You're going to have to get closer to the mic. You're very 23 hard to hear. 24 MAN 1: Yeah. Hey, Mitch. There's a second Akin 25 Gump line in addition to yours that's not muted. I think

Page 207 that's the problem. There's someone called Akin Gump New York 2, which is a separate box. Maybe you have two mics going. MR. HURLEY: Yeah. What's going on in is we originally had a camera set up, and I think the Court actually shut that camera down, so we can't access that or control it at all. THE COURT: Well, can we turn off that other mic? Can we mute -- can we turn off that mic? No? Okay. MR. HURLEY: If you turn it on, actually, then I can shut the computer off and just (indiscernible). THE COURT: Can you turn on the other camera, the other Akin Gump --CLERK: (Indiscernible) camera. I don't know what happened. THE COURT: I'm being told there was only one camera. CLERK: One camera online. MR. HURLEY: Can you hear me okay? THE COURT: Yeah. You just have to move closer to your microphone. MR. HURLEY: Okay. So before I just -- before I read onto the record what the agreement is, I want to make clear who the parties are who have agreed to it. So on the movant's side, the agreeing parties are

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Page 208 1 the states of Washington, Connecticut, and Maryland, plus 2 the U.S. Trustee, and the (indiscernible). 3 On the non-movant's side, the agreeing parties --THE COURT: So that's everyone, right, who has 4 5 made a motion for stay pending appeal? 6 Now you've just -- now we can't hear you at all. 7 MR. HURLEY: (Indiscernible). On the non-movant 8 side, the agreeing parties are the Debtors, the UCC, Ad Hoc 9 Committee of Governmental and other (indiscernible), and the 10 Ad Hoc Group of Individual Victims, plus the Ad Hoc Group 11 (indiscernible). 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. HURLEY: (Indiscernible). 14 So is there anyone, again, who is THE COURT: going to be active on these motions for stay pending appeal 15 16 that has not agreed? 17 MR. HURLEY: Not that I'm aware of, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 19 MR. HURLEY: I will put the agreement on the 20 record now. The agreement is the deadline for opposition to 21 the motion of stay, the (indiscernible) witness declarations 22 (indiscernible) is October 22nd. 23 THE COURT: October 22nd? 24 MR. HURLEY: Correct. 25 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HURLEY: The deadline for the movants to provide opposing rebuttal witness declarations, again if any, October 29th. And the deadline for (indiscernible) on the stay motions, including objections to witness declarations, again if any, is November 1st, no later than 2:00 p.m. on November 1st. To the extent that depositions are required, witnesses will be made available at a (indiscernible) prior to the November 9th hearing so that no party is prejudiced. Were you able to hear that okay, Your Honor? THE COURT: I can't hear that last part, no. MR. HURLEY: To the extent that depositions are required, witnesses will be made available at a significant time in advance of the hearing so that no party is prejudiced. THE COURT: Okay. MR. HURLEY: And that's the agreement. THE COURT: All right. So is it fair to say that the parties don't know yet what witnesses they're going to call because they have time to still think about that? MR. HURLEY: So certain of the non-movants have identified witnesses that they intend to call and to provide declarations to the Court. The movants have reserved their rate. They may put in declarations. They may not. They've also reserved their right (indiscernible) declarations

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Page 210 1 (indiscernible). 2 THE COURT: Okay. And that's understandable. 3 They want to see what your witnesses say. MR. HURLEY: I believe that's right, Your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So it's 6 contemplated that this may be an evidentiary hearing with 7 live witness testimony, in which case someone should have 8 marked up an order for that purpose, similar to the order 9 that applied for the confirmation hearing, you know, an 10 electronic remote hearing order. MR. HIGGINS: Your Honor, this is Ben Higgins for 11 12 the U.S. Trustee. May I be heard? 13 THE COURT: Yes. 14 MR. HIGGINS: Thank you, Your Honor. I know it's 15 been a long hearing. I just have a couple points to address 16 on this regard. 17 First, I want to correct what Mr. Huebner said. 18 Our emergency motion did reference the November 9th hearing 19 on the opening page and again on Page 13, so I want to make sure the record is clear about that. 20 21 Second, the U.S. Trustee is okay with the proposed 22 schedule, but we do want to emphasize that there is already 23 an extensive evidentiary record after a multiday trial, and 24 we don't think a second extensive trial is appropriate or

necessary for the Court to decide the motions for a stay

pending appeal, and that is now especially true in light of Judge McMahon's ruling yesterday, which we think is at least persuasive authority for this Court when it ultimately rules on the stay issue.

And as Your Honor is aware, it's not unusual for parties to simply move orally for a stay pending appeal after a Court's ruling, but here when Your Honor issued a conditional bench ruling at the trial's convulsion, we felt it was both prudent and necessary for the sake of a clear record to take the time to actually read the transcript of Your Honor's decision and to file a written motion.

And to the question of witnesses, we have filed a designation identifying the various documents in the extensive record that we support that -- we believe support any factual assertions in our briefs, so we don't intend to put on any affirmative witnesses.

We do intend to file very shortly an amended brief that simply adds the specific citations to those designated portions of the record. We do reserve the right to put on rebuttal witnesses, but we're hoping that won't be necessary.

But as Judge McMahon made clear in her ruling yesterday, and Your Honor made clear back on September 30th, these appeals should be determined on their merits. In light of those statements from both the bankruptcy court and

now the district court, we believe it should be clear that the parties can all save some time here by simply agreeing to a stay pending appeal as Your Honor suggested back on September 30th. But if necessary, we're prepared to go forward with the proposed schedule and with the November 9th hearing.

With regard to the motion to quash that Your Honor mentioned, I won't get into the merits. As you've noted, we have filed a premotion letter. We believe the notice is inappropriate and that it seeks irrelevant information, and the mental impressions and strategy of the attorneys representing the U.S. Trustee, and we look forward to that conference with Your Honor if we can't work that out with the PI group.

And the last point, Your Honor, which is a little bit off track, but it is related to the scheduling, is that we have asked the Debtors to provide status reports disclosing what they are actually doing to prepare for the sentencing date and the effective date. And we aren't looking for anything elaborate, but to the extent there is not a stay, which will be the case when Judge McMahon's TRO is dissolved, we think there should be some visibility for the Court and the parties to see what actions are actually taking place so we can have some assurance that they are truly just administrative or administerial in nature. So

Page 213 1 the Debtors haven't responded to this request, Your Honor, 2 but to the extent there is no stay in place, we would -- we would ask the Court to direct them to provide some type of 3 regular status report in that regard. 4 5 I have nothing further, Your Honor, unless you 6 have questions about any of that. 7 THE COURT: I --8 MR. SHORE: Your Honor, I'm happy to respond in 9 part to Mr. Higgins (indiscernible). 10 THE COURT: Let me -- let me hear first, I quess, 11 from Mr. Edmunds, and then I'll address -- I'll let people 12 address each of their comments. 13 Thank you, Your Honor. Just first MR. EDMUNDS: 14 an update. Yesterday, the State of Maryland was served with 15 a deposition subpoena and document requests, and I think 16 that we are still in the process of talking that over with 17 the UCC, which served the requests (indiscernible). 18 THE COURT: You cut out for some reason, Mr. 19 I can't hear you. Can anyone else hear him? Edmunds. 20 MR. EDMUNDS: -- can't hear you. THE COURT: Now I can. 21 22 MR. EDMUNDS: Now, I can. 23 THE COURT: Now I can hear you. 24 MR. EDMUNDS: Okay. Yeah. I can hear you too 25 now.

In any case, we are going to work through that with UCC, but we have a preliminary position to all of this similar to the Trustee's, which is that discovery certainly shouldn't be necessary in this case in light of the record that Your Honor already has.

I think you're familiar with the plan and what it does, and you've heard extensive evidence on the need for the plan and issues that relate to what the plan does in helping with the problem that is the opioid crisis and what is at stake here. I think that that was also to what the confirmation hearing was about. And it might warrant under Rule 9017, which incorporates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(C), a standard where it's in the Court's discretion what it needs to hear outside the record, and it's largely a standard of what will assist the Court in resolving the stay motions, and I think that the Court likely knows all that it needs to know from the record it's already received without the added burden on both the estate, and the parties, and the Court, all three, of hearing evidence and entertaining motions on discovery, especially over issues that the Court has been hearing about and is well versed in after two years of litigation. The issues of irreparable harm, which is the justification for the discovery, are -- ought to be readily apparent to the Court. As Your Honor said in considering the motion that

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

you just decided, that people are largely on the same page about the need for speed. The question is legal issues.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. EDMUNDS: And issues on appeal. So think as far as -- especially as far as discovery goes, will 9017 and its incarnation of 43(C) -- would -- I guess the issue is whether the Court really needs that, and I think that the Court has heard a lot and may not need that added cost, burden, and expense, and use of judicial resources.

THE COURT: Okay. Was the discovery sought -- was the discovery sought from the State of Maryland of a witness that you intended to call, or more along the lines of what was sought for the U.S. Trustee?

MR. EDMUNDS: I think it's along the lines of what was sought for the Trustee. It's the 30(b)(6) notice for designee related to what the state's understanding of the claim and its consequences are.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. EDMUNDS: And I would just say that we're not

-- we are not -- we're not planning on putting in a

declaration. We, like the U.S. Trustee, will shortly file a

sort of annotated version of our motion with the record -- a

voluminous record that supports it. But you know, I think

that we do have to -- depending on how the discussions go -
need to rethink that, depending on how the Court feels about

Page 216 1 whether it needs to hear a lot of evidence, and whether 2 discovery is necessary. 3 THE COURT: Okay. MR. SHORE: Your Honor (indiscernible) briefly 4 5 make a suggestion? Can Your Honor hear me? 6 THE COURT: If you get closer like -- yes, but 7 only if you get closer. 8 MR. SHORE: Okay. All right. As Mr. Edmunds 9 correctly pointed out, the meet-and-confer process between the UCC and Maryland has begun, hasn't been completed. 10 11 declaration that we're talking about haven't been served 12 yet. I think it would make sense and would be a more 13 orderly process if parties have an opportunity after the 14 declarations are served to meet and confer, see if they can 15 reach an agreement about (indiscernible). If they can't 16 reach an agreement about (indiscernible) and the role of 17 discovery, at that time come back to Your Honor and ask Your 18 Honor to absolve whatever dispute there may be, but perhaps 19 there won't be a dispute. To raise it now, we think is 20 premature because the process has not had a chance to work 21 itself out. 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. SHORE: Your Honor, if I could 24 (indiscernible). 25 THE COURT: Well, I could give you some guidance,

Page 217 1 but I understand both your points. 2 MR. SHORE: Okay. It's -- the deposition is for, I believe, October 19th, and it will require -- you know, it 3 will --4 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. SHORE: -- detract from our other efforts. 7 THE COURT: All right. All right. Does any -- I 8 thought I heard someone else wanting to speak, but maybe I 9 missed it. No? Okay. 10 Hearing no one --11 MR. SHORE: Sorry, Your Honor. Yeah. Sorry. 12 just - there we go. Chris Shore -- Chris Shore from White & 13 Case on behalf of the Ad Hoc Group. Let me -- let me just 14 address with respect to the U.S. Trustee and actually just 15 ask for an augment because I think we're getting there. 16 We had sent out our notice and then had a meet-17 and-confer and asked them to stipulate to some issues. It 18 sounds like two of the issues we asked them to stipulate, they've clarified in their letter now. That is that the 19 20 United States Trustee as the movant is not claiming that the 21 United States Trustee or the federal government is being 22 harmed. 23 We've addressed the issue of whether they're 24 willing to post the bond or otherwise put something on the 25 table if they're wrong. I think they've answered that one

and said definitively they are not willing to put anything on the table in the event that the confirmation order is stayed and then later affirmed.

The third question was around what Your Honor laid out before, which is the identification of the claims that they are asserting, that is when we -- we talk about the obvious claims that are being frustrated by the victims versus the claims of the parties whose Sackler claims are being released, contrary to their constitutional rights. I wanted an identification of that.

What Counsel just said is they're not putting on a witness or putting in anything other than the confirmation hearing. I'm almost certain there was nothing in the confirmation record which identified claims of individuals, so as long as that's the case, I don't think I need discovery on that topic. It leaves only one last issue, and maybe we could get guidance from Your Honor.

Depending on how one reads the DOJ settlement, the super priority administrative claim comes into existence at the later of, and it says, "confirmation of the plan and the sentencing." What we really don't want is a situation where there were a sentencing hearing and then, having nothing to do with an appeal, the Debtors can't consulate this plan. There is some intervening event. We just wanted to make sure that the government was not going to take the position

1 that because the plan was confirmed but not consummated, 2 their super priority administrative expense claim came into 3 existence. Now, based upon the look that Your Honor is giving me, I can see that you wouldn't be reading the order that 5 6 way. And if I could just get confirmation from the United 7 States Trustee that they're not going to be asserting that, 8 the (indiscernible). 9 THE COURT: But I don't -- one of the reasons I 10 was puzzled is I don't think that's the U.S. Trustee's 11 I think that's the Department of Justice's issue. And I know the U.S. Trustee is in the Department of Justice, 12 13 but I think -- correct me if I'm wrong, Mr. Higgins, but I 14 think that's something you need to be talking to Mr. 15 Fogelman about. 16 MR. HIGGINS: Your Honor, that's exactly right. 17 The U.S. Trustee, you know, we don't have, you know, 18 authority over what happens with the, you know, the 19 Department's position on the administrative priority claim. And I would also like to address what Mr. Shore said about 20 21 Issue Number 3, if I could very briefly, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Well, on that point, I think what your -- your argument is -- you're going to make a legal argument 23 on that point, right? 24 25 MR. HIGGINS: Yes, but also, Your Honor, I think

the plan is clear on its face, that it releases the claims of non-Debtors against the Sacklers, and there are more than 2,000 individual person injured -- personal injury claimants that voted against the plan. That's on the record. A few objected. That's on the record. More than 71,000 personal injury victims did not vote on the plan at all. None of these parties consented to release their claims against non-Debtors. The plan is clear on its face that the rights of these parties to sue the Sacklers, their causes of action are terminated --THE COURT: No, no. That's fine. MR. HIGGINS: -- under the plan. THE COURT: I think the only -- the only real issue is whether you are going to present factual testimony, and I don't believe you are, as to what those claims are. If you're not, then this is a nonissue. They're not going to take discovery of you. MR. HIGGINS: Correct. MR. SHORE: I just want to make sure that when we're balancing the arms, the Court can assess --THE COURT: Right. MR. SHORE: -- I have real claims that are getting paid or not getting paid. And on the other side, I have

claims that have been asserted but not articulated in any

manner that allows you to understand the risks on the other

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Page 221 1 (indiscernible). 2 MR. HIGGINS: And Your Honor, this is really an issue for November 9th, but I mean, the way the Sacklers 3 fought tooth and nail for the releasees by the non-Debtors 4 5 without consent, I mean, I think it makes clear that they 6 were pretty concerned (indiscernible) --7 THE COURT: I don't want to get into legal 8 argument. We're just talking about the evidence, and I do 9 have the designation of record in support of amended 10 memorandum of law from the U.S. Trustee, and I have a couple 11 of comments on it. But it's clear to me that you're not 12 looking to introduce a case on behalf of one of those 13 people, even a hypothetical case, right? 14 MR. HIGGINS: I don't think that's the case, Your 15 Honor. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. HIGGINS: I mean, if -- we would reserve our 18 right to put in rebuttal evidence if there's something that 19 their declarant says on that type of topic, but --20 THE COURT: To me, it's largely a legal issue --21 MR. HIGGINS: -- we're not expecting to --22 THE COURT: -- which I already identified to your 23 colleague earlier today. 24 MR. HIGGINS: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 25 MR. SHORE: So if I might, Your Honor, can I ask -

1 - technically, our letter has been extended to 6:00 tonight. 2 Let me -- if I could talked to the U.S. Trustee and see if we can't just work with that in a manner that --3 THE COURT: Yeah. It sounds to me that --5 MR. SHORE: -- my quess is --6 THE COURT: It sounds to me that this is -- that 7 this discovery is not going to go forward. You just have to 8 get something in writing, and I'll grant that extension. 9 MR. SHORE: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: And I don't know what the other 11 discovery that's being sought is, and I agree with Mr. 12 Hurley that it makes sense for the parties to speak first 13 before raising the issue with me. 14 But I tend to agree with both Mr. Edmunds and Mr. 15 Higgins that this shouldn't be a big litigation festival. 16 mean, I really think that the movants themselves aren't 17 looking to do that. And I understand that there are 18 balancing of harms issues that the objectors may want to 19 submit evidence on, and the movants are certainly entitled 20 to take discovery on that, and cross examine, and the like. 21 But there's a lot already in the record. And if the parties 22 are largely intending to stay with that record, then I would 23 recommend that the parties -- all the parties do that. 24 In that regard, I do have a problem with some of 25 the items in the U.S. Trustee's designation of record in

support of its motion. A number of these things are not evidence, Mr. Higgins. And I'm not quite sure what the purpose is of them. I mean, that would include, for example, six objections to the plan that were filed after the objection deadline, and most of which were filed after I ruled. So I mean, that just doesn't -- you know, I don't think you need it. I don't think that helps your case any, and I would hope that the parties will agree on the methodology that you and Mr. Edmunds outlined, which is, you know, filling in your brief with cites to the record. But obviously those cites need to be evidence. They can't be, you know, some -- and that includes a hearing in Congress. That's not evidence, particular one that --

MR. HIGGINS: Sure, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- was scheduled apparently to highlight the testimony of someone who had a live issue before me, I think in part to influence me outside of the courtroom, which I find truly outrageous. So it's not evidence, but you guys can work that out. I'm sure you're able to resolve that.

And I reiterate that while this hearing is important, it seems to me, given the schedule that Judge McMahon has outlined, and her understanding of already the balance between the public interest and irreparable harm, and of course she will have dealt with the merits, that --

before, I believe, the plan would ever go effective, the parties seriously consider what judges in these situations fairly often do where there is an expedited appeal, reaching an agreement to have a stay in place for a brief period after a ruling by Judge McMahon on the merits of the appeal that gives her the opportunity, and you, to have the type of hearing before her that you were planning to have in front of me on the 9th. I think you all should seriously consider that. She will have had the benefits then of full briefing on the merits and can certainly analyze that prong, and it would obviate the need for two hearings.

Now, you may want to set some record here, and I don't know whether the U.S. Trustee still wants to pursue the stay on the September 15 order. I think I should have a hearing on that, although I think you know where Judge McMahon is on that, and I think you can assume that's where I am on that.

So I am sympathetic to the statements by Mr.

Higgins and Mr. Edmunds that perhaps the parties can

stipulate that by agreeing to a stay, say for 10 days or 10

business days or 10 days after the issuance of Judge

McMahon's ruling, the parties will not hold that agreement

against anyone as far as any future requests for a stay, but

that would apply so that you don't have to have two hearings

and spend the money that could otherwise be going to

victims, one way or another.

So that's not a ruling, of course, but it's a suggestion and a fairly strong one. I suppose you all play this out not just in my court but in the court of public opinion, but frankly, that's not a court, and I think that it's just a foolish exercise to do that. But I will hear you all if you don't reach that type of agreement, and you may want to set out the record so that you can have it, and that's fine with me. And that's also acceptable to me, but I would not be averse to that type of agreement either.

So I don't know if anyone has anything more to say on the pretrial conference, prehearing conference. No?

MR. SHORE: Your Honor, nothing on the pretrial conference, but I've got one other issue to address today.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHORE: Under the confirmation order, the 1129(a)(4) applications are due Monday would be -- which would put it as a setting on the November 18th omnibus. I can't do that date. Do you want me just to -- do you want to move it to the December and move out the deadline?

THE COURT: Yeah. I think we should move it. I mean, you're still working. Among other things, I'd have to have two hearings. I'm trying not to have two hearings on a lot of different things.

MR. SHORE: Right. So if we could -- if we could

Page 226 1 just provisionally then set it for the December 16th omnibus 2 3 THE COURT: That's fine. 4 MR. SHORE: -- and have the papers come in no 5 later than December 2nd, and then we'll at least have had --6 you know, we'll have certainly a, I hope, a ruling from 7 Judge McMahon before that hearing would --THE COURT: That's fine. You can tell Ms. Li that 8 9 I agreed to that. And I don't know whether the school 10 district has that same issue or not. I guess they're not 11 really involved in the appeal process, so I guess they could 12 go forward on the --13 MR. SHORE: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- on the other date. 14 15 All right. So hearing nothing more on the 16 pretrial conference, that concludes today's hearings. 17 (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 18 4:07 PM) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Г	Pg 227 of 292		
			Page 227
1	INDEX		
2			
3	RULINGS		
4		Page	Line
5	Motion to File Proof of Claim after Claims		
6	Bar Date filed by Emanuel Thirkill		
7	(ECF #3764) Granted	30	5
8			
9	Motion to File Proof of Claim after Claims		
10	Bar Date filed by Howard Adelglass		
11	(ECF #3840) Denied	38	5
12			
13	Motion to Allow/Letter - Derivative and		
14	Fraudulent Conveyance filed by Ronald Bass,		
15	Sr. (ECF #3619) Denied	48	2
16			
17	Certification of Direct Appeal to Court of		
18	Appeals / United States Trustees Memorandum		
19	Of Law In Support Of Motion To Certify		
20	Direct Appeal To The Court Of Appeals Under		
21	28 U.S.C. § 158(d) [ECF No. 3868] Granted	50	9
22			
23			
24			
25			
I			

1	Pg 228 01 292		1
			Page 228
1	INDEX		
2			
3	RULINGS		
4		Page	Line
5	Joinder of Certain Canadian Municipality		
6	and First Nations Creditors and Appellants,		
7	in Support of the 5 Motions by the Office		
8	of the United States Trustee and the		
9	Appealing States for Certification of a		
10	Consolidated and Expedited Direct Appeal		
11	to the Court of Appeals for the Second		
12	Circuit [ECF No. 3913] Denied	202	16
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			

1		Pg 229 0f 292
		Page 229
1	26	
2		Page 229
3	1	CERTIFICATION
4	2	
5	3	I, Sonya Ledanski Hyde, certified that the foregoing
6	4	transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.
7	5	
8	6	
9	7	Songa M. declarati Hyd-
10	8	Sonya Ledanski Hyde
11	9	
12	10	
13	11	
14	12	
15	13	
16	14	
17	15	
18	16	
19	17	
20	18	
21	19	
22	20	Veritext Legal Solutions
23	21	330 Old Country Road
24	22	Suite 300
	23	Mineola, NY 11501
25	24	
	25	Date: October 16, 2021

[& - 2005]

&	38:17 43:16 45:4	15,000 144:12	18th 33:11 121:20
	46:18 49:11 72:2	154 181:6	225:18
& 22:8,15 23:1,19	106:10 124:5	158 3:15 4:11 5:2	19 31:25 44:8,12
24:1 30:6 34:24	179:6 229:13	5:11,18,22 6:4,7	229:21
83:10 86:13	111 111:21	6:13 7:4,11 8:2,11	19-23649 1:3
138:18 140:19	1123 91:7	8:16,19 9:4,17	1980s 90:11
146:3 147:15	1129 173:18	10:5,18 11:20	1988 109:24
217:12	225:17	12:5,18 51:11	1989 161:17
0	113 118:10	52:21 77:2,24	199 37:22
0 7:11 9:17 11:20	115 110.10 115 31:10 37:13	80:13 89:11 92:21	1992 106:25
187:16	118:7	92:25 104:15,16	109:25
013 199:8	11501 229:24	105:21,22 106:1	1993 31:9 36:23
06604 21:18	11501 229.24 1158 109:8	108:6,8,16 110:12	19th 129:9 217:3
07102 22:19	116 118:7	114:12 116:18,18	1st 136:1 156:7
08625-0106 21:11	110 116.7 117 124:19	117:1,9 120:9	176:6 209:5,6
1	117 124.19 1172642 120:15	121:5,25 123:5	
	1177 23:14	124:7,13,18,22	2
1 5:16 50:7 59:19	12 110:10 143:21	128:18 130:5	2 5:2 6:13 8:2,11
64:2 110:12 126:6	143:21,24 144:3,5	132:13,21 133:5	8:16,19 9:4 10:18
150:5 198:18	189:16 190:11,12	136:4 170:6	12:18 36:6 52:21
204:13 206:4,24	198:20 229:14	179:24 180:24	64:2 82:15 89:11
229:3	1201 22:18	183:22 184:19,22	90:6 109:8 115:9
1,000 144:12	1201 22:16 121 37:21	186:3 187:13,25	120:15 121:8
10 224:20,20,21	121 37.21 12151 229:9	188:7 191:9	124:13,18,22
229:12	12131 229.9 122 31:10 96:24	192:11 195:23	128:18 130:5
100 137:10	122-23 37:13	198:2 200:3	150:5 151:13,13
10014 20:17	122-23 37.13 1221 24:3	201:23 202:5	165:24 170:6
10017 20:6	126 187:17	227:21	179:24 180:24
10020-1095 24:4	13 189:15 210:19	158's 119:4	184:19 186:3
10022 23:22	229:15	16 109:22 115:5	187:13,25 189:9
10036 23:15	132 187:9	228:12 229:18,25	191:9 192:11
10036-6745 23:6	132 167.5 1334 45:17 97:5	160 128:7 186:3	195:23 200:3
1006 20:16	13th 121:23 203:8	161 187:2	201:23 207:2
10110 22:11	14 1:16 2:1 122:4	16th 56:17 58:22	227:15 229:4
105 91:1	229:16	158:5 185:24	2,000 220:3
106 97:9,10 116:8	140 121:1	226:1	2.09 52:12
177:4	141 88:12 110:4	17 229:19	2.5 36:10
10601 1:14	141 88.12 110.4 142 187:9	17689 190:11	2.9 157:2
107 96:24	142 187.9 143 88:2	198:20	20 111:1 121:7
109 121:2 191:6	145 88.2 14th 50:6	198.20 177 187:17	229:22
10:16 1:17	15 177:16 179:14	18 144:13 199:9	200 22:3
11 14:10,14 16:4,7	202:17 224:14	229:20	2000 37:22
16:24 17:2,18,22	202.17 224.14	227.20	2005 31:10 37:14
18:12,15 19:9,13	229.11		110:8 181:8
		ral Calutions	

[**2007 - 3885**] Page 2

2007 161:13 181:6	2298349 190:2	215:15 227:7	3789 16:1
2009 188:8 190:3	22998349 115:12	300 1:13 229:24	3799 3:15 14:23
190:4,15	22nd 129:9	30th 76:4 81:25	38 227:11
201 20:16	208:22,23	94:10,17 129:10	380 31:9 36:23
2010 36:20 120:15	23 32:18 33:15	139:15 146:14	3801 14:25
191:21,22	36:5 122:3 229:24	200:10 211:23	3803 15:7,15
2011 128:11	230 118:22	212:4	3804 15:16
191:20 198:18	2355705 115:8	31 128:10 198:18	3810 17:8
2012 131:21	23rd 36:8	330 229:23	3838 15:21
2013 128:20 199:9	24 100:15 190:15	34 128:11 141:6	3840 2:8,12,16
2014 187:10	196:11 229:25	198:18	227:11
190:11,12 198:20	248 1:13	3484 13:14 16:21	3845 16:14
2015 108:8 121:20	249 91:2	17:15 18:9 19:6	3847 17:8
190:10 192:22	25 21:10 102:12	3619 2:20,23 3:3,9	385 120:20 191:19
2016 96:24 121:23	187:18 229:25	227:15	3860 17:8
187:9,11 189:18	2576 189:15	363 159:14	3868 3:17 4:12,18
199:11	26 229:1	3686 3:21 4:4 7:4	5:3,12,22 6:18
2017 197:16	27 5:2 8:2 10:18	9:17 11:20	7:12,19 8:3 9:10
2018 33:25 34:17	12:18	3721 3:3,10	10:6,13,19 11:6
38:1 115:12 190:2	28 3:15 4:3,10	3726 14:16 16:9	11:13 12:6,13,19
190:3	5:11,18,21 6:4,7	17:4,24 18:17	227:21
2019 189:15,16	6:12 7:3,10 8:10	19:15	3869 5:13,22
197:7	8:15,19 9:4,16	374 120:16	3870 5:23 6:8
202 228:12	10:4 11:19 12:4	3764 2:5 30:10	3871 3:21 4:4,12
2020 143:22 144:3	45:17 52:21 55:1	227:7	4:18 5:3 6:14,18
144:18 187:17,18	92:21,25 170:6	3773 13:14 15:6	7:4,12,19 8:3 9:10
191:7	179:24 180:24	15:25 16:21 17:15	9:17 10:6,13,19
2021 1:16 2:1 3:8	182:7 187:24	18:9 19:6	11:7,13,20 12:6
32:18 33:15 36:5	190:3 191:23	3776 13:5,20	12:13,19
36:6 94:7 143:21	200:2 227:21	14:24	3872 8:12
143:24 144:6	293 110:5	3777 3:15 13:5,20	3873 18:3
179:14 185:24	29th 209:3	14:23	3874 3:21 4:4,12
202:18 229:25	2:00 209:6	3778 13:7,21 14:6	4:18 5:3 6:18 7:4
20530 21:4	2d 31:10 37:13	14:24	7:12,19 8:3 9:6,10
206 87:4	96:24 192:22	3779 14:7,24	9:17 10:6,13,19
20852 22:4	2nd 161:13,17	15:19	11:7,13,20 12:6
209 115:8	181:6 226:5	3786 14:11 15:6	12:13,19
21 229:23	3	15:24 16:5,25	3875 6:8
212 37:21	3 54:19 115:12	17:19 18:13 19:10	388-389 120:20
21st 23:21	190:2,11 199:24	3787 14:17 15:6	388-89 191:19
22 229:24	219:21 229:5	15:25 16:10 17:5	3881 8:21
229 229:2	30 112:8 190:4	17:25 18:18 19:16	3885 2:12,16
	199:24 203:3		
	1,7,12 : 200.0		

[3890 - 9th] Page 3

		I	
3890 18:21	45 110:11 192:22	600 23:21	8002 180:24
39 144:16 156:2	450 20:5	6007410 108:8	8006 180:24
177:22	452 120:20 191:19	606 190:9	8007 13:5,19 14:6
3901 30:17	453 197:15	611 190:9	14:23
3905 2:25	46 141:25	614,000 104:11	81 110:9
391 121:22 137:3	461 197:21	6150 21:3	812 191:22
3910 3:5	462 197:25	618 121:2 191:6	82 36:20
3911 2:17	470 120:16	62 197:22	83 121:20 131:8
3913 4:4,12,18 7:5	48 160:18 227:15	65 144:15	830 96:23
7:13,19 9:18 10:7	484 108:15 128:6	650 96:23	84 161:13
10:13 11:9,21	181:5 183:22	67011 190:4	850 21:17
12:7,13 228:12	188:7	676 110:11 192:22	855 161:13
3932 3:23 6:20	4:07 226:18	688 161:17	88 111:13
9:12 11:15	5	6:00 222:1	884 161:16
3933 4:5,12 7:5,12		6th 30:23	89590 3:9
9:18 10:6 11:21	5 128:21 190:4	7	9
12:6	227:7,11 228:7 229:7	7 44:21 173:18	9 113:13 191:22
3934 4:14 7:15	5.06 185:24 191:8	229:9	203:17 204:1
10:9 12:9	196:10	7019 44:7,16,17	227:21 229:11
3935 4:20,24 7:21	50 118:19 227:21	44:22,25	9/15/2021 13:9
10:15 12:15	500 22:10	703 123:16 189:17	
3936 5:5 8:5 10:21	504 187:10	199:10	19:1
12:21	507 31:9 36:23	708 189:17	9/17/2021 14:10
395 31:9 37:5	52 144:18	71,000 220:5	14:16 16:5,9,25
3d 37:22	523 66:8,13	71.1 144:2	17:4,19,24 18:13
4	524 87:4	716 123:16	18:17 19:10,15
4 225:17 229:6	5272937 128:21	716-17 199:10	90 144:7
4,924 135:10	199:9	717 197:6	9006 30:21 31:6
40 192:7	534 190:9	72,000 143:25	32:14 36:13
408 121:1 188:8	54 144:13	728 197:6	9014 44:20
191:20	543 123:16 189:17	740 110:9	9017 214:12 215:5
409 190:14 191:23	199:10	75 144:7	9019 115:14
196:11	548 46:24	75.2 144:4	93 110:9
416 110:4	551 121:1 187:9	754 187:10	96,000 143:23
419 31:10 37:13	192:7	77 36:20	960 110:5
42 121:2	57 110:11	770 187:10	99 78:3 137:16
4244 188:8	570 22:18	7th 176:6	99-107 161:13
43 214:13 215:6	576 197:15	8	99.9 137:10
434 36:20	599 197:6	_	9th 94:7 121:21
44 191:21	6	8 229:10	154:2 203:14
441 21:3		8,000 203:19	204:19 206:17
449 128:10 141:6	6 91:7 198:19	80 137:17	209:8 210:18
198:18	215:15 229:8	80,000 114:21	212:5 221:3 224:8

a	accurate 229:6	added 214:18	33:16,25 34:8,17
abatement 52:4	achieved 139:17	215:8	35:4,13 39:11,13
120:6 137:5	acknowledgment	addiction 46:4	227:10
abating 139:8	38:2	144:12,14	adequacy 57:21
ability 74:25 75:2	acquire 196:8	addictive 34:9	adhered 57:8
112:2 120:4	act 36:18 53:8	addition 30:12	adjectives 107:20
156:14	75:9 96:11,16,22	38:14 39:3 43:23	adjustment 201:2
able 34:25 78:14	124:2,6,11 174:5	45:14 49:17 50:2	administer 45:7
115:25 148:7	174:16	188:9 189:1 192:2	administered
184:16 204:5	acted 37:5 75:5	193:12 194:12	43:18
209:10 223:20	acting 55:7	200:20 206:25	administerial
abrams 24:13	action 42:3 44:14	additional 54:17	212:25
	45:1,3,15,15,18	70:23 91:11 143:4	administration
abrogated 116:10	45:21 47:4 88:14	additionally 97:8	2:22 43:19
absence 190:7,8 absolutely 116:23	220:9	address 57:11	administrative
	actions 86:4	96:7 116:2 141:1	212:25 218:19
135:23 151:19 absolve 216:18	161:11 169:11	161:1,6 162:25	219:2,19
abuse 136:5	212:23	179:12 183:3	administratively
	active 208:15	193:24 210:15	179:15
accelerate 75:17 75:20	activities 46:1	213:11,12 217:14	admission 56:24
	activity 202:2	219:20 225:14	59:6
accept 73:11 76:4 79:21 81:4 142:11	actors 45:23	addressed 49:12	admits 189:13
	acts 167:23	56:11,23,25 60:10	admitted 33:18
142:14 163:22	actual 104:1	77:15 85:7 104:15	112:11 129:12
183:13 200:13	105:4 112:11	104:16 113:19	admittedly 57:7
acceptable 225:9	132:21	127:12 141:20	adopt 53:11
acceptance 75:16	ad 4:7,13 5:1,4	156:24 158:3,6,16	186:25
77:22	7:7,13 8:1,4 10:1	161:7 167:9 171:7	adopted 89:25
accepting 74:25	10:7,17,20 12:1,7	172:6 188:9	101:19 136:10
75:9	12:17,20 23:12	192:16,18,23,24	190:8
accepts 94:20	24:2 30:13 49:23	193:6 194:10,14	ads 117:25,25
142:12	49:24,24 103:16	217:23	adult 151:14
access 100:14,15	103:18 104:2	addresses 107:19	advance 70:16
207:6	138:18 139:8	128:12 159:10	71:13,14,16 80:14
accommodating	147:15 181:15,16	194:4	82:7 93:1,7,9,9
139:14	208:8,10,10	addressing 35:7	96:2 116:24
accompanied	217:13	50:14 115:15	120:23 121:11
184:4	add 42:24 53:18	173:11 176:12	123:7 125:7 127:8
account 53:15	72:22 79:25 85:19	185:10	141:2,17 149:3
87:25 88:1,4 92:2	114:15 152:11	adds 211:18	180:20 184:20,24
199:16	171:25 174:19	adelglass 2:8,12	191:16 198:6
accounted 144:2,4	177:3	24:9 32:16,20,22	204:1 209:14
accounts 114:4		32:24 33:9,11,13	

advanced 143:18	ago 33:1,22 36:12	akin 23:1 140:19	amanda 24:12
198:23	69:2 101:1 102:8	205:12 206:4,9,24	amazing 127:10
advancement	106:16 109:22	207:1,13	ambiguity 189:13
128:17,18	172:1 201:5	al 4:20,23 7:21	ambiguous
advances 16:13	agree 52:7,13	10:15 12:15 29:3	184:13
advancing 185:12	72:2,23 74:11	40:7 179:3	ambush 116:3
198:21,22	78:2,17 80:17	alacrity 142:15	117:13 177:25
advantage 166:25	93:24 98:9 107:12	albeit 179:11	178:3
adverbs 107:21	119:22 121:6	193:23	ambushed 103:7
adversary 44:8,12	122:17 125:21	albenze 27:8	ameliorate 120:5
44:19	127:3 134:24	aleali 24:14	amended 6:1 8:14
adversely 79:1	135:1,13 154:9	alexander 25:18	14:10,14,19,19
185:3	193:22 203:16,17	alice 26:23	16:4,7,24 17:2,18
advise 204:19	222:11,14 223:8	allegations 35:12	17:22 18:12,15
advised 98:24	agreed 116:6	allege 111:3	19:9,13 44:3,4
103:19 203:12	124:12 187:18	alleged 38:1 46:3	45:13 90:14
advisory 154:1	204:10,24 205:14	47:9,14 101:3	110:17 118:11
aegean 60:7,8,9	207:24 208:16	112:11	135:22 157:6,13
66:18 67:1 69:17	226:9	allen 11:7 18:1	157:14 197:24
69:25 113:4	agreeing 207:25	22:21 92:13	201:7 211:17
126:17 160:6	208:3,8 212:2	allison 27:3	221:9
197:6	224:20	allocate 38:21	amending 131:20
afanador 22:15	agreement 52:11	allocation 151:3	135:21
affect 111:24	52:15 91:15,21	allotted 99:19	amendment 91:22
192:1	134:3,6,9,10	allow 2:19 83:3	118:22 157:11,22
affiliated 14:15	135:13,14,24	165:12 227:13	184:2 191:2
16:8 17:3,23	136:18 140:24	allowed 115:22,25	amendments
18:16 19:14	150:19 157:3,6,9	116:25 131:22	181:8
affirmative 96:12	157:13 158:1	132:12 135:19	america 23:5
211:16	206:18 207:23	156:10	118:25
affirmed 153:5	208:19,20 209:17	allowing 128:9	american 99:6
218:3	216:15,16 224:4	165:10 187:1	118:4 121:1
afforded 66:11	224:22 225:7,10	allows 91:3	156:15 188:7
afield 102:22	agrees 55:18	159:18 164:20	191:20
afternoon 138:6	65:22	165:20 166:25	americas 23:14
146:7 179:2	ahc 103:22	220:25	24:3
205:18	ahead 126:24	alternative 41:3	amount 32:6
agenda 2:1,1 29:4	138:10,11,12,14	192:13 198:1	133:3 134:13,14
29:10,14,15 203:1	146:2 187:14	alternatively	analogous 114:12
aggressive 52:8	aid 128:4	199:18	analysis 36:15
76:1	aimed 188:24	alternatives 40:21	76:10 185:21
agnostic 150:13	air 114:14	altogether 128:20	194:22 195:10

	T		
analyze 224:10	apparently 40:4	145:7,8,14,18	6:17 7:3,10 9:2,9
analyzed 197:22	69:10 162:23	146:16 153:17,22	9:16 10:4 11:6,12
andrew 26:22	223:15	154:12 160:5	11:19 12:4 55:4
27:1	appeal 3:12,14	162:4 163:1,22	58:12 66:19 70:5
andrews 24:15	4:2,9,17 5:10,17	165:3,11,12,20	73:4 74:24 77:1,3
angelos 110:10	5:21 6:3,7,11 7:2	166:5,11,15 167:7	77:18 92:15 96:9
ann 25:17,19	7:9,18 9:1,2,15	169:3,7,15 172:3	97:4 108:10
27:18	10:3,12 11:5,18	172:7,15,16,17	109:10,10 127:25
anne 24:15	12:3,12 13:2,4,16	179:5,13,22 180:1	128:2,3,8 129:7
annie 28:8	13:19 14:5,19,22	180:6,8,16,19,21	137:10,11 140:8
annotated 215:22	15:5,15,24 16:12	180:23 181:1,11	169:16,17,22,23
announced 54:22	17:7 18:1,20	182:5,17 183:14	170:1,3,5 180:6
answer 57:11	29:10,12 49:10	184:2,9,19,21,23	180:10 181:18
75:19 82:14	51:13,19,20 52:18	185:13,14 186:2	182:5,12,13,16
112:19 121:18	52:19,22 53:5,11	186:13 187:4,6,15	183:19 185:5,16
131:12 133:1,25	53:17,18,18 56:12	189:6 191:11	185:16,22 186:11
134:7 135:22	58:25 59:8 63:6	192:4,9,15,17	186:17,17 187:8
155:5,8,13 156:12	70:16 71:8,10,21	193:12 194:3,8,16	188:12 189:3,5
156:12 162:3	72:21,24,24 73:3	194:20 195:12	199:22,25 202:22
163:15 165:12	73:8,11,20 74:14	196:8,13 198:2,5	211:24 227:18,20
175:7,10,20 176:9	74:25 75:12,16	198:7,22 199:7,13	228:11
176:10	76:14,22 77:13,23	199:20 200:3,5,7	appeal's 120:11
answered 106:16	78:9,24 79:1,9,9	200:13,21 201:12	appear 47:20
124:4 217:25	79:21 80:12,14	201:25 202:17,25	appeared 168:7
answering 76:19	81:5,7,13,21 82:5	203:4,10 204:9	appearing 51:8
186:8	82:25 84:21 89:13	208:5,15 211:1,6	83:20 149:2
answers 83:1	89:24 90:19 91:12	212:3 215:4	203:13
101:8,10	91:18 92:25 93:2	218:23 224:3,5	appears 35:11
anticipate 95:8	93:5,9,11 94:16	226:11 227:17,20	37:24 172:6
anybody 152:17	94:24 97:14,16,16	228:10	188:25 195:14
154:10 162:18	98:8,13,14,15,23	appealed 49:16	appellant 52:25
anybody's 98:4	99:11 101:20	99:11 129:3	154:14 155:3
109:1	106:8,13 108:1,4	appealing 6:10,12	appellants 11:2
apartment 34:5	108:13,21 115:7	8:9,14,18 9:3 11:4	52:17 72:18 92:14
155:7	118:19 120:21	41:20 49:15 55:5	98:2 103:24
apologies 101:5	121:19,22 122:17	84:4 86:3 87:21	107:25 115:11
151:10 205:20	127:8 128:5 129:7	87:24 96:1 125:5	116:16 117:4,7
206:8,13	129:21 130:6,12	145:1 169:1 179:8	142:2,6 143:14
apologize 42:20	130:20,21 131:3	179:20 193:18	151:22 152:20,21
69:7 155:25	131:13 133:9	228:9	153:23 154:21
apparent 92:15	134:18 136:12	appeals 3:13,14	228:6
128:14 214:24	137:14 139:21	3:20 4:3,10 5:11	appellant's
	141:2,11,18 145:5	5:18,21 6:4,7,11	131:12
		10.17	

[appellate - assert] Page 7

		100 00 100 0	10110 001 01
appellate 55:1	applying 37:6	130:20 139:3	194:10 201:21
73:9 82:15 89:19	89:11 127:5	140:24 158:6	arik 23:8 138:10
97:7 128:2 129:8	177:17,18 193:19	189:6 193:18	140:18
131:10 133:10	appreciate 49:5	arguing 54:4 73:7	arising 46:4
134:21 139:14	50:2 54:5 79:4	95:21 165:19	arms 220:20
141:8,10 145:10	97:21 98:18	190:7,8	array 98:3 101:2
145:14 165:24	156:22 176:25	argument 35:11	arrested 33:4,7,7
166:13,21 179:23	apprehensible	37:25 40:11 51:6	33:10 34:13,15
182:10 184:6	138:2	51:23 69:7 70:6	38:6
195:17 198:14	approach 183:12	76:4 80:3,6 81:25	article 33:18
199:3,19 200:10	187:4 190:13	83:24 87:21 98:22	92:17 131:15,15
appellee 155:2	approached	104:13 105:21	articulated
appellees 52:17	146:22	109:1 112:14	120:25 127:24
55:7 74:13 152:21	appropriate 51:1	114:8 115:11,18	220:24
152:22,25 164:18	78:3 108:13 110:3	116:24 119:11,14	articulations
181:18	113:7 119:2,3	119:20 123:2	182:1
appellee's 87:21	125:20 136:3	125:7 127:11,19	artificially 115:13
apples 159:23	151:5 181:2 182:7	127:23,25 128:13	asarco 59:14
applicability	184:10,23 194:8,9	129:9,18,19,20	aside 109:19
44:15 193:13	210:24	130:13,25 131:2	114:18 117:3
applicable 165:6	appropriately	131:17 139:2,20	143:11 204:20
application 95:17	202:24	141:24 142:21	asked 77:22 80:6
107:22 115:14	approval 185:4	146:13 150:2	81:1 95:8,10 96:4
193:3	approve 55:12	152:11 163:18	119:20 121:15
applications	95:18	165:10 168:2,3,6	122:5 126:15
225:17	approved 52:11	168:7,14 171:1,17	146:9 160:8 161:1
applied 120:25	56:15 91:21	172:2 173:19	176:9 178:2
126:17 146:22	approximately	188:15,15,20	190:20 193:2
171:11 178:9	104:9 143:23,25	189:7 194:7,8	212:17 217:17,18
185:15,16 203:23	144:12	199:24 200:10,17	asking 58:22
210:9	apt 182:4	219:23,23 221:8	78:16 79:18 80:25
applies 39:1 44:8	aptly 171:8	arguments 83:4	89:13 105:18
64:2 96:16 171:9	ardavan 9:4 25:4	85:25 90:2 96:8	132:15 136:17
180:6	area 89:19	101:7 103:20	149:19 153:16,21
apply 31:21 37:18	areas 76:20 186:9	105:23,24 109:19	154:11,12,18,18
44:17 88:15 97:10	aren't 100:20	114:12 115:19,22	aspect 117:3
97:12 114:17	arguable 97:12	116:15 131:24	192:11,13 201:2
125:17 163:2	arguably 110:18	138:22 153:17	aspersions 68:17
169:6 195:15	argue 35:19 124:8	156:24 164:16	68:20,24 70:3
197:22,23 198:3	168:6 171:13	166:10,15 169:5	aspirations
198:17 199:21	187:23	174:10 177:23,25	128:14
224:24	argued 53:22 57:4	182:4 189:23,25	assert 44:16 45:21
	71:24 85:24	190:1 192:8	145:4 161:24

174:10	166:4 174:16	96:23	balance 145:4
asserted 36:9	179:12 202:20	average 152:8	149:21 223:24
37:17 43:20 45:1	attempted 117:11	165:15	balanced 139:16
46:7 47:18 53:14	attempting 123:4	averse 225:10	balancing 166:20
160:18 194:14,19	147:18	avoid 40:6 46:25	220:20 222:18
194:19,20 197:16	attorney 21:8	134:21 183:21	ball 24:17
220:24	22:1 39:21 99:2	avoidable 129:4	baltimore 22:4
asserting 105:11	171:1	avoidance 116:5	bank 23:5 108:8
169:4 193:21	attorneys 20:4,15	118:21	bankr 197:6,16
218:6 219:7	21:2,9,16 22:2,9	aware 35:13	bankruptcy 1:1
assertion 47:23	22:16 23:2,12,20	37:25,25 65:13	1:11,23 13:5,19
67:12,14 105:8	24:2 34:1 50:15	74:4 128:7 134:8	14:5,23 30:21
193:23	212:11	146:12,14 176:7	31:6 32:14 36:13
assertions 45:12	audacity 117:3	182:19 208:17	40:21 42:9 44:1,7
211:15	augment 217:15	211:5	44:15,20,21 45:18
asserts 31:24 46:5	august 121:21	awry 70:19	45:19,19 46:24
assess 220:20	189:16		52:21 56:14,20
	authorities 54:21	b	57:19 58:7,14
assessment 173:18		b 1:21 52:21 91:7	1
	authority 58:8,15	145:12 150:5	59:11,15,17 62:7
assessments 173:17	59:7,17 63:23	151:13 173:21	64:16 65:10,21 66:7 68:18 70:22
	64:2,6 65:17,21	179:24 181:5	
assiduously	67:20 89:3 92:17	215:15	71:24 72:2,19
115:25	106:17 108:25	b.r. 36:20 120:16	76:16,20 77:2,16
assigned 129:7	124:24 179:21	120:20 121:1,2,2	78:11 79:13 87:18
assist 214:15	211:3 219:18	123:16 128:10	88:21 89:2 90:14
associates 31:8	authorization	141:6 187:9,10	97:10 106:10,21
36:22	78:14	188:8 189:17	109:9 111:11,13
assume 94:14	authorize 111:4	190:9,15 191:6,19	112:4,22 113:2
98:1 153:18	authorized 54:22	191:21,23 192:7	118:5 123:13
177:10 224:16	55:23 148:12	196:11 197:15	128:19 137:10
assumed 58:17	179:14	198:18 199:10	140:3 148:8,15
assumption	authorizing 13:10	back 35:12 38:1	158:23 160:25
118:23	16:17 17:11 18:5	42:17 69:10 70:10	166:12 168:10
assurance 142:13	19:2 49:13	79:11 90:15 92:21	180:23 181:10
212:24	auto 122:6,8	93:23 99:25,25	184:3,6,25 185:11
assuredly 127:22	automated 178:25	106:25 107:17	185:17,23 186:6,9
atkinson 24:16	automatic 15:3,12	117:11 125:6	186:14,17,19
attachment 47:8	automotive	142:8,9 156:17	187:11 188:21
47:11,15	190:10 198:19	161:14 168:13	189:15,16,17
attack 123:4	available 132:7	178:24 206:1	190:15 191:2,4,6
attacking 105:23	209:7,13	211:23 212:3	191:7,21,22 194:3
attempt 115:6,13	avenue 20:5 22:10	211.23 212.3	194:4 195:6,7
122:25 148:18	23:14,21 24:3	210.17	196:10 197:4,18
	Varitant I as		

[bankruptcy - boat]

Page 9

198:19 200:25 bass 2:20,23 3:9 86:18 90:17 93:8 bernstein 61:19 201:9,9 203:19 17:8 24:10 39:15 93:8,13,20,21 113:9 125:17 211:25 39:15 40:12,16,18 95:19 97:25 197:21 211:25 40:18,24 41:2,8 100:13,16 102:2 197:21 31:18,22 35:16 41:11,15,23 42:6 114:2 116:16 134:11 137:19 36:11 38:15,16,16 42:10,12,17 43:14 134:11 137:19 130:9,16,19,19 124:13 227:6,10 44:6 45:8,24 46:9 143:11 144:17,21 135:20 136:6 20arely 49:11 46:19 48:6,12,14 147:3 148:13 139:13,18 152:17 20arker 24:18 48:15,21 49:5,7 153:13,14 156:6,7 183:2 193:2 20arred 178:1 227:14 169:22 170:11 beth 25:19
211:25 39:15 40:12,16,18 95:19 97:25 197:21 bar 2:4,7,11,15 40:18,24 41:2,8 100:13,16 102:2 bespoke 114:14 31:18,22 35:16 41:11,15,23 42:6 114:2 116:16 best 72:17 79:15 36:11 38:15,16,16 42:10,12,17 43:14 134:11 137:19 130:9,16,19,19 124:13 227:6,10 44:6 45:8,24 46:9 143:11 144:17,21 135:20 136:6 barely 49:11 46:19 48:6,12,14 147:3 148:13 139:13,18 152:17 barker 24:18 48:15,21 49:5,7 153:13,14 156:6,7 183:2 193:2
Dar 2:4,7,11,15 40:18,24 41:2,8 100:13,16 102:2 bespoke 114:14 31:18,22 35:16 41:11,15,23 42:6 114:2 116:16 best 72:17 79:15 36:11 38:15,16,16 42:10,12,17 43:14 134:11 137:19 130:9,16,19,19 124:13 227:6,10 44:6 45:8,24 46:9 143:11 144:17,21 135:20 136:6 Darely 49:11 46:19 48:6,12,14 147:3 148:13 139:13,18 152:17 Darker 24:18 48:15,21 49:5,7 153:13,14 156:6,7 183:2 193:2
31:18,22 35:16 41:11,15,23 42:6 114:2 116:16 best 72:17 79:15 36:11 38:15,16,16 42:10,12,17 43:14 134:11 137:19 130:9,16,19,19 124:13 227:6,10 44:6 45:8,24 46:9 143:11 144:17,21 135:20 136:6 parely 49:11 46:19 48:6,12,14 147:3 148:13 139:13,18 152:17 parker 24:18 48:15,21 49:5,7 153:13,14 156:6,7 183:2 193:2
36:11 38:15,16,16 42:10,12,17 43:14 134:11 137:19 130:9,16,19,19 124:13 227:6,10 44:6 45:8,24 46:9 143:11 144:17,21 135:20 136:6 parely 49:11 46:19 48:6,12,14 147:3 148:13 139:13,18 152:17 parker 24:18 48:15,21 49:5,7 153:13,14 156:6,7 183:2 193:2
124:13 227:6,10 44:6 45:8,24 46:9 143:11 144:17,21 135:20 136:6 parely 49:11 46:19 48:6,12,14 147:3 148:13 139:13,18 152:17 parker 24:18 48:15,21 49:5,7 153:13,14 156:6,7 183:2 193:2
parely 49:11 46:19 48:6,12,14 147:3 148:13 139:13,18 152:17 parker 24:18 48:15,21 49:5,7 153:13,14 156:6,7 183:2 193:2
parker 24:18 48:15,21 49:5,7 153:13,14 156:6,7 183:2 193:2
Darred 178:1 227:14 169:22 170:11 beth 25:19
Darring 47:5 bass's 3:2 171:20 173:2 better 68:18 78:20
pars 177:22 bass' 44:17 174:3 176:10 120:2 155:24
Daseball 73:22 battle 119:15 183:4 192:9 193:9 162:3
Dased 30:10 37:14 bear 85:5 193:14,15 194:1,6 beyond 36:17
37:24 42:25 45:22 bearing 199:24 194:13 199:3,21 94:24 110:21
46:3,7 47:8,18 beg 159:24 200:5,7 201:22,24 119:19 126:11
48:19 52:23 81:19 began 103:12 205:6,12 210:4 127:15 128:15
82:1 90:25 103:8 beginning 71:12 211:14 212:1,9 195:16
108:3 127:2,17 203:6 217:3 220:15 bgi 187:10
131:9 150:7 152:8 begun 216:10 224:1 big 120:17 125:24
157:10 161:11 behalf 2:16,24 3:4 believed 184:9 222:15
168:9 184:12 3:16,22 4:13,19 201:10 billions 118:4
193:14 219:4 5:4,12,23 6:13,19 bell 87:3 120:7 122:10
pasic 173:23 7:13,20 8:4,11,20 belongs 162:1 137:16 152:1
Dasically 33:2,8 9:5,11 10:7,14,20 ben 205:1 210:11 binding 87:7,7
33:16,19,25 34:12
64:15 66:17
112:15 124:25
129:12 141:23
Dasis 30:16 35:17 18:2 30:6 34:24 118:10 146:20 153:10 212:16
36:14 37:23 38:1 43:6,10 83:20 211:8 bkrtcy.d.del.
45:7 47:2,6,11,13 92:13 138:18 benedict 24:19 199:10
47:14 63:6 71:8
71:10,20 75:1 147:15 161:24 76:10,22 161:19 138:6,10,12,14,17
79:7 93:9 96:25
97:13,15 98:10 217:13 221:12 benefits 46:3 black 124:12
100:6 160:23 behavior 99:15 82:10 122:9 224:9 177:19
161:4,10 164:22 belabor 140:10 benefitted 80:9 black's 86:24
178:3 191:10 belief 97:15 benjamin 20:12 blank 146:21
197:9 198:1 199:6 believe 29:23 20:19 blinders 197:13
199:7 50:16,17 51:21 bernard 9:4 25:4 board 163:22
Dasketball 73:23 61:19 73:6,25 bernie 110:9 boat 77:14
79:18 84:2 85:3
Varitant Lagal Calutions

[body - case] Page 10

body 186:14	172:9 199:23	c	capture 168:4	
bond 171:14	200:17 204:4	c 20:1 25:23 27:16	cardozo 76:24	
217:24	224:9	29:1 44:20 173:22	care 161:21	
born 187:4	briefly 84:24 92:7	180:24 196:10	careful 63:18	
borne 79:8	147:12 164:14	214:13 215:6	199:1 202:12	
bottom 63:22	170:24 174:3	229:3,3	carefully 63:14	
bought 33:3	176:4 179:12	cabin 194:6	186:1 198:25	
box 207:2	216:4 219:21	cabined 195:15	carelessness	
bpacpa 181:8	briefs 211:15	calculate 150:9	36:17	
184:4	bring 86:7 95:14		cares 124:2,6,11	
brand 98:3 101:2	125:6 156:14	calendar 29:10,15	134:24	
101:6 108:4 109:1	bringing 53:22	32:12 39:14 49:9	caroline 27:13	
114:14	85:5	175:15 203:7	carranza 191:5	
brandt 27:9	broad 22:18	california 9:1,6	carry 94:15	
brauner 24:20	broader 110:20	121:7	case 1:3 24:1	
breach 134:6	169:3	call 85:11 114:13	30:21 31:7 36:11	
135:24 136:18	broadly 202:12	209:20,22 215:12	37:9,18 42:14,14	
break 104:20	brooks 24:18	called 108:14	45:19,20,21 46:11	
178:23	brothers 128:20	179:8 184:10	52:3 54:2 55:23	
brian 16:13 22:6	199:8	207:1		
		calling 119:18	57:3,15 60:20,21	
25:22 80:1 164:14	brought 39:18	calls 48:17 87:18	61:3,3,6,24 62:1,6	
bridge 102:9	95:12	camera 205:22	62:24 63:9,13,17	
bridgeport 21:18	brunswick 31:8	207:5,6,12,14,17	64:18,21 65:7,8	
brief 40:10 51:6	36:22	207:18	65:14 66:1,11	
86:15 106:2,6	bryant 23:4	canada 93:18,22	67:2,23,25 69:24	
111:2 113:14	bunch 77:13	93:25 95:25	69:25 70:17,21,22	
115:5 121:7,8	156:4 164:17	canadian 11:1,8,8	71:3,5,7,13,14,16	
122:3,4 138:23	170:4	18:2,3 22:16,17	71:16,18 72:2,9	
140:12 142:19	burden 37:20	49:18,18 92:13	72:12 73:6 74:7	
146:8 156:19,23	100:24 132:5,6,8	94:6 96:8 122:11	74:10,18 76:7	
167:18 168:24	192:10 214:18	179:9,10,17 228:5	77:12,13 78:6,11	
177:16 178:23,24	215:9	candid 125:1	79:14 80:15,17,20	
211:17 223:10	bureau 39:20	canon 133:19	80:21,22 81:23	
224:4	burn 137:4	can't 48:15 91:1	82:19,21 84:8,11	
briefed 70:24	burns 27:10	94:11 130:13	84:13,23 85:2,3,6	
71:24 101:21	business 102:10	135:18 140:21	85:8,8,22 86:7	
briefing 52:8	191:25 224:21		88:7 89:14 91:3,5	
53:11 64:14 72:5	buy 84:16	152:24 153:1	93:1,7,10,14,22	
72:6,8 74:8 75:24	bypassing 141:7	158:10	94:22 95:13,16	
76:1,5 101:20	141:16 179:22	capacity 174:6	96:3,10,18 97:16	
107:13 129:8,17	194:21	capital 61:8	97:18,22 100:24	
129:17 136:10		caplin 23:19	104:1,7,10,15,16	
139:24 152:11		146:3	105:9,9,10,22	
157.21152.11			100.2,2,10,22	
Veritext Legal Solutions				

[case - cetera] Page 11

		101 11 101 16	101111000
106:9 107:7,9,22	202:2,2 210:7	121:11 191:16	124:14 129:3
108:3,15,18	212:21 214:1,4	200:8	130:8 131:8
109:11 111:10	217:13 218:15	caused 33:2 36:16	132:18 133:9
112:18 113:5	221:12,13,14	150:11	136:3 137:3
114:16 115:10	223:7	causes 45:1,3,15	138:21,22 139:4
116:8,10,14 120:1	cases 35:5,16,20	45:15,17,21 75:8	141:19 142:11,13
120:10,17,17,17	42:9 43:16 44:1	88:14 220:9	146:6 147:22
120:24,25 121:4,9	44:17,18 45:8,9	caution 187:3	152:10 166:5
121:15 122:13,15	46:18 56:22 59:15	cdc 143:19	170:1,20 176:18
123:16,17,21,23	62:9,13,15,21	celotex 192:20,20	179:5,13,21 180:2
124:11 125:25	64:10 69:20,21	centers 144:13,14	181:3 183:14,17
126:9,17 127:11	75:6 76:13,16,20	cert 116:23 117:9	186:25 187:6
127:11,12 128:12	77:2,4,5 78:3,4,5	certain 11:1,7	188:24 190:6,18
128:14 129:16	81:13 89:11,17	13:13 16:20 17:14	190:24 199:8
131:17 132:12,19	101:3 105:12	18:2,8 19:5 22:16	202:13 227:17
133:6 139:25	106:2,21 107:4,24	39:24 49:13,18	228:9
141:3,5,10,13,17	108:7,22 110:12	91:4 92:13 179:9	certifications
141:18 143:6,11	111:4 113:3,11	179:15 186:15	90:11
146:15,16 147:15	114:12 115:1,4,5	199:6 206:17	certified 52:18,22
147:21 148:13	118:5 119:21,22	209:21 218:13	72:10 85:3 108:21
155:12 159:9	120:2,17 121:5	228:5	130:4 141:10
160:4 161:15,25	122:6 123:5,13,18	certainly 88:24	148:22 170:21
162:12 163:19,23	124:14,20,23	93:19 94:2 127:17	200:7 201:13
163:24 164:21	125:3,13,14 127:3	134:12 153:6	229:5
165:1,3 167:5	127:9 128:9 132:8	162:22 167:24	certifies 163:22
170:22 171:14	139:6 143:17,18	193:23 194:7	certify 3:14,20
177:7,17,18 178:9	147:2 148:15	196:2 214:3	4:17 5:10,21 6:6
180:21 181:9,19	155:23 159:22	222:19 224:10	6:17 7:18 9:9
181:19 182:18,23	161:25 162:24,25	226:6	10:12 11:12 12:12
182:23 183:11,13	165:1,2 171:5,9	certainty 155:19	77:22 80:16 85:12
184:12,21,25	178:6,20 182:1	certification 3:12	122:5 142:20
185:13,13,15,19	183:1,6 186:6,9	4:2,9,11 5:2 6:10	164:19 169:15
185:25 186:14	186:19,25 187:1	6:11,12 7:2,9,12	176:5 180:8,16
187:5,11,19 188:1	189:10 190:19	8:2,10,15,19 9:2,3	187:4,15 194:3
188:2 189:4,20	195:6,7,13 196:13	9:15 10:3,6,18	199:20 227:19
190:17 191:5,5,14	196:18 197:21	11:4,18 12:3,6,18	certifying 5:17
191:17 192:16	198:23	49:10 51:12,16	6:3 73:3 109:9
193:3,4,9 195:4,9	cast 68:20	52:1,14 53:4	180:1 198:1 200:3
195:13,19 196:1,3	casting 68:17 70:2	54:23 56:7 71:20	certiorari 188:22
196:3,6,12,16,17	category 90:22	72:16 73:15 74:5	cetera 136:20
197:4,5,7,9,11	194:9	75:21 77:21 81:16	160:1 173:13
198:6,12,16,22	cause 47:4 91:4	86:10 88:8 89:24	197:8,8
201:3,5,16 202:1	111:17 120:23	91:16 97:19	,
,,-,			
		ral Solutions	

[cfr - citing] Page 12

		ı	
cfr 55:1	cir 31:10 37:14,22	122:22 123:4,6,6	circuits 64:17
chain 198:14	96:24	123:7,17 124:4	76:10 116:22
challenge 57:21	circ 161:13,17	125:11,12,19	117:5 118:23
91:17	181:6 192:22	127:2,15,20	193:24
challenged 58:16	circled 107:4	128:15,17 129:15	circuit's 96:19
chambers 32:9	circuit 3:20 4:3,10	129:20 130:1,7,11	circumstance
39:7 48:7	5:18 6:4,17 7:3,10	130:15 131:2,18	81:16 171:4
chance 85:6,8	9:9,16 10:4 11:6	132:3,11,15 133:8	circumstances
139:13 203:7	11:12,19 12:4	137:11 141:17	36:17,25 44:23
216:20	31:11 37:6,17	142:7,9,11,12,19	56:14 95:23,24
change 134:16	51:13 53:9,10,10	142:22,23 143:8,9	106:9 107:10,19
147:21	53:15 54:24 55:17	146:10,12 147:1	108:9 110:4
changed 91:19	56:4,9,11,16,20	152:10 153:24	112:25 113:8
changing 77:3	56:22,25 57:3,9	154:20 155:13	119:2 124:19
channeling	59:9,24 60:1,2,4,5	158:5,25 161:9	125:21 130:24
150:18	60:6 62:7,14,18	162:15 163:8,21	132:7 141:16
channels 128:10	63:17,21 64:3,19	164:1,22 165:8,13	183:20 186:1
187:2	64:20 66:19,25	165:17,22,23	187:7 199:17
chapter 14:10,14	67:6,22 68:7,12	166:17 171:5	citation 96:22
16:4,7,24 17:2,18	68:18 70:10,11	177:17 178:7	citations 101:14
17:22 18:12,15	71:4,6,9,16,20	179:7,22 180:10	184:13 186:15,18
19:9,13 38:17	72:9,12,20 73:10	180:14 181:2,4,12	211:18
43:16 45:4 46:18	73:15,21 74:1,7	181:20 183:10,18	cite 88:18 96:10
49:11 72:2 106:10	75:4,12 76:8	183:23 184:7	101:23 124:14
124:4 179:6	77:24 78:13,16,17	185:25 186:4	125:13 127:11
character 200:6	78:18,19,20 79:6	187:8,20 188:12	150:4 158:16
chart 197:19	79:16,20 80:19	188:18,23 189:3,4	161:6 177:17
charter 113:11	81:3,11,18 82:2,6	189:11,12 190:18	184:8 187:11
chase 73:5 93:19	82:14,16,23,24	190:20 191:18	197:11
chassix 67:25 68:9	85:1,13 86:19	192:16,24,25	cited 58:3 61:7
69:22	87:2,20 88:8,18	193:1,2,11,19	62:9 67:23 88:24
check 177:21	88:23 89:2,6,7,8,8	194:21 195:5,8,12	104:14 107:17
chemetron 37:21	89:22 90:10,18	196:4,4,6,7,9,13	108:11 119:21
chen 24:21	92:25 93:6 94:18	196:22,23,24	121:4 122:2
cherry 106:19	94:19 96:2 105:23	197:2,14,18,19	146:24 150:1
chief 39:19	106:17 107:5,17	199:7 200:1,12,16	161:5 191:25
chose 77:3 198:24	108:6,10,12,20,25	200:23,24,24,25	194:11 196:14
chris 147:11,14	109:5,15,18 110:2	201:14,14,16	cites 60:24 61:7
217:12,12	110:7,8,14 112:16	202:11 228:12	127:3 223:10,11
christopher 4:13	113:17 114:9	circuit's 181:19	citing 56:22 76:23
7:13 10:7 12:7	116:17,19,20,22	192:21 193:8	105:9,12 106:24
24:6 26:11,16	117:4 118:24	196:16,18	108:22 128:6
39:19	119:5,8 121:10,16		

[citizenry - comley]

aitizanus 174.16	57.10 50.1 4 0	124,22 120,6 25	216,67
citizenry 174:16	57:18 58:1,4,9 61:5 66:11 87:13	134:23 139:6,25 147:9 150:16	216:6,7
citizens 84:9,13		151:13 153:13	clothing 115:8 190:3 194:11
148:6,11 149:3	87:25 88:1,4,10	151:13 153:13	
174:7,8,11,12	88:16,20 92:19		cmo 177:22
citizens' 148:16	102:2,3,4 105:11	163:5 168:25	code 45:18 46:24
civil 44:8,13,14	106:11 111:5,6,8	173:5 174:5	52:21 55:10 72:19
214:12	111:14,16,19,22	180:22 185:6	90:14 91:9 97:9
claim 2:4,7,11,15	112:4,24 113:22	188:1,4 189:19	97:10 168:10
3:9 30:9,21,25	113:23 114:6	190:14 195:2	181:7 182:7 191:2
31:6,13,18 32:2,5	116:6 117:24	198:11 199:5	194:3 198:10
32:14,17,18,23	118:9,12,14	206:19 207:24	coerced 195:5
36:9,12,14 37:15	125:25 126:11	210:20 211:9,22	cohen 22:8 83:10
37:16,23 38:1,23	149:10,11,14,23	211:23 212:1	coherent 186:14
39:3 40:19,24	149:24 150:6,17	220:1,8 221:5,11	colleague 221:23
42:8 44:18 46:23	150:18,24,24	clearer 88:7	colleagues 52:6
46:23 47:14 84:12	151:17,17,25	clearly 30:7 40:14	collier 185:23
94:1 105:10	152:3 158:23	71:13 112:10	191:7 196:10
111:11 118:17	159:6,11 160:3,9	114:1 133:9	198:18
119:23 127:6,14	160:17,20,23	135:18 141:5	colliers 90:13
148:16 149:15,17	161:10 167:19,22	147:18 152:24	190:23
149:18 150:15	167:22 168:5,11	158:16 160:17	color 125:10
152:4,5 161:3,24	174:9 193:20	172:5 183:15	columbia 83:19
162:1,16 171:2,15	195:6 197:3 218:5	195:1 196:14	83:21 160:18
177:7 178:8	218:7,8,8,14	199:21	168:9
215:17 218:19	220:1,7,15,22,24	clerk 13:12 16:19	combining 89:17
219:2,19 227:5,9	227:5,9	17:13 18:7 19:4	189:10
claimant 100:24	clarification	41:18 100:16	come 42:21 67:11
claimant's 160:23	147:17 149:5	207:14,18	99:25 124:16
claimants 5:5 8:5	clarified 201:6	client 146:11	126:24 171:23
10:21 12:21 23:13	217:19	154:24 155:8	174:10,12 195:3,7
38:19,20,22 49:19	clarity 157:12	177:6	203:23 216:17
59:4 84:10 100:12	class 68:2 137:17	clients 173:2	226:4
104:1 138:19	claudia 26:20	177:10	comes 76:7
168:1 171:11	clause 119:1	clint 24:25	113:21 150:13
181:17 220:3	clean 67:11	clock 122:7	151:1 218:19
claiming 37:11	clear 30:19 35:5	close 41:13 115:25	comex 190:9
85:21 104:2,3	37:9,11 46:12,13	124:16 129:1	194:11
217:20	53:16 62:3 63:17	142:15 163:16	comfort 156:4,13
claims 2:4,7,11,15	69:8 70:2 71:7	closed 37:18 90:8	coming 35:22
2:23 31:16,19,23	76:8 83:15 84:8	144:13,14	48:16 151:20,24
35:7,14 40:3,4	96:16 100:22	closely 112:3	172:15
43:20 44:17 45:8	105:22 112:16	closer 40:15 205:9	comley 21:15
45:10 46:5,18,19	118:11,13 119:24	206:22 207:20	86:13

Page 13

[comma - conflict] Page 14

aamma 100.12	20mno 5(-0	70.0 00.7 157.0 5	102.6 160.7 202.2
comma 180:13	compare 56:9	79:8 80:7 157:2,5 183:19 199:21	103:6 162:7 203:2 203:3 204:3
commanded 125:18	compared 143:21		
	compatible 76:18	202:23,23	212:13 225:12,12
commands 113:6	186:7	concerned 61:13	225:14 226:16
113:6	compel 181:2	61:18 118:8 139:7	conferences
commencing	compelled 178:6	145:9 173:3	203:21
129:8	compelling 90:25	191:10 221:6	confinement
comment 84:24	compensation	concerning 59:1	31:25
174:3	36:11 149:9,11,25	concerns 62:10	confining 178:14
commentary	150:25 151:1,19	74:9 80:11 182:18	confirmation 13:3
71:19 86:15	complain 87:23	183:4 193:13	13:18 14:4,9,21
139:23	complaint 44:2,3	concession 153:14	15:3,13 16:4,12
commentators	44:5 45:2,13,23	conclude 55:10	16:23 17:17 18:11
64:11	46:5 47:10,19,23	56:10 69:13 70:1	19:8 49:16 52:24
comments 52:24	113:25	72:15 81:25 91:13	56:19 70:25 85:24
172:14,20 213:12	complaints	111:22 115:9	104:22 105:2
221:11	167:20	197:25 202:4	108:20 112:7
commit 165:21	complete 132:20	concluded 122:15	116:7 117:21
committee 4:16	138:2 172:13	123:11 139:11	118:8 130:3
4:19,22 5:4 7:17	completed 80:10	226:17	134:11 137:11
7:20 8:4 10:11,14	216:10	concludes 92:4	147:24 148:15
10:20 12:11,14,20	completely 72:23	226:16	150:16,23 157:4,7
23:2,12 31:2	103:3 116:7	concluding 129:9	157:8,14,15,25
49:24,25 53:14,24	125:12,22 129:23	conclusion 79:14	192:15 210:9
70:19 81:2 138:18	129:23 151:5	80:18 182:24	214:11 218:2,12
139:9,12 140:20	155:7 188:25	183:2 202:3	218:14,20 219:6
181:15,15,17	204:18	conclusions 14:13	225:16
205:3,13 206:10	completing 52:3	16:6 17:1,21	confirmed 31:20
208:9	complex 38:18	18:14 19:12 70:6	38:17 93:11 95:18
committee's 5:1	complicated	70:8 127:4 131:23	103:16 146:20
8:1 10:17 12:17	55:23 135:9	201:11,17	219:1
205:16	comply 197:25	conditional 211:8	confirming 14:14
committees 49:24	computer 60:14	conditions 179:16	16:7 17:2,22
committee's	207:11	179:25 203:15	18:15 19:13 49:10
54:19	conceded 153:12	conduct 66:3,5	56:21 59:1 104:20
common 64:24	conceivable 45:20	87:5 111:16	104:25 179:6
76:24 170:14	111:12 126:22	113:23 114:6	201:1
180:12	conceivably	185:14 199:15	confirms 183:24
communications	133:10	confer 216:9,14	184:23
113:11	conceive 199:12	217:17	conflating 57:16
companies 161:11	concepts 168:9	conference 2:2	conflict 63:20
company 31:8	concern 73:4,17	15:19 29:11 100:1	125:11,14,15
36:22 161:16	74:4 78:25 79:2,5	101:24 102:11,18	196:20
30.22 101.10	11.110.2317.2,3	101.27 102.11,10	170.20

[conflicting - copy] Page 15

	I	I	
conflicting 66:24	considerable	construction 87:5	128:1 182:20
124:24 180:18	183:10 198:8	133:19	187:24 218:9
195:25 196:6,9,12	consideration	construe 198:23	contrast 56:9,17
confusion 135:1	47:19 75:21 78:8	construed 35:9	144:4
congress 65:19	85:17 145:7 163:2	191:14	contribution
76:15 77:2,23,24	199:1 200:21	construing 191:13	112:2
128:7 167:7 180:7	considerations	193:20	contributions
181:22 183:24	181:23 182:8	consulate 218:23	61:4
184:9 186:1,4	considered 32:18	consultation	contrived 168:5
191:10 196:7	59:9 72:21 84:10	54:25	control 31:14 32:3
198:15,24 199:4	89:5 91:17 158:25	consulted 30:13	32:7 36:18 37:4
201:23 203:18	173:22	consummated	39:4 47:5 207:7
223:12	considering 36:25	93:14 219:1	controlled 165:6
congress's 183:17	177:5 214:25	consummation	controlling 53:25
congress's 88:20	considers 87:2	93:12	55:17 56:2 63:17
connecticut 15:23	consistent 39:6	contamination	64:2,6,22 86:18
21:16 67:6 83:18	40:19 71:19 76:8	162:17	87:10 88:18,23
86:13 168:8	158:24 188:1	contemplated	89:6,15,15,16,20
196:23 208:1	196:2 198:12	203:18 210:6	90:3 106:17
connecticut's	200:22 202:16	contemplates	108:25 110:13
167:21	consistently	167:5	111:3 115:15
connection	202:10,11	contend 44:24	116:19 119:5,7
134:14	consla 24:22	contended 187:12	147:2,4 168:13
connections 35:13	consolidate 45:7	contested 70:24	171:18 180:10
consensual 56:5	consolidated 11:5	103:14 173:2	183:19 184:15
58:9 59:5 61:12	170:2 228:10	context 45:12	187:19 188:11,16
66:20,21 87:9,11	constituted 144:6	58:13 62:11,21	188:17,23 189:4,8
112:23 123:12	constitutes 185:18	65:9,10,25 73:1	189:21,24 190:1,7
135:9	constitution 72:19	77:17 81:20	192:5,12,19 193:9
consent 4:11 7:11	88:21 117:7	101:25 165:9	194:25 195:8,9
10:5 12:5 30:20	118:20,25	190:21 198:9	196:5 197:11,18
52:18,19 68:3	constitutional	contingent 5:5 8:5	controversially
221:5	55:22 58:8,15	10:21 12:21 23:13	122:12
consented 220:7	59:7 63:23 80:21	138:19	conveyance 2:20
consequence	89:3 97:3 105:24	continue 73:9	3:2 40:4 46:24
163:24	148:6,18,19 149:1	154:9	227:14
consequences	149:7 163:25	continued 112:8	convinced 185:4
137:4 215:17	192:3 218:9	continues 184:14	convulsion 211:8
consider 31:12	constitutionality	contours 110:21	conway 94:8
59:3 61:4 74:24	90:23	contradicted 48:1	coordinate 129:20
82:6 88:8 197:8	constraints	60:2	copied 95:13
202:25 224:2,8	144:16	contrary 91:23	copy 41:15,17,17
		92:8 113:19,24	48:6,22,25
			,

[core - court] Page 16

core 55:21 89:2	195:10 201:11	70:21,22 71:2,7	145:25 146:2
corners 183:7	223:25 225:2	71:18,25 72:1,4	147:2,7,13,19
corp 31:9 36:20	court 1:1,11 3:12	72:23,25 73:3,4	148:9 149:6 151:9
37:13,21 120:15	3:14 4:3,10 5:11	73:16 74:20,24	152:2,19 153:15
187:9 188:8 190:2	5:17,21 6:3,7,11	75:15,22,25 76:6	153:21,24 154:11
190:14 191:20,21	7:3,10 9:2,16 10:4	76:14,21,23,24	154:16,20 155:15
191:23 192:6	11:5,19 12:4 29:2	77:1,8,16,17 78:1	155:17 156:6,13
196:11 198:18	29:25 30:2,4,8,18	78:9,23 79:5,22	156:17,18 157:7
correct 42:2 50:8	32:12,15,17 33:9	79:24 80:25 82:12	157:17,20 158:2,7
53:24 55:3 73:2	33:12,14,23 34:6	82:20 83:3,6,11	158:11,20,23
118:16 134:1	34:16,19 35:1	83:13 85:14,16	159:8,16,20
141:14 150:4	36:2,6,21 37:9,10	86:11,16 87:4,7	160:17 161:15
177:8,11 178:16	38:16 39:10,12,14	89:2,10 91:3,10	162:14,20,23
185:1,6 204:18	39:17 40:14,17,21	91:24 92:5,10	163:9 164:6,9,12
208:24 210:17	40:22 41:1,5,10	94:10,12,17,23,24	165:3,4 166:8
219:13 220:18	41:12,20,22,25	95:6 97:7,14 98:7	167:3,12,15
correctly 72:8,11	42:4,7,11,13,19	98:14,20 99:8,14	168:16,20,22
82:11 103:12	42:21 43:4,8,12	99:16,24 100:4	169:13,21,24
122:12 153:16	43:17,20,21 44:10	101:12 102:8,21	170:2,4,12,23
187:14 216:9	44:11,22,25 45:2	105:19 106:22	172:18 173:9
cost 32:6 137:7	45:14,16 46:10,16	108:6,10,13,16	174:6,21,23
186:19,21 215:8	46:17,25 47:10,12	109:4,5,6,11,14	175:11,14,17,19
costs 129:4	47:13,17 48:11,13	109:15,17,18	175:23,25 176:13
couldn't 66:8	48:15,23 49:4,6,8	110:14,14,21	176:17,19,23
125:6	50:13,16,22,25	112:23 113:18	177:2,6,9,9,12
counsel 34:22	51:3,5,10,13,19	115:9,9,13 116:17	178:1,5,11,13,22
81:1 150:1 205:16	51:20 52:9,21	116:25 118:5	179:1,22,23 180:2
218:11	53:5,9,13 54:4,9	119:10 125:4	180:5,7,10,11,14
country 109:9	54:12,16 55:2,13	127:11 128:1,2,3	180:16,22 181:1,2
229:23	55:18,19 56:3,4	128:4,8,15,17,19	181:4,10,10,12,13
county 43:18	58:14,17,19 59:11	128:24 130:5,6,7	183:16 184:5,14
couple 132:24	59:20,23 60:4,8	130:22 131:17,20	184:18,24 185:1,5
210:15 221:10	60:14,18 61:2,15	131:23 132:2,3,3	185:8,9 186:10,12
course 30:24	61:21 62:3,7,9,17	132:10 133:2,7,24	186:18,20,21,23
37:12 45:3 46:17	62:24 63:5,22,24	134:5 135:2,12,18	187:19 188:12,12
51:21 75:13 90:2	64:1,3,7,7,10,15	136:14,22 137:9,9	188:19,21,25
91:19 110:6	64:16,21 65:4,13	137:9,12,13,21,22	189:3,5,12 190:5
112:17 126:14,15	65:15,17 66:19	138:4,8,12,16	190:15 191:24
135:23 136:20	67:5,8,10,15,17	139:12,18 140:3,4	192:3,25 193:1,6
140:4 141:13	67:22 68:4,5,7,7	140:13,14,17,23	193:8,10,16,17,19
151:5 155:22	68:12,15,22 69:1	141:8,8,9,12,22	194:15 195:9,20
161:13 164:21	69:4,9,15,18,20	142:3,8 143:1,7	196:15,21 198:14
180:4 193:20	69:23 70:3,3,20	143:10 144:20	199:3,16 200:1,23

[court - day] Page 17

200 27 27 201 2 5	01.00.07.6.00.00	10 10 15 10 0 3	26 10 27 1 20 1
200:25,25 201:3,6	81:22 87:6 89:23	12:12,15 18:3,3	26:18 27:1 29:1
201:7,8,19,19,24	90:8 95:9 109:9	22:16,17 23:3	51:11 52:21 64:2
202:12 203:2	109:10 116:18	49:18 50:1 52:4	77:2 89:11 90:6
204:19,22,23	117:6 118:19,19	57:17,22 84:12	109:8 110:12
205:5,8,15,19,21	120:11,13,14	87:22 92:14	124:13,18,22
205:23,25 206:2	124:22 126:18	104:10 135:8	128:18 130:5,5
206:12,15,17,21	141:11 155:13,14	137:18 140:20	133:5 170:6
207:5,8,12,16,20	182:10 185:10,17	181:14 205:3	179:24 184:19
208:4,12,14,18,23	186:11,16,17	228:6	185:24 186:3
208:25 209:11,16	187:3,5,8 188:9	creditors' 31:2	187:13,16 188:8
209:18,23 210:2,5	189:9,23,25	112:23	189:16,17 190:4,9
210:13,25 211:3	191:12 195:14	creditor's 87:25	190:11 191:6,22
211:25 212:1,23	197:19 198:11	crickets 172:13	198:19 200:3
213:3,7,10,18,21	199:4,5 202:10,11	crimes 112:12	202:5 227:1,21
213:23 214:15,16	202:25	crisis 66:4 124:9	228:1
214:19,21,25	court's 29:11	139:8 144:23	d'angelo 24:23
215:3,7,8,10,18	47:19 49:10,12	214:9	da 34:5
215:25 216:3,6,22	52:23 59:7,17	criteria 51:12,24	damages 105:11
216:25 217:5,7	78:14 80:18 83:2	54:2,18 55:15,16	113:22 114:6
219:9,22 220:11	86:21,24 102:11	70:15 74:19 79:19	danger 37:1
220:13,20,21	135:25 140:7	critical 96:3,5	dangers 128:7
221:7,16,20,22	cover 67:5 109:6	153:8 158:22	darren 25:16
222:4,6,10 223:15	123:24,24	166:24	data 152:7
	1		
225:4,4,5,15,21	coverage 147:20	crockett 24:24	date 2:5,8,11,15
i :	·	crockett 24:24 cross 222:20	date 2:5,8,11,15 31:18,22 35:16
225:4,4,5,15,21	coverage 147:20		1 1 1
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17	cross 222:20	31:18,22 35:16
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11 court's 172:21 173:17,17 179:5,5	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21 146:6 159:12,21	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4 cso 100:4	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16 93:12,15 94:16,18
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11 court's 172:21	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21 146:6 159:12,21 161:4 188:5	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4 cso 100:4 ct 21:18	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16 93:12,15 94:16,18 143:13 179:17
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11 court's 172:21 173:17,17 179:5,5 180:3 182:5,14	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21 146:6 159:12,21 161:4 188:5 covid 31:25 124:2	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4 cso 100:4 ct 21:18 cubed 117:3	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16 93:12,15 94:16,18 143:13 179:17 212:19,19 225:19
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11 court's 172:21 173:17,17 179:5,5 180:3 182:5,14 185:21 191:4	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21 146:6 159:12,21 161:4 188:5 covid 31:25 124:2 144:16 155:6	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4 cso 100:4 ct 21:18 cubed 117:3 cure 142:8	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16 93:12,15 94:16,18 143:13 179:17 212:19,19 225:19 226:14 227:6,10
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11 court's 172:21 173:17,17 179:5,5 180:3 182:5,14 185:21 191:4 192:14,19,20	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21 146:6 159:12,21 161:4 188:5 covid 31:25 124:2 144:16 155:6 cracks 85:7	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4 cso 100:4 ct 21:18 cubed 117:3 cure 142:8 current 38:8	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16 93:12,15 94:16,18 143:13 179:17 212:19,19 225:19 226:14 227:6,10 229:25
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11 court's 172:21 173:17,17 179:5,5 180:3 182:5,14 185:21 191:4 192:14,19,20 194:22 199:25	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21 146:6 159:12,21 161:4 188:5 covid 31:25 124:2 144:16 155:6 cracks 85:7 create 148:19	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4 cso 100:4 ct 21:18 cubed 117:3 cure 142:8 current 38:8 104:23	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16 93:12,15 94:16,18 143:13 179:17 212:19,19 225:19 226:14 227:6,10 229:25 dated 32:17 33:14
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11 court's 172:21 173:17,17 179:5,5 180:3 182:5,14 185:21 191:4 192:14,19,20 194:22 199:25 211:7 214:13	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21 146:6 159:12,21 161:4 188:5 covid 31:25 124:2 144:16 155:6 cracks 85:7 create 148:19 200:15,17	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4 cso 100:4 ct 21:18 cubed 117:3 cure 142:8 current 38:8 104:23 cut 73:5 93:19	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16 93:12,15 94:16,18 143:13 179:17 212:19,19 225:19 226:14 227:6,10 229:25 dated 32:17 33:14 36:5 179:14
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11 court's 172:21 173:17,17 179:5,5 180:3 182:5,14 185:21 191:4 192:14,19,20 194:22 199:25 211:7 214:13 courtesy 41:17	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21 146:6 159:12,21 161:4 188:5 covid 31:25 124:2 144:16 155:6 cracks 85:7 create 148:19 200:15,17 created 147:19	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4 cso 100:4 ct 21:18 cubed 117:3 cure 142:8 current 38:8 104:23 cut 73:5 93:19 99:8,24 124:24	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16 93:12,15 94:16,18 143:13 179:17 212:19,19 225:19 226:14 227:6,10 229:25 dated 32:17 33:14 36:5 179:14 david 23:17
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11 court's 172:21 173:17,17 179:5,5 180:3 182:5,14 185:21 191:4 192:14,19,20 194:22 199:25 211:7 214:13 courtesy 41:17 98:5	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21 146:6 159:12,21 161:4 188:5 covid 31:25 124:2 144:16 155:6 cracks 85:7 create 148:19 200:15,17 created 147:19 creative 59:13	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4 cso 100:4 ct 21:18 cubed 117:3 cure 142:8 current 38:8 104:23 cut 73:5 93:19 99:8,24 124:24 144:20 145:16,20	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16 93:12,15 94:16,18 143:13 179:17 212:19,19 225:19 226:14 227:6,10 229:25 dated 32:17 33:14 36:5 179:14 david 23:17 138:17
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11 court's 172:21 173:17,17 179:5,5 180:3 182:5,14 185:21 191:4 192:14,19,20 194:22 199:25 211:7 214:13 courtesy 41:17 98:5 courtroom 67:4	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21 146:6 159:12,21 161:4 188:5 covid 31:25 124:2 144:16 155:6 cracks 85:7 create 148:19 200:15,17 created 147:19 creative 59:13 credible 125:13	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4 cso 100:4 ct 21:18 cubed 117:3 cure 142:8 current 38:8 104:23 cut 73:5 93:19 99:8,24 124:24 144:20 145:16,20 183:8 213:18 cutting 30:18	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16 93:12,15 94:16,18 143:13 179:17 212:19,19 225:19 226:14 227:6,10 229:25 dated 32:17 33:14 36:5 179:14 david 23:17 138:17 davis 20:3 29:23
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11 court's 172:21 173:17,17 179:5,5 180:3 182:5,14 185:21 191:4 192:14,19,20 194:22 199:25 211:7 214:13 courtesy 41:17 98:5 courtroom 67:4 100:2,4,5 172:6	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21 146:6 159:12,21 161:4 188:5 covid 31:25 124:2 144:16 155:6 cracks 85:7 create 148:19 200:15,17 created 147:19 creative 59:13 credible 125:13 129:23	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4 cso 100:4 ct 21:18 cubed 117:3 cure 142:8 current 38:8 104:23 cut 73:5 93:19 99:8,24 124:24 144:20 145:16,20 183:8 213:18 cutting 30:18	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16 93:12,15 94:16,18 143:13 179:17 212:19,19 225:19 226:14 227:6,10 229:25 dated 32:17 33:14 36:5 179:14 david 23:17 138:17 davis 20:3 29:23 30:6 34:24 43:9
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11 court's 172:21 173:17,17 179:5,5 180:3 182:5,14 185:21 191:4 192:14,19,20 194:22 199:25 211:7 214:13 courtesy 41:17 98:5 courtroom 67:4 100:2,4,5 172:6 172:12 223:18	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21 146:6 159:12,21 161:4 188:5 covid 31:25 124:2 144:16 155:6 cracks 85:7 create 148:19 200:15,17 created 147:19 creative 59:13 credible 125:13 129:23 creditor 13:11	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4 cso 100:4 ct 21:18 cubed 117:3 cure 142:8 current 38:8 104:23 cut 73:5 93:19 99:8,24 124:24 144:20 145:16,20 183:8 213:18 cutting 30:18 d d 1:22 3:15 4:4,11	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16 93:12,15 94:16,18 143:13 179:17 212:19,19 225:19 226:14 227:6,10 229:25 dated 32:17 33:14 36:5 179:14 david 23:17 138:17 davis 20:3 29:23 30:6 34:24 43:9 97:24 100:10
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11 court's 172:21 173:17,17 179:5,5 180:3 182:5,14 185:21 191:4 192:14,19,20 194:22 199:25 211:7 214:13 courtesy 41:17 98:5 courtroom 67:4 100:2,4,5 172:6 172:12 223:18 courts 37:11	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21 146:6 159:12,21 161:4 188:5 covid 31:25 124:2 144:16 155:6 cracks 85:7 create 148:19 200:15,17 created 147:19 creative 59:13 credible 125:13 129:23 creditor 13:11 16:18 17:12 18:6	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4 cso 100:4 ct 21:18 cubed 117:3 cure 142:8 current 38:8 104:23 cut 73:5 93:19 99:8,24 124:24 144:20 145:16,20 183:8 213:18 cutting 30:18 d	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16 93:12,15 94:16,18 143:13 179:17 212:19,19 225:19 226:14 227:6,10 229:25 dated 32:17 33:14 36:5 179:14 david 23:17 138:17 davis 20:3 29:23 30:6 34:24 43:9 97:24 100:10 121:17 204:14
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11 court's 172:21 173:17,17 179:5,5 180:3 182:5,14 185:21 191:4 192:14,19,20 194:22 199:25 211:7 214:13 courtesy 41:17 98:5 courtroom 67:4 100:2,4,5 172:6 172:12 223:18 courts 37:11 56:20 58:7,11,14	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21 146:6 159:12,21 161:4 188:5 covid 31:25 124:2 144:16 155:6 cracks 85:7 create 148:19 200:15,17 created 147:19 creative 59:13 credible 125:13 129:23 creditor 13:11 16:18 17:12 18:6 19:3 106:22 201:2	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4 cso 100:4 ct 21:18 cubed 117:3 cure 142:8 current 38:8 104:23 cut 73:5 93:19 99:8,24 124:24 144:20 145:16,20 183:8 213:18 cutting 30:18 d d 1:22 3:15 4:4,11 5:2,11,18,22 6:4,7 6:13 7:4 8:2,11,16	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16 93:12,15 94:16,18 143:13 179:17 212:19,19 225:19 226:14 227:6,10 229:25 dated 32:17 33:14 36:5 179:14 david 23:17 138:17 davis 20:3 29:23 30:6 34:24 43:9 97:24 100:10 121:17 204:14 205:1,12
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11 court's 172:21 173:17,17 179:5,5 180:3 182:5,14 185:21 191:4 192:14,19,20 194:22 199:25 211:7 214:13 courtesy 41:17 98:5 courtroom 67:4 100:2,4,5 172:6 172:12 223:18 courts 37:11 56:20 58:7,11,14 67:21 68:10 69:14	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21 146:6 159:12,21 161:4 188:5 covid 31:25 124:2 144:16 155:6 cracks 85:7 create 148:19 200:15,17 created 147:19 creative 59:13 credible 125:13 129:23 creditor 13:11 16:18 17:12 18:6 19:3 106:22 201:2 creditors 4:17,20	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4 cso 100:4 ct 21:18 cubed 117:3 cure 142:8 current 38:8 104:23 cut 73:5 93:19 99:8,24 124:24 144:20 145:16,20 183:8 213:18 cutting 30:18 d d 1:22 3:15 4:4,11 5:2,11,18,22 6:4,7 6:13 7:4 8:2,11,16 8:19 9:4 10:5,18	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16 93:12,15 94:16,18 143:13 179:17 212:19,19 225:19 226:14 227:6,10 229:25 dated 32:17 33:14 36:5 179:14 david 23:17 138:17 davis 20:3 29:23 30:6 34:24 43:9 97:24 100:10 121:17 204:14 205:1,12 day 34:4 57:10
225:4,4,5,15,21 226:3,8,14 227:17 227:20 228:11 court's 172:21 173:17,17 179:5,5 180:3 182:5,14 185:21 191:4 192:14,19,20 194:22 199:25 211:7 214:13 courtesy 41:17 98:5 courtroom 67:4 100:2,4,5 172:6 172:12 223:18 courts 37:11 56:20 58:7,11,14 67:21 68:10 69:14 69:15 76:10,11,11	coverage 147:20 covered 45:17 111:22 138:21 146:6 159:12,21 161:4 188:5 covid 31:25 124:2 144:16 155:6 cracks 85:7 create 148:19 200:15,17 created 147:19 creative 59:13 credible 125:13 129:23 creditor 13:11 16:18 17:12 18:6 19:3 106:22 201:2 creditors 4:17,20 4:23 7:18,20	cross 222:20 crystal 188:4 cso 100:4 ct 21:18 cubed 117:3 cure 142:8 current 38:8 104:23 cut 73:5 93:19 99:8,24 124:24 144:20 145:16,20 183:8 213:18 cutting 30:18 d d 1:22 3:15 4:4,11 5:2,11,18,22 6:4,7 6:13 7:4 8:2,11,16	31:18,22 35:16 36:11 38:15,16,16 93:12,15 94:16,18 143:13 179:17 212:19,19 225:19 226:14 227:6,10 229:25 dated 32:17 33:14 36:5 179:14 david 23:17 138:17 davis 20:3 29:23 30:6 34:24 43:9 97:24 100:10 121:17 204:14 205:1,12 day 34:4 57:10 75:10 85:22

[day - deemed] Page 18

	1 11-0 6		
116:23 124:22	177:4 179:6	96:8 106:24 111:6	95:9 110:7,14
132:22 146:13	200:22	111:25 112:2,8,10	114:9 115:15
159:25	debtors 2:14 3:1	139:3	116:19 128:4
days 100:15	4:1,8 7:1,8 9:14	decade 59:10	129:21 130:21,23
108:16 115:20	10:2 11:17 12:2	decades 56:16	131:10 133:12
121:20,22 126:3	13:10 14:16 16:9	58:12 105:18	142:22,23,24
131:8 137:3	16:17 17:4,11,24	107:17 117:7	147:4 153:4 158:8
141:25 172:1	18:5,17 19:2,15	137:11 158:16	165:7,17,24
177:24 224:20,21	20:4 30:16,20,22	december 82:4	171:18 180:10
224:21	31:1 32:1,19,21	129:22 143:22	181:19 184:15
dc 21:4	34:25 38:9,24	144:3 155:4	188:11,16,18
dead 117:9	39:24 40:9 42:9	200:11 225:20	190:8 191:24
deadline 115:21	42:24 43:10,16	226:1,5	192:1,12,14 193:9
208:20 209:1,3	45:11 46:8,12	decide 62:22 75:7	193:11 194:2,15
223:5 225:20	47:25 48:4 49:21	79:20 81:17 82:17	194:25 200:16
deadly 122:1	52:2,13,16,20	82:18 85:14	211:11
deal 109:3 114:22	53:14,23 54:8	155:21 177:9	decisions 59:11
125:24 126:8	56:17 57:13 58:5	195:20 199:15	66:24 74:12 88:18
169:6	58:6,9,10 59:2	210:25	88:19 116:20
dealing 171:4,6	64:24 65:6 79:12	decided 56:4	147:2 165:4
196:15 205:4	81:2 85:20 91:15	58:14,18 63:24	171:11,16 180:19
deals 126:5	91:17 92:9,19	66:14,18 72:9,21	184:5 192:19
dealt 116:7	94:5 95:4,5,12	81:9 84:21 94:17	193:23 195:8
146:23,25 165:8	98:2 100:10	103:2 116:15	196:1,5,9
189:23 202:24	103:22 106:11	122:22 158:25	decisis 184:7
223:25	111:5 112:13	184:12 189:22	declarant 221:19
deaths 143:20,23	118:12 124:5,10	190:19 191:18	declaration
143:25 144:2,3,4	134:25 135:17	195:21 200:22	215:21 216:11
144:5,6,8	139:4,11 150:19	203:6 215:1	declarations
debtor 1:9 30:6	153:11,23 154:12	decides 75:12	126:3 208:21
30:11,13 37:1	160:11 176:2	81:12 82:25 87:16	209:2,5,23,24,25
39:6 43:21 45:2,3	179:14 181:14	129:15 130:7	216:14
45:16,22 56:6,13	196:24 202:15	165:14	declined 160:9
57:24 58:5,11	208:8 212:17	deciding 88:16	decree 180:17,20
66:10,12,20,21	213:1 218:23	122:23 190:18	184:20 195:24
70:18 84:11 87:17	220:2,8 221:4	200:4	198:6
87:24 88:1,2,11	debtors' 106:11	decision 63:22	decrees 180:9
95:14 96:14	111:4	70:12 75:11 78:6	dedication 97:22
111:11,17 158:23	debtor's 29:16,21	80:9 81:12 82:1	deem 36:4
158:24 159:2,3	34:21,22 35:6	86:18,21,25 87:11	deemed 54:24
169:9 201:2	38:17,21 45:8,21	88:2,9,23 89:6,15	63:16 68:2,2
debtor's 2:10	46:12 47:5 49:23	89:16,25 91:1	118:12 151:15
162:1 171:13	51:25 56:10,24	93:21 94:10,18,23	

[deeming - direct] Page 19

[direct - document] Page 20

	I	I	T
80:24 81:5,13	disability 46:4	disingenuous	141:8,9,11,22
82:5,25 89:13,24	disagree 70:9	65:25	142:3,8 143:1,10
90:18 91:11,16,18	125:16 140:7	disjunctive 64:8	155:14 160:18
93:2,8 98:8,22	165:15 172:12	64:13 84:2 109:4	168:8 170:2,5
106:11 108:13,21	183:2 188:20	dismiss 44:2,11	179:22 180:4
109:10 111:5,20	disagreed 201:15	91:3	181:10,12 184:5
115:7 121:19,22	disagreement	dismissed 57:6	186:10,12,16,20
122:17 127:8	80:8 144:22 145:9	dispenses 128:13	186:21 187:17
129:2 130:12	disagrees 145:1	dispiriting 125:2	190:4,5,6,11
131:8 132:18	disbursement	displace 168:11	194:22 198:14
133:9 136:3,12	13:12 16:19 17:13	displeasure	199:13,22 200:1
137:2 141:19	18:7 19:4	116:20,21	200:23 201:7,8,18
145:14 146:5	dischargability	dispositive 173:24	204:19 212:1
147:22 150:16	187:21	dispute 84:19	226:10
152:10 165:3,10	discharged 66:12	85:23 86:9 94:22	division 40:2
167:7 168:6	disclosing 212:18	127:2 216:18,19	59:21,23 125:2
169:15 179:5,13	disclosure 161:2	disputed 86:2	dizengoff 4:19
179:21 180:1,8,16	discovery 203:25	dissimilar 70:7	7:19 10:14 12:14
181:11 183:14,16	204:12 214:3,20	dissolved 212:22	dizon 27:11
184:2,9,23 186:2	214:24 215:5,10	dist 198:20	dizzying 101:2
186:13,25 187:4,5	215:11 216:2,17	distinct 53:7	doc 13:14 16:21
187:15 188:24	218:16 220:17	129:13	17:15 18:9 19:6
190:6,17 192:4	222:7,11,20	distinguished	docken 24:25
194:3 196:8 198:2	discrete 58:23	122:13	docket 30:10,17
199:7,20 200:3,7	59:3 100:7 163:24	distribution 43:24	48:23,24 100:15
200:13 202:13	184:15 189:21	87:22,25 151:14	129:8 134:11
213:3 227:17,20	discretion 51:17	distributions 47:8	136:9 170:2
228:10	82:15 180:4,5	88:3 150:10	200:17,19
directed 51:13	181:4 186:24	distributors 39:25	doctor 32:24 33:3
163:18	214:14	district 1:2 29:7	doctors 33:5,6,19
directing 13:12	discriminated	41:20 42:4 52:8	33:20 34:11,13
16:19 17:13 18:7	45:24	53:5,9 67:3 70:19	38:5
19:4 134:15	discuss 61:24	70:21,22 71:2	doctrine 199:19
direction 155:1	discussed 57:8	73:19 75:25 76:21	document 2:11,15
185:18 189:19	71:11 161:9,12	76:23 77:4,15	2:23 3:3,7,9,15,21
directive 131:22	195:4	81:21 83:19,21	4:4,12,18 5:3,12
202:17	discusses 122:3	94:10,17,23,24	5:22 6:8,18 7:4,12
directly 111:24	161:15 197:2	97:14 102:11	7:19 8:3 9:10,17
130:4 148:21	discussion 57:2,6	113:18 115:12	10:6,13,19 11:6
162:13 165:6	71:1 72:1 78:7	128:1,4,8,19,24	11:13,20 12:6,13
192:24 194:2	87:9,20 185:23	130:6,21 131:17	12:19 13:5,20
201:13	discussions	131:20 132:2,2,10	14:6,16,23 15:6
	215:24	133:7 139:12,18	15:15,19,24 16:9

[document - efforts] Page 21

	100 6 5 5 110 15		10.510.1-1
17:4,8,24 18:17	109:6,25 110:12	dual 142:17	19:6,10,15 227:7
19:15 102:17	114:2,5 119:10,11	due 56:5 57:11,13	227:11,15,21
135:17,22 157:5	119:12,14,14	57:15,17,22 58:12	228:12
213:15	121:23,24 123:2	59:10 63:23 66:19	echo 85:11 143:3
documentation	124:16 125:4,6,24	70:10 98:25 99:20	eck 26:25
94:3	126:25 127:17	102:1 117:15	ecke 25:2
documents 5:7	131:25 133:12	118:9,14,18,21,25	eckstein 5:48:4
13:9 16:3,16	134:2 135:21	144:15 146:23	10:20 12:20 25:3
17:10 18:4 19:1	136:3,4 137:2	148:11 158:24	ecro 1:25
211:13	140:7 142:10	159:12,20 172:24	ed 185:24
doesn't 55:24	144:11,25 145:8	173:3 193:6,13	edgier 110:18,20
60:19,21 63:21	147:3 148:24	225:17	editors 190:23
77:1 81:23 89:23	149:2 153:2,13,14	duplicative	edmunds 16:13
107:11 109:7	154:6 155:2	149:17	22:6 80:1,1 81:1
114:7,16 123:19	157:15,16 159:6	dylan 24:22	81:10 83:6,8
133:9 148:17	160:3	e	84:24 164:7,9,11
150:8	door 38:22 89:21		164:13,14 166:22
doing 33:4 80:23	90:7	e 1:21,21 20:1,1	167:4,11 213:11
110:24 114:22	dose 34:13	23:17 29:1,1	213:13,19,20,22
116:21 119:15	doubt 59:1 80:6	181:5,5 187:17,17	213:24 215:4,14
155:6,8 156:13	116:5 118:21	227:1 228:1 229:3	215:19 216:8
175:23 212:18	120:3	earlier 52:24	222:14 223:9
doj 54:21 218:18	downplaying	73:14 77:11 142:4	224:19
dollars 36:10	143:14	221:23	edny 187:17 190:2
118:3 120:8	dozens 117:6	early 129:22	educational
122:11 137:16	126:5	earth 67:10	187:22
152:1	dph 36:19	easiest 155:11	effect 45:20 53:5
don't 29:20 32:22	dr 24:9 33:9 35:4	easy 120:16	84:18 93:22
41:13 42:23 48:2	35:13	161:22 171:23	111:12 126:22
50:16,17 54:5,12	draft 48:3	eberhardt 25:1	133:21 174:12
54:12 55:3,7	drain 1:22 3:7	ecf 2:5,8,12,17,20	182:19 192:1
57:21 60:20 61:8	29:3 166:16 179:2	2:25 3:4,10,16,22	effective 49:14
68:13,15,22 69:9	drew 199:13	4:4,14,20,23 5:5	52:16 93:12,15
71:4 73:6 75:19	drexel 106:24	5:13,23 6:8,14,19	143:13 176:10
78:4,5,21,22	107:17 109:25	7:5,14,21 8:5,12	179:16,17 212:19
/ / /		8:20 9:6,11,18	224:1
79:24 80:3 84:22	110:3,5 159:22 160:1 196:25	10:8,15,21 11:9	effectively 96:1,14
91:25 92:23 93:24		11:14,21 12:8,15	128:18 145:21
94:12,13 95:19	dropped 125:7	12:21 13:7,14,21	
96:4 97:25 98:7	drug 38:9 46:4	14:7,11,16,25	effects 128:9
98:22 100:6 102:2	drugs 39:25	15:7,16,21 16:1,5	effort 98:19
102:3,22 104:24	drysdale 23:19	16:9,14,21,25	147:23
104:24 106:18	146:4	17:4,8,15,19,24	efforts 76:22
107:21 108:11		18:3,9,13,17,21	186:12 217:6
	I	ral Calutions	

[eighth - et] Page 22

	1		
eighth 110:17	18:12 19:9	enjoin 61:22	eric 26:21
eitel 21:6 51:7,8	eli 15:20 27:2	106:22	erroneous 185:7
51:11 53:21 54:8	eliding 184:13	enjoined 88:20	eskandari 9:5
54:14,17 55:9,14	eligible 124:5	enormous 84:25	25:4
59:25 60:7,13	eliminate 58:25	101:17	especially 211:1
61:1,14 62:2,5,15	127:25 128:19	enron 31:9 32:15	214:21 215:5
62:20 63:4,8 64:5	elisa 25:11	37:13	essence 43:19
64:12,22 65:5	elizabeth 26:13	enter 102:9	essential 45:25
67:7,9,13,16,19	ellen 18:20 24:11	136:17	86:7 105:10
67:24 68:6,10,13	50:10	entered 32:10	164:25
68:20,24 69:3,6	else's 100:21,23	149:10 201:7	essentially 85:25
69:12,16,19,22	email 32:8 39:6	entering 79:19	101:6 151:15
70:1 71:11,22	48:6,7	entertaining	164:19 169:2,6
72:7,24 73:2,13	emanuel 2:5	214:20	185:1
74:3 75:2,19,23	29:18 227:6	entire 57:6 104:7	essex 43:18
77:7,25 78:2 79:4	emerge 101:21	160:7 166:13	est 197:25
79:10,23 156:20	154:9 156:8	172:6 198:9	establish 56:7
156:22 157:19,23	emergence 139:7	entirely 37:11	128:17
158:3,9,14,22	166:12	81:19 136:8	established 38:10
159:14,17,24	emergency 29:9	159:19 172:7	38:15,16 105:12
162:10,19,22	102:12 139:13	entities 3:22 6:19	105:19 114:11
163:3,10,14	203:9 210:18	9:11 11:14 23:20	146:19
either 35:18 38:5	emphasize 181:24	38:20 39:22,22	establishes 200:18
39:24 40:5 42:23	210:22	43:21 46:2,6	establishment
45:8 47:2 48:3	emphasized 76:15	47:24 49:22,25	13:11 16:18 17:12
54:2 55:8,17 56:3	184:5 186:5	93:4 103:25	18:6 19:3
57:12 85:7 91:25	190:15	114:22 146:4	estate 47:4,5
116:16 148:4,25	employees 39:22	160:19 178:10	107:11 111:13
149:16 155:1	enacted 165:12	181:15,16 194:5	126:23 149:18
160:12 167:6	181:7	entitled 222:19	157:18 162:1
171:9 173:24	encouragement	entity 44:9,11	214:19
181:25 191:1	47:16	114:10,19	estates 45:21
192:11 193:10	ended 167:8	environmental	111:20,25 137:18
197:12 198:3	endorsement	162:16 191:19	149:17
202:6 225:10	59:12	epidemic 144:10	estate's 112:3
elaborate 83:25	enforced 84:15	equally 118:13	136:5 142:24
137:4 212:20	engage 199:2,4	equate 194:24	esther 20:9 29:24
elected 84:7	engaged 43:23	equitable 36:24	30:5
electronic 210:10	engagement 78:6	57:6 59:12 199:20	estoppel 158:13
element 173:1	engaging 65:15	equities 37:8	et 4:20,23 7:21
189:14	english 105:9	equivalence 91:10	10:15 12:15 29:3
eleventh 14:10	118:1	erased 133:22	40:7 136:20 160:1
16:4,24 17:18			173:12 179:3

197:8,8	187:8,16 194:10	existed 192:6	expense 215:9
ethic 200:6	194:17 199:8,13	existence 118:24	219:2
ethos 134:17	199:15 223:4	218:19 219:3	experience 77:5
evade 105:24	examples 144:12	existing 105:14	81:20
evaluate 76:13	exceeding 58:15	108:5 111:4 115:2	explain 108:21
evan 25:13 27:25	exceedingly	123:4 130:20,21	130:2 134:9
evening 102:10	161:23	147:25 178:19	175:14
event 32:4 47:22	exception 88:15	exists 95:7 111:3	explained 76:24
48:19 49:1 73:8	96:15 114:15	112:6 120:21	120:20
89:13 203:14	115:6	149:15 165:20	explaining 71:23
218:2,24	exceptional 97:21	193:19	explanation 35:22
eventually 71:9	108:9 187:7	expansive 59:12	125:9
71:20 127:20	exceptions 90:4	expect 37:11 82:1	explicit 183:18
132:11 162:6	96:17 188:3	153:5 162:25	explore 74:20
199:6	excluding 45:24	200:9	exposed 155:6
everybody 98:17	exclusive 96:11,20	expectation 52:23	express 101:16
evidence 107:8	96:25	128:16	expressed 74:3
108:17 125:24,25	exclusively 188:4	expecting 221:21	101:24 103:8
154:3,4 214:7,20	exculpation 61:13	expedite 142:20	157:4
216:1 221:8,18	197:10	164:23 182:23	expressing 116:21
222:19 223:2,11	excusable 35:19	198:14	expressly 88:5
223:13,19	36:14,19,24 37:12	expedited 5:16	111:9 151:14
evidentiary 210:6	37:20	6:2 11:5 13:3,17	extend 15:2,12
210:23	excuse 31:14	14:3,21 15:2,5,12	98:5
ex 5:8 8:8,16 14:1	37:15,16 38:12	15:14 50:3,8 53:1	extended 31:22
15:10	46:9 188:17	53:11 72:8 74:8	124:10 222:1
exact 106:15	199:24	75:1,24 76:1 79:7	extension 222:8
123:18	exempt 105:14	129:17 139:7	extensive 35:16
exacting 31:10	115:2	152:22 153:23	76:12 117:19
exactly 69:21	exempted 105:18	154:13,22 199:14	172:11 189:22
81:20 89:14	exemption 105:12	199:23 200:14,14	192:25 210:23,24
114:25 116:6,9	105:25 108:5	224:3 228:10	211:14 214:7
122:4,21 123:14	114:11 171:2,3	expedition 52:3	extent 35:9 61:24
125:1 128:6	178:18	53:16 71:12 75:9	62:11 67:20 209:6
151:18 157:13	exercise 180:4	136:8 164:20	209:12 212:20
219:16	181:4 191:4 225:6	183:9	213:2
exaggeration	exercises 180:5	expeditious 76:16	extinguish 106:10
122:7	exercising 171:12	143:8 166:12	158:23
examination 94:3	171:15 186:24	186:5	extra 130:22
examine 222:20	exhaustive 164:16	expeditiously	155:25 200:15,16
example 60:7	exhibition 73:22	129:11 146:11	201:16
67:25 87:16	exist 102:2,4	165:22 166:14	extraordinarily
166:19 173:16	159:6 160:3		117:19 120:3

extraordinary 172:25 174:1,9 fair 32:6 84:19 faster 73:7 1 63:5 100:13 188:3 193:13 91:24 110:22 128:25 129:2 130:22,24 131:4 196:6 198:13 128:4 133:3 130:11 131:3 132:7 136:2 137:7 199:5 201:10,17 148:22 157:23 132:9 133:23 147:21 148:1,20 factor 31:12 37:14 166:8 171:17 141:9 165:16 155:23 162:12 38:10 39:1,2 173:7 185:9 166:7,25 186	22,25 3 3
130:22,24 131:4 196:6 198:13 128:4 133:3 130:11 131:3 132:7 136:2 137:7 199:5 201:10,17 148:22 157:23 132:9 133:23 147:21 148:1,20 factor 31:12 37:14 166:8 171:17 141:9 165:16	3
132:7 136:2 137:7 199:5 201:10,17 148:22 157:23 132:9 133:23 147:21 148:1,20 factor 31:12 37:14 166:8 171:17 141:9 165:16	3
147:21 148:1,20 factor 31:12 37:14 166:8 171:17 141:9 165:16	
	5
155.23 162.12 38.10 39.1 2 173.7 185.9 166.7 25 186	
133.23 102.12 30.10 37.1,2 173.7 103.9	5:17
178:18 53:16 54:7 80:13 209:18 200:1	
extreme 66:1 80:15 91:14 fairly 31:10 67:25 fastest 139:1	3
201:25 111:18 114:15 70:24 96:16 fatal 47:23 1	04:17
extremely 101:22 119:17,18,19 100:25 178:2 119:23	
117:12 145:2 172:22 194:2 224:3 225:3 favor 37:8 10)4:8
exxon 177:20 factors 30:12 fairway 153:5 135:17 139:5	5
f 37:17 53:25 62:12 faith 37:5 97:14 154:17 183:9)
f 1:21 26:17 229:3 82:24 85:14 107:6 97:15 200:22	
f.2d 87:4 110:5 107:7,13 164:25 fall 170:17 fbi 34:5	
f.3d 31:10 37:13 197:8 fallacy 53:3 fcc 177:18	
37:22 96:24 facts 31:21 44:23 falling 90:21 february 183	7:17
+ 57.25 61.0 10 falls 104.0 100.12	
108:16 110:4,9,11 62:21 63:1 69:10 false 103:3 178:12 federal 13:4,	19
f2d 161:16 70:8 80:22 85:21 familiar 60:14 14:5,22 44:7	,12
f3d 161:13 181:5 86:1,2,7 101:3,11 192:9 214:6 46:2 55:10 7	6:9
183:22 188:7 102:19 108:3,15 family 42:8 52:13 82:15 125:4	
108:18 118:6 66:5,6 115:8 165:24 214:1	12
fabulous 113:5 126:18,19 127:5 156:5 160:12 217:21	
face 104:17 116:9 131:7 141:16,18 162:13 190:3 federalism 1	68:10
144:11 159:2 194:11 fee 137:4	
facile 177:5 184:11 193:4 family's 66:3 feedback 92:	23
facilitate 100:14 201:23 famous 120:17 feel 178:6	
183:25 factual 54:10 fantastic 136:25 feeling 183:7	,
fact 14:13 16:6	11
17:1,21 18:14 13:16.0 136:2 140:3 43:20 55:19 61:13 feels 82:17 2	15:25
17.1,21 18.14 19:12 30:22 31:21 172:16,24 173:1 61:18 102:22 feld 23:1 140	:19
46:10,11 70:8 189:22 194:15 118:7 127:18 206:9	
71:8,8,19 80:18 195:10 211:15 131:10 145:8 felt 211:8	
86:3,3 95:5 96:18 220:14 173:3,10 189:8 femino 25:6	
\perp folia $11\cdot13$ \perp $101\cdot0.215\cdot5.5$ fortival $222\cdot3$	15
97:6,17 103:1 104:20 105:22	
104.20 103.22 failed 105.20 farce 110.5 fiduciaries 8	4:12
107:25 108:2,7 111:18 10 114:8 106:3 126:22 farrell 25:5 fifth 22:10 96	5:23
111:18,19 114:8 fails 37:8 farther 105:5 118:22 142:1	12
132:1 134:18,24 135:7 140:9 142:1	
155.7 140.9 142.1 05.24 fast 132.14 141.23 fighting 111.	2
150:7,12 151:13 150:2 161:23 146:17 199:2	
159:2 161:23	

[figured - forth] Page 25

Conv. J. 117.0	finality 50.1	167.10 160.24	fold 195.2
figured 117:8	finality 59:1	167:18 168:24	fold 185:3
file 2:4,7,10,14	186:19	172:18,22 179:10	follow 37:9 63:3
30:20 31:16,18	finally 70:15	181:20 183:5	195:13 196:15,16
32:14,23 40:3	78:12 91:13 119:4	188:15 189:14	196:24
46:22 54:23 83:16	127:7 191:9 198:4	192:11 195:22	followed 57:8
98:13 176:1	find 32:25 51:20	198:12 203:3	178:4
211:11,17 215:21	59:16 189:23	204:25 210:17	following 61:16
227:5,9	197:24 223:18	213:10,13 222:12	144:21 145:20
filed 2:5,8,12,16	finder 172:25	228:6	185:21 197:1,20
2:20,24 3:3,9,15	finding 41:21	fisker 190:10	198:11
3:21 4:12,18 5:3	112:24 126:21	198:19	follows 61:16
5:12,22 6:13,18	findings 14:13	fit 63:2 123:2	134:9
7:13,19 8:3,11,19	16:6 17:1,21	fitzsimmons	foolish 225:6
9:4,10 10:7,13,19	18:14 19:12 41:24	27:12	football 73:22
11:7,13 12:7,13	117:23 131:23	five 117:5 125:8	footnote 54:19
12:19 13:6,20	140:4,7 201:10,17	141:20 156:24	125:8
14:6,24 15:6,15	finds 61:21	178:24	footnotes 125:9
15:20,25 16:13	131:19,20	fix 104:24 127:1	force 64:20
17:8 18:1,20 31:6	fine 55:9 83:6	fixed 105:2 127:1	forced 68:3 88:10
31:20 32:17 36:14	170:14 204:23	flatly 47:25	144:15
37:15,16,23 40:19	205:21 220:11	121:13	foregoing 229:5
42:8 44:5,18	225:9 226:3,8	flaw 47:23	foreign 92:18 94:5
46:18 47:10,20	finer 86:17	flawed 115:18	96:11,12,15,21,21
49:21 50:6 66:7	fire 161:16	flip 78:14	97:1,12 116:5
75:3 98:8,14,15	fired 99:2	floodgates 35:21	foremost 181:20
98:22 99:9 102:14	first 11:2,8 18:3	floor 23:21 204:8	183:5
113:24 115:20	22:17 29:15,24	fly 152:25	foresee 81:19
121:19,23 134:11	33:23 36:15 43:15	focus 32:4 86:21	forever 118:18
147:19 175:5,13	44:16 49:19 51:11	93:6 173:11	forget 135:10
176:5,6 177:6	55:16 60:21 63:9	183:18 185:13	forgetting 123:23
203:4 211:12	79:16 81:8 83:14	190:19 201:24	forgot 155:12
212:9 223:4,5	86:20 92:14 93:2	202:1	form 38:11
227:6,10,14	93:16 94:6 96:1,8	focused 123:11	104:23 126:24
files 34:1,18	98:6 100:11 106:6	147:9 169:9	177:25
filing 29:17 31:13	112:14 113:21	202:11	formally 103:19
31:15 32:2 36:12	115:10,20 117:2	focuses 64:19	forms 43:14
39:3 177:24	117:10 120:12	145:14 185:22	forth 35:24 44:13
filling 223:10	127:14,19,20	196:5	96:17 140:12
final 56:21 82:4	132:11 133:21	focusing 159:11	168:13 179:24
122:25 135:22	140:22 141:9,22	189:22	180:1,7 182:18
162:11 175:10	149:12,12 152:9	fogelman 25:7	184:8 196:25
185:18 198:14,23	152:12 155:16,19	219:15	198:2
201:1,10	157:1 164:2,10		
-			
Veritevt Legal Solutions			

[forums - go] Page 26

forums 169:17	171:25 178:15	game 73:22,22,23	160:8 163:23
forward 53:6	201:12 224:7	73:23 148:22	185:5 216:25
149:20 202:22	frozen 138:13	gange 27:13	given 32:16 47:22
203:18 212:5,12	frustrated 218:7	garden 70:22 72:2	50:5 53:8 57:15
222:7 226:12	fsi 96:25	gas 187:9 192:6	66:2,17 71:25
fought 84:15	full 78:5 106:2	gate 65:2,5 66:23	75:6 82:19,20
221:4	146:13 166:21	gatekeeper 85:12	90:22 94:21 98:25
found 33:21	224:9	gatekeeping	129:2 141:23
105:20 108:19	fully 32:5 78:4	185:19 202:4	155:6 180:25
111:9,18 112:8	135:1 203:16	gates 51:14 65:1	183:10 193:16
129:24 131:18	functioning 182:9	72:15	194:13 196:5
196:17 197:9,22	fund 13:10 16:17	gather 43:19 47:1	223:22
four 37:4 51:12	17:11 18:5 19:2	50:7	gives 156:12
51:14,24 53:24	95:7 151:21	general 21:8 22:1	224:6
55:15 65:1,20	fundamental	54:22 55:12 75:5	giving 81:3 219:4
72:15 74:19 105:3	95:15,20 154:7	87:11 121:12,16	glad 107:2
109:19 155:10,12	201:2	121:25 133:16	gleit 25:9
163:16	fundamentally	190:14 191:22	gm 72:6,7,11
fourth 70:15	112:4 153:3	192:25 196:11	122:5,13 131:7
80:13 141:2	160:24	generally 37:18	137:2 152:12
142:10	funded 94:1 95:19	48:16 76:9 80:21	159:9 195:19
frame 158:10	funding 46:2	181:5 182:1,13	gm's 122:18
framework	95:22 96:4,5	183:15 184:6	go 29:5,14 52:6
182:21	120:7 151:20	189:24	53:6 56:24 61:10
frankel 23:11	176:11	general's 39:21	63:10,12 67:3,3,4
138:18	funds 122:11	generous 66:9	70:19 71:9 72:11
frankly 50:4	124:11 150:14	gerard 26:24	74:17 78:15,15
53:15 69:23 91:25	187:22	gerber 122:5,12	104:12 126:24
117:14 134:18	further 44:4	190:14 195:18	127:13,19,20
153:9 154:25	56:24 94:25,25	gerold 39:19	128:23,25 131:5
171:5 172:24	111:23 112:8	getting 29:6 54:18	132:10,11 137:12
202:21 225:5	131:19 134:14	57:25 64:19 66:9	138:10,11,12,14
fraud 66:12	145:24 164:4	66:9 79:12 82:10	141:9 142:17
fraudulent 2:20	174:19 195:9	107:11 134:18	146:2 155:23
3:2 40:4 46:23	213:5	135:3 145:2 150:8	156:17 164:21
47:3 227:14	future 87:5	217:15 220:22,23	167:7 172:21
free 100:14	133:15 166:17	giddens 25:8	173:19 175:3
159:11	185:2 224:23	give 33:20 42:25	179:16 182:8,20
frequent 65:11	g	43:12 77:11 99:3	186:15 200:11
friday 102:10		105:25 109:7	202:22 212:4
frivolous 131:13	g 21:3 27:10 29:1	118:4 126:19	215:24 217:12
front 60:13	gained 55:11	131:11 133:21	222:7 224:1
142:19 170:5	gainsaid 110:11	155:9,12 156:3	226:12
1.2.15 170.0		100.5,12 100.5	

[goal - guidance] Page 27

1 127 20	204 12 205 2 0	. (1.0.2	124 12 14 10
goal 137:20	204:13 205:2,8	governing 61:2,3	134:13,14,19
145:10	206:22 207:3,4	61:6 62:24 119:22	140:18 204:16
goals 76:17	208:15 209:19	192:17 197:7,7	greatly 155:13
182:13 186:7	214:1 218:25	government 23:12	greenberg 22:15
goes 52:16 57:19	219:7,23 220:14	42:18 105:13	gregory 25:14
75:12 76:25	220:16 222:7	114:16 148:4,5	grievously 131:17
106:24 117:9	224:25	217:21 218:25	ground 104:20
130:15 135:25	gold 6:13 8:11,20	governmental	105:7 131:13
136:19 143:16	15:25 22:13 83:9	3:22 5:4 6:19 8:4	146:6
149:20 161:14	83:10,12,14 86:14	9:11 10:20 11:14	grounds 80:19
183:15,23 184:7	92:6,6 103:12	12:20 23:20 38:20	164:17 173:19
215:5	168:18,18,21,23	49:22,25 88:13	group 3:22 4:7,13
going 29:14 34:14	169:13,19,22,25	93:4 114:10,19,21	6:19 7:7,14 9:11
35:6 41:10,12	170:8,24 172:18	138:19 146:4	10:1,8 11:14 12:1
42:21 49:14 50:22	173:7 174:2	160:19 178:10	12:8 23:20 24:2
50:23 63:3 68:22	177:16	181:15,16 194:5	30:13 49:22,23
71:3,4,5,9,15,16	goldman 21:20	208:9	103:16,17,18,25
71:19 73:25 79:8	86:12,13,17 89:10	governments	104:3,7 146:5,11
80:18 81:24 90:7	90:20 92:3 107:2	87:13 88:9 117:13	147:15 181:16
92:10,21 93:5	164:8,11,13	135:11	208:10,10 212:14
94:13,25 98:25	167:13,17 168:17	governs 109:17	217:13
99:1,8,10,17,24	178:5	grand 125:13	groups 38:22
100:6 101:4 102:7	goldman's 167:15	grant 30:24 31:5	guess 61:15,16
102:9,21 103:5	good 29:2,22 30:3	44:2 47:5 50:9	76:6 78:22,23
104:22 106:19	30:4 34:23 37:5	61:20 71:10	90:15 132:16,24
107:5,17 110:16	51:7,10 67:15	118:13 158:12	133:2,14,15,24
113:4,16 116:11	76:3 83:9,11	200:14 222:8	153:22 154:15
116:14,16 117:10	86:12 92:12 97:14	granted 77:8	172:20 173:3
124:24 125:1	97:15 130:25	78:25 86:10 97:20	174:1 175:9
127:16 129:21,25	131:2 138:6	113:7 116:23	177:16 178:5
133:11 137:4	140:15,18 149:7	121:20 132:6	199:12 213:10
139:12,18 141:8	150:4 179:2	153:22 203:11	215:6 222:5
141:24,24 142:8	188:21 204:15	227:7,21	226:10,11
142:13,14 143:7,9	205:18	granting 13:10,13	guessing 101:10
143:9 144:20	goodness 85:21	16:17,20 17:11,14	155:8
145:16,23 146:8	goody's 190:3	18:5,8 19:2,5	guidance 87:16
151:3,16,24	194:10	30:11 31:3 32:8	108:9 123:6,9
153:12 154:6,10	goody's 115:8	81:13 140:2	134:13,14 181:13
155:18 156:16	gorrepati 27:14	gratified 101:19	181:20 183:11,25
161:6 163:19	gotten 74:23	gravel 77:13	187:7 192:4
171:22 172:10,11	121:17	189:15	194:21 195:4,16
175:2 178:23	governed 42:15	great 57:19 85:4	216:25 218:17
203:13,23 204:11	45:4 189:19 193:7	101:8 131:11,16	210.20 210.17
203.13,23 20 1.11	13.1107.17173.1	101.0 131.11,10	
Veritevt Legal Solutions			

[guide - here's] Page 28

guide 87:5	214:23 223:24	213:23,24 214:14	176:21 177:24
guided 182:15	harmed 131:17	216:1,5 225:6	203:18 204:1
183:5	217:22	heard 34:25 35:11	206:21 209:8,14
gump 23:1 140:19	harmoniously	76:3 79:7 83:12	210:6,9,10,15,18
205:12 206:4,9,25	133:20	98:1,3 101:21	212:6 214:11,20
207:1,13	harms 222:18	104:13 117:17	214:21 217:10
guys 167:9 223:19	harold 25:12	119:20 137:6	218:13,22 223:12
h	28:11	146:1 147:12	223:21 224:7,15
	harrison 27:15	148:3 149:9 164:8	226:7,15
h 5:3 8:3 10:19	hash 132:20	164:16 165:25	hearings 52:24
12:19 25:3 26:15	hasn't 64:16,21	166:18 168:3,21	99:5 117:21
27:3 187:16 hail 117:3	66:14	169:5 172:17	224:11,24 225:23
	hate 41:12	176:7 192:8	225:23 226:16
half 135:7 137:13	hauer 23:1 140:19	206:16 210:12	hears 137:10
142:25 hamilton 2:24	206:9	214:7 215:8 217:8	145:7
21:13 43:2,6,6	haven't 41:25	hearing 2:1,2,2,4	heart 103:10
· ·	64:13 75:3 99:9	2:7,10,14,19,22	heat 202:8
48:6,10,24 49:2 hand 87:1 167:4	99:20 154:2	3:1,7,8,12,19 4:1	heather 24:24
195:5	headed 102:23,24	4:7,16,22 5:1,7,9	heavily 64:19
handed 109:23	heading 40:5,6	5:15,15,15,20 6:1	108:14 141:19
handle 75:18	headquartered	6:1,1,5,10,16 7:1	184:11
handled 97:7	196:24	7:7,17 8:1,7,9,14	heightened 31:17
handling 29:20	health 66:4 80:22	8:14,17 9:1,8,14	held 29:24 56:20
hanover 193:7	168:12	10:1,11,17 11:1	58:4 63:12 87:6
happen 33:9	healthcare 46:3	11:11,17 12:1,11	91:4,10,20 92:19
74:14 90:13	124:5	12:17 13:1,9,16	102:18 106:21
105:15 148:17	hear 30:7 34:22	14:1,3,9,13,19	110:2 112:22
165:16 201:13	40:10,14,16 41:9	15:1,9,11,18,23	115:9 116:8,17
happened 124:1,2	42:1,20 48:14,17	16:3,6,12,16,23	120:12,13 132:19
157:16 207:15	50:20,22,23,25	17:1,7,10,17,21	156:7 187:5
happening 130:1	51:6 74:25 78:18	18:1,4,11,14,20	195:18 202:10
happens 105:17	78:21,22 79:6,15	19:1,8,12 29:4,5	help 80:24 100:12
148:8 219:18	79:16 80:3 83:12	29:11 35:12 41:6	156:14
happy 29:5 34:22	85:1,16 90:20	50:3 60:9 70:25	helped 33:19
40:10 49:2 51:6	92:22 99:10,11,17	85:24 86:22 94:6	155:13
64:13 79:13 138:1	99:21 138:7,14	100:17 104:22	helpful 76:21
158:19 213:8	140:16,21 141:24	105:2 110:22	79:15 83:3 101:12
hard 37:7 41:6	156:19 168:21	118:8 134:12,13	148:1 173:6
206:23	172:2 199:24	139:15 145:18	186:11 195:1
harder 160:21	205:15 206:10,14	149:20 154:2	helping 214:9
harm 129:4 135:7	206:23 207:19	156:6,11 157:4	helps 130:2 223:7
137:7 143:16	208:6 209:10,11	161:2 162:4	here's 102:6
150:11,13 160:13	213:10,19,19,20	163:12,13 166:1	122:14 154:23
, == ======			

[here's - hospital] Page 29

158:9,18,22	208:8,10,10	71:1,23 72:15,22	153:25 154:23
herring 57:20	217:13	73:2,13 74:3 75:2	155:10 156:1,4,16
159:4	hold 57:5 125:6	75:10,19 77:7,25	156:22 157:23
hey 115:4 206:4	152:4 224:22	78:12,16 79:10,23	158:9,14,18,19
206:24	holder 152:4	80:1 81:10 83:9	159:5,24 162:10
he's 61:16 84:25	171:14	83:14,16,24 85:11	162:22 163:3,7,14
115:21 156:11		, ,	· · ·
	holders 118:12,14 holding 57:10	85:12,14,18 86:5 86:9,12 88:18,24	164:4,7,14 166:22 167:11,13,17,18
higgins 20:19	59:17 63:11 86:24	90:21 91:21 92:3	167:11,13,17,18
25:10 210:11,11 210:14 213:9	107:1,13,18	90:21 91:21 92:3	168:23,24 170:8
	·	94:19 96:1,7 97:8	171:1,20,24 173:7
219:13,16,25	112:17,20 113:12 117:25 120:6,24		i i
220:12,18 221:2	/ /	97:14,23 98:12,17 99:13,22 100:9,11	174:2,19,22 176:4 177:1,8,13,14
221:14,17,21,24	189:17 200:23,23 200:25 202:11	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	, , ,
222:15 223:2,14 224:19	holdings 36:20	101:1,9,13,16 102:6,24 103:4,12	178:8,16 204:13 204:17 205:18,20
high 34:12 65:23	61:25 67:25 69:22	103:21 104:6,12	204:17 203:18,20
124:13 132:17	89:17 123:16	*	·
		104:19 106:4,15	208:17 209:10
higher 87:4 94:24	189:10 190:9,10	107:15,20 108:11	210:4,11,14 211:5
highest 87:2	194:11 198:20	109:13,19,22	211:7,23 212:3,7
highlight 184:1	199:10	110:1,15,23 111:1	212:13,15 213:1,5
223:16	holds 91:1	111:9,15,18 112:7	213:8,13 214:5,25
highlighted 192:18	homaidin 187:16 home 121:1	113:20 115:3,20	216:4,5,17,18,23
		116:5,7,13 117:22	217:11 218:4,17
highly 160:10 hill 27:16	152:25 188:7	118:16,21 119:4	219:4,16,21,25
	191:20	119:16 121:12,15	221:2,15,24,25 222:9 223:14
hinges 117:16	hon 1:22	121:25 122:2,25	225:13 226:13
history 35:4 64:18 108:20 135:10	honestly 115:23	123:20 124:20,23	honor's 211:11
	honor 29:22 30:3	124:25 127:7,9	honor's 80:5
181:21 183:24	32:11 34:24 35:2	128:6,22 129:6	
184:14,23	35:15 39:8 40:12	130:2,18 131:7,11	84:18 88:12 97:21
hit 101:6 102:11	43:2,11 48:9,10	132:5,24 133:1,18	137:13
138:3 139:19	49:2 50:10,12,20 51:7,11,23 52:10	134:7,12 135:10	hope 83:1 121:17
156:23	·	135:15,16 136:16	137:12 153:6
hits 118:4	53:4,21 54:14,25	137:22 138:6,15	202:22 203:16
hoc 4:7,13 5:1,4	55:9 56:19 57:2	138:20 139:15	223:8 226:6
7:7,13 8:1,4 10:1	58:2,20 59:2,25	140:10,15,18	hopefully 120:5
10:7,17,20 12:1,7	60:16 61:1 62:2,5	145:19,24 146:1,9	138:2 156:12
12:17,20 23:12	62:20 63:4,8,19	146:18,20,21,21	hoping 203:20
24:2 30:13 49:23	64:5,23 65:6 66:6	146:22,23,24,25	211:20
49:24,24 103:16	66:14,25 67:7,19	146:25 147:10,11	hospital 121:2,3
103:18 104:3	67:24,24 68:10,13	147:14,21 148:23	123:21 124:1
138:18 139:9	68:20,24 69:3,6,6	149:10 151:7,10	133:6 191:5,6
147:15 181:15,16	69:12,16 70:1,15	152:6,18,24 153:7	
<u> </u>	Veriteyt I ea		I

hospitals 38:20	210:4 222:12	immaterial 95:22	195:2,15,18,19
103:17 104:4	hyde 19:25 229:5	immediate 70:16	important 31:12
hour 137:13	229:10	80:14 92:25	37:14 51:18,25
hours 100:15	hyder 25:11	180:19 184:19	60:18 65:10,12,16
house 184:4,8	hypothetical	185:7 198:5	65:24 66:15 68:16
howard 2:8,12	149:23 160:4	immense 35:20	70:9,14 72:18
24:9 32:16 227:10	221:13	immensely 76:22	73:24 74:13 82:11
huebner 20:8	i	186:11	84:5,8 90:16
29:22,23 30:1	_	imminent 204:6,6	101:22 103:13
52:5 97:23,23	i.e. 31:14 36:15	immunities 96:11	104:18 106:23
98:9 99:3 100:9	45:15 81:4 179:22	96:16,22 116:6	112:25 120:3,10
100:10 102:21,24	180:3 185:12,19	immunity 116:10	120:11,17 122:15
109:13 119:13	189:3 192:12,13	impact 37:2 66:2	123:3,15 124:21
130:18 133:18	195:24 200:11	111:20	130:14 138:24
134:4,7 135:15	201:24	impacts 93:25	141:21 145:3,17
136:16,23 137:22	idea 74:10 109:9	impaired 68:2	145:17 150:6
138:5,21,24	154:20	impairment 68:1	152:8 161:8 162:8
139:22 140:11,24	identical 169:2	impartial 99:6	162:8 163:10,12
141:5,14,20 142:6	identification	impeded 186:13	165:1,4 170:10
143:4 147:24	218:5,10	impermissible	187:20 190:16,24
151:10 152:24	identified 47:22	168:4	190:25 200:20
153:20,25 154:14	168:19 209:22	implemented 91:5	202:9 223:22
154:23 155:16,18	218:14 221:22	144:25	importantly
157:10 158:3,8,19	identify 149:15,20	implicate 112:12	182:14
159:5 160:2,15,22	identifying	168:11	impose 58:8 61:12
163:4 165:14,21	211:13	implications 56:5	112:5 125:20
166:3 168:2	idiots 156:4	implicitly 143:14	129:4
	ignore 63:19		
1 1/U:25 1/1:1	0	193.72	imposed 62:13
170:25 171:7 172:21 177:14	ii 5:19 6:4 8:16	193:25 importance 54:1	imposed 62:13
172:21 177:14	ii 5:19 6:4 8:16 13:12 16:19 17:13	importance 54:1	169:10 174:13
172:21 177:14 178:7,8,12,16	ii 5:19 6:4 8:16 13:12 16:19 17:13 18:7 19:4 123:16	importance 54:1 65:6 72:13,20	169:10 174:13 imposition 59:5
172:21 177:14 178:7,8,12,16 210:17	ii 5:19 6:4 8:16 13:12 16:19 17:13 18:7 19:4 123:16 180:17 188:6	importance 54:1 65:6 72:13,20 75:6 76:15 80:20	169:10 174:13 imposition 59:5 197:3
172:21 177:14 178:7,8,12,16 210:17 huge 84:6,22	ii 5:19 6:4 8:16 13:12 16:19 17:13 18:7 19:4 123:16 180:17 188:6 189:17 198:2	importance 54:1 65:6 72:13,20 75:6 76:15 80:20 80:20 82:19 84:1	169:10 174:13 imposition 59:5 197:3 impossible 114:5
172:21 177:14 178:7,8,12,16 210:17 huge 84:6,22 151:10	ii 5:19 6:4 8:16 13:12 16:19 17:13 18:7 19:4 123:16 180:17 188:6 189:17 198:2 199:10 201:16	importance 54:1 65:6 72:13,20 75:6 76:15 80:20 80:20 82:19 84:1 84:6,22 85:4,13	169:10 174:13 imposition 59:5 197:3 impossible 114:5 impression
172:21 177:14 178:7,8,12,16 210:17 huge 84:6,22 151:10 hundred 107:12	ii 5:19 6:4 8:16 13:12 16:19 17:13 18:7 19:4 123:16 180:17 188:6 189:17 198:2 199:10 201:16 202:5	importance 54:1 65:6 72:13,20 75:6 76:15 80:20 80:20 82:19 84:1 84:6,22 85:4,13 85:15 86:8 90:22	169:10 174:13 imposition 59:5 197:3 impossible 114:5 impression 115:10
172:21 177:14 178:7,8,12,16 210:17 huge 84:6,22 151:10 hundred 107:12 155:19	ii 5:19 6:4 8:16 13:12 16:19 17:13 18:7 19:4 123:16 180:17 188:6 189:17 198:2 199:10 201:16 202:5 iii 16:20 17:14	importance 54:1 65:6 72:13,20 75:6 76:15 80:20 80:20 82:19 84:1 84:6,22 85:4,13 85:15 86:8 90:22 119:19 120:14,21	169:10 174:13 imposition 59:5 197:3 impossible 114:5 impression
172:21 177:14 178:7,8,12,16 210:17 huge 84:6,22 151:10 hundred 107:12	ii 5:19 6:4 8:16 13:12 16:19 17:13 18:7 19:4 123:16 180:17 188:6 189:17 198:2 199:10 201:16 202:5 iii 16:20 17:14 18:8 19:5 92:17	importance 54:1 65:6 72:13,20 75:6 76:15 80:20 80:20 82:19 84:1 84:6,22 85:4,13 85:15 86:8 90:22 119:19 120:14,21 121:8 122:13,16	169:10 174:13 imposition 59:5 197:3 impossible 114:5 impression 115:10 impressions 212:11
172:21 177:14 178:7,8,12,16 210:17 huge 84:6,22 151:10 hundred 107:12 155:19 hundreds 100:19 122:10	ii 5:19 6:4 8:16 13:12 16:19 17:13 18:7 19:4 123:16 180:17 188:6 189:17 198:2 199:10 201:16 202:5 iii 16:20 17:14 18:8 19:5 92:17 131:15 180:19	importance 54:1 65:6 72:13,20 75:6 76:15 80:20 80:20 82:19 84:1 84:6,22 85:4,13 85:15 86:8 90:22 119:19 120:14,21 121:8 122:13,16 122:18,20,24	169:10 174:13 imposition 59:5 197:3 impossible 114:5 impression 115:10 impressions 212:11 improper 38:3,7
172:21 177:14 178:7,8,12,16 210:17 huge 84:6,22 151:10 hundred 107:12 155:19 hundreds 100:19 122:10 hurley 23:9 205:7	ii 5:19 6:4 8:16 13:12 16:19 17:13 18:7 19:4 123:16 180:17 188:6 189:17 198:2 199:10 201:16 202:5 iii 16:20 17:14 18:8 19:5 92:17 131:15 180:19 198:5 201:23	importance 54:1 65:6 72:13,20 75:6 76:15 80:20 80:20 82:19 84:1 84:6,22 85:4,13 85:15 86:8 90:22 119:19 120:14,21 121:8 122:13,16 122:18,20,24 123:1,13,17,22	169:10 174:13 imposition 59:5 197:3 impossible 114:5 impression 115:10 impressions 212:11 improper 38:3,7 116:3 136:4
172:21 177:14 178:7,8,12,16 210:17 huge 84:6,22 151:10 hundred 107:12 155:19 hundreds 100:19 122:10 hurley 23:9 205:7 205:12,18,20,22	ii 5:19 6:4 8:16 13:12 16:19 17:13 18:7 19:4 123:16 180:17 188:6 189:17 198:2 199:10 201:16 202:5 iii 16:20 17:14 18:8 19:5 92:17 131:15 180:19 198:5 201:23 illegal 118:18	importance 54:1 65:6 72:13,20 75:6 76:15 80:20 80:20 82:19 84:1 84:6,22 85:4,13 85:15 86:8 90:22 119:19 120:14,21 121:8 122:13,16 122:18,20,24 123:1,13,17,22 124:13 146:15	169:10 174:13 imposition 59:5 197:3 impossible 114:5 impression 115:10 impressions 212:11 improper 38:3,7 116:3 136:4 improve 120:5
172:21 177:14 178:7,8,12,16 210:17 huge 84:6,22 151:10 hundred 107:12 155:19 hundreds 100:19 122:10 hurley 23:9 205:7 205:12,18,20,22 206:1,3,8,9,13,16	ii 5:19 6:4 8:16 13:12 16:19 17:13 18:7 19:4 123:16 180:17 188:6 189:17 198:2 199:10 201:16 202:5 iii 16:20 17:14 18:8 19:5 92:17 131:15 180:19 198:5 201:23 illegal 118:18 illegitimate	importance 54:1 65:6 72:13,20 75:6 76:15 80:20 80:20 82:19 84:1 84:6,22 85:4,13 85:15 86:8 90:22 119:19 120:14,21 121:8 122:13,16 122:18,20,24 123:1,13,17,22 124:13 146:15 153:8 165:9	169:10 174:13 imposition 59:5 197:3 impossible 114:5 impression 115:10 impressions 212:11 improper 38:3,7 116:3 136:4 improve 120:5 improving 137:15
172:21 177:14 178:7,8,12,16 210:17 huge 84:6,22 151:10 hundred 107:12 155:19 hundreds 100:19 122:10 hurley 23:9 205:7 205:12,18,20,22 206:1,3,8,9,13,16 207:4,10,19,22	ii 5:19 6:4 8:16 13:12 16:19 17:13 18:7 19:4 123:16 180:17 188:6 189:17 198:2 199:10 201:16 202:5 iii 16:20 17:14 18:8 19:5 92:17 131:15 180:19 198:5 201:23 illegal 118:18 illegitimate 114:20	importance 54:1 65:6 72:13,20 75:6 76:15 80:20 80:20 82:19 84:1 84:6,22 85:4,13 85:15 86:8 90:22 119:19 120:14,21 121:8 122:13,16 122:18,20,24 123:1,13,17,22 124:13 146:15 153:8 165:9 180:12 183:20	169:10 174:13 imposition 59:5 197:3 impossible 114:5 impression 115:10 impressions 212:11 improper 38:3,7 116:3 136:4 improve 120:5 improving 137:15 inadvertence
172:21 177:14 178:7,8,12,16 210:17 huge 84:6,22 151:10 hundred 107:12 155:19 hundreds 100:19 122:10 hurley 23:9 205:7 205:12,18,20,22 206:1,3,8,9,13,16	ii 5:19 6:4 8:16 13:12 16:19 17:13 18:7 19:4 123:16 180:17 188:6 189:17 198:2 199:10 201:16 202:5 iii 16:20 17:14 18:8 19:5 92:17 131:15 180:19 198:5 201:23 illegal 118:18 illegitimate	importance 54:1 65:6 72:13,20 75:6 76:15 80:20 80:20 82:19 84:1 84:6,22 85:4,13 85:15 86:8 90:22 119:19 120:14,21 121:8 122:13,16 122:18,20,24 123:1,13,17,22 124:13 146:15 153:8 165:9	169:10 174:13 imposition 59:5 197:3 impossible 114:5 impression 115:10 impressions 212:11 improper 38:3,7 116:3 136:4 improve 120:5 improving 137:15
172:21 177:14 178:7,8,12,16 210:17 huge 84:6,22 151:10 hundred 107:12 155:19 hundreds 100:19 122:10 hurley 23:9 205:7 205:12,18,20,22 206:1,3,8,9,13,16	ii 5:19 6:4 8:16 13:12 16:19 17:13 18:7 19:4 123:16 180:17 188:6 189:17 198:2 199:10 201:16 202:5 iii 16:20 17:14 18:8 19:5 92:17 131:15 180:19 198:5 201:23 illegal 118:18 illegitimate	importance 54:1 65:6 72:13,20 75:6 76:15 80:20 80:20 82:19 84:1 84:6,22 85:4,13 85:15 86:8 90:22 119:19 120:14,21 121:8 122:13,16 122:18,20,24 123:1,13,17,22 124:13 146:15 153:8 165:9	169:10 174:13 imposition 59:5 197:3 impossible 114:5 impression 115:10 impressions 212:11 improper 38:3,7 116:3 136:4 improve 120:5 improving 137:15

• • •		10.004.000.14	101 17 220 2 6
inappropriate	independently	12:8 24:2 30:14	181:17 220:3,6
117:12 160:10	44:1 187:13	49:23 66:7,11	innovated 115:11
212:10	indicated 82:2	113:25 114:4	innuendo 67:12
incarnation 215:6	indication 75:8	147:16 160:23	67:13
inch 76:25,25	indiscernible	161:23 168:1	innumerable
include 43:23	30:10,11,12,14,15	208:10 220:3	132:16
46:13 169:23	30:16,17 40:13,20	individually	insisted 104:19
223:3	41:2,3,4,19 42:10	100:19	126:6 152:2
included 42:3	42:17,18,18 48:12	individuals 151:2	instance 141:6
includes 29:10	50:11,14 52:18	161:10 218:14	164:2 184:25
196:22 197:12	53:2,12 55:11	individual's	instances 174:15
223:12	57:20,22 59:14	148:25	202:14
including 31:7	61:14 66:2,10	industries 120:19	instant 100:15
36:25 37:3 38:19	70:20 72:7,12	191:18	instructive 121:14
39:23 101:9	85:23 87:18 88:21	industry 122:8	insurance 111:25
111:25 113:12	89:4,5,9 90:12,13	ineffectual 160:5	161:16
117:23 118:19,24	91:2,3 92:9,15,16	inefficient 132:15	integrity 68:17
127:18 134:15,15	92:17,19 94:15	ineligible 124:5	70:3,12
139:25 151:22	95:11,18 96:2	inextricably	intend 95:11
196:16,23 200:16	97:18 99:23	152:3	127:17 154:2
201:6 209:4	103:18,20,25	infer 32:1 169:14	165:23 209:22
incomplete	104:17 107:3	inferior 87:5	211:15,17
184:13	111:25 112:13	infirmity 59:7	intended 183:24
inconsistent 189:1	113:13 122:6	influence 223:17	196:7 215:12
189:2	126:11 127:24	information 13:13	intending 197:13
incorporate 44:22	132:1,3,4 136:18	16:20 17:14 18:8	222:22
incorporates	137:15,25 147:23	19:5 53:19 95:4	intends 129:10
44:20 214:12	148:21,23 149:1,4	100:17 212:10	intensely 117:18
incorrect 98:12	149:20,21 150:3,7	inhabitants 84:9	intensive 126:10
99:22 150:21,22	151:6 156:2	84:13	intent 166:23
increase 144:7,19	159:19 162:10	inherently 85:22	183:17
increasingly	163:5 169:20	106:13 117:17	intentional 36:18
65:11	174:18,20,22	118:17	interacts 65:12
incredible 98:3	175:7,8,9 205:3,4	injunction 47:2	intercreditor
incredibly 75:5	205:24 206:18	47:22 61:20	126:5
89:12 121:14	207:11,14 208:2,7	106:23 112:6	interest 34:2
122:1 145:17	208:9,11,13,21,22	113:24 194:18	47:25 66:16
indemnification	209:3,8,25 210:1	injunctions 62:14	135:20 136:6
112:2	213:9,17 216:4,15	77:8,9,9 90:10	181:18 203:5
independent	216:16,24 219:8	injunctive 46:21	223:24
51:12 73:19 83:17	221:1,6	injured 220:3	interested 84:14
111:5,8	individual 4:8,13	injury 31:23	92:24 164:1
	7:8,14 10:2,8 12:2	38:19 59:4 104:1	

[interesting - it's] Page 32

interesting 87:1	investments 46:7	148:17	211:7
158:15 170:8	46:14 191:20	israel 25:12	issues 45:10 55:24
interestingly	invoked 130:24	issuance 224:21	56:11,15,23,25
125:5 161:1	involuntarily	issue 32:5 53:22	58:17,23 59:4
interests 139:16	88:17	55:2,4,21,25 56:4	65:7 70:5,24
162:5	involve 118:5	56:10,21 57:16	72:20 74:13 77:10
interfering 206:5	139:22 140:8	59:10 62:22 63:25	79:3 80:11 81:21
interlocking	190:25	64:17,23 65:8,9	84:8,19 85:1 89:5
38:18	involved 33:17	65:17,21 66:2,20	90:16 92:16 93:13
interlocutory	39:17 122:6	66:21 68:1 70:11	97:3,17 99:12
81:21 185:16,22	124:18 135:7	78:8 79:6 81:12	103:2 137:1 138:2
intermediate 78:9	159:12,13 226:11	81:14 82:1,3	139:21 140:1,2
internal 82:16	involvement 33:1	90:25 91:6 93:16	142:1 158:6 163:1
internet 117:25	112:9	94:2 95:15 96:6	165:5,8,8 169:3,6
interpret 64:4	involves 110:12	97:6 98:15 100:8	169:8 170:11,13
90:12 120:14	120:22 172:3,15	105:18 117:15,18	170:15,19,21
133:3 166:3	172:22 180:9,11	122:19,21 123:3,9	171:22,23 172:3,7
interpretation	180:17 191:11,11	123:13,19 124:7	172:10,13,16
144:24 172:21	192:13 195:24	125:21 131:14	173:10,14,15,18
187:21 191:1,3	involving 43:16	133:7,14 142:5	173:24,25 176:12
198:8	55:24 76:20 186:9	145:6,7 156:1	179:12 182:2,15
interpreted 36:21	187:21 190:24	157:2,24 158:18	182:23 188:5
127:12 147:1	201:17	159:1 161:3,9	192:3,5,9,17,23
interpreting	ira 4:18 7:19	162:9,15,21 163:9	193:6 196:13,16
30:22 31:7 46:21	10:13 12:13	163:10,11,12,25	200:21 202:3,4,24
180:5 183:6	ironically 102:1	167:9 170:16	203:23 204:16
interrupt 53:13	182:25	172:24,25 173:1,1	214:8,21,23 215:2
interrupting	irony 101:25	174:13 176:17	215:4 217:17,18
98:17	irrelevant 162:21	179:19 180:6	222:18
intervene 74:14	162:23 189:5	185:19 187:20,20	issuing 71:1
intervening 36:17	212:10	189:13 193:14,20	items 222:25
77:15 148:15	irreparable	194:24 195:21	it's 34:9 36:4
218:24	214:23 223:24	196:8 197:23	42:14,19,21 48:17
intra 125:11	irve 21:20 86:12	201:1,22,22 202:9	48:23 50:20 51:18
127:2	isaacs 18:21 24:11	202:13 203:13	51:24 53:22 54:1
introduce 221:12	50:10,10,14,16,17	211:4 215:6	54:8 55:2,10 57:7
introducing 186:2	50:19,24 51:2,4	217:23 218:16	57:10,10 58:3,17
intuitively 198:16	97:24 98:5,7,12	219:11,11,21	59:20 60:1,1,13
invested 46:11	98:16,24 99:13,15	220:14 221:3,20	61:23,24 64:5,8,8
investigation	99:22 100:3,5,11	222:13 223:16	64:8,8,23 65:9,16
33:24 34:3 38:2,6	island 83:19,21	225:14 226:10	65:23 66:4,4
investment 31:7	isn't 71:8 72:3	issued 102:13	67:19 68:16 70:12
36:22 110:9 188:7	73:21 78:25 145:5	134:13 143:19	70:12 71:3,6,14

[it's - judge] Page 33

71 17 10 07 70 07	1.5.40		
71:15,19,25 73:25	156:19	jamie 27:6	joke 95:20 132:13
75:23 77:20 78:2	i'm 29:6,14,16	jasmine 24:17	jones 25:13 37:21
80:18 81:12,18,18	34:2,3,22 41:5,6	jeffrey 23:24 25:9	joseph 20:11
81:19,24 82:7	41:11,22 48:16,24	26:12 146:3	25:14 27:9 28:1
86:2,25 87:19	49:2 50:4,22,22	jeremy 27:16	jr 3:21 6:18 9:10
88:7 90:11,18	51:6 53:21 60:5,5	jersey 2:25 21:9	11:13
92:15 95:2,15	60:20,20 63:3	39:17,18,20,23	jude 120:19
98:21 99:22	64:1 67:16 71:23	40:7,9 42:23 43:7	judge 1:23 3:7
102:24,25 104:18	74:20,22 80:25	43:18,20,21,22	29:3,7 39:11,11
105:16 106:4,7	92:21 98:8 99:8,9	45:2,9,16,23 46:1	46:9 48:12 53:8
107:6 108:12	99:10,16,16,24	46:6,7,17 47:1,8	55:18 56:18 58:21
109:3,11 110:7	102:7 104:25	47:10,24,24 94:2	61:2,11,18 63:1
112:14 113:16,17	107:2 109:2	95:6,9 115:23	66:17 67:13 68:18
114:25 116:16,19	110:16,24 113:3	156:1,6	68:18 69:23 70:4
117:9,14 119:7,19	114:22 116:11,14	jersey's 39:20	72:17 73:8,14,17
120:9,10,16 121:8	117:10 124:24	jevic 59:13 91:1	73:18,18 74:3,15
121:9,14 124:8	127:1,15 136:24	91:11	75:11 76:2,12
125:1 126:16	137:3,25 144:20	jill 24:13	77:5,15 78:19,21
127:9 129:14	145:16 146:7	jim 34:24 43:9	78:22 81:24 82:4
130:2,18 131:22	151:15 152:20	jo 28:10	89:5 94:8,12
132:20,22 135:6	153:15,16,21	job 33:4 74:11	101:15,18,23
136:4,5 137:7	154:11,11,17,18	joe's 72:3	102:6,13,17 103:8
138:24 139:25	154:19 155:2,4,7	johns 61:8 62:12	113:4,9,11 117:11
141:24 145:11,16	156:8,9,16 158:19	107:18 141:6	122:5,12 123:11
145:17 146:19	159:8 160:8	196:25 198:17	125:15,16,18
148:18,22 149:7	i've 42:1 47:22	join 39:16	126:23 127:24
150:25 151:16	48:19,21 60:8	joinder 4:7 7:7	129:6,14,19,24
152:7,14 153:25	62:9 69:20 73:14	9:1,3 10:1 11:1	130:9 131:4,10,15
154:6,20 155:5	98:13 152:7	12:1 49:22 79:25	131:15 133:12
157:2,20 158:15	159:25	83:16 115:20	135:2,3 136:6,10
158:15,16,16	i	116:3,12 176:6,7	136:25 139:22
159:1,16 160:4,5	i 4:13 6:13 7:13	177:22,24 179:8	142:14,15,23
iv 120:19 124:15	•	228:5	146:13,16 149:13
191:18	8:11,20 10:7 11:7	joinders 55:5	152:19 153:5,9,11
i'd 48:21 50:20	12:7 15:20,25 18:1 20:19 21:20	joined 44:9,14	154:5,25 158:4,5
64:13 132:14		49:14 179:18	158:11 160:7
154:20	22:13,21 24:6	joint 2:22 14:10	163:6 164:3
i'll 30:1 40:1	26:12,16 27:2	14:14 16:4,7,24	165:17 166:16,16
49:15 54:14 74:17	jacob 28:4	17:2,18,22 18:12	170:5 172:1,4,5
77:11 83:4 109:13	jaffe 120:15	18:15 19:9,13	172:25 173:22
109:19 119:13	124:16,19	56:18 59:3	179:2 195:18
120:13 131:11	james 2:16 3:4,21	jointly 43:18 45:7	197:5,9,21 199:13
150:4 154:8	6:18 9:10 11:13	83:17	199:22 200:4,6
	20:10		
	Varitant I a	gal Solutions	

[judge - late] Page 34

201.0 12 202 7 12	101.11 102 7	1-2	226.60
201:9,12 203:7,12	121:11 123:7	kirschenbaum	226:6,9
203:14 204:7	182:9 185:17	96:23 97:5	knowable 152:15
211:2,22 212:21	191:17	kirwan 113:12	knowing 73:20
223:22 224:5,15	jurisprudential	klein 25:16	102:8 154:25
224:21 226:7	181:23 182:17	kleinberg 22:8	200:6,7
judge's 201:9	194:25 195:16	83:10	knowledge 130:3
judgement 47:7	202:9	knauth 27:17	knows 129:6
47:11	jury 199:16	knew 118:24	214:17
judger 190:14	justice 20:14 21:1	133:11	kramer 23:11
judges 69:4 70:6	40:3 76:24 84:16	know 29:20 32:22	27:18 138:17
82:17 92:17	125:3 219:12	34:8 35:14,22	kudos 77:12
133:10,13 224:2	justice's 219:11	42:19,23 48:2	l
judgment 172:22	justification	60:19 61:23 68:6	1 26:25 187:16,17
175:5 180:8,17,19	178:19 214:23	69:21 70:8 73:23	l.p. 1:7 2:17 3:4
184:19,24 195:24	justifies 117:1	73:23 75:19 77:6	4:14,20,23 7:14
198:5	justify 107:11	79:16,24 81:6	7:21 10:8,15 12:8
judicial 37:2	115:7 126:22	82:20 86:6 92:23	12:15 14:15 15:20
40:20 41:16 87:3	k	93:4,24 94:12	
87:6,10 148:23		97:25 98:14,15	16:8 17:3,23 18:16 19:14 29:3
181:7 182:7	kaminetzky 20:12	101:23 102:22	
198:10 215:9	204:14,22 205:1,1	103:22 106:17,18	158 4:4
judicious 77:2	kaplan 22:8 83:10	108:11 116:11	lab 123:15 189:17
julius 24:21	karen 27:21	121:23 124:8,10	199:10
july 121:23 190:4	kate 26:19	125:8,9 133:20	labeling 34:9
junctures 104:21	katherine 26:7	135:20 136:1,23	labovitz 27:19
june 56:17,24	kathleen 26:2	137:5,13,23 138:1	lack 116:19 184:7
58:21 121:19	kathryn 24:19	142:10 144:21	194:1
158:5	katie 28:9	145:16 146:13	lacks 44:10,25
jurisdiction 44:10	keenly 146:14	151:19,23 152:2,7	ladder 115:12
45:1,14 46:15,18	keep 50:14 74:7	154:6,7,7 155:2	190:2
47:18 61:17,21	98:17 119:16	155:18 156:13	laid 113:13 218:4
89:3 96:12,21	123:22 130:10	157:15,16 159:8	langley 25:17
97:1 111:11 112:5	149:19 154:10	159:25 160:11	language 52:15
146:25 173:13	kenan 26:14	164:16,17 166:23	93:6 151:16
191:4 192:19	kenneth 5:3 8:3	167:21 168:5,7	181:20 183:5,8
197:24	10:19 12:19 25:3	171:20 173:21	languish 85:9
jurisdictional	kerr 162:18	175:1 207:14	large 114:19
J 9	kesselman 25:15		126:4
92:16 97:3,6	kevin 25:21	209:19 210:9,14	largely 214:15
142:5 182:21	key 171:7	214:17 215:23	215:1 221:20
jurisdictions	kind 66:8 73:21	217:3 219:12,17	222:22
88:19	132:17,22 135:16	219:17,18 222:10	late 29:6 30:9,21
jurisprudence	142:16	223:6,10,12	31:6,13,15,16,18
76:9 120:23		224:13,15 225:11	32:2,14,23 36:14
		ral Calutions	

[late - limit] Page 35

27.15.16.22.20.4	100.9 21 101.17	115.14 16 116.04	1.42. 55.14 (0.0.10
37:15,16,23 39:4	190:8,21 191:15	115:14,16 116:24	let's 55:14 60:8,10
laundry 68:13	192:16 193:3,4,14	117:15 120:22	60:11,22 61:10
laura 25:6	194:13 195:2,3,9	121:10 122:16,19	67:5 69:10 103:14
lauren 27:5	195:25 196:1,3,4	123:13 127:10	104:12 106:20
law 3:13 13:2,17	196:6,12,16,24	140:1 148:8,10	108:7,24 109:12
14:13,20 15:1	197:5,7,12,12,13	158:18 159:1	109:21 113:3
16:6 17:1,21	201:4,5,11,17	163:24 172:3,7,13	114:13 117:2,2,10
18:14 19:12 30:21	221:10 227:19	173:14,23 188:5	120:12 121:12
31:7 55:20,21	lawful 136:8	190:21 191:16	123:20 126:20
57:3 59:13 60:22	lawrence 25:7	202:3 215:2	127:13 128:22,23
61:3,3,7,24 62:1,6	laws 84:14 118:22	219:23 221:7,20	135:10 158:21
62:24 63:9,10,17	168:13 180:9	229:22	leung 27:21
66:23 70:13,13	lawsuits 112:9	legality 110:3	level 62:7 64:20
71:7,18 72:20	lawyer 55:1	123:12	71:25,25 110:8
73:6 76:20,25	119:25 197:11	legally 111:17	123:6 130:6
77:11,11,13 80:17	lawyering 85:4	136:3	181:10,10,12,13
84:16 86:19,24,25	lawyers 134:25	legislation 65:20	188:18,19 189:5
87:5 88:24 89:16	lay 130:10 143:4	legislative 64:18	189:11,12,12
89:20 96:18	layer 134:21	181:21 183:23	192:17 193:8,10
102:20,25 105:7	lays 171:19	184:14,22	193:11,11 196:4
105:12,14,19,22	lead 70:18 169:13	legitimate 114:20	200:16,23 201:6
105:23 107:16	183:16	lehman 128:12,13	levene 25:19
108:5,14 109:22	leading 185:10	128:15,20 199:8	leventhal 25:20
110:13 111:3	leapfrogging	length 37:1 39:1,2	levin 23:11 138:17
114:11,24 115:2,7	198:13	57:8 122:4 161:10	levinson 27:22
115:23 116:14,21	leave 32:13 90:21	161:12 170:25	lexington 20:5
100.14.100.47	109:13,19 114:18	188:9 192:16	23:21
122:14 123:4,6		100.7 172.10	
122:14 123:4,6 126:19,20 127:13	116:11 117:3	lengths 57:19	lexis 187:17
· ·	·		lexis 187:17 189:15 190:4,11
126:19,20 127:13	116:11 117:3	lengths 57:19	
126:19,20 127:13 128:23 131:24	116:11 117:3 119:13 204:20	lengths 57:19 100:13	189:15 190:4,11
126:19,20 127:13 128:23 131:24 139:22,25 141:5	116:11 117:3 119:13 204:20 leaves 87:14 133:3	lengths 57:19 100:13 lengthy 31:17	189:15 190:4,11 191:21 198:20
126:19,20 127:13 128:23 131:24 139:22,25 141:5 143:11 147:21,25	116:11 117:3 119:13 204:20 leaves 87:14 133:3 218:16	lengths 57:19 100:13 lengthy 31:17 38:15 70:25	189:15 190:4,11 191:21 198:20 li 99:4 226:8
126:19,20 127:13 128:23 131:24 139:22,25 141:5 143:11 147:21,25 155:12 160:25	116:11 117:3 119:13 204:20 leaves 87:14 133:3 218:16 leaving 44:22	lengths 57:19 100:13 lengthy 31:17 38:15 70:25 leonard 27:20	189:15 190:4,11 191:21 198:20 li 99:4 226:8 liability 111:17
126:19,20 127:13 128:23 131:24 139:22,25 141:5 143:11 147:21,25 155:12 160:25 161:25 162:14	116:11 117:3 119:13 204:20 leaves 87:14 133:3 218:16 leaving 44:22 114:18	lengths 57:19 100:13 lengthy 31:17 38:15 70:25 leonard 27:20 letter 2:10,19 3:3	189:15 190:4,11 191:21 198:20 li 99:4 226:8 liability 111:17 liesemer 23:24
126:19,20 127:13 128:23 131:24 139:22,25 141:5 143:11 147:21,25 155:12 160:25 161:25 162:14 166:25 167:5	116:11 117:3 119:13 204:20 leaves 87:14 133:3 218:16 leaving 44:22 114:18 led 55:1	lengths 57:19 100:13 lengthy 31:17 38:15 70:25 leonard 27:20 letter 2:10,19 3:3 3:7 32:17 33:14	189:15 190:4,11 191:21 198:20 li 99:4 226:8 liability 111:17 liesemer 23:24 146:1,3,3 147:10
126:19,20 127:13 128:23 131:24 139:22,25 141:5 143:11 147:21,25 155:12 160:25 161:25 162:14 166:25 167:5 168:12 171:2,3,19	116:11 117:3 119:13 204:20 leaves 87:14 133:3 218:16 leaving 44:22 114:18 led 55:1 ledanski 19:25	lengths 57:19 100:13 lengthy 31:17 38:15 70:25 leonard 27:20 letter 2:10,19 3:3 3:7 32:17 33:14 36:6,7 37:22	189:15 190:4,11 191:21 198:20 li 99:4 226:8 liability 111:17 liesemer 23:24 146:1,3,3 147:10 life 33:8 63:16
126:19,20 127:13 128:23 131:24 139:22,25 141:5 143:11 147:21,25 155:12 160:25 161:25 162:14 166:25 167:5 168:12 171:2,3,19 172:23,23 174:1	116:11 117:3 119:13 204:20 leaves 87:14 133:3 218:16 leaving 44:22 114:18 led 55:1 ledanski 19:25 229:5,10	lengths 57:19 100:13 lengthy 31:17 38:15 70:25 leonard 27:20 letter 2:10,19 3:3 3:7 32:17 33:14 36:6,7 37:22 56:24 58:22	189:15 190:4,11 191:21 198:20 li 99:4 226:8 liability 111:17 liesemer 23:24 146:1,3,3 147:10 life 33:8 63:16 81:5 200:19
126:19,20 127:13 128:23 131:24 139:22,25 141:5 143:11 147:21,25 155:12 160:25 161:25 162:14 166:25 167:5 168:12 171:2,3,19 172:23,23 174:1 178:19 180:18	116:11 117:3 119:13 204:20 leaves 87:14 133:3 218:16 leaving 44:22 114:18 led 55:1 ledanski 19:25 229:5,10 lees 25:18	lengths 57:19 100:13 lengthy 31:17 38:15 70:25 leonard 27:20 letter 2:10,19 3:3 3:7 32:17 33:14 36:6,7 37:22 56:24 58:22 158:12 212:9	189:15 190:4,11 191:21 198:20 li 99:4 226:8 liability 111:17 liesemer 23:24 146:1,3,3 147:10 life 33:8 63:16 81:5 200:19 light 133:4 135:25
126:19,20 127:13 128:23 131:24 139:22,25 141:5 143:11 147:21,25 155:12 160:25 161:25 162:14 166:25 167:5 168:12 171:2,3,19 172:23,23 174:1 178:19 180:18 181:9 182:18	116:11 117:3 119:13 204:20 leaves 87:14 133:3 218:16 leaving 44:22 114:18 led 55:1 ledanski 19:25 229:5,10 lees 25:18 left 88:5 203:20	lengths 57:19 100:13 lengthy 31:17 38:15 70:25 leonard 27:20 letter 2:10,19 3:3 3:7 32:17 33:14 36:6,7 37:22 56:24 58:22 158:12 212:9 217:19 222:1	189:15 190:4,11 191:21 198:20 li 99:4 226:8 liability 111:17 liesemer 23:24 146:1,3,3 147:10 life 33:8 63:16 81:5 200:19 light 133:4 135:25 204:6 211:1,25
126:19,20 127:13 128:23 131:24 139:22,25 141:5 143:11 147:21,25 155:12 160:25 161:25 162:14 166:25 167:5 168:12 171:2,3,19 172:23,23 174:1 178:19 180:18 181:9 182:18 183:19 184:1,3,11	116:11 117:3 119:13 204:20 leaves 87:14 133:3 218:16 leaving 44:22 114:18 led 55:1 ledanski 19:25 229:5,10 lees 25:18 left 88:5 203:20 legal 55:16 56:1	lengths 57:19 100:13 lengthy 31:17 38:15 70:25 leonard 27:20 letter 2:10,19 3:3 3:7 32:17 33:14 36:6,7 37:22 56:24 58:22 158:12 212:9 217:19 222:1 227:13	189:15 190:4,11 191:21 198:20 li 99:4 226:8 liability 111:17 liesemer 23:24 146:1,3,3 147:10 life 33:8 63:16 81:5 200:19 light 133:4 135:25 204:6 211:1,25 214:4
126:19,20 127:13 128:23 131:24 139:22,25 141:5 143:11 147:21,25 155:12 160:25 161:25 162:14 166:25 167:5 168:12 171:2,3,19 172:23,23 174:1 178:19 180:18 181:9 182:18 183:19 184:1,3,11 184:15 186:10,14	116:11 117:3 119:13 204:20 leaves 87:14 133:3 218:16 leaving 44:22 114:18 led 55:1 ledanski 19:25 229:5,10 lees 25:18 left 88:5 203:20 legal 55:16 56:1 59:20 60:19 64:23	lengths 57:19 100:13 lengthy 31:17 38:15 70:25 leonard 27:20 letter 2:10,19 3:3 3:7 32:17 33:14 36:6,7 37:22 56:24 58:22 158:12 212:9 217:19 222:1 227:13 letters 102:14,15 158:4	189:15 190:4,11 191:21 198:20 li 99:4 226:8 liability 111:17 liesemer 23:24 146:1,3,3 147:10 life 33:8 63:16 81:5 200:19 light 133:4 135:25 204:6 211:1,25 214:4 likelihood 47:21
126:19,20 127:13 128:23 131:24 139:22,25 141:5 143:11 147:21,25 155:12 160:25 161:25 162:14 166:25 167:5 168:12 171:2,3,19 172:23,23 174:1 178:19 180:18 181:9 182:18 183:19 184:1,3,11 184:15 186:10,14 187:5 188:1,2,3	116:11 117:3 119:13 204:20 leaves 87:14 133:3 218:16 leaving 44:22 114:18 led 55:1 ledanski 19:25 229:5,10 lees 25:18 left 88:5 203:20 legal 55:16 56:1 59:20 60:19 64:23 66:2 70:5 86:1,9	lengths 57:19 100:13 lengthy 31:17 38:15 70:25 leonard 27:20 letter 2:10,19 3:3 3:7 32:17 33:14 36:6,7 37:22 56:24 58:22 158:12 212:9 217:19 222:1 227:13 letters 102:14,15	189:15 190:4,11 191:21 198:20 li 99:4 226:8 liability 111:17 liesemer 23:24 146:1,3,3 147:10 life 33:8 63:16 81:5 200:19 light 133:4 135:25 204:6 211:1,25 214:4 likelihood 47:21 94:22 201:18
126:19,20 127:13 128:23 131:24 139:22,25 141:5 143:11 147:21,25 155:12 160:25 161:25 162:14 166:25 167:5 168:12 171:2,3,19 172:23,23 174:1 178:19 180:18 181:9 182:18 183:19 184:1,3,11 184:15 186:10,14 187:5 188:1,2,3 188:10,23 189:4,8	116:11 117:3 119:13 204:20 leaves 87:14 133:3 218:16 leaving 44:22 114:18 led 55:1 ledanski 19:25 229:5,10 lees 25:18 left 88:5 203:20 legal 55:16 56:1 59:20 60:19 64:23 66:2 70:5 86:1,9 100:8 103:2	lengths 57:19 100:13 lengthy 31:17 38:15 70:25 leonard 27:20 letter 2:10,19 3:3 3:7 32:17 33:14 36:6,7 37:22 56:24 58:22 158:12 212:9 217:19 222:1 227:13 letters 102:14,15 158:4	189:15 190:4,11 191:21 198:20 li 99:4 226:8 liability 111:17 liesemer 23:24 146:1,3,3 147:10 life 33:8 63:16 81:5 200:19 light 133:4 135:25 204:6 211:1,25 214:4 likelihood 47:21 94:22 201:18 limit 37:10 102:13

limitations 194:4	102:22 104:9	lost 33:5,6	malleable 157:25
limited 15:3,13	141:4 151:16	lot 72:4,5 77:1,5	man 204:13 206:4
31:8 36:23 78:10	153:10 205:9,10	82:8,12 93:5	206:24
111:15 186:1	212:15	104:13 105:6	mandamus
linda 3:16 5:12,22	live 210:7 223:16	116:14 119:20,20	185:22
13:6,20 14:6,24	livelihoods 122:9	121:13 133:3	mandated 55:10
15:6,15 26:9	lives 120:5 137:15	138:22 143:3	mandates 91:15
line 37:7 63:22	llc 13:12 16:19	146:6 161:14	mandatory 51:16
87:17 106:5	17:13 18:7 19:4	163:18 170:5	83:25 109:8
109:24 159:22	21:15 110:9	202:8 215:8 216:1	194:18
206:7,25 227:4	123:16 189:17	222:21 225:24	manifestly 185:6
228:4	190:9 199:10	lots 55:24 120:16	185:6
lines 59:13 206:4	llp 20:3 23:11	love 131:24	manner 31:13
215:12,14	24:1	low 85:6	220:25 222:3
link 99:5	logic 133:16	lower 76:11,11	mantle 148:4
links 118:1	logically 169:14	77:22 85:16 92:22	manufacturers
liquidation	long 81:9 95:8	199:4	39:24
146:24 159:9	106:16 154:9	lp 179:3	manville 61:8
193:9	159:25 201:5	lucas 26:15	62:12 107:18
list 68:14	203:21 210:15	m	109:24 127:24
listed 37:17	218:15	m 24:24 25:13,24	128:10 141:6
listen 15:18	longer 81:14 82:3	26:22 27:19 28:9	159:22 160:1
listening 107:16	136:12		196:25 198:17
lite 22:15	look 56:8 64:13	187:16,17 m10-468 131:21	mara 25:20
literally 114:3	75:4 97:15 106:5	ma'am 162:14	marc 20:11 25:15
117:7 118:2	111:1 121:12		26:17 205:6,11
177:14 178:23	123:20 126:20	maclay 25:21 madoff 110:9	march 143:21,24
192:1	131:7 141:14,15	111:10,13 112:21	144:5 190:2
litigant 58:16	158:20 160:17	mae 187:16	191:22
120:22	212:12 219:4		maria 25:2
litigants 65:15	looking 108:19	magali 25:8 magnitude 85:3	marine 60:7,8,9
litigating 135:23	114:24 166:19	mahalaxmi 28:5	66:18 67:1 69:17
litigation 5:5 8:5	172:8 212:20	mahlum 27:23	69:25 113:5
10:21 12:21 23:13	221:12 222:17	main 21:17	126:17 160:7
39:17 40:23 41:16	looks 129:22	115:23 141:22	161:16 197:6
42:3,16 43:17,25	lose 37:12 115:5	maintain 171:18	mario 24:23
44:5 45:9 46:17	121:5 122:2	major 105:8	mark 120:19
90:9 134:5 138:19	123:17 129:1	125:3	124:15 191:18
183:22 185:2	loser 117:9	making 33:20	marked 210:8
214:22 222:15	loses 127:23	67:13 108:22	market 21:10
little 29:6 30:19	losing 144:9	130:23 162:2	marshal 100:2
70:21 74:21 82:7	loss 115:6	172:20 173:20	marshall 20:8
90:15 101:5		177:22,25 200:16	29:23 58:14 89:18
	I .	1.0.1.4	I .

89:19 90:24 97:23	190:25 191:11,12	164:3 165:18	medical 122:9
100:9 131:14	191:15 192:14	166:16 172:1,4,5	meet 123:8 202:18
173:12 192:23	194:15 195:15,17	172:25 173:22	216:9,14 217:16
201:3,11,15	195:19 199:14,18	199:22 200:4	meeting 124:16
mary 28:10 117:3	203:1,20	201:12 203:12,14	meises 25:25
maryland 16:14	matters 50:23	204:7 211:22	melissa 26:25
22:1,2 80:2 83:18	53:6 58:23 59:11	223:23 224:5,16	member 42:8
164:15 168:8	65:14 70:7,14	226:7	members 66:7
208:1 213:14	84:22 85:17	mcmahon's 200:6	memorandum
215:11 216:10	103:11 183:20	203:8 211:2	3:13 13:2,16
masks 153:9	188:22 190:24	212:21 224:22	14:20 15:1 29:8
massive 172:16	matthew 6:13	mcmahon's 29:8	221:10 227:18
master 13:11	8:11,20 15:25	76:2 101:24	memory 115:21
16:18 17:12 18:6	22:13 27:12 83:9	139:23 142:14	mental 212:11
19:3	92:6 168:18	149:13 153:11	mention 92:7,7
masumoto 25:22	maura 26:2	155:1	mentioned 74:5
material 95:2,16	maxcy 25:23	menulty 25:24	85:15,20 86:14
128:18 176:12	ma'am 43:5 60:12	md 22:4	88:6 139:15 142:6
materially 70:16	99:9,16	mean 40:22 53:24	163:17 202:1
71:13,14 80:14	mcclammy 2:16	67:9 73:12 82:10	212:8
93:1,9,25 97:18	3:4 20:10 34:23	90:1,9 102:15	mere 128:16
127:8 141:17	34:24 35:2 39:8	106:17 109:7,7	198:13
180:20 184:20,24	43:9,9 48:6,8	112:15 116:8	merely 105:13
185:12 198:6	117:25	119:12 132:22	107:10 115:10
mathew 25:5	mcgee 162:18	133:21 141:7	132:14 172:8
matter 1:5 29:15	mckinsey 33:17	153:1 157:11,17	merit 167:3
29:24 32:12 39:14	mckinsey's 32:25	160:16 167:6	merited 122:17
39:15 44:10,25	memahon 53:8	169:14 170:10	meritorious 45:5
46:15 49:8 54:1	55:18 56:18 58:21	172:18 175:10	51:21 131:18
54:10,11,13 59:19	72:17 73:9,14,17	176:18 178:23	merits 30:25 32:4
63:21 65:5,23	74:3,15 75:11	221:3,5,17 222:16	35:7 47:21 51:18
70:12,12 71:6	76:12 77:5 78:19	223:3,6 225:22	52:9 55:3 75:11
72:10,13 73:24	78:21,22 81:24	meaning 80:21	81:6 129:21
81:17 84:1,5	82:4 89:5 94:12	186:19 189:2	153:13 169:6
85:13,15 86:8,25	101:15,18 102:7	meaningful 81:3	173:16 182:4,12
92:15 94:16 97:1	102:13,17 103:8	90:14	182:16,16 211:24
97:6 103:14	117:12 129:6,14	means 91:8	212:8 223:25
111:19 112:5	130:9 131:4,10	118:19 183:2	224:5,10
114:7,19,19,20	133:12 135:2,3	meant 201:24	met 165:1 180:2
120:21 122:16,18	136:10 142:15,23	202:1	187:13,15
122:23 172:4	146:13,16 152:20	mechanism 96:20	methodology
175:12 180:3,12	153:6,9 154:5	mediation 103:17	223:9
184:16 190:16,16	158:4,5,11 163:6	126:6 151:23	

metromedia 57:4	millions 36:10	mixing 159:22	morning's 203:7
57:10 60:24,24	84:6 118:3	modification	mortgage 121:1
61:7,20 62:12,22	mind 38:7 198:15	95:25	188:7 191:20
63:2,12,15,18	minds 62:5 70:4	modified 14:9	mortimer 151:4
86:20 87:14 88:5	84:17	16:3,23 17:17	motion 2:4,7,10
104:24 105:6	mineola 229:24	18:11 19:8 88:12	2:14,19,22 3:2,14
106:18 107:13,18	minimum 41:4	126:23	5:7,8,10,16,19,20
107:22 108:1	minute 103:14	moline 193:7	6:2,5,6,10,12 8:7
109:21,23 110:6	127:23 128:22	mom 72:3	8:8,10,15,17,18
110:21 112:19,20	133:1	moment 73:21	9:3 13:1,3,10,16
112:22 113:6,6,9	minutes 69:2 99:4	74:1 106:5	13:17 14:1,2,4,19
113:15,19 114:15	101:1 105:7	monaghan 26:2	14:21 15:1,2,5,9
116:15 125:17,19	107:24 108:22	monday 225:17	15:10,12,14,23,24
126:18,24 127:5	121:3 127:16,21	money 32:6 52:3	16:12,17 17:7,11
140:1,2,8 146:23	178:24	105:11 107:10	18:1,5,20 19:2
159:22 160:1	misapplied 108:2	113:22 114:6	29:9,12,16,16
195:12 196:17,25	mischaracteriza	142:25 145:2	30:9,11,20,24
197:1,9,17,22,25	174:4	151:23 160:12	31:3,4,5 32:8,13
metromedia's	miscited 60:21	224:25	32:20 34:7 35:9,9
87:8	misconduct	month 3:8 33:22	35:18,25 36:3,4
mexico 120:20	112:11	142:25 143:15	38:12 39:5,15
191:19	misinterpreting	165:15 199:16	40:1,8 45:6 46:20
mic 206:22 207:8	69:7	203:8	48:2,5,22 49:9,12
207:9	misled 38:9	months 36:11	49:14 50:5,6,9,18
michael 24:16	misperception	37:23 38:15 75:7	50:23,24 52:20
26:3	111:7	129:4 143:21,22	54:23 55:5 58:3
michele 25:25	misrepresent	143:24 144:3,5,13	73:1 74:15 83:17
26:8	153:2 197:13	144:18 152:10,13	83:17,22 93:18
microphone 40:15	misrepresentation	152:16,16	94:4 98:1,8,10,22
205:9 207:21	111:7 126:16	moot 82:3	99:9,12,18,19
mics 207:2	missed 77:14,16	mooted 135:3	100:7,20,21,23,23
mid 129:22	151:11 177:16	163:6	100:24 102:12
middle 99:23	217:9	mootness 199:20	116:4,12 134:2,3
110:7 147:25	misstates 102:19	202:23	140:25 141:1
153:5 156:11	102:20	morales 24:12	142:19 145:9,18
mill 81:15	mistake 36:16	167:14 175:2,4,11	147:22 156:5
millennium	misunderstanding	175:13,16,18,22	169:2 172:9 176:5
123:10,15 124:15	119:25	175:24	179:9,11,18 182:6
189:16 199:9	mitch 206:4,7,9	morning 29:2,22	202:16 203:5,9,11
201:16	206:24	30:3,4 34:23 51:7	203:14 204:2,4,18
miller 26:1	mitchell 23:9	51:10 83:9,11	206:16 208:5,21
million 36:10	mixed 173:25	86:12 92:13	210:18 211:11
	188:2	140:15,18	212:7 214:25

[motion - needs] Page 39

215:22 223:1	194:24 202:4	multiples 103:23	179:10 228:6	
227:5,9,13,19	209:1,21,23	multipole 107:23	nature 56:5 86:9	
motions 3:19 4:1	222:16,19	multistate 181:16	172:7,13 194:13	
4:8,17 5:2 6:16	movant's 37:24	municipalities	212:25	
7:1,8,18 8:2 9:8	115:13	94:6 96:9	ndl 103:24	
9:14 10:2,12,18	move 54:14 65:1	municipality 11:2	ndt 52:15,16,20	
11:3,11,17 12:2	69:10 80:23 91:15	11:8 18:2 22:16	near 93:15 199:6	
12:12,18 29:13	102:7 103:4,10	49:18 92:14 179:9	nearly 84:10	
44:2 50:2,3 81:17	109:12 113:4	228:5	necessarily 76:18	
82:9,14 100:1,20	129:25 132:14	mute 156:17	78:5 94:14 163:1	
115:21,23 119:12	133:23,25 136:9	204:21 206:6	169:8 173:16	
132:18 139:10	142:15 146:11	207:9	186:7	
140:13 145:7	157:23 158:21	muted 206:5,25	necessary 39:16	
179:4 180:25	162:11,20 166:24	n	50:5,5 108:10	
181:14,25 182:3,5	166:25 176:14	n 20:1 29:1	187:8 210:25	
182:16 183:3,12	182:24 183:1		211:9,21 212:4	
192:18 195:22	187:14 200:1	187:16 227:1	214:4 216:2	
202:25 203:4	203:18 207:20	228:1 229:3	necessity 107:8	
208:15 209:4	211:6 225:20,20	nadine 27:8	need 51:15,20	
210:25 214:16,20	225:21	naftalis 23:11	52:2,6 56:9,23	
228:7	movements 57:6	138:18	59:22 70:13,19	
motor 159:9	moving 115:24	nail 221:4	71:2,15 78:13,14	
motors 75:5	116:4 139:6 163:3	name 43:4 62:19	80:3 82:5,6 98:21	
121:12,16,25	165:22 168:2	157:12	109:6,16 115:9	
146:24 190:14	msge 122:3	nan 21:6 51:7	119:14 124:10	
191:23 193:8	muffled 153:10	narrative 147:18	131:14 135:13	
196:11	mullane 146:24	148:19	143:5 144:22	
mouth 149:13	multi 3:22 6:19	narrow 59:16,17	145:4 153:7	
movant 31:14	9:11 11:14 23:20	90:4 100:7 111:23	157:12 166:20	
32:16 37:4,5,20	49:22 94:21	124:18 169:9	175:14 188:15,17	
39:4 132:6 156:11	103:25 146:4	182:2	199:2 203:21	
190:7 208:7	multiday 210:23	narrowed 77:9	214:7 215:2,8,25	
217:20	multidistrict	narrower 174:17	218:15 219:14	
movant's 177:23	40:22 41:16 42:3	narrowly 89:20	223:7,11 224:11	
207:25 208:3	42:14,15	120:14 191:14	needed 123:7	
movants 113:15	multiple 57:8	nas 104:2 150:5	133:4	
114:13 118:16	62:20 68:8 74:5	151:14	needless 183:21	
122:25 126:6	89:17 96:10	natasha 27:19	202:16	
128:14 145:12,13	104:21 107:23	nathaniel 26:1	needs 62:3 66:18	
145:21 147:3	112:12,16 115:3	nation 11:8 18:3	74:14,14 82:18	
151:22 154:3	117:5,21 189:10	22:17 92:14	99:7 101:24	
156:20 174:25	193:1	national 124:9	163:17 214:14,17	
187:12 192:10	173.1	nations 11:2	215:7 216:1	
107.12 192.10		49:19 94:6 96:8	213.7 210.1	
Veritext Legal Solutions				

nefarious 54:24	newco 93:22	187:14 189:25	number 30:10,17
55:11	news 113:17	190:5 193:12	33:6 34:12 89:18
negative 178:17	204:15	197:5 203:6 212:8	93:3,3 95:23
neglect 35:19	niche 189:24	notes 151:11	103:23 113:20
36:15,16,19,24	nicholas 27:24	notice 2:1 5:9,15	119:17,18 132:16
37:12,21	nicole 27:20	5:15,19 6:1,1,5	132:17,18 143:20
′		·	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
negotiate 185:20	nine 85:22	8:8,14,17 14:2	148:4 152:6,18
negotiated 31:20 38:24 134:10	nineties 109:25	15:10,18 29:17,17	167:20,21 171:9
	nj 21:8,11 22:19	30:23 31:1,22	173:19 177:15,15
neither 45:18	nobody's 101:2	35:15 38:8 57:14	190:2 219:21
89:21 171:4	non 4:11 7:11	57:21 117:16,18	223:1
network 112:22	10:5 12:5 43:21	117:23 118:2,4,8	numbers 143:22
197:6	45:2,16,22 56:5,6	118:15 148:23	numerable 132:17
networks 120:15	58:5,8,9,10 59:5	159:13 178:3	nw 21:3
191:21	61:12 66:20,20,21	183:16 212:9	ny 1:14 20:6,17
never 56:4 63:24	66:21 87:9,11,17	215:15 217:16	22:11 23:6,15,22
65:7 89:13 96:14	87:23 88:2,10	notices 204:2	24:4 229:24
124:7 134:19	92:17 106:10,11	noting 103:13	0
136:20 141:11	111:4,5,11 112:23	notion 58:16	o 1:21 29:1 229:3
153:1 158:3,5,25	123:12 150:5,19	125:11 127:2	o'neil 26:3
163:25 171:3	158:23,24 159:2,3	136:16 155:21	o'neill 26:4
177:25	169:9 187:21	188:22	obaldo 26:5
nevertheless	208:3,7 209:21	notwithstanding	object 148:16
31:24 36:13 186:4	220:2,7 221:4	91:22	objectants 187:23
189:11 192:3	nonconsensual	nouns 107:21	objected 32:21
new 1:2 2:24 20:6	169:10 171:6,10	novel 90:2 105:23	40:8 175:6,8
20:17 21:9 22:11	nonissue 220:16	115:6,11 124:3	220:5
23:6,15,22 24:4	nonsensical	168:6 189:25	objecting 85:20
39:17,18,19,20,23	109:11	novelty 165:5	100:21 137:19
40:7,9 42:23 43:7	normal 128:2,10	november 33:11	141:1 148:14,24
43:18,20,21,22	131:3 179:23	76:4 81:25 94:7	objection 2:14,14
45:1,9,16,23 46:1	187:2 195:16	94:10,17 129:9,10	2:22 3:1,1 4:1,1,7
46:6,7,17 47:1,8	normally 199:25	146:14 154:1	4:8 5:1,1 7:1,1,7,8
47:10,24,24 90:12	nortel 120:15	199:24 200:10	8:1,1 9:14,14 10:1
		I .	□ 0.1.1 9.14.14 1U.1
98:3 101:2,6	191:21	203:13,17 204:1	·
98:3 101:2,6 104:20 105:7,7	191:21 note 29:6 36:5	203:13,17 204:1 204:19 206:17	10:2,17,17 11:17
104:20 105:7,7		204:19 206:17	10:2,17,17 11:17 11:17 12:1,2,17
104:20 105:7,7 108:4 109:1,23	note 29:6 36:5	′	10:2,17,17 11:17 11:17 12:1,2,17 12:17 34:21 57:19
104:20 105:7,7 108:4 109:1,23 114:14,15 120:19	note 29:6 36:5 51:18,25 58:13	204:19 206:17 209:5,6,8 210:18	10:2,17,17 11:17 11:17 12:1,2,17 12:17 34:21 57:19 91:25 92:7 147:8
104:20 105:7,7 108:4 109:1,23 114:14,15 120:19 123:6,9 124:7,7	note 29:6 36:5 51:18,25 58:13 83:15 87:1 110:10 160:6 170:24	204:19 206:17 209:5,6,8 210:18 212:5 221:3 225:18	10:2,17,17 11:17 11:17 12:1,2,17 12:17 34:21 57:19 91:25 92:7 147:8 223:5
104:20 105:7,7 108:4 109:1,23 114:14,15 120:19 123:6,9 124:7,7 177:25 190:20	note 29:6 36:5 51:18,25 58:13 83:15 87:1 110:10	204:19 206:17 209:5,6,8 210:18 212:5 221:3	10:2,17,17 11:17 11:17 12:1,2,17 12:17 34:21 57:19 91:25 92:7 147:8 223:5 objections 44:15
104:20 105:7,7 108:4 109:1,23 114:14,15 120:19 123:6,9 124:7,7 177:25 190:20 191:1 207:1	note 29:6 36:5 51:18,25 58:13 83:15 87:1 110:10 160:6 170:24 188:14 190:11,23 noted 35:15 36:23	204:19 206:17 209:5,6,8 210:18 212:5 221:3 225:18 nuances 77:16,17 nuisance 160:9	10:2,17,17 11:17 11:17 12:1,2,17 12:17 34:21 57:19 91:25 92:7 147:8 223:5 objections 44:15 44:24 45:5 147:8
104:20 105:7,7 108:4 109:1,23 114:14,15 120:19 123:6,9 124:7,7 177:25 190:20	note 29:6 36:5 51:18,25 58:13 83:15 87:1 110:10 160:6 170:24 188:14 190:11,23 noted 35:15 36:23 37:6 43:14 46:20	204:19 206:17 209:5,6,8 210:18 212:5 221:3 225:18 nuances 77:16,17	10:2,17,17 11:17 11:17 12:1,2,17 12:17 34:21 57:19 91:25 92:7 147:8 223:5 objections 44:15
104:20 105:7,7 108:4 109:1,23 114:14,15 120:19 123:6,9 124:7,7 177:25 190:20 191:1 207:1	note 29:6 36:5 51:18,25 58:13 83:15 87:1 110:10 160:6 170:24 188:14 190:11,23 noted 35:15 36:23	204:19 206:17 209:5,6,8 210:18 212:5 221:3 225:18 nuances 77:16,17 nuisance 160:9	10:2,17,17 11:17 11:17 12:1,2,17 12:17 34:21 57:19 91:25 92:7 147:8 223:5 objections 44:15 44:24 45:5 147:8

objective 76:19	176:6 208:22,23	144:20 145:25	121:10 123:5
186:8	209:3 217:3	147:7 151:9	204:8
objector 100:22	229:25	153:20 156:18	opened 89:22
objectors 48:3	odds 52:1	158:2 164:6,12	opening 106:12
99:21 103:24	offer 70:23 164:4	167:12 168:16	210:19
122:5 222:18	offered 46:1	169:21 170:23	openly 95:3,3
objectors' 88:13	165:15	173:7 174:21	operating 82:16
obligates 52:12	offering 203:24	175:4,11,13,16,18	operation 47:3
obligation 100:18	203:25	175:24,25 176:20	opinion 59:24
136:11	office 11:3 21:8	176:25 177:2	60:10 71:2 81:15
obligations	22:1 34:1,18	178:5,22 179:1,1	121:21,25 144:24
187:22	39:21 142:17	204:22,23 205:8	154:1,5 182:19
obliterated	143:6 228:7	205:15,19 206:2	186:3 192:21,21
126:13	official 4:16,19,22	207:9,19,22	193:19,19 197:11
observation 47:17	7:17,20 10:11,14	208:12,18,25	225:5
147:16 199:25	12:11,14 23:2	209:10,16 210:2,5	opinions 57:9
observing 91:14	31:2 49:25 140:20	210:21 213:24	59:21 62:25 64:19
obtained 52:19	206:10	215:3,10 216:3,8	89:18 193:2 197:1
obtaining 96:12	officials 43:22	216:22 217:2,5,9	opioid 39:25
96:20,25	84:7	221:16,24 225:15	43:24 139:8
obviate 199:1	oh 61:11 63:2	226:15	143:25 144:2,4,6
224:11	72:24 85:21	old 118:22 158:16	144:9,23 150:17
obvious 108:23	158:14 164:11	229:23	214:9
218:7	172:15 174:25	omission 111:16	opioids 33:3 34:13
obviously 76:12	175:13,18 178:11	omitted 186:18	42:4
76:14 91:16 97:13	205:19	omnibus 3:1 4:1,8	opponent 58:20
101:17 109:2,17	ohio 40:23 42:4	5:1 7:1,8 8:1 9:14	opponents 56:18
115:17 134:10	oil 187:9 192:6	10:2,17 11:17	opportunity
136:19 140:8	okay 29:25 30:18	12:2,17 29:4	79:17 117:17
152:14 153:1	31:4 32:12 34:6	225:18 226:1	163:23 216:13
172:20 179:18	34:19,25 36:2	once 72:7 75:21	224:6
191:25 192:8	39:10,13 41:15	157:7 163:22	oppose 31:3
193:7 195:3 196:4	42:11,17 43:8,12	165:22	139:10
223:11	48:11,13,21 49:4	oneida 113:12	opposed 29:17
occur 95:23	49:6 50:8,19 51:2	ones 68:12 86:1	36:18 50:4 90:6
143:17 176:11	51:5 54:16 55:13	169:4 173:25	94:5 181:14
179:17	58:18 65:4 67:24	online 206:1	194:18 198:25
occurrence 64:24	78:23 79:22 83:6	207:18	opposes 50:7
occurs 37:14	86:11,16 92:5,10	ontario 94:7	opposing 209:2
october 1:16 2:1	98:7,16 99:8	open 35:21 38:22	opposite 174:9
3:8 29:4 30:23	119:13 135:12	87:14 88:5 89:1	opposition 3:19
50:6,7 129:9	136:22 138:4,7,15	89:21 90:1,7	4:16,22 6:16 7:17
155:3 156:7 176:6	140:14,18,22,23	93:13 115:17	9:8 10:11 11:11

12:11 48:22 51:25	218:2 219:5	overstatement	103:6 109:1 138:1
52:10 54:19 56:13	224:14 225:16	171:19	141:15 147:19
82:9 138:20 146:5	orderly 216:13	overturned	156:3 172:4
147:5 182:12	orders 13:4,18	116:16	177:23 226:4
208:20	14:4,22 15:4,14	overwhelmingly	paradigm 177:19
oppositions 53:3	16:13 181:1	104:8 135:9	paragraph 87:19
options 75:5	ordinary 37:12	owners 161:11,12	88:6 113:13 115:5
oral 37:24 40:10	70:22 75:13 81:16	ownership 46:13	122:3,4 134:2
51:6 76:4 104:13	155:22	47:25 161:12	156:2 160:7
119:20 129:9,18	oregon 83:18,22	oxycontin 34:9	177:16,22 185:23
129:18 141:24,24	168:9	38:3,7	186:3 191:7
142:21 146:13	organizations	р	196:10 198:19
152:11 188:15	144:17,19	p 3:21 6:18 9:10	parallel 53:6
189:7 199:24	organized 101:5	11:13 20:1,1	73:14 75:14
200:17	104:7	27:22 29:1	163:21
orally 211:6	original 44:2		park 23:4
oranges 159:23	originally 207:5	p.c. 22:8 p.m. 209:6	parse 170:12
order 5:8,16,19	others' 83:4	1	parsing 114:3
6:2,5 8:8,17 13:3	ought 214:24	page 88:2,12	part 31:19 44:21
13:9,18 14:2,4,13	ousterman 26:6	102:12,13,19 107:3 111:1,13,21	52:12 55:4 58:24
14:21 15:3,10,13	outcome 82:22	112:7 115:9 118:7	72:18 106:23
16:6,16 17:1,10	111:12 120:11		117:16 126:4
17:21 18:4,14	137:19 152:12	118:10 121:7,8 151:11 184:22	144:1 145:16
19:1,12 29:5,8,15	outlined 202:14		150:15 167:20
29:17 30:23 32:8	202:19 223:9,23	189:15 190:4,11	181:8 185:21
37:10 39:6 40:2	outrageous	198:20 210:19,19 215:1 227:4 228:4	193:21 209:11
41:15 48:3,4	223:18	213.1 227.4 228.4	213:9 223:17
49:10,12,16 56:21	outrun 53:9 73:15		parte 5:8 8:8,16
58:25 59:1 87:2	outset 97:2 139:2	pages 107:12	14:2 15:10
102:9,13 108:20	outside 32:2 59:13	108:17 126:2	participants
112:7 130:3	178:7 189:24	197:21	103:18
131:20 147:24	196:7 214:14	paid 31:16 150:3 150:8 160:12	participate
148:3 149:10	223:17		116:10
150:23 157:8,15	overdose 143:20	177:10 220:23,23	participation
159:11 170:3	143:23,25 144:2,3	pain 137:7	45:25 57:18 60:15
174:11 179:5,14	144:4,5,6,8,8	panel 40:20 41:16 41:16 75:23 81:17	66:17
179:23 180:8,17	overlapping		particular 44:23
180:20 184:20	112:4	82:14,18 129:19	61:5 62:21 65:13
185:18 192:15	overrides 88:21	184:6	67:4 69:4,4 72:12
194:15 195:24	overrule 112:15	panels 75:18 85:1	74:6 99:18 108:15
198:5 201:1,7,10	123:8	papers 35:3,18,24	141:19 182:22
202:15,18 203:8	overruled 108:1	48:20 58:3 80:4	184:11 190:17
203:15 210:8,8,10		83:4 85:25 93:17	193:3 223:13
		98:4,5 101:3	
-		ral Solutions	

particularly	party 37:8,11	patiently 51:2	106:1 121:9
31:11,22 64:24	39:16 44:9,13	patients 33:5,6	122:10,17 124:10
71:22 76:11 83:25	55:25 56:13,22	34:12 38:4 144:15	125:22,22 135:13
182:3 204:6	57:5 58:1,24 59:5	patrick 25:23	142:16 143:23
parties 38:24	62:13 63:13,24	26:3	148:4 149:9
39:17,23 42:1	65:10,16,17,21	paucity 184:3	150:23 151:24
45:2,3,16,22	66:15 68:3 87:9	paul 22:3 26:14	156:15 159:5
55:24 58:5 71:9	87:11,15,20,23	161:15	160:3,9 161:20,21
74:22 78:24 79:25	88:11,17 89:4	pause 132:25	162:16 167:7
80:22 83:16 84:4	90:10,23 91:9,18	pay 150:20 151:20	192:2 213:11
84:11,12,20 85:5	94:21,23 103:18	payer 103:17	215:1 221:13
85:7,20 88:11,14	104:5 106:13,22	payers 104:5,5	people's 149:8
95:13 100:16,19	110:4 111:22	paying 107:10	pepsico 161:16
101:10 104:21	112:5 113:7,10	137:5	percent 78:3
112:24 123:15	117:23 118:9,17	payment 58:4	104:10 135:8
129:5 137:6,24	119:2 123:2,12	150:15	137:10,10,16,17
139:5 140:25	125:20,23 126:10	payments 46:25	144:2,5,7,8,14,15
143:7 146:9,10	127:3 140:2	payouts 40:6	144:16,18 155:19
148:18 157:1	146:22 148:10,14	150:12 151:2	percolate 128:10
161:1 168:19	148:16,25 149:3	peck 113:11	187:1
171:17 172:14	150:21 167:25	pediatric 104:3	perfect 124:6
175:19 177:22	168:4 171:6,10	pen 130:10 200:8	perfectly 194:7,8
179:17 181:24	177:17 178:9	pendency 35:16	period 86:15
182:11,25 183:7	193:20 195:6	pending 13:1,4,16	135:3 224:4
185:2,7,19 187:18	197:3,10 209:9,14	13:18 14:5,19,22	peripheral 163:11
192:2,8 198:4	party's 166:23	15:4,5,14,15,24	permissible 87:15
199:6 200:11	party's 100.25	16:12 17:7 18:1	91:9
203:4,5,12,17,20	party \$ 30.24 pass 155:19	18:20 29:9,12	permit 31:5 36:14
203:24,25 204:5,9	passed 124:2	42:4 43:17 45:9	112:23 201:12
204:24 206:17	142:16 181:22	47:14 65:20 73:10	permits 73:10
207:24,25 208:3,8	passing 155:16	79:1 93:12,18	145:11
209:19 211:6	passion 182:3	94:16 145:8,18	permitting 186:13
212:2,23 214:19	202:8	153:17 162:4	186:20,21
216:13 218:8	passionate 120:4	163:1 166:10	perplexing 52:10
220:7,9 222:12,21	181:25	167:22 182:5,17	91:19
222:23,23 223:8	passionately	202:25 203:4,10	person 34:2
224:2,19,22	125:22	204:9 208:5,15	104:14 220:3
parties' 36:18	path 53:6,7 79:15	211:1,6 212:3	personal 31:23
86:21 112:1	94:19 96:11	pension 39:21	38:19 59:4 104:1
partnership 31:9	142:17 187:1	pensions 122:9	181:17 220:3,5
36:23	188:24	pensions 122.9 people 9:5 48:17	personally 94:21
parts 43:15	paths 73:14 75:14	57:3 61:23 99:6	personally 94.21
parts 43.13	163:21 197:19	99:18 102:1,2	149:22 150:22
	103.41 177.17	99.10 104.1,4	179.22 130.22
Veritext Legal Solutions			

153:3	placed 144:16	176:1	174:1 176:2,14	
persuasive 211:3	171:24	pleadings 40:10	178:3,17 181:24	
pertain 42:15	plain 105:9 118:1	42:1,24 43:1,3,10	192:12,24 193:24	
pertaining 42:3	189:2 198:21	49:20 51:6 96:10	194:2,14 201:15	
pertains 183:3	plains 1:14	102:16	204:10 212:15	
petition 35:12	plan 14:10,14	please 50:11,20	219:22,24	
117:9 121:19,21	16:4,7,24 17:2,18	98:19 100:3	pointed 91:14	
121:22	17:22 18:12,15	105:14,25 140:21	107:2 141:15	
petroleum 197:6	19:9,13 31:19	166:15,16,16	147:24 168:1	
pfizer 110:10	38:17,25 40:6	pledge 155:4	200:2 216:9	
pharma 1:7 2:17	45:4 47:1 49:11	plenty 90:1	points 80:2 86:17	
3:4 4:14,20,23	49:14 52:12,16	plucked 114:14	88:24 89:7 133:14	
7:14,21 10:8,15	56:21 58:2 59:2	plural 195:8	138:25 140:11	
12:8,15 14:15	68:3 80:8 84:4	plus 208:1,10	141:21 143:4	
15:20 16:8 17:3	87:22,25 93:11,17	pm 226:18	152:6 156:24	
17:23 18:16 19:14	95:7,18,19,22	pnc 108:8	173:4,23 210:15	
29:3 65:9 66:3	96:4,5 102:5	podium 30:1 52:6	217:1	
179:3	104:8,20,25	120:1 131:1	poisoned 162:16	
phase 126:6	106:24 110:18,20	204:14	police 34:4 86:5,6	
151:23	111:23 112:6	point 38:23 53:20	87:12 88:10,15,19	
phone 29:18 41:7	113:2 114:24	54:5,6,17 60:16	88:22 90:4 106:1	
41:9,11 175:20	118:11 120:2,4	62:4 64:25 69:11	113:21,23 114:1,2	
phrase 133:2	126:12,13 135:2	70:2 71:18 73:5,6	114:3,7 160:19	
195:15	135:11 136:7,19	74:21 76:6 78:12	168:5 169:10	
pi 212:14	145:5 146:7,20	78:23 83:24 89:14	171:12,16 174:16	
pick 205:10	147:6 149:16	91:24 94:9 96:1	193:22,22 194:5	
picked 77:11	150:2,2,23 176:11	101:22 109:17	194:13,17,19	
106:19	177:10 179:6,16	113:4,20 116:13	policy 105:17	
picture 153:18	185:20 197:24	122:1 130:16	149:22	
piece 113:16	201:1 214:6,8,8	133:19 134:1	polk 20:3 29:23	
136:18 159:25	218:20,23 219:1	140:21 141:2,3,15	30:6 34:24 43:9	
pieces 65:20	220:1,4,6,8,12	141:22 143:16	97:24 100:10	
pillar 161:20	223:4 224:1	145:23 146:18	121:17 204:14	
pin 177:20	planning 215:20	148:2,3 149:12,22	205:2,12	
pioneer 30:12	224:7	155:10,25 158:7	porter 26:7	
31:7 32:14 36:22	plans 39:21 58:1	158:20,22 159:10	portions 211:19	
37:13,18 38:11	135:9	159:20,21 160:2	pose 153:15	
pivotal 86:25	plan's 59:4 118:9	161:18 162:2,7,8	posed 154:8	
pizza 72:3	play 86:2 225:3	162:11,21 163:4	position 35:6	
place 22:3 204:1	playing 73:22	163:11,15 167:10	50:17,19 58:7	
212:24 213:2	plays 106:23	167:16 168:12,14	89:25 91:20 96:19	
224:4	pleading 42:20	170:10 171:18	98:9,11 139:3	
	49:23 102:19	172:8 173:6,14	148:8,10 149:3	
Waritaut Lagal Calutions				

158:15 171:14	practices 167:23	premature 216:20	pretend 66:1
174:4 190:9 214:2	practitioners	premised 38:18	117:1 128:22,23
218:25 219:19	59:16	47:9	pretrial 100:1
positions 99:19	pre 2:2 29:11	premotion 212:9	203:2 225:12,13
182:1	35:12 47:7,11	prepare 48:4	226:16
possibility 53:7	162:7	49:13 212:18	pretty 113:16
186:2	preceded 36:5	prepared 42:25	133:16 161:25
possible 59:7	precedence 119:5	48:3 68:19 110:19	221:6
79:14 80:11,23	precedent 53:25	162:3 175:17,20	previous 106:25
120:3 139:13	55:17 56:3,8	212:4	previously 38:5
144:23 166:12,14	59:21 64:22 87:8	prescribe 34:10	58:21 102:14
166:24	90:3 119:7 130:14	38:9	106:21 110:2
possibly 107:12	165:6,7 182:21	prescribers 35:21	139:5 168:19
110:11 123:8	184:4 189:24	prescription 38:3	190:19 194:11
129:13 176:13	190:1	38:7	198:13 202:14
post 157:6 217:24	precedential	prescriptions	203:2
posted 100:17	182:19	33:5,20	prey 27:24
posters 118:1	precedents 202:9	preseason 73:23	price 166:18
potential 35:14	precise 115:16	present 24:8	primarily 173:13
37:2 45:11 81:3	165:8	82:24 125:24	188:4 193:25
95:24 124:6	precisely 177:23	193:14 220:14	primary 38:10
potentially 73:25	preclude 170:19	presentation 35:8	181:13
80:24 94:25 112:9	200:4	35:18	prime 13:12 16:19
132:16 166:6	predecessor	presented 56:11	17:13 18:7 19:4
power 58:8 59:18	107:23	57:1,11 70:11	100:16
62:18 87:12 88:10	predict 94:11	81:16 86:20	primer 63:10
88:15,19,20,22	predicts 90:13	122:14 163:25	principal 168:14
90:5 106:1 113:21	prehearing	presenting 205:7	principle 168:10
113:23 114:1,2,3	225:12	205:13	print 117:25
114:7,23 160:19	preis 23:8 138:5	presents 115:10	prior 112:11
164:23,23 168:5	138:13 140:15,19	preserve 166:10	190:19 209:8
169:10 174:9	140:24 144:21	preserved 32:5	priority 218:19
181:2 193:22,22	145:19	preserving 166:14	219:2,19
194:4,5,13,17,19	prejudice 29:8	166:21	private 39:22 46:2
201:1,8	30:24 35:20 37:1	presiding 59:3	126:7 151:21
powers 59:12 86:5	39:2 44:4 203:9	73:20 191:25	174:12
86:6 171:12,16	203:15	press 143:19	privilege 76:17
174:16	prejudiced 209:9	147:20 161:21	186:6
ppp 124:2,11	209:15	162:24	pro 24:9,10,11,12
133:7	prejudicial 38:23	presumably	39:15 65:15 99:2
pr 54:5	preliminary	114:10	100:12
practice 179:23	49:13 106:7	presume 94:9	probably 78:2
1	179:15 214:2	1	101:12 119:25
Varitant Lagal Colutions			

			_
126:9 128:8 129:3	166:21 172:24	198:25 202:5	213:3
130:10 152:17	173:3 193:6,13	224:10	provided 30:22
155:20 206:6	195:17 200:15	prongs 83:25	106:23 117:16,18
problem 134:19	201:25 213:16	104:17 132:13	128:3
158:17 160:6	216:9,13,20	133:22 147:4	provides 44:7
207:1 214:9	226:11	155:12	51:12 87:16 96:25
222:24	production 43:23	proof 2:4,7,11,15	152:1
procedural 45:7	products 43:24	42:8 227:5,9	providing 45:12
187:6	professor 60:19	proofs 36:12	56:21 87:4
procedurally	77:11	44:18 177:7	proving 37:20
101:17	professors 77:12	propaganda 33:4	132:8
procedure 13:5	77:13 197:12	33:19 34:10	provision 92:24
13:19 14:6,23	profile 65:23	proper 137:9	93:7 97:4 133:21
44:8,13 82:16	profit 185:7	145:6 182:9	134:17 136:15
165:24 214:13	profitable 33:21	properly 84:15	141:7 157:17
procedures 82:17	profound 111:6	properties 96:23	159:17 160:5
proceed 128:3	program 95:20	property 111:6,20	164:20 165:20
132:9 155:22	programs 45:25	149:8	181:7 182:22
185:20 202:2	52:4 120:6 124:6	propose 76:1	183:24,25 188:10
proceeded 43:25	144:14	proposed 30:23	190:17 191:2,11
proceeding 52:25	progress 70:16	45:13 52:7 61:5	191:13 192:12,13
95:1 180:21	71:13,14 80:15	75:25 101:19	193:5 198:7,16
184:21 185:13	93:1,7,10 95:16	118:9 131:23	199:17
198:7	95:16 96:2 97:18	161:4 201:10,17	provisionally
proceedings 1:12	127:9 141:3,17,18	210:21 212:5	226:1
37:2 44:8,12,19	180:20 184:20,25	proposition	provisions 90:7
99:2,4 131:19	185:12 198:6	124:17 197:17	90:12 91:4 133:4
165:11 226:17	proliferation	protect 40:3 46:23	135:19 136:8
229:6	90:22	157:20 160:8	prudent 211:9
proceeds 130:6	prompt 82:1	174:11,15	public 39:22 46:2
process 53:19	145:10 183:21	protected 13:13	54:1 65:5,12,14
56:5 57:11,13,15	promptly 52:17	16:20 17:14 18:8	65:16,24 66:2,4
57:17,20,22 58:12	52:19,20 144:23	19:5	66:16 72:13 75:6
59:10 63:23 66:19	145:2 152:22	protecting 148:6	80:22 84:1,22
70:10 73:9 76:25	184:17	148:17	85:4,13,15 86:8
87:18 92:16 99:1	prong 108:24	prove 104:22	90:22 103:19
99:20 102:1	120:14 122:2	178:17	104:4 119:18
117:16 118:10,14	123:5,14 124:13	proved 126:11	120:14,21 122:16
118:18,22 119:1	124:23 125:9	proven 107:9	122:18,20,23
123:19 128:2,8,20	127:12 145:13	proves 121:4	123:1,13,17,21
133:10 146:23	147:4 155:10	provide 46:3	124:13 126:7
148:2,11 158:24	184:18 185:12	57:15 64:14 94:10	151:20 168:11
159:12,20 166:13	195:23,24 198:1,4	209:2,22 212:17	180:12 183:20

[public - rachel] Page 47

<u> </u>			
191:3,15 192:5,18	quash 204:2 212:7	213:6	rachel 26:5
188:10 189:8	quarropas 1:13	186:8,12 188:2,3	rachael 26:10
180:23,25 185:17	qua 150:19	183:19 184:1,12	181:5 229:3
purposes 172:8	q	140:9 156:10,17	26:5,18 29:1
210:8 223:3		137:23 139:22	r 1:21 20:1 25:9
purpose 189:1	137:8 139:4	95:12,14 119:21	
190:21	54:20 134:22	83:2 86:19 87:15	r
purely 140:1	puzzling 51:25	80:5 81:4 82:13	111:13 124:19
194:12	134:22 136:24	72:19 76:19,23	93:20 103:1 110:5
189:13 193:4,14	puzzlement	questions 37:19	quoting 37:21
184:1 188:2	219:10	149:13	110:3
172:23 173:14	puzzled 136:25	questioning	quotes 106:20
139:22 159:1	215:20 218:11,12	questioned 82:12	198:13
103:2 117:15	143:11 204:10,11	218:4	quoted 58:3 110:1
64:23 102:25	putting 74:10	211:12 215:2	186:16
pure 55:20,20	puts 47:3	194:12,12 195:25	128:16 183:25
purdue's 57:17,18	225:18	191:16 193:4	126:15 127:25
179:3	218:1 221:18	189:21 190:22	124:17,17 126:12
151:18 152:3,4	211:16,19 217:24	184:15 188:5,10	122:21,22,23
88:4 102:3 151:4	208:19 209:24	180:9,18 184:10	120:13,20 122:20
57:18 65:9 66:3	204:21 205:16	175:3,4,21 176:8	61:3 106:9 112:21
35:14 43:16 57:1	162:17 200:8	173:24 174:18,24	quote 56:19 58:25
33:19,21,21 35:13	150:14 154:3,3	170:9 172:23,23	quotations 106:18
29:3 32:25 33:1,2	133:10 146:5	166:9,9 167:14,25	quotation 96:24
17:23 18:16 19:14	129:7 131:25	160:25 162:3	223:2
15:20 16:8 17:3	121:7,8 124:3	154:15,25 155:5	182:19 192:9
12:8,15 14:15	99:25 100:25	153:12,15 154:7	147:9 175:12
7:14,21 10:8,15	77:17 86:17 90:5	133:1,25 134:17	133:7 134:23
3:4 4:14,20,23	put 38:8 59:9	127:7,23 129:2	105:22 113:23
purdue 1:7 2:16	pushed 105:5	123:5 124:3,18	quite 60:9 103:12
punches 125:6	push 90:15	122:14,16,19	165:3
pulpit 99:17	93:5 119:11	120:22 121:10,15	quintessential
86:13	pursuing 73:13	117:15 119:17	192:20,21 197:1
pullman 21:15	224:13	115:10,14,16,16	111:13 147:1
pulled 117:13	112:3 136:11	108:14 110:13,20	quigley 110:10
pull 92:21	pursue 75:13	106:13,15 107:6	166:24
puiggari 26:8	13:19 14:5,22	101:10 102:25	156:23 165:25
published 81:15	11:19 12:4 13:4	97:10 98:20	82:17 102:8
publicity 57:14	8:15,19 9:16 10:4	81:8 88:5,9 89:1	81:18,22 82:7,11
225:4	6:12 7:3,10 8:10	74:21 75:20 80:25	75:6 80:2,10,23
195:17,19 223:24	pursuant 4:3,10	59:20 66:23 70:13	72:9,11 74:12
194:24 195:2,15	195:19	55:21 56:1 57:11	quickly 52:7 53:8
	193:4 194:25	question 55:16,20	quick 143:1 152:6

[radlax - refer] Page 48

radlax 59:14	123:23,23 133:4	reason 37:3 53:21	recognized 44:24
raise 62:10 72:18	133:20 147:8,8	80:16 91:11	62:18 82:20 88:13
76:6 80:12 93:16	151:16 162:24	109:14 131:16	93:22 128:9 165:4
142:2 157:24	177:20 198:9	132:12,19 139:10	171:10,21 189:9
162:6 174:9	206:18 207:23	151:18 156:7	recognizes 61:6
175:25 183:19	211:10	165:15 176:7	168:24
216:19	readily 186:13	177:24 190:13	recognizing
raised 82:9 84:20	214:24	202:21 213:18	167:19
92:1 93:17 133:15	reading 63:9,13	reasonable 31:14	recommend
134:1 138:25	63:18 172:4 177:4	32:2 37:4 39:4	222:23
142:6 156:3 157:2	196:2 202:12	62:5 70:4 82:13	recommending
158:4 161:3	219:5	84:17 118:23	142:18
164:18 169:3,23	reads 218:18	reasonably 32:1	recommends
170:10,15,17	ready 120:7	37:25	94:19
172:10 179:13,19	137:14 143:1	reasoned 87:24	reconciliation
192:2 200:21	156:8 179:16	reasons 35:23,24	124:24
raises 44:9 45:10	reaffirmed 109:25	39:5 48:5 54:20	reconsider 77:14
raising 92:1 169:7	110:8	82:8 108:23 132:4	record 29:23 30:5
222:13	reaffirming	140:12 147:5	30:19 35:5 43:5
random 156:10	106:25	181:22 184:2	48:1,5 68:22
randomly 99:20	real 73:16,17	202:19 219:9	76:12,13 78:5,8
range 62:6 75:4	158:20 160:13	reassuring 79:11	83:15 93:20 100:9
rapid 182:24	179:12 220:13,22	rebuttal 209:2	109:11 118:7
183:1 193:16	really 36:6 45:6	211:20 221:18	136:2 147:17
rapidly 115:24	46:15 47:2,10,12	recall 72:8,11	150:16 167:20
rare 89:12 132:7	47:17 48:15 55:2	157:3	171:16 172:11
202:13	55:8 61:24 63:5,6	receive 118:14	184:13 188:4
rarely 37:8	63:21 73:12 74:2	received 3:19 6:16	189:22 193:16
130:24	76:13,14 77:23	9:8 11:11 29:7	194:22 200:18
rate 103:17 104:5	79:2 83:2 89:16	46:2 87:22 95:11	204:17 206:19,20
209:24	90:19 103:9	99:20 139:24	207:23 208:20
rationales 113:25	119:10,11 127:5	187:22 204:2	210:20,23 211:10
rdd 1:3	133:22 145:6,11	214:18	211:14,19 214:4
reach 40:21 70:6	156:9 160:4,24	receiver 40:15	214:14,17 215:22
127:4 216:15,16	161:19,22 162:21	41:13	215:23 218:14
225:7	165:19 166:18	receiving 57:25	220:4,5 221:9
reached 206:17	169:9 172:2 173:2	88:3	222:21,22,25
reaching 224:3	173:21 174:17	recognition 36:9	223:10 224:12
read 33:18 40:1	178:14 182:8	93:18,25 94:4	225:8 229:6
42:1 51:5 59:10	199:4 202:20,24	95:1,25	recording 178:25
60:8,10,11,20,22	203:23 215:7	recognize 61:12	red 57:20 159:3
69:21 80:17 89:11	218:21 221:2	89:4,11 183:12	refer 49:15 57:14
93:23 97:5 106:19	222:16 226:11	196:14	

reference 41:18 13:14,18,20 14:4 149:16,23,24 relies 45:18 60:24 58:22 62:24 95:15 14:6,16,22,23 160:12,14 17:15 64:18 97:5 131:21 189:3 15:24 16:3,9,16 releases 52:15 releases 55:25 releases 55:25 releases 55:25 releases 55:25 releases 55:25 111:11 referring 49:17 19:6,15 45:19 61:5 62:11,14 58:2,7,9,24 59:5 remains 93:12 111:11 refine 193:3 58:23 92:16 96:23 87:9,15,20 90:10 remark 173:11 remark 10:21 10:11:1	-			_
97:5 131:21 189:3 15:4,5, 13, 15:9 15:24 16:3, 9, 16 16:21, 21 17:4, 7 69:2 83:16 196:3 17:10, 15:5, 24 16:21, 21 17:4, 7 19:1, 6 19:2 55:15 22 55:15 22 57:2 56:15, 22 57:1, 5 56:15, 22 57:2, 57:1, 5 56:15, 22 57:2, 57:1, 5 57:10, 10 13:10; 10 13:10; 10 10:10; 10:10 10:10; 10:10 10:10; 10:10 10:10; 10:10 10:10; 10:10 10:10 10:10 10:10 10:10 10:10 10:10 10:10 10:10 10:10 10:10 10:10	reference 41:18	13:14,18,20 14:4	149:16,23,24	relies 45:18 60:24
210:18	58:22 62:24 95:15	14:6,16,22,23	160:12,14 171:15	64:18
referred 41:19 16:21,21 17:4,7 releases 55:25 remains 93:12 referring 49:17 18:49,9,17 19:1,6 58:2,7,9,24 59:5 56:15,22 57:1,5 11:11 remains 93:12 refers 52:15 19:6,15 45:19 61:5 62:11,14 63:24 66:15,20,22 remains 13:19 remank 13:11 remank 13:11 remanks 92:12 17:41 18:41 10:12 13:11 13:12 13:14 13:12 13:14 16:13 16:13 16:14 11:15 <td>97:5 131:21 189:3</td> <td>15:4,5,13,15,19</td> <td>218:9</td> <td>reluctant 173:19</td>	97:5 131:21 189:3	15:4,5,13,15,19	218:9	reluctant 173:19
69:2 83:16 196:3 17:10,15,15,24 56:15,22 57:1,5 111:11 referring 49:17 18:49,9,17 19:1,6 58:27,9,24 59:5 111:11 remand 131:19 132:2 201:19 remark 173:11 remark 173:11 remark 173:11 remark 173:11 remarkable 107:8 10:4 107:8 10:4 106:15 40:23 107:8 10:4 106:14 13:15 remarkably 177:4 remarks 92:4 16:41 13:15 remarks 92:4 16:41 13:15 remarks 92:4 16:41 13:15 remarks 92:4 16:41 13:15 16:510 148:10 16:510 148:10 16:510 148:10 16:510 148:10 16:510 148:10 16:510 148:10 17:22 149:11 16:510 148:10 17:312 177:18 <td< td=""><td>210:18</td><td>15:24 16:3,9,16</td><td>releasees 221:4</td><td>rely 80:4 198:4</td></td<>	210:18	15:24 16:3,9,16	releasees 221:4	rely 80:4 198:4
referring 49:17 18:4,9,9,17 19:1,6 58:2,7,9,24 59:5 remand 13:19 198:21 46:22 57:23 58:13 63:24 66:15,20,22 remark 173:11 refine 193:3 58:23 92:16 96:23 87:9,15,20 90:10 remark 173:11 reflect 183:17 97:3 112:3 150:17 90:23 91:9 104:23 104:23 105:5 106:13 104:41 4131:5 reflection 71:1 165:19 212:16 105:5 106:13 remarkable 104:14 131:5 reflection 110:23 relatively 85:6 119:2 123:2 remedy 47:18 regard 30:25 184:16 125:20,23 126:4 remedy 47:18 199:23 96:6,8 150:10 176:8,21 16:20 17:14 18:8 165:12 148:10 17:24 remember 109:8 185:11 20:16 19:5 56:6,14 169:10 171:6,10 167:19 remember 109:8 117:24 remember 109:8 117:24 remember 109:8 117:24 remember 109:8 117:18 100:10 remember 109:8 117:24 rememb	referred 41:19	16:21,21 17:4,7	releases 55:25	remains 93:12
refers 52:15 19:6,15 45:19 61:5 62:11,14 132:2 201:19 remark 173:11 remark 181:11 10:12 10:12 10:12 <td>69:2 83:16 196:3</td> <td>17:10,15,15,24</td> <td>56:15,22 57:1,5</td> <td>111:11</td>	69:2 83:16 196:3	17:10,15,15,24	56:15,22 57:1,5	111:11
198:21	referring 49:17	18:4,9,9,17 19:1,6	58:2,7,9,24 59:5	remand 131:19
refine 193:3 58:23 92:16 96:23 87:9,15,20 90:10 remarkable reflect 183:17 97:3 112:3 150:17 90:23 91:9 104:23 104:14 131:5 refuse 125:17 215:16 107:8 110:4 remarkably 177:4 refused 104:21 relations 201:3 110:15 118:17 remarks 92:4 regard 30:25 184:16 125:20,23 126:4 164:4 164:4 31:11 92:24 93:13 relaxed 186:18 release 13:13 152:2 160:8 187:6 31:11 92:24 93:13 release 13:13 16:20 17:14 18:8 167:25 168:4 187:6 185:11 210:16 19:5 56:6,14 169:10 171:6,10 173:12 177:18 167:19 remember 109:8 152:12 10:16 89:4 91:18 92:18 173:12 177:18 169:10 171:6,10 167:19 remote 85:9,10 220:24 65:16,18,21 66:8 178:9 195:6 178:9 195:6 178:9 195:6 167:19 remote 85:9,10 regardless 152:19 92:19 107:11 relevant <th< td=""><td>refers 52:15</td><td>19:6,15 45:19</td><td>61:5 62:11,14</td><td>132:2 201:19</td></th<>	refers 52:15	19:6,15 45:19	61:5 62:11,14	132:2 201:19
reflect 183:17 97:3 112:3 150:17 90:23 91:9 104:23 104:14 131:5 remarkably 177:4 refuse 125:17 215:16 105:5 106:13 107:8 110:4 remarks 92:4 refused 104:21 relations 201:3 111:15 118:17 164:4 remarks 92:4 regard 30:25 184:16 19:2 123:2 remedy 47:18 31:11 92:24 93:13 relaxed 186:18 19:2 123:2 remedy 47:18 150:10 176:8,21 16:20 17:14 18:8 16:20 17:14 18:8 165:20 23 126:4 remember 109:8 155:11 210:16 19:5 56:6,14 169:10 171:6,10 167:19 remember 109:8 222:24 65:16,18,21 66:8 173:12 177:18 169:10 171:6,10 167:19 remote 85:9,10 regarding 30:14 68:4 87:11,12,17 89:4 91:18 92:18 173:12 177:18 195:6 115:24 156:9 remotely 116:18 render 112:25 regulator 148:5 111:23,24 112:1,5 111:23,24 112:1,5 12:21 13:2 relevant 103:9 rendered 95:9 regulator 148:5 12:22 12:2 12:25:25 126:24 17:11 19:22 12:21 146:20 regeted 87:21 <	198:21	46:22 57:23 58:13	63:24 66:15,20,22	remark 173:11
reflection 71:1 165:19 212:16 105:5 106:13 remarkably 177:4 refuse 125:17 relations 201:3 111:15 118:17 164:4 remarks 92:4 regard 30:25 relatively 85:6 119:2 123:2 remedy 47:18 31:11 92:24 93:13 relaxed 186:18 125:20,23 126:4 187:6 remedy 47:18 31:11 92:24 93:13 release 18:13 152:2 160:8 187:6 remember 109:8 34:23 96:6,8 release 13:13 152:2 160:8 187:6 remember 109:8 150:10 176:8,21 16:20 17:14 18:8 167:25 168:4 remember 109:8 155:11 210:16 19:5 56:6,14 169:10 171:6,10 167:19 remote 85:9,10 212:7 213:4 68:4 87:11,12,17 19:23 220:1 remote 85:9,10 203:3 206:16 82:4 91:18 92:18 115:24 156:9 remotely 116:18 regular 148:5 112:23,25 113:7 120:13 122:1 122:1 184:5	refine 193:3	58:23 92:16 96:23	87:9,15,20 90:10	remarkable
refuse 125:17 215:16 107:8 110:4 remarks 92:4 110:23 relations 201:3 111:15 118:17 164:4 110:23 relatively 85:6 119:2 123:2 remedy 47:18 31:11 92:24 93:13 94:23 96:6,8 126:10 148:10 126:10 148:10 remedy 47:18 150:10 176:8,21 16:20 17:14 18:8 16:22 160:8 17:224 remember 109:8 185:11 210:16 19:5 56:6,14 169:10 171:6,10 167:19 remembering 212:7 213:4 61:12 63:13 65:10 173:12 177:18 remember 109:8 169:5 182:15 87:24 88:10,11,7 197:23 220:1 remote 85:9,10 203:3 206:16 89:4 91:18 92:18 115:24 156:9 115:24 156:9 141:24 regulators 55:11 110:18 111:4,19 111:17 119:22 121:22 146:20 regulatory 88:22 113:10 117:24 176:14,19,21 14:15 16:8 17:3 related 35:12 214:8 146:22 148:14,16 relied 91:8 146:24 repat 17:23 18:16 19:14 relat	reflect 183:17	97:3 112:3 150:17	90:23 91:9 104:23	104:14 131:5
refused 104:21 relations 201:3 111:15 118:17 164:4 regard 30:25 184:16 125:20,23 126:4 187:6 31:11 92:24 93:13 relaxed 186:18 125:20,23 126:4 187:6 31:11 92:24 93:13 relaxed 186:18 relaxed 186:18 relaxed 186:18 relaxed 186:18 relaxed 186:18 relaxed 186:18 release 13:13 150:10 148:10 remember 109:8 150:10 176:8,21 16:20 17:14 18:8 16:22 160:8 17:24 remember 109:8 185:11 210:16 19:5 56:6,14 169:10 171:6,10 167:19 remote 85:9,10 222:24 65:16,18,21 66:8 178:9 195:6 210:10 remote 85:9,10 223:21 87:24 88:10,11,17 89:4 91:18 92:18 197:23 220:1 remote 85:9,10 regardless 152:19 92:19 107:11 relevant 103:9 111:17 115:24 156:9 render 112:25 141:24 render 12:25 141:24 render 12:25 141:24 render 12:25 141:24	reflection 71:1	165:19 212:16	105:5 106:13	remarkably 177:4
110:23 relatively 85:6 119:2 123:2 remedy 47:18 31:11 92:24 93:13 94:23 96:6,8 relaxed 186:18 125:20,23 126:4 187:6 150:10 176:8,21 16:20 17:14 18:8 152:2 160:8 117:24 185:11 210:16 19:5 56:6,14 169:10 171:6,10 167:19 212:7 213:4 61:12 63:13 65:10 173:12 177:18 167:19 222:24 65:16,18,21 66:8 178:9 195:6 210:10 regarding 30:14 68:4 87:11,12,17 197:23 220:1 remote 85:9,10 169:5 182:15 87:24 88:10,11,17 197:23 220:1 remotely 116:18 regardless 152:19 92:19 107:11 relevane 111:7 115:24 156:9 rendered 95:9 regulator 148:5 112:23,25 113:7 111:17 119:22 120:13 122:1 184:5 rejected 87:21 140:3 143:19 176:14,19,21 14:15 16:8 17:3 rejected 87:21 146:22 148:14,16 17:15 18:9 19:6 17:23 18:16 19:14 rejected 87:21 146:22 148:14,16 17:15 18:9 19:6	refuse 125:17	215:16	107:8 110:4	remarks 92:4
regard 30:25 184:16 125:20,23 126:4 187:6 31:11 92:24 93:13 relaxed 186:18 126:10 148:10 remember 109:8 94:23 96:6,8 release 13:13 152:2 160:8 117:24 remember 109:8 150:10 176:8,21 16:20 17:14 18:8 167:25 168:4 remembering 167:19 remembering 185:11 210:16 19:5 56:6,14 169:10 171:6,10 167:19 remember 85:9,10 222:24 regarding 30:14 65:16,18,21 66:8 178:9 195:6 210:10 remote 85:9,10 210:10 remote 85:9,10 210:10 remotely 116:18	refused 104:21	relations 201:3	111:15 118:17	164:4
regard 30:25 184:16 125:20,23 126:4 187:6 31:11 92:24 93:13 relaxed 186:18 126:10 148:10 remember 109:8 94:23 96:6,8 16:20 17:14 18:8 16:20 17:14 18:8 167:25 168:4 remember 109:8 150:10 176:8,21 19:5 56:6,14 169:10 171:6,10 167:19 167:19 212:7 213:4 61:12 63:13 65:10 173:12 177:18 20:10 10 remote 85:9,10 222:24 65:16,18,21 66:8 178:9 195:6 210:10 remotely 116:18 regarding 30:14 68:4 87:11,12,17 197:23 220:1 remotely 116:18 regardless 152:19 92:19 107:11 relevance 111:7 redevant 103:9 redered 95:9 regulator 148:5 112:23,25 113:7 124:21 173:9 121:22 146:20 184:5 regulatory 88:22 113:10 117:24 176:14,19,21 14:15 16:8 17:3 17:23 18:16 19:14 223:21 125:25 126:24 172:11 reliced 13:14 16:21 17:23 18:16 19:14<	110:23	relatively 85:6	119:2 123:2	remedy 47:18
31:11 92:24 93:13 relaxed 186:18 126:10 148:10 remember 109:8 94:23 96:6,8 16:20 17:14 18:8 16:20 17:14 18:8 16:20 17:16,10 117:24 185:11 210:16 19:5 56:6,14 169:10 171:6,10 167:19 212:7 213:4 61:12 63:13 65:10 173:12 177:18 remember 85:9,10 222:24 65:16,18,21 66:8 178:9 195:6 210:10 regarding 30:14 68:4 87:11,12,17 197:23 220:1 remote 85:9,10 169:5 182:15 87:24 88:10,11,17 197:23 220:1 remotely 116:18 regardless 152:19 92:19 107:11 relevance 111:7 115:24 156:9 141:24 regular 213:4 110:18 111:4,19 111:17 119:22 121:22 146:20 121:22 146:20 regulators 55:11 112:23,25 113:7 124:21 173:9 121:22 146:20 184:5 regulatory 88:22 113:10 117:24 176:14,19,21 14:15 16:8 17:3 17:23 18:16 19:14 52:12 106:24 17:21 14:15 16:8 17:3 17:23 18:16 19:14 52:12 106:24 17:21 106:24 19:3 18:16 19:14 52:12 106:24 19:3 18:16 19:14 52:12 106:24 19	regard 30:25	_	125:20,23 126:4	_
150:10 176:8,21 16:20 17:14 18:8 167:25 168:4 remembering 185:11 210:16 19:5 56:6,14 169:10 171:6,10 167:19 212:7 213:4 61:12 63:13 65:10 173:12 177:18 remote 85:9,10 222:24 65:16,18,21 66:8 178:9 195:6 210:10 regarding 30:14 68:4 87:11,12,17 197:23 220:1 remotely 116:18 169:5 182:15 87:24 88:10,11,17 relevance 111:7 remetly 116:18 203:3 206:16 89:4 91:18 92:18 relevance 111:7 rendered 95:9 regular 213:4 110:18 111:4,19 111:17 119:22 121:22 146:20 regulator 148:5 112:23,25 113:7 124:21 173:9 reorganization regulatory 88:22 113:10 117:24 176:14,19,21 14:15 16:8 17:3 rejected 87:21 140:3 143:19 relied 91:8 146:24 repay 187:22 relate 35:12 214:8 148:25 149:3 17:15 18:9 19:6 140:11 relate 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 30:20 32:16 36:7 140:11 3:3,7,9,15,20 4:4 160:15 161:4 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeated 10:14 <	31:11 92:24 93:13	relaxed 186:18	126:10 148:10	remember 109:8
185:11 210:16 19:5 56:6,14 169:10 171:6,10 167:19 212:7 213:4 61:12 63:13 65:10 173:12 177:18 remote 85:9,10 222:24 65:16,18,21 66:8 178:9 195:6 210:10 regarding 30:14 68:4 87:11,12,17 197:23 220:1 remotely 116:18 169:5 182:15 87:24 88:10,11,17 relevance 111:7 remotely 116:18 203:3 206:16 89:4 91:18 92:18 115:24 156:9 141:24 regardless 152:19 92:19 107:11 relevant 103:9 121:22 146:20 regulators 55:11 111:23,24 112:1,5 120:13 122:1 184:5 regulatory 88:22 113:10 117:24 176:14,19,21 14:15 16:8 17:3 reiterate 163:20 118:9,13 123:12 reliance 31:19 17:23 18:16 19:14 223:21 125:25 126:24 172:11 52:12 106:24 rejected 87:21 146:22 148:14,16 160:15 161:4 36:8 43:14 44:6 149:6 relate 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 30:20 32:16 36:7 repeated 101:14 3:3,7,9,15,20 4:4 160:15 161:4 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeated 101:14	94:23 96:6,8	release 13:13	152:2 160:8	117:24
212:7 213:4 61:12 63:13 65:10 173:12 177:18 remote 85:9,10 222:24 65:16,18,21 66:8 178:9 195:6 210:10 regarding 30:14 68:4 87:11,12,17 197:23 220:1 remotely 116:18 169:5 182:15 87:24 88:10,11,17 relevance 111:7 remotely 116:18 203:3 206:16 89:4 91:18 92:18 115:24 156:9 render 112:25 regulatess 152:19 92:19 107:11 relevant 103:9 rendered 95:9 regulations 55:11 111:23,24 112:1,5 120:13 122:1 184:5 regulatory 88:22 113:10 117:24 176:14,19,21 reorganization rejected 87:21 140:3 143:19 172:11 reliance 31:19 17:23 18:16 19:14 relate 35:12 214:8 148:25 149:3 17:15 18:9 19:6 140:11 related 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 30:20 32:16 36:7 repeated 101:14 4:12,17 5:3,7,11 174:13 193:21 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeated 101:14 5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:18 197:3,10 79:20 102:15 162:15 171:8 7:18 8:3 9:9,17 220:7 released 61:6 66:5 155:23 16	150:10 176:8,21	16:20 17:14 18:8	167:25 168:4	remembering
222:24 65:16,18,21 66:8 178:9 195:6 210:10 regarding 30:14 68:4 87:11,12,17 197:23 220:1 remotely 116:18 169:5 182:15 87:24 88:10,11,17 relevance 111:7 render 112:25 203:3 206:16 89:4 91:18 92:18 115:24 156:9 141:24 regardless 152:19 92:19 107:11 relevant 103:9 rendered 95:9 regulat or 148:5 112:23,24 112:1,5 120:13 122:1 120:13 122:1 184:5 regulatory 88:22 113:10 117:24 176:14,19,21 reorganization 14:15 16:8 17:3 rejected 87:21 140:3 143:19 17:211 reliance 31:19 17:23 18:16 19:14 223:21 146:22 148:14,16 17:15 18:9 19:6 13:14 16:21 repart 83:23 140:11 relate 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 30:20 32:16 36:7 repeated 10:14 3:3,79,15,20 4:4 160:15 161:4 46:21 66:7 78:15 79:20 102:15 162:15 171:8 7:18 8:3 9:9,17	185:11 210:16	19:5 56:6,14	169:10 171:6,10	167:19
regarding 30:14 68:4 87:11,12,17 197:23 220:1 remotely 116:18 169:5 182:15 87:24 88:10,11,17 relevance 111:7 203:3 206:16 89:4 91:18 92:18 115:24 156:9 141:24 regardless 152:19 92:19 107:11 relevant 103:9 rendered 95:9 regular 213:4 110:18 111:4,19 111:17 119:22 121:22 146:20 184:5 regulator 148:5 112:23,25 113:7 124:21 173:9 reorganization 14:15 16:8 17:3 regulatory 88:22 113:10 117:24 176:14,19,21 14:15 16:8 17:3 17:23 18:16 19:14 223:21 125:25 126:24 172:11 52:12 106:24 17:23 18:16 19:14 rejected 87:21 140:3 143:19 relied 91:8 146:24 repay 187:22 relate 35:12 214:8 148:25 149:3 17:15 18:9 19:6 140:11 repeated 101:14 3:3,7,9,15,20 4:4 160:15 161:4 36:8 43:14 44:6 repeated 101:14 4:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:18 197:3,10 </td <td>212:7 213:4</td> <td>61:12 63:13 65:10</td> <td>173:12 177:18</td> <td>remote 85:9,10</td>	212:7 213:4	61:12 63:13 65:10	173:12 177:18	remote 85:9,10
169:5 182:15 87:24 88:10,11,17 relevance 111:7 render 112:25 203:3 206:16 89:4 91:18 92:18 115:24 156:9 141:24 regardless 152:19 92:19 107:11 relevant 103:9 rendered 95:9 regular 213:4 110:18 111:4,19 111:17 119:22 121:22 146:20 regulations 55:11 111:23,24 112:1,5 120:13 122:1 184:5 regulatory 88:22 113:10 117:24 176:14,19,21 14:15 16:8 17:3 reiterate 163:20 118:9,13 123:12 reliance 31:19 17:23 18:16 19:14 223:21 125:25 126:24 172:11 52:12 106:24 rejected 87:21 140:3 143:19 relied 91:8 146:24 repay 187:22 115:13 171:21 146:22 148:14,16 relief 13:14 16:21 repay 187:22 related 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 30:20 32:16 36:7 140:11 related 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 30:20 32:16 36:7 repeated 101:14 4:12,17 5:3,7,11 174:13 193:21 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeatedly 57:14 5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:18 197:3,10 79:20 102:15 162:15 171:8	222:24	65:16,18,21 66:8	178:9 195:6	210:10
203:3 206:16 89:4 91:18 92:18 115:24 156:9 141:24 regardless 152:19 92:19 107:11 relevant 103:9 rendered 95:9 regular 213:4 110:18 111:4,19 111:17 119:22 121:22 146:20 184:5 regulations 55:11 111:23,24 112:1,5 120:13 122:1 184:5 regulatory 88:22 113:10 117:24 176:14,19,21 14:15 16:8 17:3 reiterate 163:20 118:9,13 123:12 reliance 31:19 17:23 18:16 19:14 223:21 125:25 126:24 172:11 52:12 106:24 repay 187:22 rejected 87:21 146:22 148:14,16 relied 91:8 146:24 repay 187:22 relate 35:12 214:8 148:25 149:3 17:15 18:9 19:6 140:11 repeated 10:14 3:3,7,9,15,20 4:4 160:15 161:4 36:8 43:14 44:6 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeated 101:14 4:12,17 5:3,7,11 174:13 193:21 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeated 75:14 5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:	regarding 30:14	68:4 87:11,12,17	197:23 220:1	remotely 116:18
regardless 152:19 92:19 107:11 relevant 103:9 rendered 95:9 regular 213:4 110:18 111:4,19 111:17 119:22 121:22 146:20 regulations 55:11 111:23,24 112:1,5 120:13 122:1 184:5 regulator 148:5 112:23,25 113:7 124:21 173:9 reorganization regulatory 88:22 113:10 117:24 176:14,19,21 14:15 16:8 17:3 reiterate 163:20 118:9,13 123:12 reliance 31:19 17:23 18:16 19:14 223:21 125:25 126:24 172:11 52:12 106:24 rejected 87:21 140:3 143:19 relied 91:8 146:24 repay 187:22 relate 35:12 214:8 148:25 149:3 17:15 18:9 19:6 140:11 repeat 83:23 related 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 30:20 32:16 36:7 repeated 10:14 3:3,7,9,15,20 4:4 160:15 161:4 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeated 10:14 4:12,17 5:3,7,11 174:13 193:21 79:20 102:15 162:15	169:5 182:15	87:24 88:10,11,17	relevance 111:7	render 112:25
regular 213:4 110:18 111:4,19 111:17 119:22 121:22 146:20 regulations 55:11 111:23,24 112:1,5 120:13 122:1 184:5 regulator 148:5 112:23,25 113:7 124:21 173:9 reorganization regulatory 88:22 113:10 117:24 176:14,19,21 14:15 16:8 17:3 reiterate 163:20 118:9,13 123:12 reliance 31:19 17:23 18:16 19:14 223:21 125:25 126:24 172:11 52:12 106:24 rejected 87:21 146:22 148:14,16 relied 91:8 146:24 repay 187:22 relate 35:12 214:8 148:25 149:3 17:15 18:9 19:6 140:11 repeat 83:23 related 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 30:20 32:16 36:7 repeated 10:114 3:3,7,9,15,20 4:4 160:15 161:4 36:8 43:14 44:6 149:6 repeatedly 57:14 5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:18 197:3,10 79:20 102:15 162:15 171:8 report 184:4 10:6,12,19 11:6 released 61:6 66:5	203:3 206:16	89:4 91:18 92:18	115:24 156:9	141:24
regulations 55:11 111:23,24 112:1,5 120:13 122:1 184:5 regulatory 88:22 113:10 117:24 176:14,19,21 14:15 16:8 17:3 reiterate 163:20 118:9,13 123:12 reliance 31:19 17:23 18:16 19:14 223:21 125:25 126:24 172:11 52:12 106:24 rejected 87:21 140:3 143:19 relied 91:8 146:24 repay 187:22 relate 35:12 214:8 148:25 149:3 17:15 18:9 19:6 140:11 repeate 83:23 related 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 30:20 32:16 36:7 repeated 10:11 related 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 36:8 43:14 44:6 149:6 repeated 101:14 4:12,17 5:3,7,11 174:13 193:21 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeatedly 57:14 5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:18 197:3,10 79:20 102:15 162:15 171:8 7:18 8:3 9:9,17 20:7 132:7 153:24 report 184:4 10:6,12,19 11:6 released 61:6 66:5 155:23 169:1 <	regardless 152:19	92:19 107:11	relevant 103:9	rendered 95:9
regulator 148:5 112:23,25 113:7 124:21 173:9 reorganization regulatory 88:22 113:10 117:24 176:14,19,21 14:15 16:8 17:3 reiterate 163:20 118:9,13 123:12 reliance 31:19 17:23 18:16 19:14 223:21 125:25 126:24 172:11 52:12 106:24 rejected 87:21 140:3 143:19 relied 91:8 146:24 repay 187:22 relate 35:12 214:8 148:25 149:3 17:15 18:9 19:6 140:11 repeated 83:23 related 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 30:20 32:16 36:7 repeated 101:14 3:3,7,9,15,20 4:4 160:15 161:4 36:8 43:14 44:6 149:6 repeated 101:14 4:12,17 5:3,7,11 174:13 193:21 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeatedly 57:14 5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:18 197:3,10 79:20 102:15 162:15 171:8 7:18 8:3 9:9,17 20:7 132:7 153:24 report 184:4 10:6,12,19 11:6 released 61:6 66:5 155:23 169:1 204:15 213:	regular 213:4	110:18 111:4,19	111:17 119:22	121:22 146:20
regulatory 88:22 113:10 117:24 176:14,19,21 14:15 16:8 17:3 reiterate 163:20 118:9,13 123:12 reliance 31:19 17:23 18:16 19:14 223:21 125:25 126:24 172:11 52:12 106:24 rejected 87:21 140:3 143:19 relied 91:8 146:24 repay 187:22 15:13 171:21 146:22 148:14,16 relief 13:14 16:21 repeat 83:23 relate 35:12 214:8 148:25 149:3 17:15 18:9 19:6 140:11 repeated 101:14 3:3,7,9,15,20 4:4 160:15 161:4 36:8 43:14 44:6 149:6 repeatedly 57:14 4:12,17 5:3,7,11 174:13 193:21 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeatedly 57:14 5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:18 197:3,10 79:20 102:15 162:15 171:8 7:18 8:3 9:9,17 20:7 132:7 153:24 report 18:4:4 10:6,12,19 11:6 released 61:6 66:5 155:23 169:1 204:15 213:4 11:12,20 12:6,12 88:14 102:5 111:8 178:18 196:19 reporter 42:	regulations 55:11	111:23,24 112:1,5	120:13 122:1	184:5
reiterate 163:20 118:9,13 123:12 reliance 31:19 17:23 18:16 19:14 223:21 125:25 126:24 172:11 52:12 106:24 rejected 87:21 140:3 143:19 relied 91:8 146:24 repay 187:22 115:13 171:21 146:22 148:14,16 relief 13:14 16:21 repay 187:22 relate 35:12 214:8 148:25 149:3 17:15 18:9 19:6 140:11 related 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 30:20 32:16 36:7 repeated 101:14 3:3,7,9,15,20 4:4 160:15 161:4 36:8 43:14 44:6 149:6 repeatedly 57:14 4:12,17 5:3,7,11 174:13 193:21 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeatedly 57:14 5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:18 197:3,10 79:20 102:15 162:15 171:8 7:18 8:3 9:9,17 220:7 132:7 153:24 report 184:4 10:6,12,19 11:6 released 61:6 66:5 155:23 169:1 204:15 213:4 11:12,20 12:6,12 88:14 102:5 111:8 178:18 196:19 reporter 42:22 <td>regulator 148:5</td> <td>112:23,25 113:7</td> <td>124:21 173:9</td> <td>reorganization</td>	regulator 148:5	112:23,25 113:7	124:21 173:9	reorganization
223:21 125:25 126:24 172:11 52:12 106:24 rejected 87:21 140:3 143:19 relied 91:8 146:24 repay 187:22 115:13 171:21 146:22 148:14,16 relief 13:14 16:21 repat 83:23 relate 35:12 214:8 148:25 149:3 17:15 18:9 19:6 140:11 related 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 30:20 32:16 36:7 repeated 101:14 3:3,7,9,15,20 4:4 160:15 161:4 36:8 43:14 44:6 149:6 4:12,17 5:3,7,11 174:13 193:21 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeatedly 57:14 5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:18 197:3,10 79:20 102:15 162:15 171:8 7:18 8:3 9:9,17 220:7 132:7 153:24 report 184:4 10:6,12,19 11:6 released 61:6 66:5 155:23 169:1 204:15 213:4 11:12,20 12:6,12 88:14 102:5 111:8 178:18 196:19 reporter 42:22	regulatory 88:22	113:10 117:24	176:14,19,21	14:15 16:8 17:3
rejected 87:21 140:3 143:19 relied 91:8 146:24 repay 187:22 115:13 171:21 146:22 148:14,16 relief 13:14 16:21 repeat 83:23 relate 35:12 214:8 148:25 149:3 17:15 18:9 19:6 140:11 related 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 30:20 32:16 36:7 repeated 101:14 3:3,7,9,15,20 4:4 160:15 161:4 36:8 43:14 44:6 149:6 4:12,17 5:3,7,11 174:13 193:21 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeatedly 57:14 5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:18 197:3,10 79:20 102:15 162:15 171:8 7:18 8:3 9:9,17 220:7 132:7 153:24 report 184:4 10:6,12,19 11:6 released 61:6 66:5 155:23 169:1 204:15 213:4 11:12,20 12:6,12 88:14 102:5 111:8 178:18 196:19 reporter 42:22	reiterate 163:20	118:9,13 123:12	reliance 31:19	17:23 18:16 19:14
115:13 171:21 146:22 148:14,16 relief 13:14 16:21 repeat 83:23 relate 35:12 214:8 148:25 149:3 17:15 18:9 19:6 140:11 related 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 30:20 32:16 36:7 repeated 101:14 3:3,7,9,15,20 4:4 160:15 161:4 36:8 43:14 44:6 149:6 4:12,17 5:3,7,11 174:13 193:21 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeatedly 57:14 5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:18 197:3,10 79:20 102:15 162:15 171:8 7:18 8:3 9:9,17 220:7 132:7 153:24 report 184:4 10:6,12,19 11:6 released 61:6 66:5 155:23 169:1 204:15 213:4 11:12,20 12:6,12 88:14 102:5 111:8 178:18 196:19 reporter 42:22	223:21	125:25 126:24	172:11	52:12 106:24
relate 35:12 214:8 148:25 149:3 17:15 18:9 19:6 140:11 related 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 30:20 32:16 36:7 repeated 101:14 3:3,7,9,15,20 4:4 160:15 161:4 36:8 43:14 44:6 149:6 4:12,17 5:3,7,11 174:13 193:21 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeatedly 57:14 5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:18 197:3,10 79:20 102:15 162:15 171:8 7:18 8:3 9:9,17 220:7 132:7 153:24 report 184:4 10:6,12,19 11:6 released 61:6 66:5 155:23 169:1 204:15 213:4 11:12,20 12:6,12 88:14 102:5 111:8 178:18 196:19 reporter 42:22	rejected 87:21	140:3 143:19	relied 91:8 146:24	repay 187:22
related 2:11,15,23 150:16,18 160:4 30:20 32:16 36:7 repeated 101:14 3:3,7,9,15,20 4:4 160:15 161:4 36:8 43:14 44:6 149:6 4:12,17 5:3,7,11 174:13 193:21 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeatedly 57:14 5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:18 197:3,10 79:20 102:15 162:15 171:8 7:18 8:3 9:9,17 220:7 132:7 153:24 report 184:4 10:6,12,19 11:6 released 61:6 66:5 155:23 169:1 204:15 213:4 11:12,20 12:6,12 88:14 102:5 111:8 178:18 196:19 reporter 42:22	115:13 171:21	146:22 148:14,16	relief 13:14 16:21	repeat 83:23
3:3,7,9,15,20 4:4 160:15 161:4 36:8 43:14 44:6 149:6 4:12,17 5:3,7,11 174:13 193:21 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeatedly 57:14 5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:18 197:3,10 79:20 102:15 162:15 171:8 7:18 8:3 9:9,17 220:7 132:7 153:24 report 184:4 10:6,12,19 11:6 released 61:6 66:5 155:23 169:1 204:15 213:4 11:12,20 12:6,12 88:14 102:5 111:8 178:18 196:19 reporter 42:22	relate 35:12 214:8	148:25 149:3	17:15 18:9 19:6	140:11
4:12,17 5:3,7,11 174:13 193:21 46:21 66:7 78:15 repeatedly 57:14 5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:18 197:3,10 79:20 102:15 162:15 171:8 7:18 8:3 9:9,17 220:7 132:7 153:24 report 184:4 10:6,12,19 11:6 released 61:6 66:5 155:23 169:1 204:15 213:4 11:12,20 12:6,12 88:14 102:5 111:8 178:18 196:19 reporter 42:22	related 2:11,15,23	150:16,18 160:4	30:20 32:16 36:7	repeated 101:14
5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12 194:18 197:3,10 79:20 102:15 162:15 171:8 7:18 8:3 9:9,17 220:7 132:7 153:24 report 184:4 10:6,12,19 11:6 released 61:6 66:5 155:23 169:1 204:15 213:4 11:12,20 12:6,12 88:14 102:5 111:8 178:18 196:19 reporter 42:22	3:3,7,9,15,20 4:4	160:15 161:4	36:8 43:14 44:6	149:6
7:18 8:3 9:9,17	4:12,17 5:3,7,11	174:13 193:21	46:21 66:7 78:15	repeatedly 57:14
10:6,12,19 11:6 released 61:6 66:5 155:23 169:1 204:15 213:4 11:12,20 12:6,12 88:14 102:5 111:8 178:18 196:19 reporter 42:22	5:22 6:8,17 7:4,12	194:18 197:3,10	79:20 102:15	162:15 171:8
11:12,20 12:6,12 88:14 102:5 111:8 178:18 196:19 reporter 42:22	7:18 8:3 9:9,17	220:7	132:7 153:24	report 184:4
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	10:6,12,19 11:6	released 61:6 66:5	155:23 169:1	204:15 213:4
12:19 13:4,5,9,14	11:12,20 12:6,12	88:14 102:5 111:8	178:18 196:19	reporter 42:22
	12:19 13:4,5,9,14	111:14 126:1		

[reporting - right] Page 50

	I	I	I
reporting 144:19	requires 36:15	181:18 202:19	53:1 70:23 75:9
reports 184:8	61:3 130:22 150:3	217:14	78:4 80:10,24
212:17	191:3 195:9 197:8	respectful 80:8	128:19 134:21
represent 84:13	202:8	respectfully 35:25	139:14 143:9
125:3 155:3	requiring 66:24	59:2 97:19 125:16	145:10,14 152:23
representative	180:18 195:25	respects 46:21	168:6 185:8
94:5	rescap 113:12	respond 35:3	186:20,22 193:16
represented 31:2	research 54:25	77:25 98:3 103:7	199:19 203:7
54:9	reserve 211:19	138:24 139:20	reviewed 29:7
representing	221:17	142:20,21 144:22	32:21 34:21 40:9
136:14 162:5	reserved 108:8	174:2 175:2,6,8	49:20 76:20 80:10
212:12	187:6 209:23,25	178:2,6 213:8	142:2
represents 103:23	reserving 32:9	responded 213:1	reviewing 76:22
139:12 205:13	residential 61:8	respondent 132:6	186:11
request 30:12	residents 84:6	response 70:18	rhode 83:18,21
31:16,18 32:23	resolution 15:4,14	80:5 95:11 96:4	richard 28:2
35:25 36:21 40:6	66:24 76:16	130:15 156:19	ride 82:21 170:6
47:7 50:7 52:17	120:23 121:10	168:15 174:25	riffing 116:11
53:17 59:2 74:4	166:6 180:18	175:5,10 194:5	172:5
75:16 97:19 115:1	186:5 195:25	responses 3:19	riffkin 3:16 5:12
130:12 138:21	resolve 32:6 76:23	6:16 9:8 11:11	5:23 13:6,20 14:7
158:12 166:10,17	106:9 108:14	49:21 159:6	14:24 15:6,16
187:4 200:12,13	184:10 186:12,17	rest 83:4,5 138:1	26:9
202:17 213:1	204:5 223:20	159:3 186:16	right 29:2,19
requested 95:3	resolved 54:1	restate 141:21	33:16 34:6,17,17
requesting 52:22	82:10 89:8 132:1	restrictions 31:25	34:19,20,23 36:3
requests 181:11	166:7	restructuring	41:1 42:10,11,12
190:24 213:15,17	resolving 29:17	126:1,4	43:12 47:9 48:17
224:23	181:13 189:13	result 52:7,9 67:2	49:8 51:1,1,5 54:4
require 45:6	214:16	73:8 142:8 143:8	58:6 60:11,23
124:23 151:22	resources 215:9	143:12 145:15	61:10,15,15 65:22
190:17 194:2	respect 5:9,20 6:6	185:2	67:5,8 68:1,5,16
217:3	8:9,18 14:3 15:11	resulted 44:1	69:9,18 71:8
required 44:13	35:6 37:7 47:21	resuming 179:3	73:12,16 75:22
56:7 194:23	57:13,15,17 62:6	retain 46:17	80:19 84:25 87:23
195:12 209:7,13	63:20 65:12 67:1	rethink 215:25	93:17 94:4 98:23
requirement	74:13,15 83:22	retirement 39:21	99:10,12 103:10
119:4 189:14	84:25 97:9 100:11	retract 67:17	104:12 107:4
196:14	101:17 107:25	retrying 128:7	109:16 113:15
requirements	108:2 115:19	return 63:8	115:21 117:8
113:10 132:21	146:7 149:5 153:7	reversed 104:23	120:17 124:12
196:18 197:2	153:16 154:19	review 45:22	131:25 133:21
202:18	159:14 177:21	51:13,16 52:9	136:19,20 137:19

[right - satisfied] Page 51

137:21 138:10	romanoff 27:25	188:21 203:19,19	s.d.n.y 131:21
142:23 145:13,22	ronald 2:20,23	211:3	s.d.n.y. 36:20
147:25 150:8	3:1,9 17:8 24:10	ruling 14:9 16:3	128:11 197:7,16
153:4 154:1,3	39:15 40:12,18	16:23 17:17 18:11	198:18 199:9
155:2,7,15,17	227:14	19:8 39:7 42:25	sabine 72:5 78:6
156:12,18 159:9	room 1:13	43:13 84:18 88:12	121:1 124:15
168:20 169:18,24	rose 143:20	105:4 108:16	187:9,11 192:6
176:16 177:7,10	rosen 26:12	109:4,5,23,24	sackler 52:13 66:3
177:12,19 178:7	round 129:16	111:21,24 114:5	66:5,6 92:8 126:7
178:22,23 186:2	130:22	118:10 126:25	134:3 149:10
205:5,25 208:4,18	routinely 58:15	127:1 132:16	150:15 151:4,21
209:18,25 210:4,5	roxana 24:14	134:15,15 135:25	160:12 162:12
211:19 215:18	rubric 44:6 46:6	136:17 137:3,14	218:8
216:8 217:7,7	62:12 170:17	143:1 146:20	sacklers 57:23
219:16,24 220:21	rudimentary	152:11 153:11	88:4 91:17 95:5
221:13,18 225:25	54:25	155:1 163:6 164:2	102:3 111:16,19
226:15	rule 13:4,19 14:5	171:21 183:4,21	112:10 135:19
rightly 168:1	14:22 30:21 31:6	185:1,3,4,6	136:15 149:15
rights 30:25 32:9	32:14 36:13 37:9	193:12,17 195:11	150:3,14,17,24
63:23 66:16 78:25	37:11 44:7,7,12	202:16 204:7	151:17,25 152:1
84:5 112:1,1	44:16,16,19,20,22	205:17 211:2,7,8	157:20 160:24
148:6,18,19 149:1	44:25 68:8 81:6	211:22 224:5,22	167:23 220:2,9
149:7 153:16,19	81:22 82:15 94:13	225:2 226:6	221:3
154:19,22 166:21	114:24 126:20	rulings 131:23	sackler's 150:19
174:7 193:22	129:10,20 131:8	193:1 227:3 228:3	safety 168:12
218:9 220:8	135:18 136:6	run 81:15	saint 22:3
ringer 26:10	152:20 154:17	runup 85:23	sake 211:9
rise 141:1	165:24 180:23	ryan 26:18	sallie 187:16
risk 93:19 143:7	199:3 214:12,12	S	salutary 128:9
143:12 145:22	ruled 39:12 41:25	s 2:11,15,23 3:3,9	samsung 120:16
199:18	48:19 64:16,21	3:15,21 4:4,12,18	124:16
risks 220:25	68:8 69:25 114:11	4:18 5:3,12,22 6:8	sara 24:20
rivera 27:1	118:5 119:1 121:5	6:18 7:4,12,19,19	sarah 28:3
road 229:23	123:18 124:7,22	8:3 9:10,17 10:6	satisfaction
robert 1:22 27:10	127:24 129:14	10:13,13,19 11:6	151:15
roberts 21:6	131:3 133:7 136:2	11:13,20 12:6,13	satisfied 51:15,24
robertson 26:11	152:14 171:9	12:13,19 13:5,20	65:2 80:16 105:3
robinson 26:4	178:20 200:9	14:6,16,23 15:6	107:14 118:9
rocket 129:8	223:6	15:15,19,24 16:9	132:22 136:4
136:9	rules 36:13 42:15	17:4,8,24 18:17	147:3 163:17
role 216:16	44:13,21,21 82:15	19:15 20:1,12	187:25 188:19
rolling 119:16	135:3 137:13	24:13 25:16,22	192:10 196:19
	164:3 178:1,3	27:5 29:1 187:16	202:6

[satisfies - see] Page 52

205:14 206:18	56:22,25 57:3,9	196:18,22,22	
204:12,15 205:7	54:24 56:3,9,10	195:12,23 196:16	219:5 222:2
172:9 199:23	51:23 53:9,10,10	193:8,11,18 195:8	212:23 216:14
142:14 143:2	36:19 37:6,17	189:4 192:21	206:15 210:3
136:11,25 141:23	11:6,12,19 12:4	183:10 187:19	198:17,18 199:8
101:20 129:18	7:3,10 9:9,16 10:4	171:5 179:6	194:21 196:9
76:2,5 81:24	4:10 5:18 6:4,17	166:16 169:12	191:7 192:6
74:8,16 75:24	second 3:20 4:3	165:16,22,23	189:15 190:2,10
schedule 53:11	sean 25:10	164:1,22 165:7,13	187:15 188:6
221:19	100:12	162:17 163:7,21	175:1 181:4 187:8
184:9 218:20	39:15 65:15 99:2	158:25 161:9	148:13,15 164:1,3
160:2 172:22	se 24:9,10,11,12	147:1 152:9 158:5	140:17 141:6
155:1,12 158:12	190:15 191:19	143:8,9 146:10,12	125:2 135:21
140:2 150:2,5,9	sdny 187:9,10,11	142:19,22,22	97:24 120:15
130:5,8,14 134:9	scrutiny 31:16	142:1,7,9,11,12	35:17 36:19 84:22
125:8 128:23	script 101:13	138:13 141:16	see 30:2 32:20
114:16 116:9	97:24 138:9	132:15 137:11	110:9
109:8 113:5	screen 30:2 32:20	130:1 131:2,18	securities 39:20
89:24 106:7,8,20	scott 20:8	129:15,16,20	sections 91:6
58:4,11 61:2,8,19	188:22	127:20 128:15	202:5
says 34:9 41:3	scores 76:13	125:12,19 127:15	200:3,25 201:23
172:15 174:8	scope 105:6	123:7 124:4	196:3 198:2,9,21
154:19 171:4,14	26:14	118:16,24 121:16	192:11 195:23
136:19 150:14	schwartzberg	116:17,22 117:4	187:13 191:9,16
123:17,18 135:25	104:4	113:17 114:9	185:15 186:3
117:4 119:6	schools 103:19	110:2,6 112:15	180:17,24 184:18
90:16,20 99:20	226:9	107:5 108:12,20	177:4 179:24,25
71:15 73:12 74:22	school 63:10	105:8 106:17	151:13 157:2
60:20 64:1,15	187:23	90:9,17 96:19	128:18 150:5
58:11 60:5,5,20	scholarship	88:8,18,23 89:1	91:1 97:9 119:4
saying 55:10	schlecker 26:13	85:1 86:19 87:1	77:2,24 80:13
saw 152:9 177:25	scheindlin 120:19	82:14,16,22,24	51:11 64:4 66:8
saving 137:15	212:16	81:11,18 82:2,6	section 46:24
saved 182:4	102:11,18 103:6	79:6,16,20 80:19	177:15
127:22 212:2	15:11,19 101:24	78:17,17,19,20	seconds 151:12
save 120:5 127:21	6:5 8:9,17 14:2	75:3,12 78:13,15	181:21
195:22,23	scheduling 5:9,19	72:20 73:15 74:7	160:6 176:8
123:19 170:6,11	schedules 52:8	71:16 72:8,10,12	46:20 81:5 158:3
106:1 119:6	223:15	70:10,11 71:4,5,6	secondly 44:24
72:17 84:3 104:24	129:10 203:3	65:5 67:6,22	228:11
satisfy 51:15	scheduled 94:7	62:18 63:17 64:6	206:24 210:21,24
satisfies 51:14 59:19 74:19	223:22	59:9,24 60:1,1,4,5 60:6 62:7,14,17	197:2,14 198:1,1 200:24 202:10
	210:22 212:5		

[seeing - similar] Page 53

	I	Γ	T
seeing 178:17	september 32:18	settlements 38:18	shortening 5:9,19
seek 32:13,15	33:15 36:5,6	seven 100:15	6:5 8:8,17 14:2
36:7,8 52:9,14	136:1 139:15	118:19,23	15:10
79:7 108:5 114:14	144:18 179:14	seventh 110:17	shortly 211:17
115:6 152:22	202:17 203:3,22	177:17	215:21
153:23 154:12,21	211:23 212:4	shame 161:21	shouldn't 79:2
171:3 179:4	224:14	shannon 25:24	116:2
200:14	sequential 53:7	share 182:13,25	show 63:18
seeking 53:1,4	seriously 224:2,8	shareholder	shown 47:6 202:5
56:18 78:24 98:8	seriousness 82:21	46:12 52:11 88:14	shows 122:1
98:22 102:15	137:1	111:23 112:1	shut 207:6,11
105:24 108:4	serve 100:18	118:13 157:3,8,13	sick 95:20
153:17 166:2	served 48:25	157:25	side 29:21 98:2
171:2 174:15	213:14,17 216:11	shares 136:7	103:13,15,21
seeks 32:18 39:16	216:14	sheer 143:22	104:6,8 117:14
40:1 43:14 44:6	service 85:12 99:1	she'll 82:1	124:8,9 137:24
46:20 179:11	services 31:8	she's 155:18	146:7 147:6 156:5
212:10	36:22 45:25 46:1	shifer 28:1	158:20 204:10
seen 35:10 154:6	set 35:4,18,24	shocked 54:21	207:25 208:3,8
self 26:15	96:17 101:6	57:4 69:24 196:21	220:23
send 48:25 49:3	114:22 130:14	shocking 113:16	sides 110:23
205:2	140:12 146:13,17	shockingly 127:5	166:11 181:25
sensationally	170:1 179:23	shoehorn 123:1	201:21
150:22	180:1,7 182:18	shop 72:3	sidney 27:22
sense 53:12 60:3	196:25 198:2	shore 4:13 7:13	siegel 59:13
74:23 75:15 79:11	199:23 207:5	10:7 12:7 24:6	sign 157:7
80:21 81:8 86:4	224:12 225:8	26:16 28:2 147:11	signal 146:10
95:21 109:7	226:1	147:11,14,14	signaled 203:16
136:13 169:18,19	sets 44:13 113:9	151:11 153:3	signature 229:9
216:12 222:12	setting 37:10	160:22 162:2	signed 13:9 14:10
sent 41:8,15,17	172:9 181:22	174:3 213:8 216:4	14:16 16:5,9,16
99:3 217:16	184:8 198:25	216:8,23 217:2,6	16:24 17:4,10,18
sentence 106:6,12	225:18	217:11,12,12	17:24 18:4,12,17
116:14	settle 184:16	219:20 220:19,22	19:1,9,15 157:5
sentencing 212:19	settled 56:16	221:25 222:5,9	significance
218:21,22	70:13 114:9 115:7	225:13,16,25	146:14
separate 40:5	126:12 184:3	226:4,13	significant 53:18
75:18 98:15	settlement 91:15	short 124:25	87:19 94:3 96:18
115:22 174:13	91:21 92:8 126:7	145:16,20	144:1 209:13
191:2,10 207:2	134:3,8 135:13,24	shorten 5:7 8:7	silence 172:14
separately 175:25	136:18 151:25	14:1 15:9 116:12	silverstein 123:11
sept 199:9	157:3,9,25 173:16	shortened 116:4	similar 29:13 70:8
	173:17 218:18		81:21 91:6 127:4
	1,5.1, 210.10		
	1	1	

[similar - standard] Page 54

skapof 26:17		sped 165:20
		speed 54:2,6
132:10 186:15	83:2 101:16	71:15 76:17,18
skipping 129:25	106:19 116:11	80:7,18 130:14
131:16	117:11 119:17	131:4 143:5
slate 146:21	123:21 134:20	145:14,21 165:13
slaugh 26:18	153:25 156:13	166:20 185:14
sleep 205:16	176:1 215:22	186:6,7,19,21
slip 85:6	sought 42:2 47:12	201:24 215:2
slow 163:19	47:13 50:3 95:4,5	spend 119:15
165:11	95:10 142:2 169:1	224:25
slowdown 143:15	204:9 215:10,11	spent 118:2,3
143:17	215:13,15 222:11	160:7 191:13
slower 164:21	sounds 149:7	split 151:24
205:10	150:4 157:10	splits 151:21
small 114:19	217:18 222:4,6	spoke 34:1
117:16 186:22	source 159:21	spoken 98:18
smith 27:8	southern 1:2	162:15
social 105:17	73:19	spot 139:17,19
solely 182:22	sovereign 92:18	springer 26:20
solicitor 54:22	96:11,13,15,22	springfield 121:2
55:12	116:6,9	121:3 123:20
solution 76:2	sovereigns 92:18	124:1 191:5,6
solutions 59:13	_	squared 148:7
229:22	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	squarely 56:11,23
solved 160:6		56:25 70:11
someday 105:15		143:12 158:6
somers 26:19		163:25
sonya 19:25 229:5	205:10 217:8	sr 2:20,23 3:10
229:10	222:12	17:8 24:10 227:15
soon 144:23	speaking 58:20	sraders 28:3
200:10	98:6 167:15	st 161:15
sophisticated 72:4	special 130:22	stahl 28:4
72:5 118:2	specific 36:7,8	stake 122:8
sorry 41:5,22	44:21 140:3 142:1	184:16 189:21
48:16 64:1 74:20	151:3 159:10	214:10
99:10,16,24	211:18	stakeholders
122:20 152:20		137:16
153:15 167:15	52:14 111:15	stand 35:2 43:2
	123:11	43:10 134:1
179:1 186:21		197:16
	_	standard 31:5
	•	56:2 59:25 81:13
	skip 128:24 132:10 186:15 skipping 129:25 131:16 slate 146:21 slaugh 26:18 sleep 205:16 slip 85:6 slow 163:19 165:11 slowdown 143:15 143:17 slower 164:21 205:10 small 114:19 117:16 186:22 smith 27:8 social 105:17 solely 182:22 solicitor 54:22 55:12 solutions 59:13 229:22 solved 160:6 someday 105:15 somers 26:19 sonya 19:25 229:5 229:10 soon 144:23 200:10 sophisticated 72:4 72:5 118:2 sorry 41:5,22 48:16 64:1 74:20 99:10,16,24 122:20 152:20 153:15 167:15 174:23 175:1,16	skip 128:24 sort 62:25 73:4 132:10 186:15 83:2 101:16 skipping 129:25 106:19 116:11 131:16 117:11 119:17 slate 146:21 123:21 134:20 slaugh 26:18 153:25 156:13 sleep 205:16 153:25 156:13 slow 163:19 176:1 215:22 slow 163:19 47:13 50:3 95:4,5 165:11 95:10 142:2 169:1 slowdown 143:15 204:9 215:10,11 143:17 slower 164:21 204:9 215:10,11 205:10 small 114:19 217:18 222:4,6 sorial 105:17 southern 1:2 solely 182:22 southern 1:2 solicitor 54:22 55:12 southern 1:2 solutions 59:13 96:21 97:11,13 sovereign 92:18 solutions 59:13 speak 92:11 99:18 somers 26:19 104:2,4 152:25 205:10 2

[standard - stock] Page 55

04.2 120.12 10	-4-4	174.15 177 10	100.25.25	
84:3 120:12,18	statement 4:11	174:15 177:19	190:25,25	
121:1,6 123:8	7:11 10:5 11:1	179:7,8,20,25	stay 13:1,3,16,18	
124:15 170:12,16	12:5 15:18 35:3	180:11,13,15	14:4,19,21 15:1,3	
214:13,15	67:18 93:24 106:7	183:18 184:22	15:4,5,12,13,14	
standards 163:16	128:1 161:2	186:4 188:13,20	15:23,24 16:12	
standing 47:6	178:12	188:25 193:18,21	17:7 18:1,20 29:9	
100:7 131:20	statements 37:24	196:22 203:9	29:12 41:13 73:1	
174:8 201:7	56:10 171:25	208:1 217:20,21	74:15 79:1 82:9	
stands 94:4	211:25 224:18	219:7 227:18	85:2 99:11 100:1	
stare 184:7	states 1:1,11 3:13	228:8,9	102:12 145:8,18	
stark 154:8	3:16 4:2,9 5:8,10	states' 113:22	153:17,22 154:2	
start 35:21 105:9	5:13,16,17,20,23	state's 48:22	154:18,19,22	
119:17 132:16	6:2,3,6,10,12 7:2	114:6 134:2	163:1,10,12	
137:14 156:20	7:9 8:9,15,18 9:3	135:20	166:10,17 172:9	
started 34:3 79:11	9:15 10:3 11:3,4	stating 91:21	176:21 182:5	
125:23	11:18 12:3 13:1,2	143:19	199:18,18 202:25	
state 2:24 3:22	13:6,17,21 14:1,3	statue 148:12,22	203:4,10 204:4,9	
6:14,19 8:7,11,16	14:7,20,25 15:2,7	statues 124:7	208:5,15,21 209:4	
8:20 9:1,5,11	15:9,11,16,23	133:20	210:25 211:4,6	
11:14 15:25 16:14	20:14 21:1 29:9	status 15:19	212:3,21 213:2	
21:9,16 22:1,2,9	40:2,20 46:22	212:17 213:4	214:16 222:22	
23:20 39:17,18,20	49:9,15,16 51:8	statute 47:3 73:10	224:4,14,20,23	
39:23 40:7,8	51:19 53:23 55:5	84:1 89:21 90:4	stayed 45:4 154:9	
41:19 42:18,23	55:6 57:25 58:25	96:17 104:13	218:3	
43:4,7,22 46:1,6,7	59:19 65:2 69:5	105:13 109:16	stays 162:4	
47:1,8,24 49:22	72:16 75:25 78:18	130:5,23 133:16	182:17	
67:3 80:2,7 86:13	79:18 84:2,4,5,6,9	136:5 141:14	step 36:15 129:25	
87:13 88:9,22	84:14 86:3,3,7,14	144:25 145:11,13	152:9,13,15	
97:1 103:25	88:3 96:10 102:9	165:12 167:5,9	201:16	
113:25 125:3	103:23 105:10	178:15 180:5,22	stephanie 25:1	
146:4 151:14	118:25 125:6	181:21,22 182:18	steps 49:13 87:17	
164:14 169:10	137:17,19 138:25	183:6,8,15,18	179:15	
171:15 181:5	139:2,21,24 141:6	188:6 189:20	stern 58:14,20,23	
186:23 196:23	142:18 143:6,20	190:16 191:1,3	59:14 66:21 70:11	
213:14 215:11	143:24 145:1	192:6 194:23	89:18,19 131:14	
state's 167:19	148:15,24 149:2	195:20 196:2	173:12 192:23	
168:3,11 215:16	149:14 150:1	202:12,19	201:3,11,15	
stated 37:22 40:25	151:22 157:4	statute's 189:1,2	sterns 90:23	
41:2 48:5 91:20	160:18 163:2	statutes 91:2,7	stipend 187:23	
139:5 140:12	165:25 167:22	115:1 170:16	stipulate 217:17	
141:5 143:5 145:5	168:25 169:1,4,8	statutorily 55:22	217:18 224:20	
147:5 203:15	169:15,23 171:12	statutory 159:17	stock 131:25	
	174:4,5,5,6,10,11	159:18 182:22		
	1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 10, 11	103.10 102.22		
Veritext Legal Solutions				

[stodola - take] Page 56

			_
stodola 26:21	subparagraph	suitable 91:18	59:20 63:22,24
stop 40:6 46:25	180:1,3	suite 20:16 21:3	64:3,7,7,16,21
71:2 99:7 100:3	subpoena 213:15	22:18 229:24	76:23 109:4,11,16
114:23 127:17	subramanian	sullivan 27:7 28:6	110:14 116:17,25
133:9 135:8 200:4	28:5	summary 175:5	147:2 180:11,14
stopped 178:25	subsection 179:24	175:13	187:19 188:12,19
story 135:4	180:15 188:19	summer 158:15	188:21,25 189:12
straight 58:2	189:9 196:5	sunedison 60:11	192:20 193:1,8,10
147:25	subsections	61:10,18 67:1	193:19 201:3,6
straightforward	183:16 187:13,24	69:17 113:9	sure 48:24 50:4
107:22	188:6	126:14,17,21	79:6 98:9,9 109:2
strategy 212:11	subsequent 49:12	197:15	121:17 130:18
strauss 23:1	subset 145:12	sunset 124:8	134:4 136:24
140:19 206:9	substantial 93:3	super 218:19	146:2 155:4 156:9
street 1:13 20:16	153:12 181:9	219:2	156:9,16 159:9
21:3,10,17 22:18	191:13,25 192:16	superior 43:17	165:7 175:12
strike 160:5	substantially	supplement 150:2	203:11 210:20
strip 84:5 107:20	31:22 193:13	supplemental	218:25 220:19
strong 182:11	subtext 163:7	64:14	223:2,14,19
183:7 225:3	success 47:21	supplied 89:16	surprise 102:12
strongly 76:7	113:1	189:10	114:25
structure 46:12	successful 142:7	support 2:10 3:8	surprised 59:16
46:13 76:9 98:21	successor 107:23	3:13 11:3 13:2,17	172:2
student 60:22	sue 220:9	14:20 15:1 61:20	survival 122:8
63:10	suffering 34:14	64:10 103:20	survive 144:17
stuff 68:16 108:22	sufficient 38:12	134:24 135:1	susan 26:6
115:23 131:1	56:6 128:17	150:2 211:14,14	sustained 44:11
subject 31:25	sufficiently 91:5	221:9 223:1	sweet 139:17,19
44:10,25 46:15	167:10	227:19 228:7	switch 78:14
70:25 93:11 94:2	suggest 81:2	supported 91:12	sworn 108:17
96:25 97:6 112:5	96:14 168:3	108:18	sympathetic
117:19 157:6	176:20	supporter 146:7	224:18
170:14 181:1,9	suggested 57:24	147:6	system 116:24
192:15,25 193:15	69:1 109:15 212:3	supporting 3:3	t
194:16,17 195:7	suggesting 103:1	115:1	-
195:11 196:8	140:6 162:19	supports 215:23	t 25:10 64:16
198:8	169:15,20	suppose 86:2	229:3,3
submit 85:9 86:10	suggestion 216:5	198:22 225:3	table 217:25
91:19 126:23	225:3	supposed 105:25	218:2
202:15 222:19	suggests 65:23	130:23	tag 40:24
submits 65:2	70:9 97:4,5	supreme 36:21	tagalong 40:19
submitted 138:20	suing 106:22	55:18 56:3,4	tagged 170:13
		58:14,16,18 59:11	take 34:16 46:16
			47:7 53:10,15,17
	'		

[take - thing] Page 57

70:5 73:21 74:16	149:14 158:13	terms 45:11 47:2	104:15 105:17
74:16 75:7,12,21	160:7 174:14	75:20 80:8 96:7,7	106:11,15 108:6
75:24 76:3 78:13	175:12 213:16	96:18 112:25	114:24 115:16
81:9,14 85:2,8,8	216:11 219:14	157:18 172:10	120:3,9,18 121:20
85:17 92:2,20	221:8	176:12,18 198:21	122:21 123:8
94:24 98:10,11	talks 80:13 101:25	terrible 105:17	124:6 126:18
99:19 100:5	143:5 145:21	124:9 129:4	129:24 131:5
103:14 110:1,15	target 33:19	terrific 73:17	132:4 134:19,21
126:19 128:14	targeted 32:25	135:6	134:22 135:5
129:16 130:7	targeting 33:2	test 37:6,7,13	136:23 137:12,23
143:7 145:22	taxpayer 122:11	38:11 119:7 120:9	140:4 141:13
148:23 151:12	taylor 27:15	testimony 108:17	143:15 145:6,22
153:8,18 161:11	tdp 150:5,10	117:20 210:7	145:23 147:18
166:5,24 178:23	151:1	220:14 223:16	148:1 151:7 153:8
179:15 181:3	tdps 151:12,20	thank 32:11 35:2	157:8,8 158:12,24
185:20 186:24	technically 222:1	39:8,10 48:8,10	159:1,9,17,21
199:7,16 200:19	techy 151:16	48:11 49:7 51:4	160:3
204:1 211:10	tele 1:12	54:14 79:10,23,24	theirs 117:14
218:25 220:17	telephonically	83:7,8,14 86:11	theodore 27:4
222:20	20:8,9,10,11,12	92:3 97:22 138:4	theory 38:8 45:23
taken 32:15 38:4	20:19 21:6,13,20	140:13,14 145:25	there's 53:3,25
43:19 50:17 63:16	22:6,13,21 23:8,9	147:6,7,9,10,14	64:22 65:1 73:18
73:25 74:10 86:4	23:17,24 24:6,8	151:9 156:18,22	73:24 81:2 92:23
88:16 149:8	tell 55:20 78:19	164:5,6,13 167:11	100:14 119:7
150:25 180:21	78:21 95:17	167:17,18 168:16	131:1 152:15
184:21 198:7	100:23 106:8	168:17,23 174:20	158:13,17
201:18	136:6 140:21	176:25 177:13	they'll 74:8
takes 37:7 74:7	204:24 226:8	178:22 210:14	they're 65:10 66:9
82:2 86:20 130:7	telling 106:4	213:13 221:24	66:9 79:3 87:12
149:11 181:13	119:19 165:21	222:9 226:13	99:5,6 106:19
talk 39:11 98:16	tells 111:10	thanks 30:8 179:1	107:16 111:2
103:14 106:20	tempting 182:20	that's 34:3 37:10	112:15 116:20,21
107:24 108:7	ten 104:11 148:21	42:4 47:16 54:10	117:8 118:18
109:21 113:3	151:12 177:15	55:9 57:20 58:2	119:10 123:3
117:2,10 120:12	tend 93:23 186:16	59:25 61:3 64:23	131:25 132:15
127:16,21 143:16	222:14	67:25 72:25,25	142:14 148:5,8
183:14 218:6	tends 53:8	73:11,12 74:1	155:21
talked 60:14	tens 118:3 120:6	78:16 79:2,2,10	they've 91:19
69:16,17,19,22	122:10 192:1	79:17 80:15,15,16	106:3 119:11
141:12 142:3	tents 185:4	82:22 83:2,6	thin 114:14
222:2	term 193:5	89:14 90:1,19	thing 33:8 58:6
talking 52:6 67:10	terminated	91:24 95:19 98:25	61:23 85:19
67:12 141:3	220:10	99:1,14 103:3,9	104:14 133:19

[thing - times] Page 58

			C
153:8,10 156:14	132:22 133:2,3,6	thinks 71:5	thousand 126:2
164:25	133:8,12,25 134:2	178:13	148:21
things 35:4 66:11	134:25 136:3,4,4	third 45:12 55:25	thousands 100:19
74:6 77:21 82:11	136:5 137:25	56:13,20,21 57:5	108:17 112:9
82:13,21 98:3	138:1,9,13,21,24	58:1,24 59:5	114:3,4 120:6,6
101:2 107:4 109:3	139:18,25 140:6	62:13 63:13,23	122:10 192:2
110:23 120:10	140:10 144:25	65:9,16,17,21	thousandth 104:9
121:13 132:25	145:8,11,17	66:15,23 68:3	threat 160:13
137:24 153:2,10	146:19 147:22	70:2 87:9,11,15	three 37:3 65:20
155:16,22 161:22	148:22 152:8,16	87:20,23 88:11,11	100:14 113:17
178:2 201:8	153:4 157:12,21	88:17 89:4,8	116:13 124:23
204:20 223:1	159:9,23 160:20	90:10,22 91:8,18	129:13,19 132:13
225:22,24	160:20,21,22,22	103:17 104:4	133:22 152:10,13
think 30:19 32:1	161:8,18,20 162:2	106:13,22 110:4	165:15 176:9
35:5,20 51:18	162:2,6,15 163:11	111:22 112:5,24	183:15 187:12
52:23 53:1 54:13	164:9,18,22	113:7,10 117:23	199:16 214:19
57:3 61:11 62:1,5	165:16 166:8,9,11	118:9,17 119:2	throwing 68:15
63:1,12 65:6,13	166:18,23 167:4	123:2,12 125:20	thrown 62:25
66:25 67:17 69:23	167:10 168:24	125:23 126:10	tie 117:11
70:18 71:4 72:1,9	170:10 171:7,8,21	140:2 142:5	tied 108:18 152:3
72:11 73:5,7,18	173:22,23,25	146:22 148:10,14	time 5:7 8:7 14:1
75:4 76:2 78:20	174:5,25 176:11	148:16,25 149:2	15:9 34:2 37:10
79:3,7,15 80:3,9	176:20 177:3	150:21 159:5	38:3 41:6 43:25
80:20 81:10,15,25	178:6 182:25	160:2 167:24	51:1 53:18 71:6
82:3,7,12,13,19	185:9 190:13	168:4 171:6,10	72:10 90:14 93:5
82:22 83:1,3	198:17,24 200:18	177:17 178:9	93:21 98:18 99:19
84:25 86:1,23	202:21 203:18,22	185:12 193:20	103:7 110:16
87:8 88:7 89:10	205:8,23 206:5,25	195:6 197:3,10	116:4,12 119:15
89:19,20 90:1,21	207:5 209:20	198:4 200:23,24	122:7 127:21,22
90:25 91:9,11,13	210:24 211:2	201:16 202:5	133:22 140:22
91:25 92:15 94:13	212:22 213:15	218:4	142:24 143:13
94:21 95:2,15,20	214:6,10,16 215:4	thirkill 2:5 29:18	149:2 152:8
97:4,8,11 98:8,21	215:7,14,23	29:18 31:24 227:6	156:23 160:21
98:22 101:4,11	216:12,19 217:15	thirkill's 30:9,11	161:5,7,14 164:5
105:16,16 106:18	217:25 218:15	thomas 26:4	188:15 191:13
107:25 108:2	219:10,11,13,14	27:23	200:19 201:20
114:5 117:12,24	219:22,25 220:13	thoroughly 70:24	209:14,20 211:10
117:24 118:23	221:5,14 222:16	188:20	212:2 216:17
119:8,10,11	223:7,7,17 224:8	thought 77:10	timely 31:13,20
121:24 124:25	224:14,15,16	105:2 133:16,23	32:17 44:18 156:6
125:15 128:23	225:5,21	147:9 155:11	156:8
129:12 130:9,25	thinking 129:24	161:5 168:3 217:8	times 33:18 68:9
131:1,9,13,22			74:5 77:10 85:24

[times - trying] Page 59

105:3 112:16	156:3	tribunal 56:18	156:21 157:4
113:17 117:5,6	toto 129:24	59:3	161:2 168:25
129:13 137:6	touchstone	tried 76:13 96:14	169:2,7,22 173:12
176:9 182:2 195:1	111:10	106:2 195:11	176:5 179:7 181:5
195:1	tower 23:5	trier 111:18	188:14 189:7
timing 121:16	townes 20:9 29:24	trigger 110:12	196:14 197:17
146:15 180:25	30:2,3,5,5,9,19	116:18	200:2 202:20
tired 161:20	32:11	triple 154:1	204:3 208:2
tobak 20:11 205:2	traceable 66:4	tro 203:11 212:21	210:12,21 212:12
205:6,6,9,11,11	track 146:17	tronox 161:13,14	215:13,15,21
today 35:11,19	200:15 212:16	162:17	217:14,20,21
51:20 58:21 79:12	trade 167:23	troop 26:22	219:7,12,17
83:20 93:10 95:7	transcend 65:8	trophies 60:15	221:10 222:2
98:4,18 103:9	transcends	66:17	224:13 228:8
110:22 115:24	120:22	true 71:22 81:10	trustee's 5:8,10
135:23 136:17	transcribed 19:25	121:14 149:24	5:16,20 13:1
140:12 142:10	transcript 172:19	153:14 200:5,5	14:20 15:2,12
149:9 155:3,4	173:5,21 211:10	211:1 229:6	169:16 172:4
156:25 157:10	229:6	truly 112:24	176:5 179:9,11,18
158:16 163:18	transfer 41:3 47:4	148:12,13 212:25	202:22 203:9
166:4 175:15	transform 115:14	223:18	204:18 214:3
176:24 178:15	transpired 35:4	trust 13:12 16:13	219:10 222:25
182:6 221:23	treasury 39:19	16:19 17:13 18:7	trustees 3:13 6:2
225:14	treat 125:23	19:4 48:24 170:25	6:6 13:3,17 14:1,3
today's 226:16	131:22 201:8	trustee 3:16 5:13	15:9 92:1 227:18
told 34:4 63:11	treated 38:5	5:23 11:4 13:6,21	trustee's 29:9,12
101:4 104:21	treatise 185:11	14:7,25 15:7,16	51:19 58:25 80:6
108:12 121:13	treatment 50:8	20:15 21:2 40:2	81:1 101:14 106:6
135:5,21 158:4	59:4 66:10 71:25	46:22,25 49:9	109:1 111:2
207:16	144:13,14,17	50:3 51:8,9,14	130:16 134:3,22
tonight 222:1	154:13,22 200:14	53:23 54:9,23	136:24
tooth 221:4	200:14	55:6,19 57:4,25	trusts 13:11 16:18
topco 13:12 16:19	treats 73:7	59:19 65:2 72:16	17:12 18:6 19:3
17:13 18:7 19:4	tremendous 74:11	76:1 78:18 79:18	94:1
topic 64:14 195:5	78:7 135:6	91:14 101:23,25	try 40:20 100:13
218:16 221:19	trenton 21:11	102:9,18 106:8,12	101:5 130:25
toronto 94:7	trial 85:22 94:3	117:13 121:7	147:23 149:21
total 102:12	126:3,10,18 162:7	129:12 130:8	189:23
125:13 152:15	182:9 196:15	139:1,3,21,24	trying 54:13
totally 45:10	199:16 210:23,24	140:6 142:18	75:13 77:23
100:14 105:16	trial's 211:8	143:6 145:1	112:15 118:3
111:8 125:12	tribal 97:11,12	148:14,24 149:6	134:21 135:8
126:16 131:12		149:14,18 150:1	140:22 150:9

156:14 178:18	217:18 224:11,24	221:10 222:2,25	undermine 126:1
225:23	225:23,23	224:13	126:12
tsier 26:23	twofold 44:16	u.s.c. 5:2 7:4,11 underneath 40:	
tuesday 55:19	type 38:23 81:21	8:2,10,15,19 9:4	understand 33:17
74:6 102:18	161:24 195:20	9:17 10:5,18	33:23 42:5,7 44:4
127:18	213:3 221:19	11:20 12:5,18	54:6,21 60:22
turn 30:1 55:14	224:6 225:7,10	45:17 92:21,25	62:8 63:15,19
79:11 144:15	types 38:19	170:6 179:24	65:8 77:23 78:6
147:23,25 164:23	114:12 161:3	180:24 182:8	84:17 86:23 90:16
203:1 204:13,21	173:18 183:12	187:24 200:3	90:17 108:4
207:8,9,10,12	188:5 194:17,18	227:21	123:24 130:13
turned 42:5	typical 78:10	ucc 30:13 84:12	133:24 156:5
205:23	tzerina 27:11	103:19,20,22	157:19 158:7,14
turning 51:23	u	208:8 213:17	161:6 163:9 170:9
74:12		214:2 216:10	170:15,18 173:3
turns 117:18	u.s. 1:23 20:15	ucc's 113:13	173:14 175:7,9
184:18	21:2 29:12 31:9 36:23 40:2 46:25	uday 27:14	176:13 178:13
twelfth 14:14 16:7		ultimate 76:18	200:9 217:1
17:2,22 18:15	50:3 51:8,14	106:8 121:21	220:25 222:17
19:13	52:21 54:9,22	186:8 193:17	understandable
twenty 178:24	55:6,18 57:4 80:6 81:1 87:3 91:14	ultimately 77:20	210:2
twice 95:3,12	91:25 92:18 97:11	93:15 95:22 158:8	understanding
110:8 186:23	101:14,23,25	166:5 173:4,9	160:23 215:16
two 36:15 37:1	101.14,23,23	183:4 201:19,22	223:23
43:14,15 44:2	102.18 100.0,8,12	211:3	understandings
46:21 52:2 58:22	117:13 121:7	un 122:12	67:20
59:3,11 62:9	122:8,11 129:12	unable 149:18,19	understands
65:19 69:2,20	130:8,16 134:2,22	unambiguously	135:6 137:1 171:1
73:13 74:6 75:13	136:24 140:6	170:11	understated
75:17 77:20 79:3	145:1 148:13	unavoidable	72:21
81:4 82:11 95:3	149:5,18 156:21	112:9	understood
113:4,20 119:17	161:2 169:2,7,16	uncertainty	145:19 153:20
119:18 122:2	169:22 172:4	152:16 204:16	154:23 158:9
123:5 125:9,13	173:11 179:8,11	unchallenged	163:3,14
127:3 138:25	179:18 187:17	117:21	underway 134:12
139:16 143:15	188:14 189:7	unconstitutional	underwood 11:7
152:6,18 159:6	190:3,11 196:14	148:11	18:2 22:21 92:10
169:17 172:1	197:17 198:20	uncontroverted	92:12,13 94:15
177:14 178:20	200:2 202:20,21	117:20	116:11 156:2
179:4 188:21	204:3,18 208:2	undergird 86:8	174:22 175:1,3
196:13 199:1	210:12,21 212:12	underlying 30:25	176:3,4,14,16,18
200:15 206:4	215:13,21 217:14	47:9 113:1 159:21	176:20,25 177:3,6
207:2 214:22	219:10,12,17	182:12	177:8,11,13,21
		ral Calutions	1

underwood's	unjust 99:6	6:13	vermont 83:19,21	
115:19	unknown 132:17	use 65:11 107:6	189:16 191:7	
unfair 98:21 99:5	152:15	113:1 116:14	versed 214:22	
167:23	unneeded 114:4	124:7 136:2	version 215:22	
unfortunate	unopposed 31:1	148:18 150:17	versus 58:9 71:15	
66:10	unprecedented	215:9	166:21 173:12	
unfortunately	35:17	ust 54:21 58:6	218:8	
161:19	unqualifiably	usually 120:24	victims 4:8,14 7:8	
unhappiness	123:15	191:17	7:14 10:2,8 12:2,8	
184:3	unquestionably	utility 78:10	24:2 30:14 49:23	
unheard 58:17	105:5 110:19	utterly 129:4	104:1,3 137:5	
uniform 196:1	112:12 135:17	uzzi 26:24	147:16 208:10	
uniformity 69:13	unreasonable		218:7 220:6 225:1	
uniformly 90:8	37:16 114:20	V	video 1:12	
unique 67:25	unrebutted	v 31:8 36:22 37:21	view 53:19 54:12	
united 1:1,11 3:13	117:20	58:14 59:13 87:3	59:16 63:2,20	
3:16 4:2,9 5:8,10	unrelated 45:10	89:18,19 90:23	77:19 119:14	
5:12,15,17,20,23	unresolved 123:9	96:23 103:21	136:7 145:5	
6:2,3,6 7:2,9 9:15	unsecured 4:16	108:8 110:10	155:24 166:20	
10:3 11:3,18 12:3	4:19,23 7:17,20	120:16,19 124:16	184:8 187:3 202:7	
13:1,2,6,17,21	10:11,14 12:11,14	131:14 161:16	viewed 186:10	
14:1,3,7,20,24	23:2 31:2 50:1	181:5 187:16	193:5	
15:2,7,9,11,16	140:20	191:5,18 192:23	views 77:18,24	
20:14 21:1 29:9	unsettled 76:20	193:7 201:3,11,15	101:24 103:8	
40:2,19 46:22	186:9	vague 91:7	109:20 128:4	
49:9 51:8,19	unstated 134:20	valerie 2:24 21:13	134:23 135:2	
53:23 57:24 58:24	unsupportable	43:6	137:6 171:21	
59:19 65:2 72:16	125:5	valid 127:25	vince 27:7 28:6	
75:25 78:18 79:18	unsupported	170:19	violate 118:18	
102:9 118:25	105:16,23 127:6	value 38:21 58:1	violated 149:8	
138:25 139:2,21	unsurprisingly	184:7	violates 148:25	
139:24 142:18	152:12	van 26:25	violating 58:12	
143:6,20,24	untruth 134:20	vargas 1:25	117:6 118:20	
148:24 149:13	unusual 107:9	varick 20:16	violation 156:2	
150:1 157:4	112:24 211:5	variety 70:22 72:2	157:15	
168:25 179:7	unwieldy 55:24	various 39:16	virtual 155:19	
180:11,13,15	update 213:14	45:24 203:4	virtually 93:5	
181:5 188:13,20	upheld 137:14	211:13	vis 96:3,3	
188:25 203:9	upholding 174:6	vary 81:11	visibility 212:22	
217:20,21 219:6	urge 140:13	vast 62:6 171:19	voice 178:25	
227:18 228:8	163:20	velez 27:1	volume 92:22	
universe 78:3	usc 3:15 4:3,10	verbs 107:21	voluminous	
	5:11,18,22 6:4,7	veritext 229:22	215:23	
	2.11,10,22 0.1,7			
Varitant Lagal Calutions				

[vonnegut - wilk] Page 62

181:24 199:6 206:19 207:23 wasted 142:24 weigh 77:18 wiles 61:2,11 63:1 210:3,17,19,22 218:21 220:19 way 54:2 55:7 weight 97:16,16 125:16,18 160:7 58:16 61:11 68:8 weight 97:16,16 125:16,18 160:7			00.14.112.5	
vote 68:1 220:6 146:18 157:24 136:1 139:18 welfare 168:12 voted 104:7 135:11 220:4 163:14 167:8 141:14 144:9 wellbeing 122:18 w 135:11 220:4 warsing 166:9 158:11 162:12 wells 27:4 28:8 w 28:4 181:5 wants 73:11 74:2 158:11 162:12 wells 27:4 28:8 watted 102:10 warting 42:1 129:19 143:7 154:10 165:17 170:12 221:3 225:1 went 66:25 93:23 waive 135:19 usive 135:19 wart 111:2 war 111:2 we've 169:1 122:19 125:19 waive 135:19 warrant 59:18 79:19 80:22 82:24 we've 169:1 205:23 217:23 we'd 127:19 132:9 we'll 43:2 73:7 75:10 107:23 132:10 we'll 43:2 73:7 75:10 107:23 132:10 we'll 43:2 73:7 75:10 107:23 132:10 we'll 43:2 73:7 75:10 107:23 121:2 127:21 we'll 48:2 13:9 91:3 13:9 197:13 197:13 197:13 1		i i		·
voted 104:7 135:11 220:4 163:14 167:8 141:14 144:9 welbeing 122:18 woting 137:17,18 135:10,24 145:6 150:22 wellseing 122:18 w 28:4 181:5 wanting 166:9 174:24 217:8 172:16 178:21 wendy 28:7 wend 28:11 10:21 21:11:18 122:19 122:19 28:11 122:19 28:11 123:19 136:13 136:14 136:15 136:14 136:17 136:13 136:18 136:18 136:18 136:18 136:18 136:18 136:18 136:18 136:18 136:18 136:18 136:18 136:18 136:18 136:18 136:				
135:11 220:4				
voting 137:17,18 218:10,24 wanting 166:9 158:11 162:12 wells 27:4 28:8 wendy 28:7 28:8 word 28:7 wendy 28:7 28:93:23 29:125 29:23 218:10,24 wendy 28:7 wendy 28:7 wendy 28:7 wend 66:25 93:23 100:21:11 wend 66:25 93:23 110:21 12:18 wend 28:7 wend 66:25 93:23 110:21 12:18 wend 66:25 93:23 110:21 12:18 wend 66:25 93:23 110:21 12:18 110:21 12:18 wend 66:25 93:23 110:21 12:18 110:21 12:18 110:21 12:18 wend 66:25 93:23 110:21 12:18 110:21 12:18 110:21 12:18 12:19:19 12:12 wend 66:25 93:23 110:21 12:18 12:19:19 12:12 wend 66:25 93:23 110:21 12:18 12:19:19 12:12 wend 14:21:19 wend 16:21 16:21 16:21 16:21 16:21 16:21 16:21 16:21 17:11 17:12 werin 16:23 16:23 17:13				
w 28:4 181:5 wait 51:2 59:23 59:23 79:17 137:3 wanted 102:10 wanted 102:10 wait 51:2 59:23 59:23 79:17 137:3 wanted 102:10 wait 2:1 129:5 202:3 219:6 125:11 160:11 120:19 wait 11:2 way 118:2 125:4 we've 169:1 120:19 120:19 war 111:2 war 111:2 wave 135:19 war 111:2 war 111:2 war 111:2 wave 135:14 war 111:2 war 111:2 we've 169:1 132:10 we'l 132:13:10 132:10 we'l 132:13:10 we'l 143:27:37 75:10 107:23 182:23 132:10 we'l 132:10 we'l 132:13:10 we'l 132:13:10 we'l 132:10 we'l 132:10 we'l 132:10 we'l 132:10 we'l 132:10 we'l 132:10 we'l 132:13:10 we'l 132:10 we'l 132:13 100:12 we'l 143:27:37 75:10 107:23 121:11 we're 15:12 we're 15:12 we're 15:12 we're 15:12 we're 15:13 110:12 we're 15:13 121:12 we're 169:1 we're 16:21:2 we're 15				
W 28:4 181:5 wait 51:2 59:23 59:23 79:17 137:3 waited 102:10 waiting 42:1 129:19 waive 135:19 135:16 154:19 waiver 135:16 136:11,15,21 154:22 157:11,21 want 34:10 56:8 67:11 70:2 73:4 74:17,20 78:18,21 79:5,16,17,20,25 81:4,6 83:2,15 86:17 92:6,21 93:6 98:5,10 100:22 101:20 105:11 110:16 114:15 126:23 127:14 135:21 136:9 137:2 138:12 139:6 143:16 145:12,22 151:5,11 156:23 165:24 166:1,11 166:13 167:18 168:15,25 176:1 181:24 199:6 washington's 8:8 8:16 18:15,25 176:1 181:24 199:6 washington's 8:8 8:16 200:19 207:23 218:21 220:19 way 54:2 55:7 \$8:16.61:11.68:8 ways 113:2 weigh 77:18 wilberg 28:7 weigh 97:16,16 weigh 97:25 9.7 125:19 125:19 125:19 125:19 110:21 121:18 122:19 125:19 170:25 186:25 122:19 125:19 170:25 186:25 170:25 186:24 170:25 186:24 170:25 186:24 170:25 186:24 170:25 186:24 180:31	voting 13/:17,18			
wait 51:2 59:23 wants 73:11 74:2 192:5 202:3 219:6 110:21 121:18 syited 102:10 waited 102:10 waited 102:10 waited 102:10 waited 102:10 110:21 121:18 122:19 125:19 waive 135:19 153:16 154:19 war 111:2 war 111:2 war 111:1 wein 13:1 war 111:1 wein 13:1 wein 13:1 wein 13:1 wein 23:1 wein 23:1 wein 23:1 wein 23:	W		· ·	
Wait 31:2 99:23 59:23 79:17 137:3 waited 102:10 waiting 42:1 129:19 waive 135:19 135:16 136:11,15,21 wardwell 20:3 30:6 34:24 warrant 59:8 79:19 80:22 82:24 warranted 56:7 170:2 73:4 74:17,20 78:18,21 79:5,16,17,20,25 81:4,6 83:2,15 86:17 92:6,21 93:6 98:5,10 100:22 101:20 105:11 110:16 114:15 126:23 122:19 125:19 170:25 186:23 weren't 126:12 we'd 127:19 132:9 132:10 we'll 43:2 73:7 75:10 107:23 121:2 127:21 we're 55:14 58:11 75:13 78:16 99:22 197:13 124:9 134:25 137:25 140:22 156:4,13 weaver 183:11 185:21,25 188:2,6 189:20 weber 108:12,15 181:5,19 195:4 199:12 warrants 90:18 166:5 washington 6:14 8:12,20 15:23 166:12 1:4 22:9 83:18,20 168:9 208:1 week 72:17 74:12 122:14 147:5 white 1:14 24:1 28:9,10 124:12 147:15 177:19 102:22 109:17 122:14 147:5 wide 87:14 widespread 184:2 125:19 170:25 186:23 weren't 126:12 we'd 127:19 132:9 132:10 we'll 43:2 73:7 75:10 107:23 121:2 127:21 we're 55:14 58:11 75:13 78:16 99:22 199:14 185:21,25 188:2,6 189:20 199:14 189:20 199:14 189:20 189:12 199:25 189:12 199:25 199:14 189:20 199:14 189:20 189:12 199:25 189:12 199:25 199:14 189:20 199:14 189:20 189:12 199:25 189:12 199:25 199:14 189:20 199:14 189:20 189:12 199:25 199:14 189:20 189:12 199:25 189:12 199:25 199:14 189:20 189:12 199:25 189:12 199:25 199:14 189:20 199:14 189:20 199:14 189:20 199:14 189:20 199:14 189:20 199:14 189:20 189:12 199:25 189:12 199:25 199:12 199:12 199:14 189:20 199:14 189:20 199:14 189:20 199:14 189:20 199:14 189:20 199:12 199:12 199:12 199:14 189:20 199:14 1	w 28:4 181:5			
143:7 154:10	wait 51:2 59:23			
waited waiting waiting 42:1 129:19 42:1 129:19 165:17 170:12 224:13 155:11 160:11 169:3 weren't 126:12 we'd 127:19 132:10 waiver 135:16 136:11,15,21 154:22 157:11,21 warrant 59:8 67:11 70:2 73:4 74:17,20 78:18,21 79:5,16,17,20,25 81:4,6 83:2,15 86:17 92:6,21 93:6 98:5,10 100:22 101:20 105:11 110:16 114:15 126:23 127:14 135:21 138:12 139:6 warranting 51:12 warranting 51:12 washington 6:14 8:12,20 15:23 16:1 21:4 22:9 83:18,20 168:9 127:14 135:21 136:9 137:2 138:12 139:6 washington 6:14 8:12,20 15:23 16:1 21:4 22:9 83:18,20 168:9 137:2 138:12 139:6 washington 6:14 washington 8:8 weeker 64:18 76:7 85:14 108:12 122:14 147:5 washington's 8:8 816 wash't 57:25 77:15 146:21 159:15 wash't 57:25 17:15 146:21 18:24 199:6 206:19 207:23 210:3,17,19,22 218:21 220:19 waste 201:20 wasted 142:24 wave 90:11 way 54:2 55:7 58:16 61:11 18:24 120:19 waste 201:20 wasted 142:24 wielphorg 28:7 weigh 77:18 weigh 97:16,16 66:17 69:23 113: weigh 97:16,16 66:17 109:75:9 waiver 135:19 warrants 99:18 166:5 155:11 160:11 160:13 167:18 washington 6:14 8:12,20 15:23 16:1 21:4 22:9 83:18,20 168:9 12:12 128:15 100:16 weeks 33:1 95:3 102:21 102	59:23 79:17 137:3			
waiting 42:1 129:19 waiting 42:1 129:19 war 111:2 wardwell 20:3 we've 169:1 we'd 127:19 132:10 waive 135:16 136:11,15,21 154:22 157:11,21 warrant 59:8 179:19 80:22 82:24 weaponization 117:11 we're 15:10 107:23 121:2 127:21 we're 75:10 107:23 121:2 127:21 we're 15:10 107:23 121:2 127:21 we're 15:10 107:23 121:2 127:21 we're 15:10 107:23 121:2 127:21 we're 55:14 58:11 15:21 we're 15:13 78:16 99:24 19:14 wearing 153:9 197:13 190:6 192:4 195:4 199:14 wearing 153:9 199:14 185:21,25 188:2,6 189:20 199:14 185:21,25 188:2,6 189:20 189:20 199:14 185:21,25 188:2,6 189:20 189:20 199:14 185:21,25 188:2,6 189:20 199:14 185:21,25 188:2,6 189:20 189:10 199:14 185:21,25 188:2,6 189:20 189:10 199:14 185:21,25 188:2,6 189:20	waited 102:10		•	
129:19 waive 135:19 153:16 154:19 wardwell 20:3 30:6 34:24 warrant 59:8 79:19 80:22 82:24 89:24 214:11 warranted 56:7 190:6 192:4 195:4 199:14 warrants 90:18 166:5 136:11 10:16 114:15 126:23 127:14 135:21 136:9 137:2 138:12 139:6 143:16 145:12,22 151:5,11 156:23 166:13 167:18 166:15 181:24 199:6 206:19 207:23 210:3,17,19,22 218:21 220:19 228:21 220:19 228:21 220:19 228:21 220:19 228:21 220:19 228:21 220:19 228:21 220:19 224:13 warrant 112:2 warrant 205:23 217:23 we've 169:1 205:23 217:23 we'll 43:27 3:7 75:10 107:23 121:2 127:21 we're 55:14 58:11 125:12 127:21 we're 55:14 58:12 127:21 127:21 we're 55:14 58:11 125:12 127:21 we're 55:14 58:12 127:21 ve're 55	waiting 42:1			
ward				
30:6 34:24 warrant 59:8 79:19 80:22 82:24 wear 148:4 wearing 153:9 197:13 197:13 197:13 197:13 197:13 197:14 199:14 199:14 199:14 199:14 199:14 199:14 199:14 199:14 199:14 199:14 199:14 199:14 199:14 199:15 166:5 181:5,19 195:4 198:12 199:25 19	waive 135:19			
waiver 135:16 30:6 34:24 weaponization 75:10 107:23 136:11,15,21 154:22 157:11,21 warrant 59:8 79:19 80:22 82:24 wear 148:4 we're 55:14 58:11 warrant 59:8 79:19 80:22 82:24 wear 148:4 we're 55:14 58:14 warrant 59:8 79:19 80:22 82:24 wear 148:4 we're 55:14 58:14 warrant 59:8 79:19 80:22 82:24 wear 148:4 we're 55:14 58:14 warrant 59:8 79:19 80:22 82:24 wearing 153:9 153:9 159:15 weaver 183:11 183:11 19:16 120:3 124:9 134:25 19:13 13:2 19:16 120:3 124:9 134:25 19:13 13:2 19:16 120:3 124:9 134:25 19:16 120:3 124:9 134:25 19:16 120:3 124:9 134:25 19:16 120:3 124:9 134:25 19:16 120:3 124:9 134:25 19:16 120:3 124:9 134:25 19:16 120:3 124:9 134:25 19:16 120:3 124:9 134:25 19:16 120:3 124:9 134:25 69:17,19,22 19:17 13 19	153:16 154:19			
79:19 80:22 82:24 89:24 214:11 warranted 56:7 197:13 199:14 199:6 192:4 195:4 199:14 185:21,25 188:2,6 189:20 189:20 189:20 189:20 189:20 189:20 189:20 189:21 199:14 185:21,25 188:2,6 189:20 189:20 189:20 189:20 189:20 189:20 189:21 199:25 181:5,19 195:4 199:14 185:21,25 188:2,6 189:20 189:21 199:25 198:12 199:25 198:12 199:25 198:12 199:25 198:12 199:25 198:12 199:25 198:12 199:25 198:12 199:25 189:10 10:16 181:24 199:6 189:20	waiver 135:16		_	
154:22 157:11,21	136:11,15,21			
want 34:10 56:8 67:11 70:2 73:4 89:24 214:11 warranted 56:7 190:6 192:4 195:4 197:13 119:16 120:3 124:9 134:25 119:16 120:3 124:9 134:25 124:9 134:25 137:25 140:22 137:25 140:22 137:25 140:22 156:4,13 we've 35:10 65:2 156:14 11 166:12 11:4 22:9 156:14 11 166:12 11:4 22:9 158:14 108:12 166:14 108:12 166:14 108:12 166:14 108:12 166:14 108:12 166:14 108:12 166:14 108:12 166:14 108:12 166:14 108:12 166:14 108:12 166:14 108:12 166:14 108:12 166:14 108:12 166:14 108:12 166:14 108:12 166:14 108:12 166:14 108:12 166:14 108:12				
67:11 70:2 73:4 74:17,20 78:18,21 79:5,16,17,20,25 81:4,6 83:2,15 86:17 92:6,21 93:6 98:5,10 100:22 101:20 105:11 110:16 114:15 126:23 127:14 135:21 136:9 137:2 138:12 139:6 143:16 145:12,22 151:5,11 156:23 165:24 166:1,11 166:13 167:18 168:15,25 176:1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		U	
74:17,20 78:18,21 190:6 192:4 195:4 weaver 183:11 124:9 134:25 79:5,16,17,20,25 81:4,6 83:2,15 warranting 51:12 warrants 90:18 185:21,25 188:2,6 137:25 140:22 93:6 98:5,10 100:22 101:20 weber 108:12,15 we've 35:10 65:2 105:11 110:16 114:15 126:23 16:1 21:4 22:9 weber 64:18 76:7 what's 55:4 63:11 136:9 137:2 138:12 139:6 143:16 145:12,22 83:18,20 168:9 128:6 130:1 weeker 72:17 74:12 63:11 90:19 166:13 167:18 wasn't 57:25 100:16 weeks 33:1 95:3 102:22 109:17 166:13 167:18 168:15,25 176:1 181:24 199:6 waste 201:20 weigh 77:18 217:12 181:24 199:6 waste 201:20 wasted 142:24 weigh 77:18 wiles 61:2,11 63:1 185:11 100:16 wiles 61:2,11 63:1 wiles 61:2,11 63:1 185:12 129:19 wasted 142:24 weigh 77:18 wiles 61:2,11 63:1				
79:5,16,17,20,25 81:4,6 83:2,15 86:17 92:6,21 93:6 98:5,10 100:22 101:20 105:11 110:16 114:15 126:23 127:14 135:21 136:9 137:2 138:12 139:6 143:16 145:12,22 151:5,11 156:23 165:24 166:1,11 166:13 167:18 168:15,25 176:1 181:24 199:6 206:19 207:23 210:3,17,19,22 218:21 220:19 199:14 warranting 51:12 warrants 90:18 166:5 wary 189:25 washington 6:14 8:12,20 15:23 16:1 21:4 22:9 83:18,20 168:9 208:1 washington's 8:8 8:16 wasn't 57:25 77:15 146:21 159:15 waste 201:20 wasted 142:24 wave 90:11 way 54:2 55:7 58:16 61:11 68:8 warranting 51:12 189:20 weber 108:12,15 181:5,19 195:4 198:12 199:25 weber 100:16 website 100:16 weeker 64:18 76:7 85:14 108:12 128:6 130:1 100:16 weeker 72:17 74:12 100:16 weekeks 33:1 95:3 102:8 108:19 147:15 177:19 217:12 widespread 184:2 wides 77:18 wiles 61:2,11 63:1 141:19 weight 97:16,16				
81:4,6 83:2,15 86:17 92:6,21 93:6 98:5,10 100:22 101:20 105:11 110:16 114:15 126:23 127:14 135:21 136:9 137:2 138:12 139:6 143:16 145:12,22 151:5,11 156:23 165:24 166:1,11 166:13 167:18 168:15,25 176:1 181:24 199:6 206:19 207:23 210:3,17,19,22 218:21 220:19 warrants 90:18 166:5 wary 189:25 washington 6:14 8:12,20 15:23 16:1 21:4 22:9 83:18,20 168:9 208:1 washington's 8:8 8:16 wasn't 57:25 77:15 146:21 159:15 waste 201:20 wasted 142:24 wave 90:11 way 54:2 55:7 58:16 61:11 68:8 we've 35:10 65:2 69:17,19,22 121:23 156:18 what's 55:4 63:11 63:11 90:19 102:22 109:17 122:14 147:5 white 1:14 24:1 28:9,10 124:12 143:15 weight 77:18 141:19 weight 97:16,16				
86:17 92:6,21 93:6 98:5,10 166:5 wary 189:25 washington 6:14 181:5,19 195:4 69:17,19,22 121:23 156:18 100:22 101:20 washington 6:14 8:12,20 15:23 weber 64:18 76:7 whatsoever 74:9 14:15 126:23 16:1 21:4 22:9 83:18,20 168:9 85:14 108:12 63:11 90:19 136:9 137:2 138:12 139:6 washington's 8:8 8:16 week 72:17 74:12 102:22 109:17 151:5,11 156:23 wasn't 57:25 77:15 146:21 102:8 108:19 147:15 177:19 166:13 167:18 168:15,25 176:1 159:15 waste 201:20 wasted 142:24 weigh 77:18 wides 71:16,16 181:24 199:6 wasted 142:24 wave 90:11 weigh 77:18 wiles 61:2,11 63:1 181:19 weigh 77:18 125:16,18 160:7 181:21 220:19 197:5 9				·
93:6 98:5,10 100:22 101:20 105:11 110:16 114:15 126:23 127:14 135:21 136:9 137:2 138:12 139:6 143:16 145:12,22 151:5,11 156:23 165:24 166:1,11 166:13 167:18 168:15,25 176:1 181:24 199:6 206:19 207:23 210:3,17,19,22 218:21 220:19 166:5 wary 189:25 washington 6:14 8:12,20 15:23 16:1 21:4 22:9 83:18,20 168:9 208:1 washington's 8:8 8:16 weeker 64:18 76:7 85:14 108:12 128:6 130:1 week 72:17 74:12 100:16 weeks 33:1 95:3 102:8 108:19 143:15 wehner 3:21 6:18 9:10 11:13 widespread 184:2 wides 77:18 141:19 weight 97:16,16 121:23 156:18 what's 55:4 63:11 63:11 90:19 102:22 109:17 122:14 147:5 white 1:14 24:1 28:9,10 124:12 147:15 177:19 217:12 wide 87:14 widespread 184:2 wides 61:2,11 63:1 141:19 weight 97:16,16 125:16,18 160:7			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
100:22 101:20 wary 189:25 198:12 199:25 105:11 110:16 8:12,20 15:23 website 100:16 whatsoever 74:9 114:15 126:23 16:1 21:4 22:9 85:14 108:12 what's 55:4 63:11 136:9 137:2 138:12 139:6 83:18,20 168:9 128:6 130:1 102:22 109:17 138:12 139:6 washington's 8:8 8:16 week 72:17 74:12 102:22 109:17 155:24 166:1,11 wasn't 57:25 77:15 146:21 102:8 108:19 147:15 177:19 166:13 167:18 159:15 wehner 3:21 6:18 wide 87:14 181:24 199:6 waste 201:20 wasted 142:24 weigh 77:18 widespread 184:2 206:19 207:23 wave 90:11 way 54:2 55:7 weight 97:16,16 wiles 61:2,11 63:1 125:16,18 160:7			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
105:11 110:16 114:15 126:23 washington 6:14 weeber 64:18 76:7 what's 55:4 63:11 127:14 135:21 136:9 137:2 138:12 139:6 143:16 145:12,22 128:6 130:1 102:22 109:17 138:12 139:6 washington's 8:8 100:16 week 72:17 74:12 102:21 109:17 143:16 145:12,22 washington's 8:8 8:16 week 72:17 74:12 102:22 109:17 151:5,11 156:23 wasn't 57:25 100:16 weeks 33:1 95:3 28:9,10 124:12 166:13 167:18 168:15,25 176:1 159:15 wehner 3:21 6:18 147:15 177:19 181:24 199:6 waste 201:20 wasted 142:24 weigh 77:18 wides 72:17 6:18 181:24 199:6 wasted 142:24 weigh 77:18 66:17 69:23 113:4 210:3,17,19,22 way 54:2 55:7 weight 97:16,16 125:16,18 160:7 218:21 220:19 way 54:2 55:7 weight 97:16,16 125:16,18 160:7	-			
114:15 126:23 8:12,20 15:23 weeber 64:18 76:7 what's 55:4 63:11 127:14 135:21 136:9 137:2 83:18,20 168:9 128:6 130:1 102:22 109:17 138:12 139:6 washington's 8:8 100:16 week 72:17 74:12 122:14 147:5 143:16 145:12,22 8:16 wasn't 57:25 100:16 white 1:14 24:1 165:24 166:1,11 166:13 167:18 168:15,25 176:1 159:15 wehner 3:21 6:18 217:12 181:24 199:6 waste 201:20 wasted 142:24 weigh 77:18 wides 87:14 206:19 207:23 wave 90:11 weigh 77:18 141:19 66:17 69:23 113:4 218:21 220:19 58:16 61:11 68:8 weight 97:16,16 125:16,18 160:7				
127:14 135:21 136:9 137:2 138:12 139:6 143:16 145:12,22 151:5,11 156:23 165:24 166:1,11 166:13 167:18 168:15,25 176:1 181:24 199:6 206:19 207:23 210:3,17,19,22 218:21 220:19 16:1 21:4 22:9 83:18,20 168:9 208:1 week 72:17 74:12 122:14 147:5 weeks 33:1 95:3 100:16 weeks 33:1 95:3 102:8 108:19 143:15 weeks 33:1 95:3 102:8 108:19 147:15 177:19 217:12 wide 87:14 widespread 184:2 wides 61:2,11 63:1 weight 77:18 141:19 weight 97:16,16 weight 97:16,16 weight 97:16,16 125:16,18 160:7				
136:9 137:2 138:12 139:6 143:16 145:12,22 151:5,11 156:23 165:24 166:1,11 166:13 167:18 168:15,25 176:1 181:24 199:6 206:19 207:23 210:3,17,19,22 218:21 220:19 83:18,20 168:9 208:1 washington's 8:8 8:16 washington's 8:8 100:16 weeks 33:1 95:3 102:8 108:19 147:15 177:19 217:12 wide 87:14 widespread 184:2 widespread 184:2 widespread 184:2 wiles 61:2,11 63:1 125:16,18 160:7 127:5 9				
138:12 139:6 208:1 week 72:17 74:12 122:14 147:5 143:16 145:12,22 8:16 weeks 33:1 95:3 28:9,10 124:12 151:5,11 156:23 wasn't 57:25 102:8 108:19 147:15 177:19 166:13 167:18 159:15 wehner 3:21 6:18 217:12 181:24 199:6 waste 201:20 weigh 77:18 wides 87:14 206:19 207:23 wave 90:11 wides 61:2,11 63:1 218:21 220:19 218:21 220:19 weigh 77:16,16 125:16,18 160:7		·		
143:16 145:12,22 washington's 8:8 100:16 white 1:14 24:1 151:5,11 156:23 wasn't 57:25 102:8 108:19 147:15 177:19 166:13 167:18 168:15,25 176:1 159:15 wehner 3:21 6:18 217:12 181:24 199:6 waste 201:20 weigh 77:18 wides 87:14 206:19 207:23 wave 90:11 weigh 77:18 wiles 61:2,11 63:1 218:21 220:19 58:16 61:11 68:8 weight 97:16,16 125:16,18 160:7				
151:5,11 156:23 165:24 166:1,11 166:13 167:18 168:15,25 176:1 181:24 199:6 206:19 207:23 210:3,17,19,22 218:21 220:19 8:16 wasn't 57:25 77:15 146:21 159:15 waste 201:20 wasted 142:24 wave 90:11 way 54:2 55:7 58:16 61:11 68:8 weeks 33:1 95:3 102:8 108:19 147:15 177:19 217:12 wide 87:14 widespread 184:2 wiles 61:2,11 63:1 66:17 69:23 113:4 125:16,18 160:7		_		
165:24 166:1,11 166:13 167:18 77:15 146:21 143:15 168:15,25 176:1 181:24 199:6 waste 201:20 weigh 77:18 206:19 207:23 wasted 142:24 weigh 77:18 wides 87:14 210:3,17,19,22 way 54:2 55:7 weigh 97:16,16 66:17 69:23 113:4 218:21 220:19 58:16 61:11 68:8 weight 97:16,16 125:16,18 160:7				28:9,10 124:12
166:13 167:18 77:15 146:21 143:15 217:12 168:15,25 176:1 181:24 199:6 waste 201:20 9:10 11:13 wide 87:14 206:19 207:23 wasted 142:24 weigh 77:18 wiles 61:2,11 63:1 210:3,17,19,22 way 54:2 55:7 weight 97:16,16 125:16,18 160:7 58:16 61:11 68:8 weigherg 28:7 197:5 9	· ·			147:15 177:19
168:15,25 176:1 181:24 199:6 206:19 207:23 210:3,17,19,22 218:21 220:19 159:15 waste 201:20 wasted 142:24 wave 90:11 way 54:2 55:7 58:16 61:11 68:8 wehner 3:21 6:18 9:10 11:13 weigh 77:18 141:19 weight 97:16,16 125:16,18 160:7 197:5 9	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	77:15 146:21	143:15	217:12
181:24 199:6 waste 201:20 9:10 11:13 widespread 184:2 206:19 207:23 wasted 142:24 weigh 77:18 wiles 61:2,11 63:1 210:3,17,19,22 way 54:2 55:7 weigh 97:16,16 125:16,18 160:7 58:16 61:11 68:8 weigh 97:16,16 125:16,18 160:7		159:15	wehner 3:21 6:18	
206:19 207:23 210:3,17,19,22 218:21 220:19	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	waste 201:20	9:10 11:13	widespread 184:2
210:3,17,19,22 218:21 220:19		wasted 142:24	0	wiles 61:2,11 63:1
218:21 220:19 way 54:2 55:/ weight 9/:16,16 125:16,18 160:/		wave 90:11	141:19	66:17 69:23 113:4
58.16.61.11.68.8 weinherg $28.7 197.5.9$		way 54:2 55:7	weight 97:16,16	125:16,18 160:7
221:7 222:18 36.10 01:11 06.6 weinberg 26.7		58:16 61:11 68:8	weinberg 28:7	197:5,9
221.7 222.18 224:12 225:8,19 68:8 75:8,17 weiss 27:3 wilk 83:10		68:8 75:8,17	weiss 27:3	wilk 83:10
225:19 82:23 84:16 89:21	1	82:23 84:16 89:21		
	223.17			

[williford - à] Page 63

williford 28:11	working 48:17	years 52:2 77:10
	130:10 225:22	109:22 118:22
willing 155:21 217:24 218:1		214:22
	works 150:23,23	
winnowing	189:20	yesterday 49:21
170:18	world 105:19	143:19 211:2,23
wisely 76:19	112:18 114:10	213:14
186:8	worlds 130:9,17	yesterday's 111:2
wish 76:17 115:4	130:19,19	yield 164:11
186:6	worried 79:12	york 1:2 20:6,17
wishes 44:23	160:14	22:11 23:6,15,22
withdrawal 34:14	worse 120:1	24:4 207:2
withdrawing	157:18	you'd 68:18
200:12	wouldn't 60:2	you'll 61:11
withdrawn 58:22	154:14	you're 41:5,10,12
witness 208:21	write 33:3,20	48:15 54:13 63:11
209:2,4 210:7	109:15	64:15 67:15 68:15
215:11 218:12	writing 33:5	68:16 73:7,12,12
witnesses 203:24	146:21 222:8	90:16,20 129:25
203:25 204:11,12	written 89:18	150:8,9 155:1
209:7,13,19,22	211:11	you've 108:11
210:3 211:12,16	wrong 54:10	121:15 137:5
211:20	65:22 101:3,11	141:3 142:3
wl 108:8 115:8,12	117:5,5 119:7,9	Z
120:15 128:20	121:17,24 125:16	z 26:20 114:23
190:2 199:9	132:20 134:21	zabel 27:5
woke 34:4	136:12 201:15	zeevi 27:6
wolff 22:8	217:25 219:13	zero 114:25,25
wonder 74:1,23	wrongly 57:16	115:1,1 171:8
won't 105:13	116:15	172:14 177:15
127:21 140:10	wrote 56:18 58:21	zewdie 108:7
word 42:21 64:12	X	zoom 175:20
110:1 150:6 171:7	x 1:4,10 114:23	à
171:8 180:13,14	155:3,4,4 227:1	
180:14 198:24	228:1	à 96:3
words 113:1,6		-
125:8 129:7	y	
143:18 144:6	y 114:23 155:4	
149:12 151:18	yeah 133:2 175:22	
work 64:20 74:10	206:9,24 207:4,20	
99:4 167:1 200:6	213:24 217:11	
212:13 214:1	222:4 225:21	
216:20 222:3	year 33:12 60:22	
223:19	63:9 152:14	
	188:21	